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Abstract of Thesis
This thesis is an exploratory study which attempts to shed light on the rhetoric, 
ideology and practice concerning the role of the Cyprus Attorney General’s Office in 
prosecutions, and aims to enhance understanding of its functions. It is mainly based 
on empirical data gathered during a five-month period in the Office, involving 
observation, semi-structured interviews with Law Officers and examination of 
criminal files. The findings are supplemented by an examination of the internal 
circulars, press releases and documents of the four Attorney Generals who have 
served since the establishment of the Cyprus Republic; and by interviews carried out 
with three of those four office-holders.
The Constitution, while recognising the right to private prosecutions, entrusts the 
Attorney General with the overall responsibility for all prosecutions and with broad 
powers in the execution of his functions. However, the statutory legislation has not 
determined the exact parameters of his broad role and has afforded great latitude to 
the post-holder in the specification and use of his powers.
The findings of this research indicate that the Attorney General serves as the head of 
the prosecution system and exercises control over all prosecutions in the jurisdiction, 
although he is closely dealing with only the most serious cases, and those regarded as 
exceptional, complex, or in need of particular attention. Although his Office does not 
have an immediate investigatory role, its broad powers regarding investigations 
provide an obstacle to the absolute control of the investigative stage by the police. The 
Attorney General determines and formulates the prosecution policy of his Office, and 
also the overall prosecution policy in the jurisdiction. Furthermore, he provides a 
central and relatively tight control of all diversionary decisions. One of the most 
crucial functions that the Law Office appears to perform is that it serves as a forum o f  
appeal where all prosecutorial actions (or inaction) by other prosecuting agencies can 
be reviewed: the public require the Law Office’s intervention in cases that do not 
usually belong to its workload, when they judge that they are not being handled 
properly by the police; they ask for its intervention when investigations are not carried 
out properly; and they apply for a review or overturn of police prosecutorial decisions.
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Chapter One: Introduction
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
‘(T)he constitutional powers o f  the Attorney General...are due to the need 
for control, oversight and organisation o f  the prosecution system by an 
independent...public prosecutor w ho w ill ensure the objective and fair 
functioning o f  the criminal justice system and w ill protect the public 
interest.’ (Loucaides 1974:44)
This thesis is an exploratory study which attempts to shed light on the rhetoric, the
ideology and the practice concerning the role of the Cyprus Attorney General’s Office 
in prosecutions and aims to enhance understanding of its functions. More specifically, 
it has three main objectives:
Firstly, to give a comprehensive account of the legal framework regarding the role of 
the Attorney General’s Office (AG’s Office) in prosecutions and to explore the 
rhetoric that has been developed over time in this area, as well as to reveal some 
contradictions and varying interpretations within this rhetoric. It is widely accepted 
that the ‘law in the books’ or the official rhetoric about a certain area does not utterly 
correspond to the ‘law in action’, but since the former ‘constrains, enables, and 
channels’ (Johnson 2002:13) the actual reality -  even if this is done through the 
context of many other factors -  it still merits careful scrutiny. Given the very broad 
legal provisions and the great discretion that is afforded to the Attorney General to 
specify his powers, it is also essential to examine historically how the successive 
office-holders themselves have interpreted their role.
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Secondly, to uncover the ideology that characterises the Law Officers’1 approach to 
their role. As Lacey (1994:7) advocates, a full picture about criminal justice agencies 
cannot be gained merely by learning their legal status: ‘To get a real sense of how 
their discretionary powers are exercised, we also need to know a great deal about the 
cultural context in which these agents are operating, and about how they themselves 
see their task.’ It is, therefore, important to gain an appreciation of the Law Officers’ 
own understanding and attitudes towards their functions which, presumably, also 
infuse and influence their practices.
Thirdly, to explore the practices developed in the Law Office when discharging its 
prosecutorial functions. This will provide a first insight into the actual day-to-day 
activity of the Office regarding prosecutions.2
In all countries there is a state agency entrusted with the power and the responsibility 
for all, or a significant part, of criminal prosecutions; especially with the crucial 
decision as to whether criminal cases should be forwarded to the courts or not. 
Naturally, the prosecuting authorities’ specific structures, additional functions and 
powers differ from country to country for they are rooted in the history and the legal 
culture of the jurisdictions in which they are found. Nevertheless, the pivotal position 
that public prosecution services occupy in the criminal justice system is equally 
emphasised and appraised in every jurisdiction.
In Cyprus, the Constitution, although preserving the right to private prosecution, 
entrusts the Attorney General with a central role and wide powers as far as 
prosecutions are concerned. The Attorney General’s Office, introduced in Cyprus for 
the first time during British rule, was retained by the Constitution after Cyprus gained 
independence (1960) and was granted an independent rather than a political status. In 
addition to functioning as the Legal Service of the Government, the AG’s Office is
1 ‘Law Office’ is another name for the Attorney General’s Office, and ‘Law Officers’ is the term used 
for the Counsel working at the Law Office.
2 For the term ‘practice’, the definition given by Lacey (1994:31) is preferred: ‘a relatively structured 
field o f action o f agents or groups o f agents, which can only be understood in terms o f the assumptions, 
values, goals, and interpretive frames which inform the agents’ actions and infuse the surrounding 
context in which those actions take place.’
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also vested with the ultimate responsibility for, and control of, all prosecutions, and its 
role in this area appears far broader and more multifarious than that of its counterpart 
in England and Wales has ever been.
This research seeks to explore the role of the Attorney General’s Office in 
prosecutions. The history of prosecutions in Cyprus after 1960 is characterised by the 
affirmation on any given opportunity of the supremacy of the Attorney General over 
the rest of the actors involved in prosecutions. However, this has never been 
combined with a detailed and thorough appraisal of the AG’s exact role in the process. 
Over the years, a number of important elements crucial to an understanding of the 
Law Office’s constitutional position, its workload and the functions that it is called 
upon to fulfil have been left out of discussions on the prosecutorial role of the Office.
This dearth of knowledge about the Law Office is not only confined to information 
about its workings in practice, but it firstly applies to matters of theory and rhetoric 
concerning its role within the prosecution system. This is partly attributable to the fact 
that legal provisions in this area have remained limited and vague, allowing the 
holders of the Office wide discretion. The way that this discretion has been interpreted 
by successive Attorney Generals also remains unexplored, as do the practices that 
have been developed concerning the role of the Law Office in prosecutions. The Law 
Office has managed to retain a certain mystique as far as the execution of its functions 
is concerned. Consequently, very little is known about the role that the AG is 
supposed to, is expected to and actually does play in the prosecution system.
This thesis is based on empirical data gathered during a five-month fieldwork period 
at the AG’s Office which involved observation, semi-structured interviews with Law 
Officers and examination of criminal files. The findings are supplemented by the 
results of an examination of the internal circulars, press releases and documents of the 
four Attorney Generals who have served since the establishment of the Cyprus 
Republic; and by interviews carried out with three of those four office-holders. The 
findings of this research are set out and discussed in the following chapters.
Before proceeding to the situation in Cyprus, in Chapter Two a comparative 
description of prosecution services in a number of other jurisdictions -  including
20
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some of those traditionally associated with the common law tradition, as well as some 
associated with the continental one -  will be attempted. The distinct choices and paths 
that different legal systems have followed will be explored. Emphasis will be given to 
the organisation of prosecution authorities and their constitutional position especially 
in relation to the other agencies involved in prosecutions, their role in investigations, 
and the way different prosecution systems approach the issues of prosecutorial 
discretion, diversion from prosecution and the formulation of prosecution criteria and 
policies.
Chapter Three will detail my research strategy and explain the specific 
methodological choices I have made. The lack of any prior scientific knowledge or 
research has dictated the choice of an exploratory study, instead of a theory-testing 
strategy, and a flexible methodology. This will be explained in the first part of the 
chapter, followed by an explanation of the necessity of two broad research strategies. 
In the second part, the first research strategy (fieldwork in the AG’s Office) will be 
developed, starting from the description of the process of negotiating access to the 
AG’s Office and followed by an account of the three different techniques of data 
collection (observation, documentary survey and semi-structured interviews). In the 
third part, the second research strategy, including a documentary analysis of internal 
circulars, press releases, memoranda, etc, issued by the successive AGs, as well as 
interviews with the AGs themselves, will be presented, followed by the development 
of an argument about the reliability and validity of the research and the approach to 
data analysis (fourth part).
The next chapter, Chapter Four, will serve as an introduction to Cyprus law and its 
prosecution system. It will commence with a brief historical background of the legal 
system in Cyprus, followed by an outline of the criminal justice process and an 
explanation of the Cyprus pre-trial procedure. This is useful in gaining an 
understanding of the origins and the general characteristics of Cyprus law and 
criminal process that, arguably, partly explain some of the choices adopted regarding 
prosecutions. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a study of the evolution and the 
legal framework of the prosecution system. This is essential in order to understand the 
inter-relationships of the various agencies that maintain an involvement in 
prosecutions and the extensive powers and key role of the AG’s Office.
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Chapters Four, Five and Six will present the results of my empirical study on the role 
of the AG’s Office in prosecutions and the way in which the AG’s broad and vague 
powers are interpreted and translated in practice. In Chapter Five, the workload o f  
the AG's Office, and the various functions which it is called to fulfil regarding 
different categories of cases, will be explored. In the light of his overall control of 
prosecutions, and also the coexisting power of the police (as well as other agencies) to 
institute prosecutions, it is interesting to examine which cases the AG is expected to 
and actually does closely deal with and which others are left to the police to manage. 
In Chapter Six the role that the AG plays during investigations will be examined. In 
accordance with the wide powers that are delegated to him generally as far as 
prosecutions are concerned, the AG in Cyprus, in contrast to his common law 
background, is also entrusted with an important role in investigations. In Chapter 
Seven his role in the formulation o f prosecution policies will be described and an 
examination of the policies/criteria developed in the Law Office will be provided. 
Each of these three chapters will be divided into three main themes which reflect the 
objectives of my thesis: (i) the rhetoric that has been developed over time concerning 
these areas, combined with the manner in which successive AGs have approached 
their role; (ii) the ideology developed in the Law Office and, in particular, the 
approach of the Law Officers towards these particular functions; and (iii) the nature of 
the practices observed in the Law Office.
In Chapter Eight all the findings of my research will be drawn together and further 
discussed so that the role of the Attorney General’s Office in prosecutions can be 
elucidated and more profoundly understood. Implications for further research and 
reform proposals will also be considered.
‘I f  w e are to make sense o f  this chaotic picture, w e will have to look  
beyond official criminal justice rhetoric to the reality o f  criminal justice  
practice -  whilst also recognising the sense in which the rhetoric is a part 
o f  the reality.’ (Lacey 1994:33)
22
Chapter Two: Comparative Analysis o f  Prosecution Systems
CHAPTER TWO
Comparative Analysis of Prosecution Systems
‘Traditionally, European legal system s are described to include at least 
tw o cultures: (a) two cultures regarding the organisation o f  the criminal 
procedure (adversarial and inquisitorial system s), (b) tw o cultures 
regarding the requirements for deciding whether or not to engage 
prosecution (principle o f  legality and principle o f  opportunity), (c) two  
cultures regarding the role o f  the authorities entrusted with investigating 
and prosecuting alleged offenders. In reality, w e can no longer establish 
such clear-cut distinctions. All our countries are taking from each other 
what they find suits better their own needs.’ (Schwim m er 2000:8) 
(Emphasis added)
Before focusing on my own research into the role of the Cyprus Attorney General’s
Office in prosecutions, in this chapter, a comparative description of prosecution 
systems in a number of other jurisdictions will be attempted, bearing in mind that ‘it is 
impossible to understand prosecution in one country or culture without seeing how it 
differs from prosecution elsewhere’ (Johnson 2002:89).
In the first section, the origins, constitutional position and organisation of prosecution 
services in three common law countries (England and Wales, Ireland and Northern 
Ireland), a mixed jurisdiction (Scotland), as well as a number of inquisitorial 
jurisdictions (mainly France, Germany and the Netherlands) will be described. The 
second section will deal with the role of the prosecuting authorities in investigations 
and the third one with the way different prosecution systems approach the issues of 
prosecutorial discretion, diversion from prosecution and the formulation of
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prosecution criteria and policies. This comparative analysis will not be constrained to 
a theoretical description of the systems; wherever empirical studies are available they 
will be cited, so that an insight into matters of practice, as well as principle, can be 
achieved. However, it has to be noted that, regrettably, empirical research studies in 
inquisitorial jurisdictions are significantly limited in comparison to the ones available 
in common law jurisdictions.'
This review is necessarily selective, as it is impossible for a single chapter to cover all 
the issues related to prosecutorial arrangements in a number of countries. The main 
focus will be on the aforementioned areas, for three reasons: firstly, these concern 
characteristics that distinguish one jurisdiction from another (usually deriving from 
the common law tradition or the civil law one) and, therefore, illuminate both the 
different choices adopted by various legal systems and also their implications; 
secondly, they have represented controversial topics of discussion among academics 
and practitioners, and at times have been included in the agenda of various 
Commissions vested with the duty to examine reforms in various jurisdictions; and 
finally, and most importantly, these very issues emerge from my own research as 
crucial areas for the understanding of the role of the Cyprus Attorney General’s Office 
in prosecutions.
I. ORIGINS, CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION AND ORGANISATION OF 
PROSECUTION SERVICES
‘In the history o f  criminal law the institution o f  a prosecuting authority is 
a relatively new feature. It first appeared in the wake o f  the French 
revolution after which it, gradually, took up its position as a central 
institution in the legal systems o f  continental Europe. It is only in the past 
few  decades that it has becom e established as a feature o f  com m on law  
system s.’ (Jehle 2000:27)
If we consider the development of the prosecution arrangements in various countries, 
it is evident that many jurisdictions have always been grappling with the question of
1 This is a common acknowledgment: see e.g. Field and West (2003:262) and Hodgson (2001:2-5).
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the position of the prosecution service within the state structure and its relationship 
with the police. There is a long tradition in civil law systems of public prosecutors 
taking responsibility for prosecutions in the public interest, which pre-dates the 
creation of police forces. In the common law tradition, by contrast, as Stenning 
(1986:17) describes, ‘the system of criminal prosecutions...relied heavily upon the 
initiative of private individuals, rather than being exclusively controlled by public 
authorities.’ In most common law countries the notion of a separate prosecution 
agency emerged after police forces had already been established, and is not so 
embedded within the common law culture. During the course of the last century, 
however, independent prosecution services established themselves and took 
responsibility for prosecutions.
England and Wales
The history of the prosecutorial arrangements in England and Wales2 charts a 
progression from a clearly private activity to a half-hearted introduction of a public 
prosecution service in the mid 1980s, and then, after a series of piecemeal reforms, to 
the more recent changes (Criminal Justice Act 2003) that may potentially alter the 
whole philosophy of public prosecutions in this country.
Until the nineteenth century, in England and Wales, there was no public official 
responsible for ensuring that crimes were prosecuted. Emphasis was placed upon the 
concept of individual responsibility in the administration of criminal justice and, thus, 
the responsibility for prosecuting the perpetrators of crimes lay predominantly with, 
and at the discretion of, private individuals. As Sanders (1996:xii) remarks, ‘(v)ictims 
who wished to prosecute did so by bringing an action which, in legal form, was 
similar to a civil action.’3 Since the early part of the nineteenth century, as the police 
developed and their powers increased, they progressively replaced the old system of 
law enforcement. As a result of evolution rather than of any deliberate decision, the
2 See Langbein (1973), Hay (1983) and Hetherington (1989) for a comprehensive account o f the origins 
and the history o f public prosecutions in common law.
3 Langbein (1973:318) refers to the inherent fallacies o f such a system: ‘The obvious drawback to any 
system o f gratuitous citizen prosecution is that it is unreliable. There will be cases where there are no 
aggrieved citizens who survive to prosecute, and others where the aggrieved citizens will decline to 
prosecute, or be inept at it.’
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police had become convenient substitutes for private prosecutors. However, no 
specific prosecution powers or responsibilities were conferred on the police and 
private prosecutions remained the model on which police prosecutions were based.4 
Sanders (2004:100) points out that ‘(i)n the absence of specific laws to regulate their 
prosecutions, the police evolved their own systems. They prosecuted most of their 
own cases in the Magistrates’ Courts... and for Crown Court cases... they instructed 
solicitors who then instructed barristers.’ Eventually, many police forces set up their 
own in-house departments of prosecuting solicitors or employed local firms of 
solicitors to act on their behalf.
Thus, throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (until 1986), the police 
controlled the vast majority of prosecutions, with the exception of a small minority of 
the most complex and serious cases which were prosecuted by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP). The Office of the DPP was established in 1879 and was 
characterised as a ‘compromise between those who wanted to retain England’s 
unsystematic approach to prosecution and those who wanted prosecutions in general 
to be structured and controlled as was believed to happen in most of Europe’ (Sanders 
1996:xii).5 Previously, as a result of voices against the prosecution function of the 
police, there had been unsuccessful attempts to introduce a system of public 
prosecutions (with the Bills of 1872 and 1873). With the Prosecution of Offences Act 
1879, the government avoided a radical change to the existing system and indeed gave 
retrospective legitimacy to the previous arrangements.6
During the 1980s, complaints and opposition to the system of police prosecutions 
increased. In 1970 the Committee of JUSTICE,7 as a result of their inquiry into the 
problems relating to contemporary prosecution practices, published a report in which 
they highlighted the danger to public perception and the quality of justice when the 
same police officer decides on whether to charge a suspect, selects the charge, acts as 
prosecutor, and also takes the stand as his or her own chief witness. This report, as
4 This legal form o f police prosecutions with all its accompaniments survived the mid-1980s changes to 
the system. See Sanders (1996) and Bennion (1986:3-4).
5 Sanders refers to Hay’s (1983) analysis.
6 See Edwards (1964).
7 The British Section o f the International Commission o f Jurists.
26
Chapter Two: Comparative Analysis o f  Prosecution Systems
well as a report by Sir Henry Fisher in 1977 after the Confait Case8 and growing 
public concern, led to the appointment of a Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure 
under the chairmanship of Sir Cyril Philips. They reported in 1981, recommending the 
establishment of a separate service responsible for the prosecution of all offences,9 
taking into account the following main considerations:
‘(a) concerns that combining the role o f  investigation and prosecution invests 
too much power and responsibility in one organisation; (b) the desirability, from  
a public confidence perspective and in order to secure a balanced criminal 
justice system , o f  separating the investigative and prosecutorial functions; (c) 
inconsistencies in prosecution policy across the country and concerns that too  
many cases were being prosecuted on the basis o f  insufficient evidence; and (d) 
a desire for greater accountability and openness and common standards on the 
part o f  prosecutors’ (Criminal Justice Review Group 2000:69-70).
The government, acting on the recommendation of the Commission, enacted the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, which created the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS). The CPS became operational on 1 October 1986. It was a national service 
headed by the DPP and formally accountable to the Attorney General. It was 
organised into areas and branches, each branch serving the police area to which it 
corresponded.10 Each area was headed by a Chief Crown Prosecutor who was 
responsible to the DPP for supervising the operation of the service in his area."
8 R v. Leighton, Lattimore and Salih (1975) 62 Crim. App. R. 53.
9 But with considerably fewer powers than their Scottish counterpart, contrary to some o f  the 
suggestions heard in the Commission.
10 The CPS was originally organised into 31 areas, which in most cases were built on existing 
prosecuting solicitors’ departments for each police force. In 1993 it was reorganised into 13 regions 
with strong control from the London headquarters but this was criticised by the Glidewell Report 
(Glidewell 1998) as a mistake which led to over-centralisation. In 1999 42 separate CPS areas were 
created, coextensive with the police areas, to facilitate the suggestion in the report that more decisions 
be taken locally rather than centrally. For a further discussion, see Ashworth (2000).
" Prosecution o f Offences Act 1985, s. 1 (1) (b) (as initially enacted).
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The new service had a duty to take over the conduct of all criminal prosecutions12 
instituted by the police and advise the police forces on matters relating to criminal 
offences. It was also empowered to discontinue prosecutions or drop and amend 
specific charges when they disagreed with initial police decisions. The CPS was not 
given any role concerning prosecutions brought by a series of other organisations, 
such as the Serious Fraud Office, the Health and Safety Executive, the Environment 
Agency, etc. Neither was it given any powers to institute proceedings itself, nor a role 
regarding the investigative stage of a case, contrary to some suggestions heard for the 
adoption of a public prosecution system similar to the Scottish one.
Even since its creation, the CPS has been the subject of considerable adverse publicity 
and criticism. As Belloni and Hodgson (2000:106) report, the CPS was criticised ‘for 
the very weaknesses which it was set up to remedy: a lack of objectivity and legal 
scrutiny in the decision to prosecute; inconsistency in the decision to prosecute and in 
the choice of offence; and an inability or disinclination to weed out even obviously 
weak cases at an early stage in the process.’ Fionda (1995) reports that the CPS, in the 
early days of its creation, experienced criticism from various groups from all branches 
of the criminal justice process, such as the Association of Chief Police Officers, the 
General Council of the Bar and the Magistrates’ Association. ‘The staff shortages, the 
incompetence of CPS staff and outside agents contracted to conduct prosecutions, 
poor administration and the civil service mentality of the service’ (Fionda 1995:19) 
were some of the criticisms leveled at the CPS which were partly adopted by the 
Commons House Affairs Committee in 198913 and the Audit Commission14 in the 
same year.
A series of research studies revealed deficiencies in the CPS performance but at the 
same time commented on inherent structural problems of the system that could not be 
easily overcome, and also pointed at the conflicting expectations that the service was 
called to fulfil. Ashworth (2000:274) pointed out: ‘(o)n the one hand there has been 
criticism of the CPS for discontinuing too many cases; on the other hand there has
12 With the exception o f  the prosecutions concerning some minor offences.
13 House o f Commons, Crown Prosecution Service, Fourth Report o f  the Home Affairs Committee, 
H.M.S.O. (London 1989).
14 National Audit Office (1989).
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been criticism that too many Crown Court cases end in acquittal, suggesting that the 
CPS is not fulfilling its function of weeding out weak cases.’
Research studies (e.g. Crisp and Moxon 1994), as well as the CPS’s own surveys,15 
found that discontinuance rates have been rising in the years since the introduction of 
the CPS.16 This could have been seen as a positive trend and as an indication that the 
CPS was actively screening cases but some commentators (e.g. Rose 1996) were 
critical that too many cases were dropped on efficiency grounds.17 Closely related to 
these criticisms were accusations that too many cases used to be downgraded by the 
CPS, either by amending the charges preferred by the police or by accepting a plea of 
guilty to a lesser offence.18
Nevertheless, a decline in the number of convictions for indictable offences, as well as 
a rise in the number of non-jury acquittals, was observed since the introduction of the 
CPS, which suggested that prosecutors allowed too many weak cases to be forwarded 
to courts. A study by Block et al. in 1993 involved an examination of 100 case files in 
which there had been a non-jury acquittal and tried to identify the proportion of cases 
where this acquittal could have been foreseen. They found that in 55 per cent of them, 
evidential deficiencies were sufficient to make acquittal either clearly foreseeable (27 
per cent) or possibly foreseeable (28 per cent) and in 15 per cent of the cases the 
evidential weakness was apparent before the committal. A similar study by Baldwin 
(1997) found that 80 per cent of non-jury acquittals were foreseeable. Prosecutors 
failed to discontinue weak cases due to lack of experience or self-confidence and 
tended simply to endorse the initial police decision. Although in some cases it was 
very obvious that the chances of acquittal were very high, Baldwin reports that it
15 See Crown Prosecution Service’s Annual Reports and Discontinuance Surveys (1993, 1994).
16 However, in 2003-04 the proportion of cases discontinued decreased to 13.8 per cent, from 16.2 per 
cent in 2001-02. Ashworth and Redmayne (2005:193-196) argue that this is probably due to the 
changes brought by the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which transferred the authority to charge from the 
Police to the CPS.
17 The Glidewell Report (1998) also expressed concern on this issue.
18 See Ashworth (2000) commenting on the significant structural pressures exercised on the CPS to be 
flexible in adopting various forms o f charge reduction and referring to research by Cretney and Davis 
(1995) and Hoyle (1998) confirming this practice.
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appeared easier for the prosecutors ‘to pass the buck to the courts’ (1997:542) than to 
discontinue. As Ashworth (2000) points out, the most worrying finding of Baldwin’s 
research was that some prosecutors shared a common value system with the police. 
Baldwin reports that ‘some prosecutors remain stubbornly of the view that the 
defendant may do the decent thing and plead guilty’ (1997:548) even in apparently 
weak cases -  a view that reflects a classic police attitude -  and they also believed that 
serious cases ought to be prosecuted ‘almost irrespective of considerations as to the 
evidential strength’ (Baldwin 1997:551).19 Ashworth (2000:277) concludes that ‘(t)his 
shows that the CPS has not been successful in inculcating an independent ethical 
approach, based on the model of the “Minister of Justice”, in the minds and conduct 
of certain Crown Prosecutors.’
Furthermore, research by McConville et al. (1991) found that prosecutors, constrained 
by police-generated information, most of the time, used to endorse the initial police 
view of a case. Cases were constructed by the police presenting evidence in a way 
which pointed to the disposal that they preferred. That research confirmed previous 
arguments by Sanders (1986c) that the CPS could not be independent of the police, 
partly because they relied on the police for information; the police had the power to 
construct cases for prosecutions and made weak cases appear strong.20 Moreover, 
McConville et al. pointed out that prosecutors also lacked the incentive to weed out 
weak cases as, in an adversarial system, the goal of the CPS was to assist the police in 
achieving a maximum conviction rate; a half-hearted attempt to graft an inquisitorial 
element on to an adversarial system was destined to fail.
Many academics argued that the failure of the CPS to live up to their promises was 
inevitable precisely because deeper changes in the system were not introduced: ‘In a 
system where the prosecutor becomes involved in a case at a stage when the odds are 
already stacked in favour of prosecution, the objective and independent review o f files
19 See a similar finding o f the research by Hoyano et al. (1997). They found that in some cases 
prosecutors felt under pressure to continue a prosecution in serious cases even when the case was weak, 
especially where a decision not to prosecute might have resulted in public or press criticism.
20 This is more problematic due to the prosecutors’ practice when reviewing the cases to rely mostly on 
police summaries, which proved to be very selective and sometimes misleading (Baldwin and Bedward 
1991).
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which is expected of them is a difficult duty to carry out.’ (Fionda 1995:59). 
Prosecution practices were not altered dramatically because the structural relationship 
between the CPS and the police remained problematic and ill defined.21 The police 
retained their power to charge and make the initial decision of instituting a 
prosecution and the CPS was given only a reactive role, namely to review a police 
decision to prosecute based only on evidence collected by the police themselves. 
Sanders (2004:105) argues that the fact that the CPS had been characterised as a 
police-dependent body was ‘not just a matter of, in many instances, over­
identification with police goals and ideology, but also a structural problem: that, while 
the police made the initial decisions, the CPS were not decision makers, but decision- 
reversers.’
Over the years, there has been a series of attempts to clarify the relationship between 
the CPS and the police, and efforts made to establish closer cooperation between the 
two services during the stage prior to charge.22 With the Criminal Justice Act 2003, 
however, more radical changes have been introduced which ‘mark a significant 
reorientation of the English prosecution system’ (Ashworth and Redmayne 2005:173). 
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 implements many of the changes suggested by Lord 
Justice Auld (2001) in order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
criminal justice system in England and Wales. As far as prosecutions were concerned, 
Auld (2001) concluded that one contributor to the high level of discontinuances was 
the ‘overcharging’ by the police and the failure of the CPS to remedy it at an early 
stage. He identified one of the causes of this to be the fact that it was the police who 
initiated prosecutions, leaving the CPS to review the charge at a later stage and, in 
doing so, to apply a more stringent test than that of the police. To resolve these 
problems, Auld suggested that the CPS should become involved earlier in the process 
and be given the power to determine the charge and initiate the prosecution.
21 See inter alia Ashworth (2000), Belloni and Hodgson (2000), Leng et al. (1996), Fionda (1995, 
Chapter 2).
22 See the next section for a review o f the gradual changes implemented as a result o f  recommendations 
of various commissions.
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Therefore, with the Criminal Justice Act 2003 the responsibility for charging suspects 
and, thus, initiating criminal proceedings in all but very minor offences is transferred 
from the police to the CPS. The new legislation provides for new, extensive powers 
allocated to the CPS and the DPP23 to enable them to discharge their new functions. It 
also emphasises and facilitates the early consultations between the police investigators 
and ‘duty prosecutors’ before a charge is preferred.24 Since the provisions of the CJA 
2003 involve considerable resource and organisational implications, the new system 
will come into being gradually. It remains to be seen whether in practice it will 
achieve its objectives.25 Ashworth and Redmayne (2005:178) argue that ‘the success of 
the new arrangements will inevitably turn on the commitment of the police and the 
CPS to implement the full spirit of the new division of responsibilities.’26
Ireland
Prosecutorial arrangements in Ireland are heavily shaped by their common law 
origins. Their development has evolved in an ad hoc manner rather than in a planned 
fashion since the last century and, as a result, currently, ‘the prosecutorial process in 
Ireland is governed by a mixture of common law and statute law which subjects it to a 
relatively loose form of regulation’ (Walsh 2004:283). Furthermore, most of the key 
relationships between the various agencies involved in prosecution ‘are regulated by 
custom, convention, informal liaison and a limited body of case law rather than 
statutory framework’ (Osborne 1997:23).
23 E.g. the power o f the DPP to issue guidance to custody officers as to how detained persons should be 
dealt with and as to what the police ought to do to facilitate the decisions on charge by prosecutors. The 
first edition of the DPP’s guidance was issued in May 2004 and the second one in January 2005.
24 For a detailed analysis o f the new legislation, see Brownlee (2004).
25 As stated in Brownlee (2004:897), the new system’s objectives were: ‘the elimination at the earliest 
opportunity o f hopeless cases, the production o f more robust prosecution cases, the elimination o f  
unnecessary or unwarranted delays...and the reduction o f the number o f trials that “crack” through the 
... acceptance o f guilty pleas to reduced charges at a late stage in the process.’
26 In advance o f the passing o f the CJA 2003, a pilot statutory charging scheme had operated in five 
CPS areas to test Auld’s proposals. This scheme resulted in what was seen as a high level o f  success. 
The CPS reported that the benefits included a significant improvement in discontinuance rates and a 
reduction in the number o f charges being dropped or changed (PA Consulting Group 2003).
32
Chapter Two: Comparative Analysis o f  Prosecution Systems
As in England and Wales, before the organisation of police forces, criminal 
prosecutions were brought by private individuals, mostly by the victims of a crime. 
However, while this model of implementation of the criminal law may have sufficed 
for England and Wales for a longer period of time, ‘in Ireland it began to reveal its 
deficiencies in the second half of the eighteenth century, as the consequences of a 
community polarised on religious and political grounds began to emerge.’ (Osborne 
1997:9). Bell (1989) reports that even the device of offering rewards to induce private 
prosecution failed and there was a growing concern over widespread abuses of the 
system. The same writer points out that, earlier than in other common law 
jurisdictions, ‘(i)n Ireland...a deliberate policy was adopted to introduce a 
professional system of law enforcement, the main reason being that its impartial 
administration could not be otherwise guaranteed’ (Bell 1989:9).
Police prosecutions in Ireland can be traced to the establishment of an Irish 
constabulary in 1836, replacing the county constabularies. It has to be noted, though, 
that although police officers quickly dominated the petty courts, they were not given a 
specific statutory responsibility for prosecutions and they prosecuted individual cases 
in their common law capacity as private citizens. Besides police prosecutions, as early 
as in 1801, Crown Solicitors responsible to the Attorney General were appointed for 
every circuit in the country. Initially, they were responsible for forwarding to the 
Attorney General information about cases which were listed for the next Assizes and 
which might be proper for prosecution by the Crown. As Osborne (1997) reports, 
during the years 1821-25, the categories of cases which were prosecuted by the 
Crown were broadened from its previously narrowly-constructed criteria to include 
almost every serious felony and, thus, the role of the Crown Solicitors was 
significantly expanded. Again, these arrangements were not provided by a statute but 
they were based on the common law and existed side by side with the right of private 
prosecution.
With the Criminal Justice Act 1924 the Office of the Attorney General was placed on 
a statutory basis and was entrusted with a monopoly over prosecutions on indictment. 
However, the law did not interfere with the common law right of private individuals 
and police officers to conduct prosecutions in summary cases. While legislation 
governing the national police force (Garda Siochana) was introduced in 1924 and
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1925, it did not provide for the issue of prosecutions and the role of the police in 
relation to the Attorney General’s (and later the DPP’s) role in prosecutions. The next 
major statutory intervention was in 1974,27 when most of the Attorney General’s 
prosecutorial functions were transferred to the Office of the DPP, again without 
attempting to regulate the conduct of prosecutions.
As a result of the retention of the basic historical structures regarding prosecutions, 
even today, no single service has the overall control of prosecutions in Ireland and 
‘there is frequently no clear demarcation of function between the various agencies 
operating in this sphere.’ (Osborne 1997:23). A number of agencies have concurrent 
responsibility for aspects of criminal prosecutions in Ireland. These include the Garda 
Siochana, the Office of the DPP, Local State Solicitors and, until recently, the Office 
of the Chief State Solicitor (CSS).
The Garda Siochana have assumed the role of public prosecutor in the lowest courts. 
As an organisation, they are responsible to the Minister for Justice and are totally 
independent of the DPP, the Attorney General and all other agencies. The decision to 
prosecute is most commonly exercised by the Garda Siochana alone, although, with 
increasing frequency, the police are referring some cases to the DPP prior to charge. 
Such referrals, however, remain a small minority of the total number of offences 
prosecuted, although they appear to account for a large proportion of the more serious 
offences. All offences which are to be prosecuted on indictment must be referred to 
the DPP, while some others are referred in any event as a matter* of practice. 
Unfortunately, there has been no empirical research into this issue. Nevertheless, 
Bryett and Osborne (2000:33-34), when conducting a comparative analysis of various 
prosecution systems, pointed out: ‘We have been unable to determine the precise 
criteria applied by the Garda Siochana in deciding within their discretion whether to 
refer a matter to the DPP, although it seems to approximate to the category of 
indictable offences, a category which is much wider than the category of offences 
which are prosecuted on indictment’. Garda prosecutions in the District Courts are 
generally conducted by members of the force, the investigating officer or a
27 Prosecution o f Offences Act (1974).
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prosecuting inspector or superintendent, while more complex summary cases are sent 
to the State Solicitors.
As mentioned above, the Office of the DPP was established by the Prosecution of 
Offences Act 1974, which conferred on the Director ‘all functions capable of being 
performed in relation to criminal matters’ by the Attorney General immediately before 
the passing of the Act. While he is a civil servant in the service of the State and is 
appointed by the Government, the DPP is required by statute and by constitutional 
convention to be independent in the performance of his duties. The Office of the DPP 
is located in Dublin and has no regional representation. Until recently, it used to have 
very few professional staff and the bulk of professional legal work in criminal 
prosecutions was handled by the Office of the Chief State Solicitor (CSS) or Local 
State Solicitors. The Director deals, in theory, with all indictable offences and those 
which are complex and sensitive. He has no right to undertake summary proceedings 
apart from those instituted in his name. He has no direct contact with the police and 
receives files from them via the State Solicitors. Thus the CSS fulfils the role of 
intermediary between the investigating Garda and the DPP in those files which are 
referred to the Director’s Office. Furthermore, the CSS operates as the ‘solicitor’ for 
the DPP in trials in the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court, the Special Criminal Court and 
the Central Criminal Court. Nevertheless, until 2001, the CSS was responsible to the 
Attorney General instead of the DPP and this was heavily criticised as leading to 
‘abnormal consequences’. The 1999 Report of the Public Prosecution System Study 
Group (Nally Report 1999) recommended that the staff of the CSS who perform 
functions on behalf of the DPP should be transferred to the staff of the DPP, and that 
the line of responsibility of Local State Solicitors should be altered to lead to the DPP 
and not to the Attorney General. In 2001, the first part of the Nally recommendations 
was implemented and the second part is currently in the process of being introduced.28
Summarizing, it can be said that in Ireland: (a) the decision to charge in virtually 
every case is made by the investigating Garda; (b) the vast majority of summary 
offences are prosecuted by the Garda Siochana; (c) summary offences of complexity 
are prosecuted by a State Solicitor on behalf of the Garda Shiochana; (d) summary
28 See the Annual Report (2004) o f the DPP’s Office.
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offences of sensitivity are passed from the police to the DPP via the State Solicitors 
and are prosecuted by a State Solicitor; (e) indictable offences are passed to the DPP’s 
Office, and when they are to be tried summarily, such offences are prosecuted by the 
State Solicitors, whereas when they are to be tried on indictment such offences are 
prosecuted by an independent counsel briefed by a State Solicitor on behalf of the 
DPP; and (f) the DPP does not have the right to undertake the conduct of prosecutions 
instituted by private individuals or the police (Osbome 1997:41).
These complex and inconsistent prosecutorial arrangements have been the subject of 
considerable criticism,29 and have been scrutinised by the Public Prosecution System 
Study Group mentioned above (working under the auspices of the Office of the 
Attorney General and chaired by Mr Nally, former Secretary to the Government). 
Included, amongst other things, in the Group’s terms of reference was the question of 
‘whether there is a continuing role for the Garda to prosecute as well as to investigate 
crime’. The report by Nally’s Group concluded that, while there was scope for 
improvement in co-ordination and effectiveness, the existing system should not be 
replaced with a unified prosecution service. The Group reached this conclusion 
largely on grounds of financial considerations and general confidence in the current 
arrangements expressed during the course of its consultations.
Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland shared a joint legal heritage with Ireland until the establishment of 
the Irish Free State in 1922 and, therefore, the historical development of criminal 
prosecutions until that time was common to these two jurisdictions. However, the 
introduction of the Prosecution of Offences Order (1972) and most importantly the 
recent introduction of the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act (2002) resulted in the 
adoption of a modem public prosecution system in Northern Ireland considerably 
different from its Irish counterpart.
Even after 1922, and until 1972, the structure of criminal prosecutions in Northern 
Ireland bore considerable resemblance to the system as it presently exists in Ireland 
and as described above. In a report of the Working Party on Public Prosecutions in
29 See Osbome (1997) and Bryett and Osbome (2000).
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1971 a summary of the system, as it existed at that time, was given which confirmed 
the similar prosecutorial arrangements in force.30 During the years 1969 to 1971, 
these arrangements received the attention of two government-appointed groups. The 
Hunt Committee, reporting in 1969,31 was critical of the practice of the police in 
undertaking the majority of prosecutions. They expressed a concern that the 
impartiality of the police might be questioned if they were responsible for deciding 
who shall be prosecuted and thereafter acting in court as prosecutors. A concern was 
also expressed about the impression given of an over-close relationship between the 
police and the courts. The Hunt Report concluded that consideration should be given 
to the establishment of an independent prosecution service along the lines of the 
Scottish procurators fiscal. The MacDermott Committee, constituted to study this 
recommendation and give their advice, found ‘that it would be quite impractical to 
graft the Scottish system onto our system of criminal jurisprudence.’32 However, they 
did reach the conclusion that, as a matter of general principle, prosecutions should be 
conducted by public prosecutors, independent of the investigating process and of 
political influence. They recommended the establishment jof a Department of Public 
Prosecutions staffed with full-time lawyers who would be responsible for 
prosecutions brought in all courts, other than minor summary cases.
In 1972 the Prosecution of Offences Order was introduced which established the 
Department of the Director of Public Prosecutions, adopting some of the suggestions 
of the MacDermott Committee. The Order, without precluding the right to private 
prosecution, gave primacy to the DPP, who had statutory power to control all
prosecutions in the jurisdiction.33 Article 5(1 )(c) of the Order provided that ‘the DPP
30 The Working Party on Public Prosecutions reported that: (a) the prosecution o f 98 per cent o f cases 
heard at a Magistrates’ Court were carried out by police officers; (b) police officers handled 93 per cent 
of the cases in which the court committed an accused to a higher court o f trial; (c) the remaining cases 
(mainly serious and particularly difficult cases, cases that have a political background and cases that 
involve a member o f the Royal Ulster Constabulary) were dealt with by either a Crown Solicitor or a 
Crown Counsel; and (d) the ultimate responsibility for prosecutions rested with the Attorney General 
and in cases o f a serious nature the relevant files had been referred to him for his directions and advice 
(Report o f the Working Party on Public Prosecutions 1971).
31 Report o f the Advisory Committee on Police in Northern Ireland (1969).
32 Report o f the Working Party o f Public Prosecutions (1971: Para.6).
33And, thus, the right to take over prosecutions being conducted by any other individual or agency.
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shall, where he thinks proper, initiate and undertake on behalf of the Crown 
proceedings for indictable offences and for any summary offence or class of summary 
offence that he considers should be dealt with by him.’ Therefore, it was for the DPP 
to determine which type of case his Department would take on. In addition to 
indictable only offences, those requiring to be referred to the DPP had been selected 
for a variety of reasons including: seriousness; complexity both of substantive law and 
of evidential issues; political, racial or sectarian sensitivity; the fact that the accused is 
a police officer, etc.34
Article 6(3) placed a duty on the Chief Constable to inform the Director about 
indictable offences and any other offences specified by the Director as well as to 
respond to a request from the Director for information on ‘any matter which may 
appear to the Director to require investigation on the ground that it may involve an 
offence against the law of Northern Ireland’. In practice, Article 6(3) was formally 
invoked on the rare occasions when the facts of an alleged crime were reported 
directly to the DPP but it also -  together with Article 5(1 )(b) -  underpinned the 
routine requests for further information or enquiries frequently made of the police by 
the Director when considering whether to prosecute.35 The Review of the Criminal 
Justice System in Northern Ireland (Criminal Justice Review Group, Northern Ireland 
2000) reported that the DPP used to seek further information from the police before 
coming to a decision on whether to prosecute in about thirty per cent of cases. They 
commented that ‘(w)hile this relatively proactive approach may add to the time taken 
to process cases at the earlier stages, it is the DPP’s view that it improves the quality 
of decision making and is less likely to result in problems, such as discontinuance, at 
later stages.’
34 See Bell (1989) and Osbome (1997).
35 It should be noted that the DPP had no formal involvement in the conduct o f police investigations, 
prior to charge or summons, or between the charge and the submission to him o f the police 
investigation file. It was, however, open to the police to seek the advice o f the DPP’s staff in the course 
o f their investigations, especially where it was apparent that complex issues o f law or evidence were 
likely to be involved. The Director had also provided the police with detailed instructions on what 
should be included in an investigation file (Criminal Justice Review Group, Northern Ireland 2000).
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On the basis of the above-mentioned statutory provisions (especially the mandatory 
reporting requirements), it was said that the Director was in a position to effectively 
discharge his supervisory role over all prosecutions apart from the particularly minor 
(Bell 1989). However, it was also remarked that his functions were principally 
regulatory rather than participatory since the DPP’s office prosecuted in only a 
minority of cases -  the cases in the Crown Court and the most serious cases in the 
Magistrates’ Courts -  while the police were still conducting the large majority of 
prosecutions.36
As a result of the Belfast Agreement in 1998, which provided for a ‘wide ranging 
review of criminal justice’ in Northern Ireland, a Criminal Justice Review Group was 
established. Their terms of reference inter alia included the review of ‘the 
arrangements for the organisation and supervision of the prosecution process, and for 
safeguarding its independence’ (Criminal Justice Review Group, Northern Ireland 
2000:2).
The Criminal Justice Review Group (2000:83) ‘in line with international trends’ and 
‘founded largely on the desire to separate the prosecutorial function from the 
organisation responsible for carrying out investigations’ recommended that:
‘in all criminal cases, currently prosecuted by the DPP and the police, 
responsibility for determining whether to prosecute and for undertaking 
prosecutions should be vested in a single independent prosecuting authority.
Thus the police would no longer have a role in prosecuting less serious cases 
before the magistrates’ courts.’ (Criminal Justice R eview  Group, Northern 
Ireland 2000:83-84)
As a result of these recommendations, the Justice (Northern Ireland) Act 2002 was 
enacted which established a Public Prosecution Service (PPS). Whilst the PPS came 
into effect as a statutory body in June 2005, the new PPS structures are not yet fully in
36 In the Review o f  the Criminal Justice System in Northern Ireland (2000) it is reported that in 1997 
there were 1,128 prosecutions carried out by the DPP in the Crown Court, 7,262 by the DPP in 
magistrates’ courts and 27,209 by the RUC in the Magistrates’ Courts. Overall, 76 per cent o f cases 
were prosecuted by the police, including 79 per cent o f  those in the Magistrates’ Courts.
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place throughout Northern Ireland. The full implementation of the new Service is 
planned to be accomplished by December 2006.37 The Prosecution Service is headed 
by the Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland who is appointed by the 
Attorney General for Northern Ireland. The new Service is regionally-based. There 
will be four regions in total, each coterminous with one or more court divisions. Each 
region will be headed by a Regional Prosecutor who will have overall responsibility 
for decision making on investigation files and for the conduct of prosecutions in that 
region, with the exception of certain files which will be dealt with centrally.
According to the law and the code published by the Service, the PPS are empowered 
to take prosecution decisions in all cases, offer prosecutorial and pre-charge advice to 
police, review all charges prior to their submission to court38 and conduct prosecutions 
in the Magistrates’, Youth and County Courts. Therefore, subject to the full 
implementation of the PPS, the Director is to assume responsibility for all criminal 
cases previously prosecuted by the Department of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP) and the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and will be entrusted with 
particularly wide powers in the execution of his duties.
Scotland
The Scottish prosecution system has long been considered as a possible model to be 
adopted by various English and Irish committees when discussing the reform of their 
prosecution systems. Fionda (1995:65) remarks that ‘(t)he Scottish criminal justice 
system has enjoyed the advantages of a public prosecution system, with independent 
prosecutors working in the public interest, for a good deal longer than England and 
Wales.’ The Scottish prosecution system has many characteristics which resemble
37 The full range o f services is currently available in the Belfast Region and five police districts in 
Fermanagh and Tyrone only. Prosecutors in other areas continue to handle those prosecutions 
previously submitted to the DPP.
38 Prosecutors retain the right (previously possessed by the DPP) to request further investigation into 
any particular matter where it is considered that additional information is required in order to take a 
fully-informed prosecution decision. In addition, the Prosecution Service may require the Police 
Service o f Northern Ireland to investigate any matter that comes to its attention where it believes that a 
criminal offence may have been committed.
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those of its counterparts in continental jurisdictions and, therefore, it has been 
characterised as a quasi-inquisitorial prosecution system.
The Office of the Procurator Fiscal emerged during the late sixteenth to eighteenth 
centuries, when it took over the investigative and prosecutorial functions of the 
medieval sheriff who was left primarily with a judicial function. The police forces, on 
the other hand, came into being during the nineteenth century, being formed in a 
‘piecemeal and largely unstructured way’ (Gordon 1980:21). The Fiscal in Scotland, 
therefore, pre-dates the police and has developed as an integral part of the Scottish 
system and culture over the centuries.39
The Lord Advocate, assisted in his functions by the Solicitor General, is the 
Government Minister responsible for the prosecution of crime in Scotland. Although a 
member of the Scottish Executive, as the head of the prosecution system, he is said by 
convention to be independent in making decisions concerning prosecution. Under the 
authority of the Lord Advocate, the Crown Office and the Procurator Fiscal Service 
provide the sole public prosecution service in Scotland. Officers known as Procurators 
Fiscal undertake prosecutions in the Sheriff or District Courts. These officers are 
based at six regional and 49 district locations throughout the jurisdiction. They have a 
commission to prosecute from the Lord Advocate. In addition, there are a number of 
Advocates Depute (collectively known as ‘Crown Counsel’) who are practising 
members of the Bar and hold a commission to prosecute in the High Court, where the 
most serious cases are heard. The Crown Agent, who is the permanent civil service 
head of the fiscal service working from the Crown Office in Edinburgh, has 
responsibility for the management of the prosecution service but the Lord Advocate is 
politically accountable for acts and decisions taken by the prosecution service. 
Directions and guidance on policy and practice are issued to prosecutors on his 
authority and with his approval.
In Scotland all criminal prosecutions are conducted by a single service (the Fiscal 
Service). As Duff (1999:117) reports, ‘(i)n Scotland, a few statutory offences may be
39 See Moody and Tombs (1982, Chapter 2) for an historical account o f the development o f the Office 
o f Procurator Fiscal.
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prosecuted by a public body...but, in practice, such proceedings are normally 
undertaken by the public prosecutor.’ Furthermore, the right of private prosecutions 
was abolished for summary cases with the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1995 and 
in solemn cases such proceedings require the concurrence of the Lord Advocate or the 
High Court.
The police and other reporting agencies send reports of crimes to the Procurator 
Fiscal. The Procurator Fiscal then decides whether to begin criminal proceedings and, 
if he decides positively, he determines the forum and the procedure (summary or 
solemn) as well as the charges to be brought; otherwise, he decides whether to take 
alternative action or no action at all.40 Depending on the nature of the offence, the 
decision to prosecute may be made by a more senior officer on behalf of the Lord 
Advocate, instead of the Procurator Fiscal. Thus, the decision to prosecute is not one 
for the police. In the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 it is specified that, when an offence is 
committed, the role of the police is confined To take all such lawful measures, and 
make such reports to the appropriate prosecutor, as may be necessary for the purpose 
of bringing the offender with all due speed to justice.’
What has been characterised as the most significant aspect of the Scottish system of 
Public Prosecutors is the hierarchical position of the Procurator Fiscal in relation to 
the police and his complete independence (Duff 1999). This hierarchical position of 
the Procurators Fiscals is also connected with their supervisory role over the 
investigation of crimes.41 Fionda (1995:66) points out that ‘since the office of fiscal 
was created early in the nineteenth century before permanent police forces were set 
up, the police remain in law subordinate to the prosecutor in the investigation of 
crime, a position now embedded in statute...(s. 17 Police (Scotland) Act 1967).’
However, although in theory Procurator Fiscals’ decisions are entirely independent, in 
practice they are heavily and often exclusively based on information collected by the
40 See section II o f this chapter.
41 For further analysis, see section II.
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police. Research by Moody and Tombs (1981) concluded that the role of the police in 
the supply of information to fiscals was crucial.42
Nevertheless, Fionda (1995:93) during her research observed a very good relationship 
between police officers and Procurator Fiscals: ‘There are close links between senior 
fiscals and Chief Constables who have regular meetings to discuss policy. Hostilities 
rarely arise, and the tensions that exist in England and Wales are not present in 
Scotland.’ Therefore, the same writer concludes, this good cooperation between the 
two services surely contributes to the dissemination of the information needed to 
make well-informed decisions.
Inquisitorial Jurisdictions
There is a long tradition in civil law systems, which pre-dates the creation of police 
forces, of public prosecutors taking responsibility for prosecutions in the public 
interest. Although the inquisitorial process originated in an inquiry by a judge, 
specialised officials acting on behalf of the court later became charged with building 
the case against the defendant, long before police forces came into existence. In this 
section some of the broad characteristics of jurisdictions belonging to the continental 
tradition regarding the origins, constitutional position and organisation of their 
prosecution services will be examined, without concentrating exclusively on any 
specific country. More details about the specific characteristics (especially the role of 
the prosecutors regarding investigation and the legality principle which originally 
characterised their decision-making) that differentiate these systems from the 
traditional common law philosophy of prosecution systems will be analysed later on, 
in sections II and III.
First, it has to be said that it would be wrong to assume that there is only one model of 
prosecution service in the civil law family of countries. Leigh and Hall Williams, after 
conducting their research on the prosecution systems of Denmark, Sweden and the 
Netherlands, concluded that ‘(i)t became clear that Continental institutions differ 
markedly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction... There is no single Continental approach to
42 See also research by Stedward and Millar (1989), Duff and Burman (1994) and D uff (1997) 
confirming that fiscals are heavily influenced by the information contained in the police report when 
deciding whether to divert an offender to social work or psychiatric treatment.
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this matter of the management of prosecutions’ (Leigh and Hall Williams 1981:l).43 
Naturally, the prosecuting authorities’ specific structures and detailed functions differ 
from country to country. Nevertheless, there are still some characteristics in the 
prosecution system of these jurisdictions which are commonly associated with the 
inquisitorial model of criminal justice and prevail in the majority of these countries.
The origins of prosecutorial arrangements in most civil law jurisdictions can be traced 
back to the French Code d ’Instruction Criminelle of 1808,44 which created the 
ministere public, the French Public Prosecution Service. In the years following the 
creation of the ministere public, other European countries, which were under French 
rule at that time, saw the creation of their own equivalents of the ministere public. 
After regaining independence, the Public Prosecution Service was maintained in these 
countries; until quite recently, Belgian and Dutch Public Prosecution Services were 
still very similar to the French ministere public. In Germany,45 the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor (Staatsanwalthschaft) was created in the middle of the nineteenth century 
by splitting the investigative and judicial functions of the inquisitorial judge.46 
Nevertheless, as Weigend (2004:205) reports, The separation between judge and 
prosecutor remained incomplete throughout the nineteenth and the greater part of the 
twentieth century. In that period, the public prosecutor shared dominance of the pre­
trial process with the German version of the juge d’instruction.’ However, gradually 
the investigating judge lost his powers -  the office was eventually abolished in 1975 -  
and the public prosecutor became the ‘undisputed master of the pre-trial process.’
These days, prosecutors in civil law systems, as a rule, function in a hierarchical 
structure with strong internal guidelines controlling the use of discretionary
43 See Ambos (2000) for a more detailed comparative overview o f the prosecutorial arrangements of 
various civil law countries (as well as common law countries).
44 As Verrest (2000:211) reports: ‘similar institutions have existed since the fourteenth century, but it is 
difficult to place the debut o f the ministere public earlier than the beginning o f the nineteenth century. 
At that time, the current ministere public received its main characteristics.’
45 See, including others, Fionda (1995, Chapter 5), Albrecht (2000), Jehle (2003) and Weigend (2004) 
for information on the German prosecution system.
46 Langbein (1974:446) remarks that ‘(p)rior to that time, the prosecutorial function had been merged in 
the all-encompassing work o f the inquisitorial judge, who both investigated alleged or suspected crime 
and then adjudicated on the basis o f his own investigation.’
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prosecutorial powers.47 For example, the organisation of the ministere public is based 
on French judicial organisation, and it is structured in two layers corresponding with 
the District Tribunals and the Courts of Appeal.48 The ministere public's office at each 
of the 181 District Tribunals constitutes its basic working level. It is directed by a 
public prosecutor, the procureur de la Republique, who assures the investigation and 
prosecution of criminal offences in the district of the tribunal. Other magistrates of the 
ministere public, called substitutes, assist the public prosecutor. At the 35 Courts of 
Appeal in France the ministere public's office is directed by a procureur general, who 
has authority over the public prosecutors in the district of the Court of Appeal and is 
responsible for the application of the government’s criminal policy. Article 5 of the 
French Judicial Organisation Act 1958 states that the members of the ministere public 
are subordinated to the Minister of Justice. The latter can give formal instructions to 
the procurators general and is politically accountable for the functioning of the Public 
Prosecution Service. A similar hierarchical structure of the prosecution system exists 
in Belgium,49 the Netherlands50 and Germany.51
As a rule, in the continental tradition the state monopolises the right to prosecute and 
vests it in the public prosecution services, which represent the public interest. This is 
in contrast to the common law tradition where originally the prosecution of crimes 
was largely the concern of private individuals and even these days the prosecutorial 
power is granted to both the state prosecution service and the individuals (e.g. in 
England and Wales). As Tak (2004a) reports, however, the general rule of state’s 
monopoly in civil law countries has been somewhat compromised. In some countries
47 For example, §146 Law on the Constitution o f the Judicial System in Germany states that 
prosecutors have to follow directives as issued by their superiors. According to this, the head o f the 
public prosecution service, the Prosecutor-General, and also the Minister o f Justice are authorised to 
direct and to supervise decisions made by individual prosecutors on criminal cases. Such directives can 
be issued as general guidelines but can also be related to individual cases.
48 See Verrest (2000:212-13) for a more detailed description.
49 See Parmentier, Fijnaut and Van Daele (2000), and Van Daele (2004) for a comprehensive review o f  
the Belgian Prosecution Service.
50 See Leigh and Hall Williams (1981), Fionda (1995, Chapter 4), de Doelder (2000) and Tak (2004b) 
for detailed descriptions o f the Dutch Prosecution Service.
51 However, in Germany the criminal justice system is organised on a federal basis and, thus, each o f  
the twelve German States operates its own justice system headed by a different Minister o f Justice.
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there is a right to private prosecution restricted to certain crimes, mainly those which 
constitute a violation of private legal rights, and in others (e.g. Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden) this right can only be exercised when the public prosecutor decides not to 
prosecute. There are, however, a few countries (e.g. France and Belgium) where ‘the 
public and private rights to prosecute co-exist in a unique fashion’ (Tak 2004a:7).
Public prosecutors in continental jurisdictions normally belong to the judicial branch 
(e.g. in France and the Netherlands) or they are considered as quasi-judicial officers 
(e.g. in Germany). This is in accordance with the inquisitorial tradition in which the 
prosecutor is seen as a neutral and impartial party. Referring to the French 
Prosecution Service, Verrest (2000:221) states: ‘The impartiality of the Public 
Prosecution Service is contained in Article 66 of the Constitution. As part of the 
Judiciary, the mission of the Public Prosecution Service is to secure citizens’ basic 
rights to freedom and liberty.’ Fionda (1995:7) reports that ‘(i)n the Netherlands and 
Germany judges and prosecutors usually train together on the same postgraduate 
training course, with some law graduates opting to enter the judicial branch of the 
legal profession and others the prosecution and defence branches.’ The relationship 
between judges and prosecutors in France is even tighter.52 The procureur, the juge 
d ’instruction and the trial juge, after following the same education program at the 
Ecole nationale de la Magistrature, become members of the same body, the 
magistrature, and it is not uncommon for them to change from ministere public to the 
bench or vice versa during their career.
As a rule, in the continental tradition (and again contrary to the common law one), the 
police have never had a prosecutorial role.53 This has always been the responsibility 
of prosecution services, which were created before the establishment of organised 
police forces. Furthermore (and, arguably, related to this), police are regarded as 
coming under the command of and being controlled by the public prosecution
52 See Hodgson (2001), (2002) and (2005) for a comprehensive account o f the French prosecution 
system based on her extensive empirical work in that jurisdiction.
53 See, however, an exception to this rule in the case o f Norway, where in some particular minor cases 
the police have the responsibility for prosecutions (Jehle 2000).
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services54 as far as all the functions related to prosecutions (in a broad sense, including 
also the investigative stage55) are concerned. The police must report to the prosecutors 
all offences known to them and the prosecutors take the decision on prosecuting 
criminal offences. Therefore, the responsibility for the decision to prosecute or not 
lies exclusively with the public prosecutors.56 Thus, even in countries where the 
opportunity principle applies, the police, theoretically, are not allowed to end cases 
but instead are obliged to pass them on to prosecutors to decide. The Netherlands 
appears to be an exception to this rule: a clear legal framework is in place which 
allows the police to end cases by imposing a condition in accordance with general 
guidelines of the prosecutor-generals.57 It has to be noted that in the other countries as 
well, in practice, police also enjoy some discretion regarding their reporting 
requirements. Verrest (2000:243) for example reports of the situation in France: ‘In a 
certain sense, the police do settle some criminal offences themselves. The police do 
not forward all the information they have on criminal offences to the ministere public 
-  even though they are supposed to.’58
Concluding remarks
In all countries, a state agency is vested with the power to prosecute deviant behavior 
which constitutes a criminal offence. However, as has been shown, prosecution 
agencies do not have similar organisational structures and are not vested with 
identical prosecutorial powers and tasks. Moreover, the place of the prosecution 
services in the constitutional state organisation differs considerably (Tak 2004a).
There is a long tradition in civil law systems of public authorities taking responsibility 
for prosecutions in the public interest. By contrast, in the common law tradition, 
prosecution services are a relatively new feature, the responsibility for prosecutions
54 See, for example, Article 13 o f the Dutch Police Act o f 1993 which states that the police functions 
under the command o f the public prosecution service and a prosecutor is entitled to give orders to the 
police in criminal matters that they are obliged to obey.
55 See section II o f this chapter.
56 Or the juge d ’instruction in France.
57 This is the so-called transactie system, which also applies to the prosecution level.
58 There are very few empirical studies in continental jurisdictions with which to draw a better picture 
o f  the situation that exists in practice. See, however, Hodgson (2005) for a valuable contribution.
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being left before to private individuals and mainly to the police. However, although in 
some common law countries (e.g. Ireland) police still retain significant prosecutorial 
functions the trend has been towards giving responsibility for prosecutions to a 
prosecution agency independent of the police. Despite some common trends observed, 
the varying structures, and the specific characteristics of the modem prosecution 
services, as well as their constitutional relationship with the police, can be traced back 
to their different roots and underlying principles.
II. THE ROLE OF PROSECUTION SERVICES IN INVESTIGATION
‘While prosecutors may not play an investigative role in all or even most 
criminal cases, the majority o f  which are probably reactive as well as 
routine, the importance o f  the investigative role lies not in the number o f  
cases it affects, but in the significance o f  the role in the matters where it 
arises.’ Little (1999:728)59
While the decision as to whether a case should be brought before a court -  whether to 
prosecute or not -  is undoubtedly regarded as the central function of every 
prosecuting authority, the role and the powers that a prosecuting agency acquires 
during the investigation of a case is a matter of great variation across different 
prosecution systems. It is, furthermore, a controversial issue in the discussions about 
the relationship between police and prosecutors. In theory, it can be stated that in 
common law jurisdictions, investigations have been traditionally regarded as the 
preserve of the police, contrary to the pure continental tradition which places 
prosecutors in charge of the investigatory as well as the post-investigatory stage. In 
practice, and as time passed, there have been developments that have caused 
adjustments in this crude statement.
Common law tradition
As was shown earlier, in most common law countries there is no a direct line of 
authority between the police and the prosecution service and the police enjoy a 
considerable independence in the execution of their duties. Related to this, it has been
59 Quoted in Krone (2003:1).
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declared that the responsibility for investigations lies exclusively in the hands o f  the 
police. After the creation o f  modem public prosecution services, the police may have 
been released from their responsibilities in prosecutions,60 but they remained the 
institution responsible for the investigatory stage. Indeed, the main reason behind 
establishing the Crown Prosecution Service in England and Wales and the DPP 
Offices in Ireland and Northern Ireland was the desire to draw a clear line between 
functional responsibility for investigation and for prosecution.
The maintenance o f an investigator-prosecutor divide was central to the report which 
led to the establishment o f  the Crown Prosecution Service. The Philips Royal 
Commission recommended that the CPS should not have a role in supervising police 
investigations apart from giving advice to the police, which the Royal Commission 
encouraged.61 However, it also recommended that the CPS should not have the power 
to direct the police to undertake further inquiries. The Philips Commission saw the 
separation o f  the prosecutor from the charge decision as being essential to the 
maintenance o f  a proper relationship between prosecutor and investigator. The 
investigator-prosecutor divide was premised on the belief that if  the prosecutor 
becomes involved in the investigation o f  a case, then the prosecutor may become 
committed to a particular line o f  inquiry and lose objectivity in assessing that case. 
Therefore, under the 1985 Act, the police retained the power to investigate and to 
decide what charge to bring without the interference o f the C P S.62
In the early 1990s, a series o f  miscarriages o f  justice led to the appointment o f  another 
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice which examined once again the possibility o f  
giving the CPS a role in investigations. The role o f the juge d ’instruction in France 
was particularly discussed as a possible model but in the end it was rejected along
60 However, not entirely, as in many comm on law countries, including Ireland (and until very recently  
Northern Ireland), police still have a role in the prosecution o f  minor cases.
61 Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (1981:71-73).
62 A s Ashworth (1998:173) remarks on the pre-Criminal Justice Act 2003 situation: ‘The English  
prosecutor has no power to order the police to interview different people, or to ask further questions o f  
the defendant or other witnesses. The CPS may put a request to the police for further investigations, but 
it seem s that in the past this has som etim es been a source o f  friction between the two organisations.’
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with any other proposal which went against the strict separation of the roles of 
investigator and prosecutor. The RCCJ stated:
‘The relationship o f  the CPS with the police ...  is particularly relevant. W e see  
as central to it the unambiguous separation o f  the roles o f  investigator and 
prosecutor. It was the need for a separate prosecution authority which led to the 
establishment o f  the CPS in the first place. In our view , just as the police should  
concentrate on discovering the acts relevant to an alleged or reported criminal 
offence, including those which may end to exonerate the suspect, so should the 
CPS concentrate on assessing both the strengths and weaknesses o f  the case  
which, i f  the decision is taken to proceed, w ill bring the defendant before the 
court.’ (RCCJ 1993:69)
Field (1994:121), as well as other commentators, criticised the Commission for not 
giving proper and creative thought to the possibility of introducing some inquisitorial 
elements in the pre-trial stage, adapting them to the English system of criminal 
justice. Instead, they were seeking to ‘take a pre-existing system and implant it in its 
entirety’ and, naturally, this approach was destined to fail.63
A similar reasoning to that of the two Royal Commissions of Criminal Justice was 
followed in other common law countries when discussing the possible involvement of 
prosecutors in the investigative stage.64 Thus in Ireland,65 Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada66 and other common law countries, prosecutors have no formal role in the pre­
trial stage apart from that of advising the police whenever the latter wish to consult 
them.
63 Field (1994:121) comments on the Commission’ s approach: ‘The report complained that no foreign 
model existed in which the rights and interests o f  the various parties were so well balanced that it could 
simply be adopted...The idea that foreign experience might cast light on the kind o f  underlying 
principles needed for designing systems is not considered by the Commission.’
64 See Hunt Report (1969) and Bryett and Osborne (2000) in Northern Ireland and Public Prosecution 
Study Group (1999) in Ireland.
65 In Northern Ireland, as shown earlier, the DPP had some indirect investigatory powers. See Articles 
6(3) and 5(1 )(b) o f the Prosecution o f Offences Order.
66 See Law Reform Commission o f Canada (1990) and Stenning (1986).
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Problems and inefficiencies
The division between investigation and prosecution proved to be problematic in 
practice and researchers were critical of the absence of a prosecutor’s power to exert a 
form of control in the investigative stage. They argued that the failure to give the 
prosecutor control over investigations meant that the control over prosecutions 
actually stayed with the police:67
‘Independent decision-making, which is what is required o f  the prosecutor, is 
impossible so long as he remains dependent upon the police for the relevant 
information. In deciding whether to involve the prosecutor before a charge is 
made or in deciding what and how much information the prosecutor should be 
given, the police will be guided by their law enforcement concerns which are not 
necessarily the same as those o f  the prosecutor.’ (Lidstone 1987:311)
Much research evidence concluded that prosecutors could not effectively monitor 
police investigations via police-constructed files,68 that many police files contained 
insufficient and sometimes misleading evidence69 with the result that weaknesses 
often came out only in or after the trial,70 and that the police investigation focused 
prematurely upon a police suspect, sometimes overlooking other crucial evidence.
Furthermore, research studies revealed that there had been reluctance from the police 
to use the possibility available to them of seeking prosecutors’ advice during 
investigations. McConville et al. (1991), based on their research undertaken in the 
early days of the CPS, reported that police asked for prior advice in only 51 out of 711 
cases. Later research by Moxon and Crisp (reported in RCCJ Report 1993) found that 
police asked for the CPS’s prior advice in four per cent of cases, mainly in order to 
resolve doubts about the sufficiency of the evidence.
67 See inter alia Lidstone (1987) and Fionda (1995, Chapter 2). See also the previous section o f this 
chapter.
68 McConville et al. (1991).
69 Ashworth (1998, Chapter 6), Sanders (1988a), Sanders (1988b) and McConville et al. (1991). See 
also Baldwin and Bedward (1991) who found that the police summaries, on which most o f  the time 
prosecutors based their prosecution decisions, were even more selective.
70 Leng (1993).
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Change of thinking and practice
All the problems mentioned above caused a gradual change of thinking regarding the 
prosecutors’ involvement in investigations. Before reflecting on this, it should be 
mentioned that the police themselves were gradually forced to seek prosecutors’ 
advice more often. The appearance of new forms of criminality (organised crime, 
especially money-laundering and drug-trafficking) and the ever-increasing 
complexities of substantive and procedural law made the police more dependent on 
the prosecutors for legal advice. In many common law jurisdictions this has evolved 
into forms of cooperation that provide the prosecutor with some influence in the 
investigation process itself. In most jurisdictions, though, this form of cooperation has 
remained on an informal and usually ad hoc level, without changing the constitutional 
relationship between the two institutions.71
In England and Wales more formal responses started to emerge in order to face the 
inefficiencies observed in practice as far as investigations were concerned. The thrust 
of the new thinking, evidenced in such reviews as the Narey Report in 1997 and the 
Glidewell Report in 1998, has been to place the emphasis on co-ordination, 
partnership and integrated working between the police and CPS, with the prosecutor 
being fully involved from the point of charge. The Narey Report (1997:11), stating 
that they did ‘not consider that working with the police in this way would necessarily 
impinge on the proper independence of the prosecutor’, recommended that 
prosecutors should be placed permanently in police stations as a means of ensuring 
that appropriate decisions are made for the prosecution of cases from the start. 
However, in reporting on a review of the ‘Lawyers at Police Stations’ (LAPS) scheme 
which was introduced as a result of these recommendations, Baldwin and Hunt (1998) 
concluded that CPS lawyers were being used inefficiently to provide oversight and 
guidance to police officers. Moreover, the police were not being required to 
internalise the demands of the CPS for the preparation of cases for prosecution. The
71 However, in many countries special offices were created long ago who were dealing with economic 
crime; for example, the Serious Fraud Office was established under the Criminal Justice Act 1987 (UK) 
and combined in one office the roles o f investigator and prosecutor. See also the Criminal Assets 
Bureau in the Republic o f Ireland and the Integrated Proceeds o f Crime (IPOC) Units in the Canadian 
Federal jurisdiction.
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fact that the police retained control of the decision to charge was arguably a factor that 
prevented a change in the balance of powers between prosecutors and the police.
The Glidewell Committee (1998) recommended the creation of Criminal Justice Units 
(CJU) in each major police station where CPS case workers and police civilian staff 
were able to work together on some cases. It was believed that, through co-location, 
the relationship between the prosecutor and the police would improve and cases 
would be prepared earlier and more efficiently. A first review of the CJU scheme was 
generally positive.72 However, again, this scheme was criticised as being based on 
police control of the charging process73 and as creating a danger that the CPS officers 
would lose a degree of their independence and objectivity by being co-opted into the 
rubber-stamping of police decision-making.74
With the Criminal Justice Act 2003, however, as was shown above, the responsibility 
for deciding whether to lay a charge is transferred from the police to the CPS. Once 
the prosecutor has charge responsibility, the prosecutor can require the police to 
investigate further before agreeing to the commencement of criminal proceedings. In 
the guidance issued by the DPP according to the Act, ‘custody officers are expressly 
required to direct investigating officers to consult a duty prosecutor as soon as 
practicable after a suspect is detained in custody. During these consultations the 
lawyer is expected to identify whether a case is likely to proceed and to advise on 
lines of inquiry and evidential requirements.’ (Brownlee 2004:902-903). It is, 
therefore, evident that with the new law prosecutors are given a more powerful role 
regarding investigations. It remains now to be seen how they will discharge it in 
practice.
72 ‘All sites report that the co-location of Police and CPS staff is eliminating unnecessary work through 
improved communications. Enquiries by CPS and the Police which used to take weeks to clear can now 
be resolved satisfactorily in minutes. Speedier notification o f proposed discontinuance, for example, 
has reduced the wasted effort on upgrading files unnecessarily’ (Glidewell Working Group 2001:7).
73 Decisions about the cases were taken jointly only after the completion o f the police investigation and, 
most o f the time, after the charging decision.
74 See Baldwin and Hunt (1998), Sanders and Young (2000, Chapter 6) and Sanders (2004).
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Continental tradition
In the inquisitorial environment the distinction between investigation and prosecution 
is more blurred than in common law systems. As Ambos (2000:513-514) remarks, 
‘(t)he French distinction between pour suite and instruction refers to different phases 
of the proceedings and thereby distinguishes between the competences of procureur 
and juge d'instruction.'’ Generally, prosecutors are responsible for the whole pre-trial 
stage, including investigations. There are a number of variations among different 
inquisitorial systems as far as the extent of prosecutors’ powers are concerned. 
Nevertheless, in most of them, the prosecuting authority is empowered ‘to instruct the 
instigation of investigations, to give instructions on the scope of investigations, 
personally to investigate criminal cases, to participate in investigations and to decide 
on the type of investigations’ (Tak 2005b:4).
In France, the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) states that the procureur has 
formal authority over the police services when they investigate criminal offences. In 
order to facilitate the execution of their duties, the Code provides that prosecutors can 
issue general instructions (apart from the specific instructions they give in individual 
cases) to investigators in which they explain the choices in the crime policy and the 
priorities in the detection of particular categories of crimes. The police must report to 
prosecutors all offences known to them and seek instructions as to the lines of 
investigations. They also have the formal obligation to inform the public prosecutors 
of all arrests they make and of the decision to put a suspect in police custody, as well 
as to seek their authorisation for the use of undercover investigation techniques. The 
prosecutors may, if they think proper, take over the investigation themselves.
In the case of serious offences and complex investigations the public prosecutors can 
request that a judicial inquiry be opened. The case is then brought to the juge 
d ’instruction, who opens the judicial inquiry. As Verrest (2000:213-14) describes: ‘If 
there is already a suspect in the case, the examining judge will inform him of the 
existing charges and declare him ‘the subject of investigations’. The examining judge 
continues the investigations and directs police services. He can order phone taps and 
basically any other investigation technique, as long as it remains within the legal 
framework and is needed to solve the case. He can also decide to put a suspect in 
preliminary detention.’ It is estimated that only seven per cent of all cases are the
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subject of judicial inquiries despite ‘the image of an omnipresent examining judge, 
sometimes imagined by foreign academics’ (Verrest 2000:215).
The German Criminal Procedure Law provides that the prosecution service is legally 
and functionally responsible for the pre-trial stage and it is referred to as ‘the ruler of 
the investigative stage.’75 It authorises prosecutors to perform acts of investigation 
themselves or to request the police to do so. They can also give general instructions to 
the police regarding how particular cases are to be handled and can set areas of 
priority of investigation. The police are obliged to inform the prosecution service of 
their actions and to provide them with information in order to facilitate their decisions 
for further investigatory actions. In practice, there are only a few areas where the 
prosecutor’s office is involved from the very beginning in investigations. Weigend 
(2004) refers to homicide cases, serious white-collar cases and cases where significant 
publicity is expected. Furthermore, when there is a need of search and seizure, pre­
trial detention, telephone tapping, deploying an undercover agent or DNA-analysis,76 
in principle a court has to authorise these actions and, therefore, the public prosecutors 
must serve as an interface in terms of moving a corresponding motion. In the rest of 
the cases the police can complete the investigation on their own and pass on the 
complete file to the prosecution service. Nevertheless, as Weigend (2004:208) 
remarks, ‘(n)otwithstanding the practical domination of the investigation process by 
the police, the prosecutor’s office remains ultimately responsible...The prosecutor 
must eventually make the decision whether or not to charge the suspect with an 
offence.’
In Scotland, Procurators Fiscal have similar powers to their counterparts in 
continental jurisdictions. They have a common law duty to investigate crime and 
section 17(3) of the Police (Scotland) Act 1967 places Chief Constables under a 
statutory duty to comply with the lawful instructions of the fiscals. In practice, it is 
only in the more serious or complex cases that the fiscals would become heavily 
involved at the investigative stage, for example through attendance at the scene of a
75 See Eisner (2005).
76 See, however, the Law on Control o f Organised Crime o f  1992 by which the police have been 
authorised to initiate deployment o f undercover agents and have also been authorised to make 
independent decisions in emergency cases.
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murder to take charge of the evidential aspects of the investigation and autopsy 
arrangements.
Some limited empirical research in continental jurisdictions revealed a number of 
inefficiencies77 which do not match up to the ideal picture of the system that some 
common law commentators have in their minds. During the RCCJ 1993 discussions, 
there were allegations by some researchers of a lack of cultural commitment to 
impartiality amongst some prosecutors and juges d ’instruction in France but Field 
(1994:128-9) claims that these general assessments were not empirically founded and 
that ‘there does seem to be an impressionistic case of thinking that processes of 
training do not seem to shape cultural attitudes in quite the same way in France as 
they do in Germany and the Netherlands’ (where there was evidence that prosecutors 
do appear neutral and impartial). Hodgson (2001:357), however, based on her 
research, also expressed doubts about the neutral stand of the magistrats in France, 
stating that ‘in practice independence does not guarantee neutrality and in particular, 
the stance of the procureur in representing the public interest is predominantly one of 
crime control.’
Related to this, concerns are expressed that the regular involvement of prosecutors 
with the police in investigations might compromise their ability to make dispassionate 
judgments.78 However, there is evidence that prosecutors are only involved in 
investigations on an everyday basis in very serious cases and for the rest they only 
exercise overall control and supervision.79 This evidence leads to a contrary argument 
that the involvement of prosecutors in the investigative stage is largely rhetorical and 
not effective80 and ‘a dangerous disguise for untramelled police control of 
investigations’ (Field 1994:126). This argument, though, does not take into
77 Apart from the mentioned inefficiencies, see also criticisms o f the limited defence rights during 
investigations (Hodgson 2004). However, in an attempt to demonstrate conformity with the ECHR and 
under the influence o f the Recommendations o f  the Council o f  Europe (e.g. Rec 97(13)), there are a 
series o f reforms in inquisitorial countries aiming to strengthen the defence’s position. See Field and 
West (2003) and Hodgson (2005) for a review o f  relevant reforms introduced in France.
78 See evidence presented in Bryett and Osborne (2000).
79 See Eisner (2005), Weigent (2004), Falletti (2004), Hodgson (2001).
80 See Goldstein and Marcus (1977) and the discussions in the RCCJ 1993.
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consideration the fact that prosecution services in civil law countries make a great use 
of their power to issue guidelines and directives to the police on how to investigate 
particular cases and what kind of methods they can use. They also require the police 
to keep them informed of the most crucial investigative actions.81 Furthermore, 
prosecutors in their relationship with the police place a great importance on trust and 
mutual understanding (Hodgson 2001). Leigh and Zedner (1992:69) report:
‘A  striking feature o f  the French and German system s which w e might further 
emulate is the readiness o f  the police to request advice from prosecution. The 
foreign observer cannot but be struck by the harmonious working relationships 
in Germany between prosecutors and police which exist notwithstanding the 
independence and superior status o f  the prosecutor in the procedure.’
This is in contrast to the tension that has always characterised the relationship 
between police and prosecutors in England and Wales.
Leigh and Zedner (1992) confirm that the prosecutors’ monitoring generally starts 
after preliminary police investigations. But, as Field (1994:127) points out, these 
authors ‘do not conclude from this that prosecutors always become prisoners of a 
police-constructed file and their supervision meaningless.’ This is prevented partly by 
the defence actions which provide the prosecutor with additional information that 
challenges the police view of the case. It is argued (Field et al 1995) that when 
prosecutors are alerted to ambiguities or impropriety in investigations, they are often 
decisive in response. Field (1994:127) claims that especially the German and the 
Dutch systems ‘seem to depend on the development of a particular kind of 
relationship between the defence lawyer, prosecutor and (in the Netherlands) 
investigative judge in the development of the dossier.’
Concluding remarks
Comparative analysis in relation to prosecution systems reveals that both adversarial 
and inquisitorial systems either in theory or in practice have moved away from their 
traditional models. In common law systems a steady movement away from an 
insistence on prosecutor detachment from the investigator is observed; this either
81 See Weigent (2004), Jehle (2000).
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takes the form of informal arrangements between police and prosecutors without 
changing the constitutional relationship between the two services or, as in the case of 
England and Wales, a statutory reform. In inquisitorial systems, in practice it was 
observed (Tak 2005b:4) that ‘the public prosecutor...does not exercise his function as 
head of the investigation except in more important cases’ mainly because of resource 
issues but partly due ‘to the recognition that with regard to investigative techniques 
and tactics, the police possess more expertise than the prosecution service.’ However, 
he still retains the overall control and responsibility for the regulation of the 
investigative stage.
III. PROSECUTION PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
The power to decide whether a particular case should be forwarded to courts or 
filtered out of the system is regarded as the central function -  the sine qua non -  of 
every prosecuting authority. In this section, a comparative analysis will be attempted 
of the way different prosecution systems approach the issues of prosecutorial 
discretion, diversion from prosecution and the formulation of prosecution criteria and 
policies.
Theoretical background: mandatory v. opportunity principle
‘A  rigid v iew  o f  the law is that it should be fixed and certain: i f  it is 
broken it should be enforced. Mandatory prosecution ensures that all 
individuals against whom there is a prim a facie  evidence are tried by the 
courts...A  more flexible v iew  o f  the law is that it provides guiding 
principles for the regulation o f  the behavior, which are highly developed  
but do not...anticipate every eventuality and every variation in 
circumstances. Such an approach in turn requires significant discretion to 
be vested in those making the decisions about whether to set the law in 
m otion.’ (M ansfield and Peay 1987:27)
Prosecution systems have traditionally been characterised as adhering or coming 
closer to either the legality or the opportunity principle. This depends on the extent of 
the discretion that the prosecuting authorities are allowed over the decision to
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prosecute and the permission to take into account factors other than evidence in 
making this decision.
The legality principle commands that every case in which there is enough evidence 
and in which no legal hindrances prohibit prosecution has to be brought to court. 
Adherence to the legality principle in the procedural sense means that the prosecution 
service cannot exercise any discretion over the prosecutorial decision.82 Its role is 
limited to the legal assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence against the suspect. 
Other considerations -  what are known as public interest factors in opportunity 
systems -  are not considered as factors that prosecutors are allowed to deploy in their 
decisions. Rather, the public interest is regarded as a consideration for the court which 
might be reflected in the verdict or the penalty imposed.
The adoption of the legality principle is usually connected with the continental 
tradition in which enforcement agencies are, at least theoretically, denied any 
discretion and primacy is given to the legislative power of the state. In these systems 
(e.g. Germany, Italy and Spain) ‘(t)he Penal Code is the foundation of legal authority: 
judges and prosecutors have no “inherent” power to take positions that modify or 
nullify the Code’s requirements’ (Goldstein and Marcus 1977:246-7). As Ashworth 
and Redmayne (2005:147) remark, ‘(i)f the administration of the criminal law 
produces unjust results, it is for the legislature to amend it and not for prosecutors to 
make their own policies.’
Tak (2004a) refers to two principal reasons usually given for the mandatory 
prosecution of all offences as prescribed by the law. The first is the safeguard of the 
principle of equality before the law and the second is the upholding of the concept of 
general deterrence: ‘The guarantee that all offenders will be tried and that no offence 
will remain unpunished would be an important means by which to uphold the trust of 
the population in law enforcement, and in the proper administration of justice’ (Tak 
2004a:9). Furthermore, the dispensation of justice in open court is seen as essential in
82 As Langbein (1974:440) remarks: ‘(t)he prosecutor’s power o f non-prosecution becomes 
controversial when it extends beyond the power to discard hopeless cases. Prosecutorial 
discretion... means the power to decline to prosecute in cases o f provable criminal liability’.
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ensuring that the law is impartially upheld and that undue influences by the executive 
are prevented.83
Prosecution systems that adhere to the opportunity principle (e.g. England and Wales, 
Ireland, Northern Ireland and all the rest of the common law countries) ‘allow 
enforcement agencies almost unfettered discretion over whether or not to prosecute, 
which allows prosecutors to take account of factors other than evidence in making 
their decisions’ (Sanders 1996: xi). Therefore, not every offence in respect of which 
there is evidence of guilt of an individual must be prosecuted, for there may be other 
significant reasons which suggest that inaction is better than prosecution. These 
reasons are normally classified as exigencies of the public interest and cover a wide 
range of issues that entail consideration of factors associated with the accused, the 
victim, the gravity of the offence, the availability of resources, etc.
This high level of discretion with which the enforcement agencies are entrusted is 
mostly associated with the common law tradition. Unlike codified systems that aspire 
to provide in advance for all eventualities, the common law tradition admits the 
impossibility of pre-determined answers to all future questions and recognises the 
need for flexibility in the law, so that it can be adapted to every variation in 
circumstances.84 Consequently, as Walther (2000:293) remarks, ‘this type of legal 
culture...makes it necessary to entrust professionals in the ranks of the enforcers of 
the law with far-reaching power of interpretation and application of the law in the 
books.’
Furthermore, the permission that is given to prosecutors to apply extra-legal 
considerations to prosecution decisions is a recognition that within a society there are 
competing interests and values which must be reconciled (Mansfield and Peay 1987) 
and a realisation that prosecutors are possibly in the best position to pursue a cost 
benefit analysis.
83 See Ashworth and Redmayne (2005:165).
84 See McConville and Wilson (2002) and Mansfield and Peay (1987:26-29).
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Finally, it is advocated that the adoption of the opportunity principle has three main 
advantages: (a) it prevents ‘the negative counter-effects of the strict application of the 
legality principle which, under circumstances, could lead to injustice’ (Tak 2004a:9); 
(b) it enables the individualisation of criminal justice; and (c) it prevents ‘delays and 
backlogs in the court and prison system, which may in turn jeopardise the overall aim 
of protecting the rights and interests of the accused’ (Fionda 1995:10).
Changes in practice and remaining differences
Despite the doctrinal contrast between the principle of legality and the principle of 
opportunity, the differences between the systems that were originally used to adopt 
either principle are increasingly eroded in practice. As Sanders and Young (1994:209) 
remark, ‘(i)n Britain, where discretion is theoretically total, most cases are 
prosecuted,85 and in a legality system, where there is theoretically no discretion 
available, a similar, or perhaps even greater, number of cases are not prosecuted.’
These days, most of those traditionally regarded as legality systems,86 especially due 
to rising caseloads and scarce resources,87 allow the prosecutors to also take into 
account other reasons apart form the evidential ones when deciding to prosecute or 
drop a case. As Wade (2005:2) reports, ‘in systems which do not explicitly allow this, 
practices achieving the same effect can be found (indeed legislation allowing such 
drops, e.g. in Germany, France and the Netherlands, was introduced in order to codify 
practice).’
In Germany, which used to be considered as one of the strong representatives of the 
mandatory prosecution philosophy, as early as the 1960s, a statutory basis for 
discretionary non-prosecution was introduced (§153 German Code of Criminal
85 Especially in relation to adult cases, as the same authors report.
86 With the exception o f Italy, which theoretically still adopts the principle o f strict legality. See, 
however (Di Federico 1998:378): ‘The first clear element that emerges from our research is that, in 
spite o f the constitutional provisions that require our magistrates to prosecute all criminal violations, 
penal action in Italy is de facto just as discretionary as in other countries, and perhaps more.’
87 Ashworth and Redmayne (2005:147) mention another important reason for this trend, naming the 
‘increasing realisation that prosecution and sentence in court are stressful for all participants and are 
not necessarily more effective (in terms o f reconviction rates) than forms o f diversion.’
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Procedure) in order to cope with the rising caseloads. Since then, a number of 
exceptions from the mandatory prosecution rule have been enacted. Therefore, 
currently, prosecutors can refrain from or dismiss a prosecution in the following 
cases: (a) for minor criminal offences with low guilt and no public interest in 
prosecuting and (b) for less important criminal offences where the penalty would be 
insignificant alongside the punishment for some other crime committed by the same 
offender. In these cases there can be a dismissal without consequences, but also a 
conditional dismissal by which prosecutors impose upon the offender certain 
obligations, e.g. to make a payment to the victim, the state or a charity, to perform a 
community service or to undergo victim/offender mediation.88 It is worth noting that 
the court’s consent is necessary for the dismissal of cases concerning certain kinds of 
offences.
For more serious offences (felonies) only the Federal Prosecutor General is 
empowered to refrain from prosecutions in very specific circumstances: (a) when 
proceedings could endanger the Federal Republic or if other substantial public 
interests weigh against prosecution and (b) with the consent of the court "if the 
offender has, after the deed, contributed to avert the danger for the state created by the 
offence’ (153e CCP).89
In France the expediency principle also applies currently in a number of cases and 
there is also a number of options available for prosecutors when they decide to divert 
a case out of the courts (e.g. mediation penale, composition penale, etc).
However, although there is a good deal of convergence between opportunity and 
legality-based systems in practice, commentators draw attention to some important 
differences that still exist: ‘Because diversion in a legality system is an exception to a 
general rule, non-prosecution decisions are relatively strictly controlled even if they 
are greater in number than in systems like that in England and Wales.’ (Sanders and 
Young 1994:209). As the examples of Germany and France indicate, the conditions
88 There has been criticism by some scholars in Germany that conditional dismissals enable rich 
suspects to buy their way out o f  criminal prosecution. See inter alia Jehle (2003)
89 See Weigend (2004) and Fionda (1995, Chapter 5) for more information on the diversionary options 
in Germany.
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under which those exceptions can be made, are stipulated and diversion decisions are 
usually reserved for the prosecutors to make. Furthermore, in order to encourage 
consistency and adherence to official policy, only a relatively small number of senior 
decision-makers are empowered to take the most serious diversionary decisions.90
On the contrary, in opportunity-based systems such as that in England and Wales, 
‘neither the basis for the exercise of discretion nor the level of decision-maker is 
consistent throughout the system’ (Sanders and Young 1994:209).91 Diversionary 
decisions are not the exclusive responsibility of prosecutors. Most non-prosecution 
decisions are still made by a relatively large number of police officers and, thus, are 
difficult to control. Police are empowered to take no further action, give an informal 
warning, or administer a caution without notifying the CPS. Furthermore, until 
recently, prosecutors had no power to impose any diversionary measures instead of 
prosecution. Their only option was to recommend to the police -  but not require -  the 
administration of a caution.92
Prosecutors could, of course, discontinue a case for public interest reasons but 
research revealed that they were not very successful in doing so. McConville et al. 
(1991) found that the CPS rarely dropped cases on public interest grounds alone and 
although later on discontinuances of this kind were increased, most of the time, these 
occurred in trivial cases and mainly on cost grounds (Sanders and Young 2002). It 
was argued that police control of information and case construction used to make it 
extremely difficult for prosecutors to identify cautionable cases:93 ‘Factors which 
could point towards caution or other forms of diversion are downplayed in the file, or 
such facts are not brought out by the police because of failure to ask appropriate
90 See Sanders (1986b), Leigh and Zedner (1992), Sanders and Young (1994, Chapter 6).
91 This is not necessarily the same in all expedience-based systems. See, for example, the situation in 
the Netherlands where prosecution policy is ‘strikingly organised and determinate, implementing a 
carefully considered and coherent working philosophy’ (Fionda 1995:63).
92 Contrary to the situation in Scotland, where for a long time now there has been a sophisticated 
diversionary package available to the procurators fiscal, including fiscal warnings, conditional offers o f  
fixed penalties, fiscal fines and diversionary schemes (e.g. supervision by a social worker, referral to 
drug treatment, restorative interventions, etc).
93 McConville et al. (1991), Leng et al. (1996).
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questions’ (Sanders 2004:118).94 The experiment with ‘Public Interest Case 
Assessment’ (PICA) schemes, where the CPS were provided with information from 
other than the police sources (e.g. Social Services), proved that far more cases could 
be diverted provided that the right information was available (Crisp et a l, 1994).
The introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 confers a greater role on the CPS in 
relation to diversion. It gives them the power to offer conditional cautions to offenders 
and requires them to propose the conditions. However, as Ashworth and Redmayne 
(2005:171) point out, the police seem to retain the power to offer a police caution or 
otherwise to divert the case. Therefore, even after the introduction of the new 
legislation, it appears that in England and Wales diversionary decisions will still not 
be centrally controlled by a single agency acting on explicitly pronounced policies 
and common starting points for all cases.95
Formulation of prosecutorial policy
‘Prosecutors must be given discretion, so that they can respond sensitively  
to the great diversity o f  factual situations and policy issues which arise.
Equally, the public interest in fair, consistent and principled decision­
making sustains the case for policy guidance and for accountability.’
(Ashworth 1987:606)
Once it is admitted that a certain amount of discretion should be allowed to 
prosecuting agencies over the decision to prosecute or divert a case from the courts, a 
number of issues arise to which different jurisdictions have not responded in a similar 
manner.
94 However, McConville et al. (1991) and Gelsthorpe and Giller (1990) report that, even when 
cautionable cases could be identified, the CPS was reluctant to drop them, especially where police 
working rules pointed to prosecution.
95 See Ashworth and Redmayne (2005:148): ‘In the heavily pragmatic English system, fundamental 
values and principles have little explicit recognition, even as starting points. Instead, the alternatives to 
prosecution have developed one by one, often without statutory foundations, and hardly constitute a 
“system” o f diversion.’
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First, should prosecutors act on a predefined policy, publicly announced or does this 
negate the very need for individualised decision-making (which, supposedly, 
discretion promotes)? In England and Wales the CPS are obliged by law to issue a 
code setting out their policies and criteria according to which prosecution decisions 
should be made.96 This is a public document formulated by the DPP and revised 
periodically. Moreover, recently, as Ashworth and Redmayne (2005:176) remark, 
‘there has been a welcome step towards openness, with the publication on the CPS 
website of considerable amounts of prosecutorial guidance previously confidential to 
Crown prosecutors.’ Prosecutors are, theoretically at least, obliged to follow all these 
guidelines, although practice showed that there has been a considerable degree of 
variation regarding their approaches and their understanding of the code (Hoyano et 
al 1997).
Other jurisdictions have adopted a different approach to the one mentioned above, 
which allows prosecutors a broader discretion regarding the creation of predefined 
policies, while at the same time significantly limiting the number of decision-makers. 
For example, in Germany there are no published documents specifying the conditions 
under which a prosecution is dismissed or reflecting on the proper conduct of criminal 
prosecutions. There are some internal guidelines issued by the Federal Chief 
Prosecutor that are not published. It is argued that the strong hierarchical structure that 
exists, as well as the concentration of the most crucial decisions in the senior 
prosecutors, makes up for the lack of detailed and published guidelines.97
The second issue concerns the question of who should formulate prosecution policies. 
The most important issue in this context is the relationship between the Executive and 
the prosecution services. Ashworth (2000:282) argues that the quasi-judicial role that 
prosecutors play suggests that they should enjoy a certain independence in matters of 
policy-making. In England and Wales the DPP formulates the CPS policies on 
prosecution and the Attorney General is constitutionally answerable for these policies 
to Parliament. In practice, Parliament never debates the principles or the contents of
96 In Scotland there is also a Prosecution Code which sets out the criteria for decision-making and the 
range o f options available to prosecutors dealing with reports o f  crime.
97 Furthermore, the law on which prosecutors base the exercise o f their discretion is also relatively 
detailed.
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the code (Sanders 2004). The relationship between the Attorney General and the DPP 
is in practice primarily consultative in nature, enabling the Attorney General to retain 
a general overview of prosecution policy; also, the DPP is expected to provide 
sufficient information to the Attorney General to enable him to answer to Parliament 
for the performance of the CPS. In theory, both the Attorney General and the DPP are 
independent of the Executive. However, as Ashworth (2000:262) remarks, the CPS in 
the past failed to act in an independent way from the Executive and his policies have 
been highly influenced by the Home Secretary’s policies for prosecution and 
diversion.98
In other countries, such as France, Belgium, Germany, and the Netherlands, the 
prosecution services act under the supervision of the Minister of Justice who can issue 
directives to his subordinates concerning prosecutorial decisions to be made. The 
instructions of the minister can relate to a specific case or be of a general nature and 
thus concern general prosecution policies.
For example, Article 5 of the French Judicial Organisation Act 1958 states that the 
members of the ministere public are subordinated to the Minister of Justice. The 
Minister of Justice is politically accountable for the functioning of the Public 
Prosecution Service and thus can issue general instructions 4so that criminal politics 
of the government can be put in practice.’ Verrest (2000:223-4) argues that:
‘the more ideological ground behind the criminal policy entirely led by the 
government, is the deep fear in France o f  ‘judicial corporatism” . The b e lie f is 
high that i f  the M inister o f  Justice would cede any o f  his prerogatives in the field 
o f  criminal policy, the government would rapidly lose control over legal 
practice. ...T h e ministere public  could abuse the expediency principle to
98 Ashworth (1998) reports that, in 1994, the Home Secretary announced a new policy on police 
cautioning followed by a new circular directed to the police requiring them to change their cautioning 
policies. In the 1994 edition o f the Code for Crown Prosecutors, the influence o f this policy was more 
than obvious: ‘...this episode casts doubt on the CPS’s claim to be independent and quasi-judicial, and 
raises questions about the role o f the Attorney General, a member o f  the government and the minister 
to whom the Director o f Public Prosecutions is accountable’ (Ashworth 1998:196). See also Ashworth 
and Fionda (1994) and a response to this criticism by Daw (1994).
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prosecute whatever it chose and the Minister o f  Justice would lack the pow er to 
address his political responsibility for the administration o f  justice.’
In Germany there is a similar situation to the French one regarding the formulation of 
prosecutorial policies. Nevertheless, it has been argued that although general rules for 
the proper conduct of criminal prosecutions are defined by the Minister of Justice, 
more specific prosecution policies are not usually determined at the level of the 
Ministry of Justice but at that of the Federal Chief Prosecutor (Weigend 2004).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The description of prosecution systems in various jurisdictions used to be 
characterised by dichotomies: on the one hand there were adversarial prosecution 
systems and on the other inquisitorial ones; there were systems where prosecutors 
were also responsible for the investigative stage and others where there was a 
complete division of responsibility regarding the prosecution and the investigative 
stage; finally, there were systems which adhered to the opportunity principle and 
others which adhered to the mandatory one. However, as Cappelletti (1984:207) 
points out, ‘dichotomies provide only two-dimensional slices through reality: they 
give us black and white and -  depending upon their degree of refinement -  
innumerable shades of grey ... But they do not give us the reds and greens and blues.’
This is particularly true for the description of prosecution systems these days. Both 
adversarial and inquisitorial systems, either in theory or in practice, have been moved 
away from their traditional models and, at the present time, no prosecution system can 
be characterised as coming under one particular model. There are as many variations 
in prosecution systems as the number of countries involved. However, some common 
trends have been observed -  encouraged also by the guidance of supranational 
institutions such as the Council of Europe" and the European Court of Human Rights 
-  that argue for the adoption of some common principles regarding prosecutions.
"  See a series o f Recommendations issued by the Council o f Europe relating to prosecutions: Rec 
(2000) 19, Rec (97) 13, Rec (92) 17, Rec (95) 12, etc.
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In the first section of this chapter, the origins, constitutional position and organisation 
of prosecution services in a number of jurisdictions were analysed. There is a long 
tradition in civil law systems of public authorities taking responsibility for 
prosecutions in the public interest, which pre-dates the creation of police forces. By 
contrast, in the common law tradition prosecution services are a relatively new 
feature, the responsibility for prosecutions having previously been left to private 
individuals and mainly to the police. However, although in some common law 
countries (e.g. Ireland) the police still retain significant prosecutorial functions, the 
trend has been towards giving responsibility for prosecutions to a prosecution agency 
independent of the police. Nevertheless, the varying structures and specific 
characteristics of the modern prosecution services, as well as their constitutional 
relationship with the police, can be traced back to their different origins. In common 
law countries, there is still a right to private prosecution, a number of other agencies 
apart for the main prosecution service carry out a significant number of prosecutions, 
and the police enjoy a strong independence not coming under the control of the 
prosecution service. In inquisitorial jurisdictions, as a rule, the state monopolises the 
right to prosecute and prosecution services function in a hierarchical structure with 
strong internal guidelines. Public prosecutors normally belong to the judicial branch 
or they are considered as quasi-judicial officers. The police have never had a 
prosecutorial role and are regarded as coming under the command of, and being 
controlled by, the public prosecution services.
The second section dealt with the role of the prosecuting authorities in investigations. 
The classical divide between the prosecutor and the investigator, which is often seen 
as a distinguishing characteristic of common law systems, in some countries tends to 
dissolve. This either takes the form of informal arrangements between police and 
prosecutors without changing the constitutional relationship between the two services 
or, as in the case of England and Wales, a statutory reform. In inquisitorial systems, 
prosecutors have always been regarded as responsible for the investigatory as well as 
the prosecuting stage. Although, in practice, the police are left to investigate alone the 
majority of -  especially less serious -  crimes, prosecutors still retain overall control 
and responsibility for the regulation of the investigative stage.
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The third section dealt with the way different prosecution systems approach the issues 
of prosecutorial discretion, diversion from prosecution and the formulation of 
prosecution criteria and policies. Prosecution systems have traditionally been 
characterised as adhering to either the legality or the opportunity principle depending 
on the extent of the discretion that prosecutors are allowed over the decision to 
prosecute and the permission to take into account factors other than evidence in 
making this decision. Most of those traditionally regarded as legality systems, due to 
rising caseloads, currently provide for exceptions in the legality principle. However, 
although in practice there is a good deal of convergence between opportunity and 
legality-based systems, commentators draw attention to some important differences 
that still exist. Because diversion in a legality system is an exception to a general rule, 
usually the conditions under which those exceptions can be made are stipulated and 
diversion decisions are usually reserved for the prosecutors to make. There are also 
relatively small numbers of senior decision-makers and a more centralised approach 
regarding diversion from prosecution. In opportunity-based systems, on the contrary, 
diversionary decisions are not the exclusive responsibility of prosecutors. Most non­
prosecution decisions are still made by a relatively large number of police officers 
and, thus, are difficult to control.
As far as the formulation of prosecutorial policies is concerned, in some countries 
prosecutors are obliged to issue a code stating their policy and criteria according to 
which prosecution decisions should be made. Other jurisdictions, however, have 
adopted a different approach, which allows a broader discretion while at the same 
time significantly limiting the number of decision-makers. Furthermore, the 
formulation of prosecutorial policies, in some countries is the responsibility of the 
prosecution service itself, while in others it belongs to the control of the Executive 
(usually the Ministry of Justice) which also defines the government’s criminal policy.
In this chapter, the distinct choices and paths that different legal systems have 
followed, their underlying philosophy, as well as the implications of these choices as 
documented by empirical studies, have been explored. This analysis was intended to 
serve as an additional context within which the particular choices of the Cyprus 
prosecution system can be understood. As stated in the Introduction, in Cyprus there 
is a dearth of theoretical as well as empirical research which sheds light on the issues
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discussed in this chapter for jurisdictions elsewhere. The objective of my research 
project is exactly this: to attempt a first exploration of these issues, focusing on the 
pivotal role that the Attorney General’s Office occupies in the Cyprus prosecution 
system.
‘The value o f  comparative work is not sim ply to document differences 
and similarities between counties and system s, for the comparative 
perspective is also a valuable tool for analysing the distinctive character 
o f  one’s own dom estic practice and policy .’ (Zimring and Johnson 
2005:794)
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CHAPTER THREE
Research Strategies and Methodology
‘The importance o f  the m ethodology is that it provides a sense o f  vision, 
where it is that the analyst wants to go with the research. The techniques 
and procedures (method), on the other hand, furnish the means for 
bringing that vision into reality... Just as painters need both techniques 
and visions to bring their novel images to life on canvas, analysts need 
techniques to help them see beyond the ordinary and to arrive at new  
understandings o f  social life .’ (Strauss and Corbin 1998:8)
In  this chapter I will reveal the vision of my research and the means by which I intend
to bring it about. This research on the role of the Attorney General’s Office in 
prosecutions is an exploratory study which draws on data gathered using a variety of 
mainly qualitative methods. The influences on the choice of my research strategies 
and the specific methodology will be explained in the first part of this chapter, 
followed by an explanation of the necessity of two broad research strategies. In the 
second part, my first research strategy (fieldwork in the AG’s Office) will be 
developed starting from the description of the process of negotiating access to the 
AG’s Office and the pre-fieldwork period I spent there; these will be followed by an 
account of the three different techniques of data collection (observation, documentary 
survey and semi-structured interviews) I employed. In the third part, my second 
research strategy including a documentary analysis of internal circulars, press 
releases, memoranda, etc issued by the succeeding AGs, as well as interviews with the 
AGs themselves, will be presented followed by the development of an argument about
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the reliability and validity of the research and the approach I adopted for the data 
analysis {fourth part).
I. RESEARCH STRATEGIES 
Exploratory research
R. Stebbins (2001:6) argues that researchers who want to explore effectively a given 
phenomenon for which they have little or no scientific knowledge ‘must approach it 
with two special orientations: flexibility in looking for data and open-mindedness 
about where to find them.’ In the case of my research, the lack of any prior scientific 
knowledge or research, which would provide some information or suggest theories 
about the role of the Attorney General’s Office in prosecutions, dictated the choice of 
an exploratory study instead of a theory-testing strategy and a flexible methodology. In 
Cyprus there is not a single empirical study about the criminal prosecution system (or 
aspects of it) and only a handful of studies on other areas of the criminal justice 
system in general.1 Theoretical studies about criminal justice issues have also been 
very limited and most of them are confined to the mere description of legal provisions 
or the review of the case law.2 More specifically, there is no definitive work on the 
structure of the Cyprus criminal prosecution process and the system has not been the 
subject of a detailed and systematic review by any state agency. The only relatively 
comprehensive description of the various functions of the Attorney General’s Office 
dates back to 1974.3
The dearth of any theoretical or empirical work on criminal prosecutions is largely the 
reflection of the very limited legal or socio-legal research of any kind in Cyprus. The 
greatest volume of research in other countries emanates from academe. The absence 
of a Law School at the University of Cyprus imposes obvious difficulties to academic 
research.4 In addition to that, the tendency of practitioners to rely on English, and
1 See Kapardis (1983), Kapardis (2002) and Ministry Of Justice (2004).
2 Most of these articles are published in the Cyprus Law Review and in the Cyprus Law Tribune.
3 Loucaides (1974) ‘The Office o f the Attorney General o f the Republic o f Cyprus’.
4 The University o f Cyprus is currently taking the first steps towards the establishment o f a Law 
School.
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increasingly also on Greek, French and American textbooks or Law Reviews for their 
everyday practice derived from their educational background, discourages any studies 
focused exclusively on the Cyprus System, which could reveal the singularities or any 
special features of the System.
Qualitative study -  Influences on the choice of study
i) The research question
The objective of this research is to explore the role of the Attorney General’s Office in 
the Cyprus prosecution system. As much mystery surrounds this area, the idea is to 
contribute insight and understanding of the constitutional position of the Law Office, 
its workload and the functions it is called to fulfil. The research question to a great 
extent determines the most appropriate method of research. As Straus and Corbin 
(1998:36) observe ‘some problem areas clearly suggest one form of research, over 
another...; an investigator should be true to the problem at hand.’
Other research studies about prosecution arrangements in organisations such as the 
DPP’s Office and the CPS, as well as studies about prosecution systems in general,5 
have demonstrated the advantages of more qualitative approaches in order to fully 
understand the complex interaction of formal and informal influences, organisational 
constraints, shared ideologies and procedural requirements involved in the operation 
of a prosecution agency (as indeed in any criminal justice agency).6 The questions that 
such studies seek to answer are not amenable to any rigidly structured methods 
preferred by a quantitative approach; rather they demand the richness and the wealth 
of information of data generated by more intensive research methods.
Furthermore, a qualitative approach for my methodology is better suited to the 
exploratory design of this research. There is a widespread tendency to view 
quantitative research as being suited to the confirmation and rejection of theoretical 
prepositions and hypothesis. By contrast, qualitative research is depicted as placing 
emphasis on the discovery of the novel and unfamiliar, which its more unstructured
5 See inter alia Mansfield and Peay (1987), McConville et al. (1991), Fionda (1995) and Hodgson 
(2005).
6 See Lacey (1994)
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approach to data gathering deemed to facilitate (Bryman 1984). This connection of 
quantitative/qualitative with confirmation/discovery should not be read as a hard and 
fast principle.7 However, it is widely accepted that the constant interchange between 
theory and data, the ‘discovery-based’ approach in which ‘there is a development, 
refinement and perhaps even reformulation of research ideas in accordance with what 
is discovered as fieldwork continues’ (Jupp 1989:58), is a methodological 
characteristic more closely associated with the ethnographic tradition.
ii) The research perspective
It has been advocated that research techniques are of high theoretical relevance, and 
can no longer be viewed as ‘atheoretical tools’. The research methods represent lines 
of action taken towards the empirical world, while each theory demands and produces 
a special view of the research act (Denzin 1978). Consequently, although the choice 
of method is primarily determined by the research question, it also involves some 
more general assumptions about the nature of the social world being studied. It is, 
therefore, admitted that the sociological approach informing this research project 
influenced, the selection of the methodology, at least to some extent.
I certainly exclude positivism or naturalism as the theoretical standpoint for my 
research enterprise. Positivism assumes that methods of natural sciences could and 
should be unproblematically applied to the social world and that human behaviour 
should be studied within a deterministic framework. However, social sciences are not 
the same as natural sciences, essentially because their subjects are human beings who 
can attribute meanings to the situations in which they are placed, and may therefore 
react to and possibly alter those situations.8 As Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) 
point out, both positivism and naturalism neglect social research’s fundamental 
reflexivity: the fact that we are part of the social world we study, and there is no 
escape from reliance on common sense knowledge and methods of investigation.
By contrast, closer to my assumption about the nature of social reality is the view that 
the social world should be seen ‘as something which is continuously under social
7 As Bryman (1988) himself argues elsewhere.
8 See Bottoms (2000) and Giddens (1984).
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construction via social interactions by the participants themselves rather than as some 
external, objective and ill-constraining reality...’ (Jupp 1989: 29). According to this 
paradigm, it is important to gain access to the ‘actors’ viewpoint’, as well as to the 
structures within which they operate, in order to understand the way in which the 
criminal justice system is constructed. However, I do not agree that this is sufficient. 
It is also important not to neglect the analysis about the legal status of the criminal 
justice agencies that are studied, their formal powers and the rhetoric that is being 
developed about their legitimacy and operation. I agree with Lacey (1994) that 
research on criminal justice agencies have to take into account all of these factors 
since rhetoric (alongside a number of other things) forms a part of the reality.
Two broad research studies
This conveniently brings me to the reasons I decided to integrate two research 
strategies for my research. As stated earlier, this study seeks to explore the role of the 
Attorney General’s Office in prosecutions. Originally, it was intended to provide an 
‘in-depth’ description of the working of the Law Office as far as prosecutions are 
concerned and penetrate the operational philosophy of an agency which much mystery 
surrounds. In order to achieve this, it was judged essential to attempt to get behind the 
public life of the Law Office and perhaps reveal a rich and ‘concealed underlife’ 
(Bryman 1989:142). It was, therefore, inevitable to immerse myself fully in the 
process of prosecution and the everyday life of the Office, as access to organisational 
culture cannot be obtained through methods employed at a distance.9 Consequently, it 
was decided to conduct a fieldwork period in the Law Office including a variety of 
methods.
However, during the pre-fieldwork period, I realised that the exploration of the 
current situation in the Law Office mainly by an ethnographic approach could only 
give a partial and incomplete picture of the role of the Law Office in prosecutions. A 
study of the rhetoric that has been developed over time regarding the functions of the 
Law Office was also essential, since legal provisions in this area have remained 
limited and vague over the years and sometimes caused contradictory interpretations. 
Furthermore, these broad statutory provisions, as mentioned before, allowed the
9 See Crompton and Jones (1988).
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holders of the Office a particularly extended discretion in defining their role in the 
system. Therefore, since that much appeared to depend on the particular office­
holders, I thought that it would be very interesting to explore how successive Attorney 
Generals approach their role. That would place my research also into a historical 
context and, consequently, make it possible to uncover and understand how the role of 
the Law Office has been formed, developed and possibly modified over time. 
Therefore, I decided to employ an additional research strategy which would respond 
to this additional objective of my study. That would entail a documentary analysis of 
internal circulars, press releases and documents that the four Attorney Generals who 
have served office since the establishment of the Cyprus Republic (1960) have issued. 
Additionally, it would be supplemented by interviews carried out with three of those 
four Attorney Generals.10
II. FIRST RESEARCH STRATEGY: THE FIELDWORK STUDY IN THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE
Gaining access
i) The access problem
Any kind of social research involves gaining access to data. It is not unusual to 
experience difficulties negotiating access to any research setting, but seeking access to 
an organisation may be particularly problematic: ‘A research project is an intrusion 
into the life of the institution to be studied. Research is a disturbance, and it disturbs 
routines, with no perceptible immediate or long-term pay off for the institutions and 
its members’ (Flick 1998:57). Researchers recall how tiresome it can be to negotiate 
access11 and they report that this process takes a considerable amount of time. 
Furthermore, they point out that ‘the researcher is dependent on the goodwill of 
organisation “gatekeepers”. This dependency creates risks that are beyond the control 
of the researcher and which are difficult to predict or avoid’ (Buchanan et al. 
1988:56). Therefore, they warn that from the very beginning, the research timetable
10 Mr Triantafyllides, Mr Markidis and Mr Nikitas. The first Attorney General o f the Cyprus Republic, 
Mr Tomaritis died in 1997.
11 E.g. see Baldwin (2000).
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must take into account the possibility that access may not be automatic and instant, 
but take time-consuming meetings and correspondence to achieve.
If gaining access generally in organisations is characterised as difficult, the same 
enterprise in relation to criminal justice agencies, most of the time, faces 
insurmountable obstacles. Certain features of them ensure that the difficulties in their 
case are particularly highlighted. As Jupp (1989) reports, the peculiarities of research 
on criminal justice derive from a number of facts: the ‘sensitive’ nature of this area, 
the criticism levelled very often against the government for its policies,12 the fact that 
on certain occasions information that researchers might wish to uncover is meant to be 
kept secret by gatekeepers, and the actuality that some areas of the system (e.g. 
prisons) are formally closed.
ii) Negotiating access
Having all the above in mind and being fully conscious of the obstacles that my 
undertaking might encounter, I decided to ask permission for conducting research at 
the Attorney General’s Office.
Researchers differ in their opinions about the level within the organisation at which 
access should be sought. Crompton and Jones (1988) advocate that it is desirable to 
start negotiations at the top of the organisation. They argue that trying to secure access 
through a lower level may mean that much time is spent in negotiations only to be 
turned down at the last minute by those with the ultimate authority for such 
decisions.13 In my case, I thought that it was more secure and less time consuming to 
ask permission directly from the head of the Office.
12 These policies, as Jupp (1989:130) remarks, are inevitably underpinned by important political 
viewpoints about which there is often considerable dispute: ‘It is not surprising, therefore, that those 
who formulate such policies and those who activate them are sensitive to and often hostile towards 
those who appear to be questioning or undermining such policies and practices.’
13 However, other researchers (e.g. Buchanan et al. 1988) express some reservations about such a 
strategy, supporting that it is sometimes more advantageous to seek access through lower levels. It 
should be noted, though, that knowing who has the power to open up or block off access is not always 
straightforward and sometimes it becomes itself an important aspect o f  sociological knowledge about 
the organisation (Hammersley and Atkinson 1995).
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Having been informed that the Attorney General himself had a particularly heavy 
schedule during that period, initially, I asked for a meeting with the Deputy Attorney 
General. Rather than ‘going on cold’, I chose a more secure way by using as a contact 
a family friend who had worked in the past with him.14 This first meeting could have 
been characterised as ‘exploratory’ as I was aiming to explore the general possibility 
of conducting a study in the Law Office and assess the degree of the cooperation I 
could expect. Given the fact that no other empirical research had been carried out 
before in the Law Office, I was not sure how such a proposal would appear and be 
considered by those in charge of the Office. During that first meeting, I explained to 
the Deputy Attorney General my original research proposal and objectives in general 
terms. Subsequently, I asked permission to spend initially a period of time at the Law 
Office in order to test the general feasibility of carrying a study along the lines 
proposed and make the necessary modifications, as well as collect relevant material 
and information needed for the final research plan of my main fieldwork. To my 
surprise, he appeared enthusiastic with the idea and straight away granted me the 
permission I asked for, adopting an attitude which implied that ‘they had nothing to 
hide and they were willing to help.’
After that meeting, I carried out several visits at the Office, during which I had 
discussions with key-personnel, collected some relevant documents and observed the 
actual workload of the Law Office. During that period, I also spent some time at two 
Police Prosecution Departments in order to get some initial information about their 
cooperation and dealings with the Law Office. After that, I had another meeting with 
the Deputy Attorney General to inform him about my final decision (if allowed) to 
carry out my research at the Law Office. I asked an official permission by a formal 
letter which was accompanied by a more detailed research proposal. He immediately 
replied that he was happy to allow me access to the Law Office and offered me any 
help they could reasonably give ‘without disturbing the proper everyday functioning 
of the Office.’ He finally, kindly asked me to provide him with a draft of my thesis or 
a report after the completion of my research, as ‘it would be valuable for the Office’.
14 The use o f friends, family and academic contacts is mentioned as a useful asset by a number o f  
authors drawing on their own experience in negotiating access for research; see e.g. Van Maanem and 
Kolb (1985) and Bryman (1988).
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Although some researchers argue that when negotiating access it is desirable to offer a 
report as a ‘tangible product in return for cooperation’ (Buchanan et al. 1988), and 
that gatekeepers sometimes demand it, I understood Deputy Attorney General’s 
request more as an expression of his interest rather than a term for granting his 
permission.
What surprised me more was that I was not asked to sign any research undertakings. 
The assurance of protecting confidentiality and guaranteeing anonymity in the formal 
letter by which I asked access was apparently sufficient for them. However, in order 
to be on the safe side and avoid problems subsequently, I thought that it would be 
wise to emphasise the fact that the results of my research would probably be 
published, not necessarily only in my thesis. That statement did not seem to alarm the 
Deputy Attorney General.
My explanation for this rather generous ‘treatment’ was that more important than the 
fact that I was introduced by my contact as ‘a person who can be trusted’, I was 
perceived to be a student who presented no danger. In addition to that, the lack of any 
tradition of similar empirical studies at the Law Office or any other criminal justice 
agency, at this stage, turned out to be an advantage. At least, it saved me from long 
hours of negotiation about the technicalities of a research undertaking.
However, I was fully aware that formal access is not something which can be taken 
for granted after it has been given, neither problems of access cease when entry has 
been established. As Jupp (1989:149) warns, ‘this continuous process of negotiating 
access does not end when one has successfully bypassed all those who have some 
formal power to prevent the research taking place. Arrival at the sources of data 
provides no guarantee that research work can begin.’
Accessing a setting is far more than the granting or withholding of permission by the 
‘gate keepers’. It is widely acknowledged by researchers that another negotiation 
begins once you enter the field. The researchers need to capture the cooperation o f the 
members of the organisation with whom they will have the most immediate contact: 
‘Once research access to an organisation has been negotiated successfully, it then 
becomes necessary constantly to renegotiate access to the lives and experiences o f the
79
Chapter Three: Research Strategies and Methodology
individual members of that organisation. “Getting on” with respondents is 
fundamental to the quantity and quality of data collected5 (Buchanan et al. 1988:58). 
This point conveniently brings me to the value of the preparatory period of the 
research not only for building up rapport but also for a number of other issues.
Preparatory period
‘Until w e enter the field, w e do not know  what questions to ask or how  to 
ask them. In other words, the preconceived image w e have o f  the settings 
and people w e intend to study may be naive, misleading, or downright 
fa lse.5 (Taylor and Bogdan 1998:25)
It has been advocated, that in exploratory research the best move is ‘to get your feet 
wet5, enter the field, gaining some intimacy with the situation and then decide on your 
specific research methods. Until you are actually engaged in the study, you can not be 
sure which of the lines you have in mind will be most fruitful (Taylor and Bogdan 
1998). This made me realise the need for a preparatory period in order to facilitate the 
selection of the most suitable methods of data collection. This initial period proved to 
be of extreme value also in a number of other ways. Before describing how it assisted 
me in constructing my specific methodology, I will detail some other aspects of 
fieldwork it made me recognise and obstacles it helped me overcome.
i) Entering the field -  Establishing rapport
The first days of the fieldwork were definitely the most difficult ones. Having a legal 
educational background and a short but intense relevant working experience, a 
criminal justice agency did not seem a completely unfamiliar environment to me. 
Entering the field I might not have experienced a ‘cultural shock5, as other researchers 
recall from their fieldwork; however, I was definitely preoccupied with the same silly- 
sounding but very ‘stressful questions5: ‘who looks too busy to talk to me? Where can 
I sit without being in the way? Can I walk around? What can I do to avoid sticking out 
like a sore thumb? Who looks approachable?5 (Taylor and Bogdan 1998:45).
During the very first days, collecting data appeared to be secondary to getting to know 
the setting and the people. I discovered that just wandering around the corridors of the
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Office, the library, even the photocopy room brought with it numerous opportunities 
to be introduced to people, explaining why I was there, listen to informative 
conversations and slowly but steadily become a familiar face in the Office.
During this period, I realised that the decisive battle of real access in the organisation 
was not fought at the top (that one, as I explained earlier, was not really a battle) but 
at the lower level of each Law Officer. I understood, early enough, that the permission 
of the Deputy Attorney General was not itself enough to achieve a sustained level of 
cooperation with the Law Officers. My effort was to make them understand the aim of 
my study and feel that they could contribute to it and then gain their trust dispelling 
notions of an obtrusive research approach. All the researchers highlight the 
importance of gaining the approval and establishing the trust of the ‘actual people 
researched.’ In practice, I recognised that this requires a constant and delicate 
negotiation but when achieved, it certainly makes life in the field much easier. Further 
on (arguing about the validity of my research), I will discuss why I think that I 
managed to establish such a relationship with most of the Law Officers.
ii) Key informants
Some people from the very beginning of this preparatory period seemed to be more 
willing to help than others. I was very lucky to have the support of a very respected 
and knowledgeable Law Officer who became, as Taylor and Bogdan (1998) would 
call him, my ‘key informant’ at that stage. During the first days in the Office, he 
showed me around, introduced me to other Law Officers and he was also tipping me 
off about crucial information. However, although it was extremely helpful to have as 
an informal ‘sponsor’ an ‘insider’ of the setting, I had soon to acknowledge the danger 
of assuming that all informants shared the same perspective or had the same depth of 
knowledge as he had.15 As the days passed, I started interacting with other Officers 
and broadening my sources of information.
iii) Detecting the most suitable methods of data collection
This initial period, besides teaching me how to act appropriately in the setting, 
helping to break the ice and establishing my identity as a trustworthy person, it was
15 See Van Maanen (1988).
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originally designed to assist me with selecting the most suitable methods of data 
collection. I spent more than three weeks at the Law Office doing virtually a bit of 
everything. I visited the offices of a number of Law Officers and discussed with them 
different aspects of their work. I also observed prosecutors handling criminal cases at 
various stages: e.g. reviewing criminal files sent to them by the police, preparing for 
court hearings, meeting police officers and prosecution witnesses, appearing at court, 
etc. That gave me a clearer picture of the procedures that were followed and enabled 
me to uncover some aspects of the working practices of the Law Office that 
previously were not apparent. What is more, I was provided with a better 
understanding of the Law Office’s actual workload, which was not clearly defined 
anywhere causing confusion and only unclear speculations. This enabled me to detect 
the most suitable methods for data collection which could correspond to the diversity 
of the Law Office’s workload and powers.
Specific methods of data collection
Subsequently, in this section, I will embark upon a detailed account of my methods of 
data collection after the exegesis of the multi-method approach I employed.
i) Multi-method approach -  Triangulation
‘A ll methods have their strengths and weaknesses, better to ask what 
combination o f  strategies w ill be most adequate and most fruitful.’
(Bulmer 1984:32, original em phasis)
Most researchers recognise the advantages of combining a variety of techniques of 
data collection and encourage a multi-method approach which can produce different 
data useful for addressing the same research problem (Trow 1957). Moreover, 
qualitative research itself is inherently multi-method in focus (Brewer and Hunter 
1989). It is advocated, that the combination of multiple methods, empirical materials 
and perspectives in a single study is best understood as a strategy that adds rigor, 
breadth and depth to any investigation (Flick 1992).
Furthermore, the value of ‘across-method triangulation’ (Denzin 1989), whereby the 
use of more than one method of data collection is employed, is that it balances the
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strengths and the weaknesses of differing methods. Besides having the benefit of 
producing a rich stream of data, triangulation assists in raising social scientists above 
particular biases that stem from single methodologies and provides some internal 
‘quality control’ for the research.
The preparatory period I spent at the Law Office was crucial for the adoption of a 
multi-method approach for my research. What I observed was that part of the 
prosecutors’ work was written and file-based, part of it centred around the formal 
verbal exchanges in court and some of the particularly interesting issues were dealt 
with by means of informal chats and telephone conversations with the defence 
attorneys, the police and other prosecution agents as well as with colleagues. 
Moreover, the broad variety of duties that comprised the Law Office’s workload 
entailed sufficiently wide-ranging aspects to require an equally wide-ranging selection 
of methods of collecting data. Therefore, in order to achieve a good coverage of 
prosecutorial practices and cover the breadth of prosecutorial work, I decided to 
combine observation and informal discussions with a survey o f  documentary 
materials (examination of criminal files) and semi-structured interviews (see figure 1 
at p. 91). Many researchers advocate the combination of the above techniques and 
argue that data collected by each of them come to complement each other (Denzin 
1989, Taylor and Bogdan 1998),16 and, thus, enhance reliability and validity.
ii) Methods of data collection
1. Observation
‘One must immerse on eself in everyday reality — feel it, touch it, hear it
and see it — in order to understand it.’ (Kotarba and Fontana 1984:6)
Observation was essential in giving a good overall understanding of the work of the 
Attorney General’s Office and providing a framework for the rest of the research. It
16 Young (1996), acknowledging the complexity o f studying especially discretionary power, advocates 
sensitive methodological strategies and a combination o f  methods. He points out that the decision 
maker being studied may be unwilling or unable to articulate the reasons why decisions are reached; 
therefore, interviews must be supplemented by other methods, such as the examination o f records.
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was an ongoing activity existing even in parallel with the use of the other techniques. 
This was expected, since the very concept of observation is defined by some 
researchers as a field strategy that simultaneously combines document analysis, 
interviews of respondents and informants, direct participation and observation and 
introspection (Denzin 1989 and Bogdan and Taylor 1998). One of the strengths of 
‘direct observation’17 is that it allows the researcher to look behind the formal aspects 
of organisational settings and to reveal the aspects of their every day life.
I spent more than five months (including the pre-fieldwork period) at the Law Office 
on a daily basis during their working hours18 trying to observe every aspect of their 
work and grasp their routine. Most of my time in the Office was devoted to reading 
files and having informal conversations with the Law Officers. It was not possible to 
have my own desk in an office but that proved to be an advantage rather than a 
drawback. The first option I had was sitting at the Library situated next to the 
Conference Room. While studying there, I had the opportunity to hold very 
interesting discussions with most of the Law Officers, who were frequently visiting 
the Library looking for Law Reviews and legal textbooks. I was also able to attend 
some meetings of Law Officers taking place at the Conference Room, about which I 
probably would not have found out if I were not in the right place at the right time. As 
a second option, I was sometimes allowed to examine criminal files at Law Officers’ 
offices.19 This enabled me to discuss with the Law Officers the decisions they had 
made in particular cases, while they were dealing with their office work. Being there, 
I was also able to listen to the Law Officers dictating correspondence, having 
telephone conversations and discussing cases with fellow Law Officers. Moreover, 
Law Officers were commenting on their work and were showing me other criminal 
files they were dealing with. I was often present when police officers or defence
171 use the same term that Hodgson (2005:10) uses to describe her field role agreeing with her that this 
term is preferable to the most commonly used ‘participant observation’, ‘as it more accurately 
describes the role o f the observer who remains a researcher, rather than a participant in the sense o f  
contributing to the goals o f the organisation under study.’
18 Law Office’s working hours are: Monday to Friday 07:30-14:30 except from Thursday which are 
07:30-13:30 and 14:30-18:00. These are also the working hours o f Courts and Public Services in 
Cyprus.
19 Each Law Officer either has his/her own room or shares a room with another Law Officer.
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attorneys had meetings with the Law Officers to discuss about particular cases (or, 
occasionally, to investigate the possibility of an ‘informal plea-bargain’). These 
observations generated a considerable amount of information. I was keeping notes 
during the day and writing up more extensive notes each evening.
In addition to the above, I often accompanied the Law Officers appearing in courts on 
behalf of the Attorney General.20 There were about 15 Officers who would exclusively 
or mostly deal with criminal cases at the Law Office.21 During my fieldwork period I 
managed to accompany and observe 9 of them at court. My initial intention was to 
follow a number of cases from the arrival of the criminal file at the Office up to the 
outcome of the trial through all their trial stages. The long period of time that 
intervenes between these two stages, various difficulties with the listing of cases and 
the very frequent adjournments made this impossible for a large number of cases. 18 
cases were followed through their trial stages and provided me with valuable 
information, as well as offered me a fuller picture of the procedure, necessary to keep 
in mind while reviewing documentary evidence.22 Although these cases were not 
enough for a proper analysis of the role of the Law Officers in presenting cases at 
court -  my research anyway intended to focus more on the pre-trial role of the 
Attorney General -  that aspect of my fieldwork was a precious experience in many 
ways. I was able to observe the Law Officers ‘at work’ both in and outside the 
courtroom. Thus, for example, I was able to listen to discussions between police 
officers -  usually the investigators of the offence -  and Law Officers before the court 
session began or to informal conversations between the Law Officers and the defence 
attorneys. Moreover, travelling to and from the court with the Law Officers provided
20 Most o f the time, I was accompanying Law Officers at Assize Courts, where they usually appear and 
most of the cases I followed up to the end were Assize Court cases. I managed though, to observe a few 
cases at District Courts in order to have at least a flavour o f this procedure. My limited time and the 
fact that 1 was working alone, inevitably forced me to choose the most important category o f  cases to 
focus on, without, however, totally ignoring the rest.
21 During Mr Markidis’ tenure, the Law Office was theoretically divided into various divisions (e.g. 
Civil Law, Administrative Law and Criminal Law divisions); see Chapter Five, Section 11(c). Although 
Law Officers did not strictly come under one o f  them, those 15 Law Officers were either exclusively or 
mostly dealing with prosecutions.
22 Some o f these cases had not been completed by the day I left the field. However, 1 was able to find 
out about their outcome from communication with the LO presenting them, after I left the field.
85
Chapter Three: Research Strategies and Methodology
an excellent opportunity for informal discussions not only about the cases presented in 
court but also about a variety of other issues.
2. Examination of documents
In order to put into context the data collected by observation and informal discussions 
and, thus, strengthen the database, examination of criminal files and other 
documentary materials was necessary.
a) Review o f  criminal files
As mentioned earlier, there is not a very clear distribution of criminal cases between 
the Attorney General’s Office and the Police Prosecution Departments. In order to get 
a real sense of the extent of the Law Office’s involvement in prosecutions, I had to 
explore how this was translated in everyday practice. My preliminary observations 
enabled me to sketch an outline of the Law Office’s workload. There were, however, 
a number of questions to be answered: Which cases actually reach the Law Office, 
what type of cases are usually judged as ‘sensitive’ or ‘complex’, which are filtered 
out of the system, etc? The right way to arrive in answers regarding these issues was 
(besides observing) by examining the files that were allocated to Law Officers and 
discover what type of cases they were concerning.
Every day, files concerning the review of criminal cases that were forwarded to the 
Attorney General’s Office were allocated to six particular Law Officers. Although, as 
I stated earlier, there were 15 Law Officers dealing with criminal cases, only these six 
used to receive criminal files coming under this category of the Law Office’s 
workload (if they could not manage all of them, they would distribute them to the rest 
of the Law Officers). In order to cover all types of cases reaching the Office and 
study the decision-making strategy adopted by each Law Officer, each week I would 
locate (with the precious help of the administrative staff), and then examine, all the 
files allocated to a different Law Officer. Although I used a rather flexible format, 
capable of responding to the particular characteristics of each category of cases, in so 
far as possible I recorded the same basic information from each file. I was making 
notes on the type of case and offences they were concerned, the reason they were 
referred to the Law Office and the information the police sent to the Law Office (e.g. 
the summary of evidence, the record of interviews, witness statements and
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confidential information). All papers with the information sent by the police were 
placed inside a file jacket upon which the Law Officers would record their opinion, 
directions or advice depending on the specific circumstances. Sometimes they wrote 
in some detail the reasons for their decisions, but on other occasions the comments 
were quite brief. However, in a later instance, the notes that were made were 
occasionally used as a basis for discussions in which prosecutors would elaborate on 
their reasons.
In total 183 files of this category were examined.23 The selection procedure I 
employed (described above) ensured that in this sample all types of cases which 
usually reach the Law Office were represented. However, since the data to be drawn 
from my research methods were to be primarily qualitative and were not intended to 
be statistically representative, the size of the sample was not as critical as it would 
have been for an equivalent quantitative study. Nor was it necessary or even possible 
for the total number of files to be decided firmly in advance. Thus, the final sample 
size was the result of a balance between what would be manageable in the time 
available and what I conceived in practice to be large enough to produce sufficient 
material for the type of my study.24
b) Examination o f  requests for the entering o f  nolle prosequi submitted by defendants 
There was a special procedure followed regarding this aspect of the Law Office’s 
workload, in which eleven Law Officers25 were employed. Every week a different one 
was responsible to deal with all requests that reached the Law Office. 53 requests for 
the entering of a nolle prosequi and the outcome of them were examined during my 
fieldwork period. In this sample I included an almost equal number of requests 
reviewed by each Law Officer. As with the files I reviewed, I did not predefine a
23 118 o f them concerned cases coming under category four o f  Law Office’s workload and 65 cases 
under category five (see Figure 1 on p.91).
24 It has to be noted, here, that a significant part o f the Law Office’s workload was not necessarily file- 
based. See, for example in Chapter Six, the cases for which the Law Office’s advice was sought during 
the investigative stage: for serious cases, police investigators used to come to the Office in person and 
consult with the Law Officers. See also footnote 73 in Chapter Five.
25 Seven out o f those eleven Law Officers were part o f the group o f Law Officers who were exclusively 
or mostly dealing with criminal cases in the Law Office, while for four o f them criminal cases 
constituted only one o f the various aspects o f their work in the Office.
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certain number of requests which needed to be examined. In this case, the final size 
was less the result of time considerations than the effect of the ‘theoretical saturation’, 
as Adler and Adler (1994) describe the point when the generic features of the new 
findings start to consistently replicate earlier ones.
c) Attachments to the Attorney General
Realising that I would not be able to follow many ‘live’ cases concerning indictable 
offences through all their trial stages (see above), I decided to employ an additional 
method of exploring decision making regarding this category of cases. I was informed 
that after the completion of a case before an Assize Court, the Officer in charge sends 
to the Attorney General the decision of the Court accompanied with an attachment 
explaining how she/he handled the case and offering a critique of the outcome. Access 
to these attachments was relatively easy. I examined 60 attachments, which 
represented virtually almost all the attachments of cases finalised during 2001. I 
acknowledge the limitations involved in finding out about a case based on what is 
written afterwards. A written record of what has happened is never a full one and 
there is always the danger that some information could have been written so as to 
justify a decision rather than directly reflecting the actual basis on which the decision 
was made. Therefore, their purpose of and the possible bias within them were 
critically appraised and borne in mind throughout the analysis of the information 
collected from these documents. Although I had the opportunity to discuss some of 
these cases with the Law Officers, clarify issues and gain additional information about 
them, I have to note that few of these attachments were as detailed and thorough as I 
would wish and, therefore, they were only used as a supplementary source of data 
instead of a primary one.
3. Semi-structured interviews
The advantages of interviews as a combined method of data collection with
observation has been well documented (see e.g. Hammersley and Atkinson 1995).
Therefore, besides everyday informal discussions, semi-structured interviews during
the last period of my fieldwork were designed to clarify observed procedural details
and to act as a method of preventing me from misinterpreting events or wrongly
giving significance to observed situations. Apart from this ‘factual’ sort of
information, I was also particularly interested in eliciting from Law Officers their own
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views about their role in the prosecution system and about how they put this role into 
practice. Moreover, I wanted to gain an insight into their perceptions and philosophies 
about a variety of issues; for example, their approach to prosecutorial discretion, 
explanation of their own experiences in the system, their opinions and views on their 
relationship with the police, etc. Using Fionda’s (1995:4) words referring to her own 
empirical study, ‘(t)he interview technique lended itself particularly well to this 
project since prosecutors were able to give reflective and thoughtful explanations of 
their own experiences in the system as well as their opinions and views about current 
criminal policy in general.’
Therefore, I carried out semi-structured interviews with 13 Law Officers (out of 15 
LOs dealing with criminal cases26). The semi-structured form of interviewing was 
elected because it was more flexible and thus, suitable for the aims of my interviews 
(Bryman 1989). The interviews were conducted in the LOs’ offices and they tended to 
last a couple of hours. I used an aide-memoire, which reminded me of the topics I 
wanted to cover, while I was giving the Law Officers latitude over what they wanted 
to say and how to say it. Written notes were taken during the interviews and these 
were later expanded to reflect the contents of the interviews as fully as possible. I 
made a conscious decision not to force them to accept a tape recorder as soon as I 
realised that they did not feel comfortable with the idea of being recorded and that 
could inhibit the openness of their responses. I felt that insisting on using a tape 
recorder while they were assuring me that ‘they will talk slowly and I could stop them 
anytime I wanted so I could write down everything’ would emote unwanted 
suspicions and fears without making that much difference. The inability to use a tape 
recorder surely had some implications for my recording of the information; it was 
difficult to record the information verbatim although the field notes were as faithful to 
the original phrasing of comments as possible. However, it also had advantages; while 
writing down their responses, LOs had some time to think, clarify earlier remarks, add 
to earlier responses or refer to examples they could not recall previously. Moreover, in 
this way, the very time consuming process of transcribing the tapes was avoided.
26 The other two were on leave for most o f the time 1 spent at the Law Office.
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Because of the distinct procedure that was followed regarding requests for a nolle 
prosequi and the special features that characterised this part of the Law Office 
workload, I conducted a separate series of interviews (10 interviews in total) with the 
responsible Law Officers, devoted exclusively on this aspect of their work. These 
interviews tended to last about 40 minutes.
In the last week of my fieldwork period I managed to interview apart from the 
Attorney General (see section III), the Deputy Attorney General.27 The interview with 
the latter lasted about two hours and thirty minutes in total,28 and I was allowed to use 
a tape recorder. This interview was extremely beneficial and informative, particularly 
regarding the policy of the Law Office as far as prosecutions are concerned and the 
relationships of the Law Office with other agents involved in the prosecution process.
In addition to these interviews, I carried out a semi-structured interview lasting fifty 
minutes with the head of the Police Prosecution Department in Nicosia and another 
one lasting almost an hour with the head of the Police Prosecution Department in 
Limassol. I also had the opportunity to hold briefer and more unstructured discussions 
with the Chief of the Cyprus Police and the head of the Central Police Prosecution 
Department as well as with three Defence Attorneys.29 These interviews aimed to 
offer me an insight (limited I admit) into the relationship of the Law Office with other 
participants in the prosecution process from these participants’ points of view and to 
provide possibly alternative understandings of the Attorney General’s Office role. 
Moreover, the interviews with the Police Officers were valuable in supplying me with 
information about the cases that they usually forward to the Law Office and about the 
procedures which are followed for each category of cases. It has to be mentioned here 
that apart from these more formal interviews with these criminal justice agents, there 
were also other opportunities for me to hold valuable discussions with them, mainly 
with police officers (investigators) and defence lawyers when they were visiting the 
Law Office to discuss cases with the Law Officers or when appearing in Court.
271 had the opportunity to hold informal discussions with the Deputy AG on several other occasions.
28 The interview with the Deputy AG had to be interrupted after the first hour due to a tape-recorder 
problem (!); however, Mr Klerides kindly agreed to continue the interview the next day.
29 These are three o f the 11-13 Attorneys who are specialised in criminal cases in Cyprus and their 
selection was made on an opportunistic basis.
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Figure 1: The Law Office’s workload and methods of data collection
(Research Strategy I)
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III. SECOND RESEARCH STRATEGY: DOCUMENTARY ANALYSIS AND 
INTERVIEWS WITH POST-HOLDERS
Attempting to place my research in a historical context and gather information of how 
succeeding Attorney Generals have approached their role and powers regarding 
prosecutions, two main methods of data collection were employed: a documentary 
analysis and interviews with post-holders. The advantages of using more than one 
method of data collection have been presented earlier in this chapter when discussing 
about the various methods I employed during my fieldwork study.
Documentary analysis
My first step towards gaining information about how succeeding Attorney Generals 
have interpreted their powers was the search of any articles or books authored by 
them and published. I used the Supreme Court Library and the Law Office Library to 
locate such documents. Unfortunately, I discovered that only Mr Tomaritis authored a 
number of short monographs relevant to the role of the Law Office in prosecutions.30
My second step was to search inside the Law Office for internal circulars, press 
releases, memoranda or archival documents which were related to the prosecutorial 
role of the Law Office. I asked permission to access such documents and that was 
granted. With the assistance of one administrative officer, I discovered that most of 
these documents were kept under a series of files titled ‘Responsibilities of the 
Attorney General regarding prosecutions’ which were chronologically kept. In these 
files a variety of materials were placed including all the pre-mentioned types of 
documents, albeit without separating them in categories. Therefore, I went through all 
of these files in order to discover what was relevant to my study. Unfortunately, there 
were not many documents authored by the Attorney Generals, but there was some 
interesting information in them which was sufficient to shed some light on the 
Attorney Generals’ approach towards their role in prosecutions. The very fact that 
there was only limited written information on this issue even within the Law Office 
was another indication that the succeeding office-holders have been avoiding the -  at 
least direct -  specification of their broad powers.
30 Nevertheless, after a newspaper search I found a couple o f interviews given by Mr Markidis and one 
by Mr Triantafyllides in which they reflected inter alia on issues relevant to their prosecutorial role.
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Interviews with the Attorney Generals
Having completed the examination of documents, I proceeded to the second method 
of data collection: interviews with the post-holders themselves. This sought to gain a 
more direct view of how succeeding Attorney Generals translated their role over time 
and therefore, add to the information gathered by the documentary analysis.
‘Elites need to be interviewed. The best w ay o f  finding out about people is 
talking to them. It cannot guarantee to secure the truth, especially from people 
w ell practised in the arts o f  discretion, but it is surely superior to any alternative 
w ays o f  discovering what they believe or d o .’ (Crewe 1974:43)31
I firstly approached Mr TriantafyHides and asked him to give me an interview, 
explaining in brief the nature of my research study. He agreed and we arranged a 
meeting at his office a couple of weeks afterwards.32 That interview lasted about one 
and a half hours and written notes were taken. While at the Law Office during my 
main fieldwork period, I also had the chance to interview Mr Markidis.33 His 
interview lasted about an hour and fifteen minutes and I was allowed to use a tape 
recorder. Several months after the completion of my main fieldwork, Mr Markidis 
resigned and Mr Nikitas was appointed to the office. To keep my research up to date, 
I decided to extend my research study so that his approach on the Law Office’s 
prosecutorial role could also be covered. Therefore, I employed both of my methods 
of data collection (that I used for the other Attorney Generals) in order to cover Mr 
Nikitas’ tenure as well. As far as the interview was concerned, I sent him an official 
letter asking to interview him and we arranged a meeting at his office for this 
purpose.34 That interview lasted about an hour and 20 minutes. The semi-structured 
form of interviewing was elected for all three interviews because it was flexible 
enough to cover all the topics I wanted to, while at the same time it was giving the 
Attorney Generals latitude over what they wanted to say and how to say it.
31 Quoted in Malleson (1995:69).
32 Date o f the interview: 01/02/2002.
33 Date o f the interview: 15/05/2002.
34 Date o f the interview: 11/01 /2004.
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I felt particularly privileged to be able to interview those three post-holders, given the 
well-known problems which researchers usually face when approaching elites for any 
kind of research.351 had a unique opportunity to gain first hand information about an 
area regarding which even indirect information had been very limited. At the same 
time, I fully acknowledge that the data collected especially concerning the tenures of 
the rest of the office-holders, apart form Mr Markidis, are limited; they offer a 
restricted account of the actual working of the Office during those times (since they 
are not corroborated by direct observation as the data on Mr Markidis’ tenure are). 
Having said that, it has to be mentioned that the main purpose of this part of the 
research was not so much to produce a complete picture of the day-to-day life of the 
Office through time; it was predominantly to gather information of how succeeding 
Attorney Generals themselves have approached their role and powers regarding 
prosecutions.
IV. RELIABILITY, VALIDITY AND DATA ANALYSIS
The traditional criteria of methodological adequacy, validity and reliability were 
formulated and initially associated with the positivist paradigm. Positivists’ obsession 
with objectivity, based on the assumption that everything in the universe can in 
principle be explained in terms of causality, led them to insist on and emphasise the 
need for standardised and rigid procedures in order to gain validity and reliability for 
a research project. In response to the extreme positivist assumptions, some social 
sciences have tended to overreact by stressing the possibility of alternative 
interpretations of everything to the excluding of any effort to choose among them.361 
do not support this extreme relativism but I do acknowledge that qualitative research 
is inherently more flexible and interpretevistic than other paradigms and therefore, it 
should be assessed in this context. However, this does not mean that qualitative 
researchers should be unconcerned about the accuracy of their data. ‘A qualitative 
study is not an impressionistic, off-the-cuff analysis based on a superficial look at a 
setting or people. It is a piece of systematic research conducted with demanding, 
though not necessarily standardised, procedures’ (Taylor and Bogdan 1998:9). Some
35 See Reiner (1992) and Hammersley and Atkinson (1995).
36 For a critic o f both extremes, see Kirk and Miller (1986).
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concerns about the reliability and validity of my project and how I dealt with them 
follow here.
Reliability
A criticism levelled especially against observational research is that it lacks reliability. 
‘(W)ithout statistical analysis to confirm the significance of observed patterns or 
trends, researchers cannot ensure that their findings are real and not merely the effects 
of chance’ (Adler and Adler 1994:381).37 As Dawe (1973) points out direct or 
participant observers need to consider the impact of their own views on the research 
because any interpretation of subjective meaning will inevitably incorporate the 
researcher’s own perceptions and experience. There is no guarantee that if another 
researcher entered the same research setting, he/she would perceive things in the same 
way or record the same things. However, it is emphasised that the reliability of 
ethnographic research should not be measured by the ability of another researcher to 
replicate findings (Hammersley 1990). The fact that the researcher’s own values 
inescapably affect the research means that it is important for researchers to be value 
aware:
‘There is no neutral Archimedean point from which objective data can be 
collected: the researcher always influences the social interactions that constitute 
the data. A ll one can do is seek to be reflectively aware o f  this and interpret 
material in the light o f  the probable biases.’ (Reiner 2000:221)
Nevertheless, it has been advocated that the researcher’s views are less likely to 
influence ethnographic research than research carried out using more structured 
methods, because the ethnographer does not have rigid hypotheses that he/she wants 
to test (Becker 1970b). In my research, I did not have any firm preconception about 
what I might find in the Law Office, because little was actually known about that 
organisation; therefore, it would be justified to argue that the probability of observer 
bias might have been reduced. Moreover, as Hutter (1988) remarks, it is difficult for 
the researcher to record the deviant when the research subjects engage in quite
37 See also Denzin (1989).
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routinised behaviour and the researcher is in contact with them for a relatively long 
time, as in my case.
Validity
In a qualitative study, the researchers need to be watchful about some issues that 
could weaken their data and employ some tactics which validate and increase 
confidence in the findings of their research (Miles and Huberman 1994):
i) Checking for researcher’s effects
More crucially than in other cases, researchers who carry out direct observation need 
to address the effect that their presence may have had on the research subjects. While 
negotiating my field role with the Law Officers -  my research subjects-, I was aware 
of the significance of convincing them that I was not ‘important’. Becker (1970a) has 
commented that the researchers are not normally as important to the research subjects 
as what they are doing at the moment of observation. However, difficulties may arise 
if, for example, informants believe that the researchers know someone at the top of 
the service. As I secured access to the Law Office from the Attorney General and the 
Deputy Attorney General, I had to convince them about my real research purposes 
and establish a relation of trust. From the beginning, I assured the Law Officers that 
their anonymity would be protected in any case (e.g. in future publications). Most 
importantly, on every occasion, I was stressing that I was not reporting to their 
superiors nor discussing with their colleagues the views or comments made by 
individual Law Officers. The impression I got was that I was perceived as a ‘non 
threatening’ student. There were occasions, especially in the first days of my 
fieldwork, where I was fed the ‘official line’. As time passed though, generally the 
Law Officers did appear to trust me and instead of the ‘official line’ they more often 
told me that ‘sometimes we do that, although we are supposed to do this.’ They very 
often made ‘off the record’ comments and occasionally discussed some of their 
colleagues in negative terms or criticised some of their superiors’ decisions, signs 
which by themselves indicated a level of trust. Furthermore, especially at the initial 
stages, the student definition offered me the opportunity to appear quite credible in the 
‘ignorant and inexperienced’ role (Powell 1985) and encouraged Law Officers to be 
more explicit about what they were doing.
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ii) Checking for representativeness
Representativeness in qualitative research does not represent what exactly the same 
term does in quantitative studies. It was not a purpose of my study to analyse a strictly 
statistical representative sample of cases. However, the small size of the Law Office 
and the long period I spent there38 allowed me to cover almost all aspects of 
prosecution practices and types of cases, as well as to observe virtually all the Law 
Officers working at the Office. This gives me some confidence to argue that I reported 
what normally occurs in the setting and formed a full picture of its workload.
iii) Getting feedback from the informants
As Miles and Huberman (1994:275) point out ‘(o)ne of the most logical sources of 
corroboration is the people you have talked with and watched. After all, an alert and 
observant actor in the setting is bound to know more than the researcher ever will 
about the realities under investigation.’ During my fieldwork, building up a very good 
rapport with the Law Officers enabled me to seek clarification for certain findings. 
That occurred more often during the last period o f the fieldwork, when research 
findings began to take shape and the danger o f introducing bias by feeding 
information back was less possible.
Data analysis
Denzin and Lincoln (1994:14) remark that ‘qualitative research is endlessly creative 
and interpretive. The researcher does not just leave the field with mountains of 
empirical material and then easily write up his or her findings.’ Especially in an 
exploratory study, there is a constant interaction between research design, data 
collection and analysis.
I did not go into the field to test a particular well-formulated hypothesis; in this 
research the findings came from the data. My approach of analysis is an articulation of 
analytic induction and grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967), which essentially 
requires the making of constant comparisons between analytic categories identified by 
a careful reading and coding of the data. For example, as I discussed earlier, after
38 The fieldwork period lasted for about five months: the pre-fieldwork period for almost three weeks 
and the main fieldwork period for more than four months.
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some data collection through observation during my initial period of fieldwork, I was 
able to generate the various categories of the Law Office workload and then undertake 
further data collection in order to refine or expand my first impressions.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The findings of this research are set out and discussed in the following chapters. 
Derived from data collected by a blend of methods, they are arguably more valid and 
reliable than they could have been if drawn from one source alone. These data, 
gathered by ‘watching, asking and examining’ (Miles and Huberman 1994:19), are 
used to build up a picture of the role of the Attorney General’s Office in prosecutions: 
more particularly their workload, their powers regarding investigations and their 
principles and policies on prosecutions. It can be argued that given the strategic 
position of the Office within the prosecution process, an -  indirect and limited -  
insight into the whole prosecution system can be also achieved.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Introduction to Cyprus Law and Prosecution System
‘A system  o f  administering criminal justice is a detailed tapestry woven  
o f  many varied threads. It is often difficult to understand the nature and 
the significance o f  any particular fibre without at least a general 
appreciation o f  the function o f  the other threads, and also the realisation 
o f  the impact on the w hole.’(Pugh 1962: l ) 1
B y way of a background to the analysis in the more empirical chapters that follow,
this chapter will commence with a brief historical background to the legal system in 
Cyprus, followed by an outline of the criminal justice process and a study of the 
evolution and the legal framework of the prosecution system.
The first task is useful in gaining an understanding of the origins and the general 
characteristics of Cyprus law. Although Cyprus is mostly characterised as a common 
law jurisdiction, it will become apparent that it has attracted influences from various 
legal systems and under those influences even original common law institutions have 
been modified. The second section discusses the law relating to the criminal justice 
process, highlighting again its particular characteristics and the way that a written 
Constitution has modified some rules and practices of the original English system. 
Finally, in the last section, the evolution of a private system of prosecutions to a 
unique prosecution system which concentrates extensive powers in the Attorney 
General’s Office will be outlined and the present (limited and vague) legal provisions 
that regulate the prosecution process will be examined. This is essential in order to
1 Quoted in Johnson (2002:268).
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understand the inter-relationships of the various agencies that maintain an 
involvement in the prosecution of criminal offences and the key role of the Attorney 
General’s Office. In some aspects there is a blurred division of responsibilities 
between criminal justice agencies that needs to be further explored. Overall, in this 
chapter, I will provide a discussion of the law and describe how it serves as an 
additional context for the rhetoric and the operational practices regarding 
prosecutions, which I will investigate in the following chapters.
I. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF CYPRUS LAW
‘In contrast to its size and population Cyprus has an extensive legal 
history. Study o f  that legal evolution provides an exceptional 
e x a m p le ...o f the possibilities o f  harmonious co-existence and som etim es 
even the blending o f  legal system s/ (Markidis 2000: vii)
This section will examine the historical evolution of the Cyprus legal system in order 
to demonstrate that it incorporates influences from different families of law but also 
that, like other ‘mixed systems’, it ‘...has combined these influences with its own 
ethos to produce its distinct way of doing justice’ (Gebbie and Bein 2002:253).
Beginning with the Hellenic system of city-kingdoms,2 Cyprus legal history was 
influenced by neighbouring legal orders, such as those of Egypt, Babylonia and 
Assyria. As Markidis reports, ‘more permanent influences came in the Roman and 
Byzantine periods with the introduction of Roman law, its codification and 
development by Justinian, the second codification and further development during the 
reign of Leon the Sixth, and the growth of ecclesiastical law. In later periods, first the 
French customary law and then the Turkish law and the concepts of Sharia3 were 
brought to Cyprus, followed by English law from 1878’.4
2 For a detailed description o f the legal institutions o f  the Ancient Kingdoms o f Cyprus, see Colotas
(1988).
3 See Kemal Cicek (2002).
4 Markidis (2000:vii).
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With the Treaty of Constantinople of 4 June 1878 Turkey ceded Cyprus to Britain. 
Neocleous and Bevir (2000) report that when the British came to Cyprus they found a 
legal system already in place. There was inter alia the Imperial Ottoman Penal Code,
a comprehensive criminal code whose general arrangements followed that of the
French Penal Code (which had been enacted in 1858 and subsequently amended5). 
Meanwhile, the Sheri Courts (administering Islamic and Ottoman law) and the 
ecclesiastical courts of the Greek Orthodox Church had supreme authority in family 
matters, exercising jurisdiction over Muslims and Christians respectively. The same 
writers (2000:11) continue:
‘the British left this division intact for family matters and retained the Penal 
Code (which remained valid until 1928 when the Criminal Code now in force 
was introduced) but transferred jurisdiction in all other matters to the civil 
courts. Soon after their arrival, and probably in 1879, they established A ssize  
Courts, District Courts and a Supreme Court. The Supreme Court had 
jurisdiction over all criminal or civil causes that did not com e under the 
jurisdiction o f  the Ottoman C ourts...’
The judicial system was revised in 1882. The power of the Sheri Courts was further 
limited by the transfer of their jurisdiction to the civil courts.6 As Kapardis (2001) 
argues, the establishment of a decent court system in 1882, headed by legally 
qualified individuals instead of the cadis in Ottoman times, was one of the successes 
of the colonial administration, which managed to rid the courts of corruption and 
arbitrariness and establish a more equitable system of justice.7
When Britain annexed Cyprus in 1914, Cypriot residents became British subjects. 
Nevertheless, Ottoman law continued to be used in some cases, because litigants 
could choose to have their rights determined either by Ottoman or by English law. 
Simeonidis (2003:447-448) points out the peculiarity that the mixture of legal systems 
provoked: ‘Ottoman law was applied by English judges, trained in the common law 
and following the English procedure that had already been introduced in 1882. This
5 Loizou and Pikis (1975).
6 See Neocleous and Bevir (2000).
7 See also Katsiaounis (1996) and Georgallides (1979).
101
'  Chapter Four: Introduction to Cyprus Law and Prosecution System
was a very interesting phenomenon because all too often these judges resorted to 
English law to fill the real or imaginary gaps of Ottoman law.’8
In 1935 British common law was fully introduced in Cyprus and its broader principles 
were applied to all cases. Cyprus became a member of the common law family as of 
that year. In addition to the common law, Cyprus was now subject to all of the special 
British colonial legislation, as well as those statutes of the British Parliament which 
were of ‘general’ (as opposed to local) character.9 However, this should not give the 
impression that the 1935 law succeeded in, or even tried, eliminating the diversity of 
sources that comprised the law of Cyprus. According to Simeonidis (2003), legal 
diversity was not eliminated because, firstly, Ottoman law was partly preserved: (a) 
by retaining in force the Ottoman Land Code and the Maritime Code (which was at 
least partly French); and (b) by recognising the jurisdiction of the Muslim Religious 
Courts to adjudicate pursuant to their law matters of personal status of the Muslim 
inhabitants of the island; and, secondly, because Byzantine law was preserved through 
the recognition of the jurisdiction of the Episcopal Courts and the law-making 
authority of the Orthodox Church for matters of personal status of the Greek 
inhabitants.10
The Republic of Cyprus was established as an independent sovereign republic with a 
presidential regime11 on 16 August 1960, when its Constitution came into force and
8 For an overview o f the justice system in Cyprus during British rule, see Limbourides (1983).
9 The effects of the British common law on a culture different from that o f Britain and the discrepancy 
observed between a foreign law and local customs created a series o f legal conflicts. See Demetriadou
(1989).
10 Even some o f the statutes that the colonial authorities enacted during this period increased rather than 
decreased the diversity o f Cyprus law. For example, Contract Law and the Law on the Sale o f  Goods 
contained elements o f Indian, including Hindu, law, as they were copies o f codifications undertaken in 
India, another British colony, a few years earlier. Similarly, the Law o f Intestate Succession drew from 
provisions o f the Italian Civil Code, while the Law o f Horizontal Ownership o f Buildings was based on 
a corresponding Greek statute. For further analysis, see Simeonidis (1977).
11 The structure o f the new state was based on the separation o f powers. The legislative power vests in 
the House of Representatives, the executive power is exercised by the President and the Council o f  
Ministers and the judicial power is vested principally in the Supreme Court and its subordinate courts 
as established under Part X o f the Constitution.
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British sovereignty over Cyprus as a Crown Colony ceased. Cyprus had its first 
opportunity in centuries to decide on its own the future of its legal system. The 
Constitution provided that the Laws previously applicable should remain in force in 
the Republic, to the extent that they did not contravene the Constitution, until repealed 
or amended by its Laws.12 In the meantime, the pre-1960 Laws were to be interpreted 
consistently with, and when necessary adapted to, the Constitution. Thus, as 
Simeonidis (2003:449-450) points out ‘the Constitution provided the necessary legal 
continuity without prejudging the future legal orientation of the Republic’.
However, four months after the founding of the Republic, the Parliament passed a 
statute that according to Simeonidis (2003:450) ‘went much further than the letter and 
spirit of the Constitution, and sought to tie the legal system of Cyprus surreptitiously 
and permanently to the English common law’. Law 14 of 1960, provided inter alia 
that when not otherwise provided by applicable statutes, the courts of Cyprus would 
continue to apply the English ‘common law and the principles of equity.’ What was 
striking about this provision was that unlike other provisions of the same law, it 
contained no temporal limitations.13 Thus it authorised the application of not only the 
pre-independence common law, but also of the post-independence common law. 
According to one theory, this provision made the post-independence common law 
binding, not just persuasive, on the courts of Cyprus, subject only to the self-evident 
principle of compatibility with the Republic’s Constitution. As Simeonidis (2003:450) 
continues ‘(t)his meant that a post-1960 decision of the House of Lords would be 
binding on the courts of Cyprus, and -  what is more -  even if a subsequent statute of 
the British Parliament had superseded that decision’. In contrast to some very 
enthusiastic supporters of this view who believed that English law had served the
12 Article 188 o f the Constitution.
13 The general tactic that has been followed by other countries o f  the commonwealth was the adoption 
o f  common law with time limitations (Kenneth Roberts-Wray, 1966). See for example Section 7(2) in 
the Canadian Criminal Code o f 1954, which provided that: ‘The criminal law o f England that was in 
force in a province immediately before the Is' day o f April 1955 continues in force in the province 
except as altered by the Act or any other Act o f the Parliament o f  Canada’ (emphasis added).
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country well and should continue to do so,14 there were some others who expressed 
concern and criticised this provision in the Law.15 Simeonidis (2003:451) argued that 
‘this provision of the 1960 Law raised the spectre of Cyprus law becoming more 
English after independence than it had become during the relatively short British 
period.’ However, this ‘danger’ has not fully materialised, for a number of reasons:
1. Two years after Independence, when the Supreme Court was asked to follow 
English case law issued after 1960, it adopted the position that this did not have 
binding authority. It accepted though, that as a general practice (for reasons of 
‘judicial comity’) it would be followed,16 unless courts are convinced that it is false.
2. ‘Cyprus courts have asserted the right to subject the application of the English 
common law to the condition that it be ‘suitable for Cyprus’. This is similar to the 
position that American courts took during the formative period of American law 
before importing the common law of England. The difference is that in Cyprus there 
is no statutory authorisation for imposing this condition, although, as in the United 
States, there is ample justification in logic. As one Cyprus court noted, ‘(T)he 
Common law must be planted here as a living growth which can be pruned by judicial 
decision to suit local conditions [because]...the intention of the country’s legislator 
was the service of people in this country.17
3. Furthermore, Cyprus courts have exercised a quasi-legislative power in dealing 
with pre-1960 statutes that were found unconstitutional. In such cases, the courts have 
not confined themselves to the option of simply refusing to apply the particular 
statute, but have also employed the option of either abolishing the statute or 
‘amending’ it so as to make it consistent with the Republic’s Constitution.’ 
(Simeonidis 2003:451)18
14 See Pikis (1981), who argued that the reason why common law was adopted in Cyprus en masse with 
the Law 14/1960 was the common belief o f  both Greek and Turkish Cypriots that it had been tested in 
the country for a while and provided security for people and effective protection of civil rights.
15 Loucaides (1982).
16 Stylianou v. The Police (1962) 2 C.L.R. 152.
17 Paikkos v. Kontemeniotis, (1989) 1 C.L.R. 50 at 73.
18 Christodoulou v. The Republic (1967) 3 C.L.R. 691.
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4. The Supreme Court of Cyprus has drawn from non-English sources in at least two 
areas of public law. The first area is that of administrative law. Article 146 of the 
Republic’s Constitution provides that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review 
administrative acts and to annul them, if it finds them unconstitutional, illegal or ultra 
vires. Because Article 146 owes its origin to Continental legal sources, the Supreme 
Court has turned to Greek and French academic and judicial authorities, mainly the 
decisions of the Greek and French Conseil d ’ Etat. This gave rise to the creation of a 
whole new corpus of Cyprus law derived from Greek and French sources. A similar, 
but less pronounced, borrowing lfom non-English sources has also taken place in the 
area of constitutional law, particularly in the area of individual rights. English law was 
not particularly helpful in this area given the absence of a written constitution in 
England. This explains, at least to some extent, why in dealing with certain 
constitutional issues the Supreme Court of Cyprus has occasionally turned to the 
jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court (Simeonidis 2003:451).
To sum up this brief discussion of the evolution of Cyprus law, it can be said that 
Cyprus history is marked by long periods of foreign occupation and, consequently, its 
legal system is characterised by much diversity which reflects that past. Because 
Great Britain was its most recent foreign ruler, Cyprus has received and retained most 
of the essential elements of the English common law tradition, especially in the areas 
of procedure and methodology. However, Cyprus has also retained significant 
elements of Roman-Byzantine law and Ottoman land law and, since winning its 
independence in 1960, has borrowed heavily from Greek and French administrative 
and public law in general. Before the accession to the European Union in May 2004, 
Cyprus had also harmonised its public and private law with that of the Union. 
Moreover, the Cyprus legal profession is no longer as tied to England as it was before 
and shortly after independence. Although many Cypriots continue to study Law in 
England, equally as many, if not more, do so in Greece (given the very close relations 
and national ties between Cyprus and Greece) and are inescapably influenced by the 
continental legal system of this country.19 Therefore, although some still insist to
19 See Simeonids (2003). Until 1988, the official language in courts was English. With the enactment of 
Law 67/1988 the use o f Greek was established.
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characterise Cyprus as a common law country,20 it becomes obvious that, especially in 
the course of the last four decades, the Cyprus legal system has gradually moved 
closer to being characterised as a ‘mixed legal system’.21
‘ ...th e  above developm ents and borrowings contributed to turning the 
law  o f  Cyprus into a fascinating legal m osaic where the English common  
law coexists with Greek and French administrative law, European and 
American constitutional principles, Roman-Byzantine law, and Ottoman 
law. The fact that this diverse law is applied and reshaped by Cypriot 
judges, som e o f  whom have been trained in the common law tradition and 
increasingly more o f  whom have been trained in the Greek and 
Continental tradition, makes the Cypriot amalgam one o f  the most 
interesting legal system s within the Western legal fam ily.’(Sim eonidis 
2003:453)
II. THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
It can be argued that criminal law and procedure represent areas where the common 
law tradition and principles have been preserved to a greater extent compared to other 
areas of Cyprus law. Having said that, even in this area the influence of other legal 
systems is not totally absent and often provisions originating from them are being 
advocated for proposed changes in Cyprus criminal procedure.22 The variety of 
influences, although not objectionable per se, combined with the absence of a detailed 
and systematic review of the system, sometimes leads to confusion about the 
principles and aims of the criminal justice system. It is regrettable that criminal 
procedure has received only intermittent official attention since the foundation of the
20 ‘(A)lthough Cyprus legal system comprises various statutes not based solely on English law but also 
on various other continental legislation, nevertheless, the common law cardinal rules o f  legal 
construction continue to prevail and the Republic o f Cyprus may still be considered as a common law 
country’ (Tomaritis 1982:40).
21 For further discussion, see Simeonidis (1977) and Neocleous (2000).
22 See particularly the discussions about the reform o f the Evidence Law in criminal cases (House o f  
Representatives: Discussions on the Draft Bill on Evidence, 2001-2003).
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state and there has never been a designed strategy to update the system in a structured 
and comprehensive way.
Law in force
The relevant law which presently regulates criminal justice is embodied in the 
Criminal Code (Cap. 154) and the Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155), while the 
structure and jurisdiction of the Courts are regulated by the Courts of Justice Law, No. 
14/60. The courts involved in the administration of criminal justice are: (a) the 
District Courts (single Judge), (b) the Assize Courts (three Judges), and (c) the 
Supreme Court in its appellate jurisdiction.
The Criminal Code represents a codified version of all major offences which exist 
under common law. As was stated previously, though, prior to the British occupation 
the applicable criminal law was the Ottoman Penal Code, which was mainly based on 
the continental European law (especially the French Penal Code). Therefore, in the 
existing criminal code, certain resemblances to the Ottoman Penal Code can still be 
identified, such as in the area of premeditated murder, where no malice aforethought 
is required, in contrast to the common law.23
The system of criminal procedure currently in force in Cyprus originates from the 
English system of criminal proceedings which, however, has been adapted in certain 
respects to Cyprus standards. The Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155) is based on 
English statutes regulating criminal procedure and clearly states that where no 
provision is made in the Law or in any other enactment in force for the time being in 
Cyprus, every court shall in criminal proceedings ‘apply the law and rules of practice 
relating to criminal procedure for the time being in force in England/24 Three crucial 
points should be kept in mind at this point:
1. In interpreting the above Laws, the Cyprus judiciary is assisted by the precedents of 
English case law. Although, as was shown above, according to the Supreme Court, 
these have no binding authority, they nevertheless provide useful guidance on
23 Clerides (1984).
24 Criminal Procedure Law Cap. 155 s. 3.
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numerous points of law, and it is rarely that the courts will depart from them.25 On the 
other hand, decisions of the Cyprus Supreme Court are binding on all inferior courts.
2. A very important difference between Cyprus and other common law judicial 
systems, which in some cases modifies the orthodox common law criminal procedure 
rules or the interpretation of them, is that the jury system is not and has never been 
applicable in Cyprus.26 It has been asserted that the sitting of three Judges to deal with 
serious criminal cases in the Assize Court makes up for the jury’s absence to a 
considerable extent,27 but others claim that this absence takes away from the trial the 
democratic element of public participation in the administration of justice.28
3. Criminal law and procedure are also influenced by the civil rights and liberties 
entrenched in the Constitution. Article 11.5 of the Constitution partly reproduced the 
provisions of Article 5(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which was 
ratified by Law 39/1962, and it forms part of the legal order of Cyprus.29 Artemis 
remarked that ‘the Constitution has moulded present day rules of criminal law and 
procedure in such a manner as to uphold in an effective way civil rights and liberties’ 
(1989: 4016).30
25 Especially in this area o f law, Cyprus courts appear more reluctant to deviate from common law 
principles; see Loizou (1968) and Artemis (1989).
26 The British did not introduce the jury system in all o f their former colonies, as the public 
participation in the administration o f criminal justice was not well suited to a colonial regime. See 
Kapardis (2001:60). See also Vidmar (2002), who reports that the jury system was introduced in a 
number of British colonies, albeit with various modifications (e.g. in some African colonies only 
whites were eligible to serve on juries and in other instances property or other requirements effectively 
excluded non-whites).
27 Loizou (1972).
28 See inter alia Drakos (2005).
29 See European Commission’s Report (1999:58): ‘The Constitution safeguards fundamental rights and 
liberties in a comprehensive way. The constitutional charter o f human rights is modelled on the 
European Convention on Human Rights, even though it is more detailed and extensive.’
30 An example o f this was the abolition o f  the mandatory or minimum sentence as it was judged 
contrary to the constitutional principle which states that ‘no law shall provide for a punishment 
disproportionate to an offence’ (Article 12.3 o f the Constitution). Another example would be the power 
o f  arrest and detention that has been formulated in such a way as to comply with the constitutional
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Arrest -  Detention -  Questioning
Article 11.2 of the Constitution contains an exhaustive list31 of the situations whereby 
interference with a person’s right to liberty may be allowed, including arrest on 
reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence. However, it is declared that, 
save in the case of flagrant offences punishable with imprisonment, a person may be 
arrested only under the authority of a reasoned judicial warrant. Based on this section 
the Supreme Court has stated that sections 14 and 15 of the Criminal Procedure Law, 
which make it possible for a police officer or a private citizen to make an arrest 
without warrant in certain cases, are not fully applicable:32 they must be read and 
applied subject to the provisions of Article 11 of the Constitution.
The procedure for the issue of a warrant of arrest is regulated by sections 18 and 19 of 
the Criminal Procedure Law. According to them, a judge may issue a warrant of arrest 
if satisfied that there is reasonable suspicion that the person in question has committed 
the offence or that the detention of the person is reasonably necessary for preventing 
the commission of offences or the escape of the suspect. These sections, as they are 
today, were introduced in 1996 after a decision of the Supreme Court (Re Polycarpou 
(1991) 1 C.L.R. 207) which stated that the previous provisions of the Criminal 
Procedure Law (allowing a judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person ‘if he 
considered it to be necessary or desirable’) were unsatisfactory, as they failed to 
address the real essence of the problem, which was the interference with the liberty of 
a person. Thoma (2000) remarks that under the previous provision it was very easy 
for the police to abuse their power and issue warrants against persons only on‘mere 
suspicion of having committed an offence and then release them due to lack of 
incriminating evidence. In the same decision, the Supreme Court also stated (a) that in 
deciding whether to issue a warrant of arrest the court must draw its own conclusions 
from the affidavits presented to it when deciding whether a reasonable suspicion 
exists or not, and (b) that the opinion of the police officers making the statements do 
not form the basis for issuing an arrest warrant.
requirements contained in Article 11 and the right o f  liberty o f  an individual -  see the discussion later 
in this chapter.
31 Pitsillos v. The Police (1966) 2 C.L.R. 50.
32 Kyriakides v. The Republic 1 RSCC 66.
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It can be concluded from the above that the police in Cyprus have relatively narrow 
arrest powers, in comparison for instance with their counterparts in England and 
Wales. The necessity of a judicial warrant in the absolute majority of cases (apart 
from flagrant offences), at least in theory, provides a safeguard against the absolute 
discretion of the police to arrest people based on very little evidence. However, given 
the lack of any empirical studies, it is difficult to say how easily courts issue such 
warrants in practice and based on what type of evidence.33
The Constitution also stipulates that every person arrested must be informed of the 
reasons for his arrest, in a language that he understands, and must be allowed to have 
the services of a lawyer of his choice. The right to legal advice is guaranteed by 
Article 11.4 of the Constitution but, until recently, it had not been specified with 
statutory legislation. Law 163(1) /2005 specified this right and introduced a number of 
other provisions which regulate the treatment of suspects in a police station.
Any person arrested by the police (whether or not under an arrest warrant) must, as 
soon as is practicable after his arrest, and in any event not later than twenty-four 
hours, be brought before a judge (Article 11.5 of the Constitution). Not later than 
three days after the appearance of the person arrested, the judge must either release 
him (on bail or not), or remand him in custody.34
The principles on which the court will exercise its discretion in remanding an arrested 
person in custody have been considered in a number of cases.35 The judge: (a) must be 
satisfied that there is a genuine and reasonable suspicion of involvement of the 
suspect in the crime under investigation; (b) must determine that the inquiries and
33 Nevertheless, as people (especially police officers and Law Officers) I interviewed argued, currently, 
it is considerably more difficult for the police to issue arrest warrants compared, for instance, to a 
decade ago. An example o f the stricter approach o f the courts has been the decision in Re Polycarpou 
(1991) 1 C.L.R. 207 mentioned above.
34 An arrested person may be remanded in custody for renewable periods o f up to eight days. And the 
total period o f remand in custody must not exceed three months (Article 11 (6) o f the Constitution).
35 Tsirides v. The Police (1973) 2 C.L.R. 204, Stamataris v. The Police (1983) 2 C.L.R. 107, Aeroporos 
v. The Police (1987) 2 C.L.R. 232, Shimitras and Another v. The Police (1990) 2 C.L.R. 397, Houris v. 
The Police (1989) 2 C.L.R. 56, Simillides v. The Police (1997) 2 C.L.R. 160, Demetriades v. The 
Police (1997) 2 C.L.R. 312.
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investigations conducted by the police have not yet been completed; and (c) determine 
that the remand of the suspect is necessary because he is likely to interfere with the 
prosecution witnesses or destroy or hide any incriminating evidence, abscond or 
generally interfere with the investigation process.36 The courts have repeatedly 
pronounced that in deciding on a remand order, the judge is interfering with the 
fundamental right of freedom (as enshrined in the Constitution) of the accused and 
therefore must exercise proper care in ensuring ‘a healthy balance between individual 
liberty on the one hand and public interest in the investigation and suppression of 
crime on the other’ (Stamataris v. The Police (1983) 2 C.L.R. 107 at 113-4).
Section 8 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides that the procedures for the 
questioning of suspects in Cyprus are governed by the Judges’ Rules that are defined 
by the Queen’s Bench Division in England. The courts decided that Judges’ Rules do 
not constitute rules of law but they have the same status as in England: they are 
practice rules that offer guidance during the investigation37 and, therefore, the breach 
of these rules does not automatically result in the exclusion of evidence in court. It is, 
however, taken into consideration by the court in order to decide whether a testimony 
was taken voluntarily or under oppression and conditions unfair for the suspect. 
Nickolatos (1993a) argues that the Supreme Court in Cyprus, although recognising 
this wide discretion of the courts, has taken a strong line against the breach of these 
rules:
‘In Cyprus...the Supreme Court in a series o f  cases has emphatically stressed 
that the courts should freely exclude testim onies that had been obtained as a 
result o f  a breach o f  the Judges’ Rules; this should be done in their effort to 
promote the rule o f  law and deter any misconduct and unfair practice by the 
police.’ (N ickolatos 1993a: 19-20)
At this point, it is very important to stress that Cyprus courts have been following a 
strict exclusionary rule regarding evidence that has been obtained in breach of
36 An application for a remand must be made by a police officer not below the rank o f inspector 
(Criminal Procedure Law s. 24).
37 Azinas v. The Police (1981) 2 C.L.R. 9.
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constitutionally protected rights.38 As far as illegally or unfairly obtained evidence is 
concerned, the courts have also been strict, albeit recognising some exceptions to this 
rule.39
Mode of Trial
A trial for a criminal offence can take the form of either a summary trial or a trial on 
information, for which a preliminary inquiry must be held. According to section 2 of 
the Criminal Procedure Law, a summary trial means any trial held before a judge in 
the exercise of his summary jurisdiction. Every judge of a District Court has 
jurisdiction to try summarily all offences punishable with terms of imprisonment not 
exceeding five years and/or a fine not exceeding CY£5000.40 He also has jurisdiction 
to try summarily any offence beyond the above limits, provided the consent o f the 
Attorney General is obtained.41 In this case, though, the sentence passed could not 
exceed the sentence which could be passed by the court trying the case summarily, 
regardless of what the Criminal Code may provide for this offence.
A trial on information takes place before the Assize Court. Section 20(1) of the Courts 
of Justice Law 1960 provides that the Assize Court has jurisdiction to try all types of 
offences with the exceptions of those where specific provisions are made in Article 
156 of the Constitution of the Republic. This mode of trial involves the filing of an 
accusation of an offence in writing exclusively by, or on behalf of, the Attorney 
General in the Assize Court.42
After an accused is committed to the Assize Court for a trial on information, it is 
possible for him to be remitted to the District Court for a summary trial. The power of
such remittal is vested in the Attorney General, who can exercise this discretion, if
38 See inter alia Attorney General v. Aeroporos (1999) 2 C.L.R. 232 and Merthodja v. The Police 
(1987) 2 C.L.R. 227.
39 See Michalis Andrea Psillas v. The Republic (2003) 2 C.L.R. 353, Parris v. The Republic (1999) 2 
C.L.R. 186, The Police v. Georghiades (1983) 2 C. L. R. 33.
40 Courts o f Justice Law 1960, s. 24.1.
41 Courts o f Justice Law 1960, s. 24.2.
42 This information must comply with all the formalities provided under the Criminal Procedure Law, 
s.39.
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after the committal he considers that a case is more appropriate for a summary trial.43 
Likewise, it is possible for a court dealing with a case in a summary trial to commit 
the case to the Assize Court and order a preliminary inquiry, if before or during the 
summary trial it appears to the court that this is a case which should have been 
committed for trial to the Assize Court.44
Preliminary inquiry
Whenever any charge has been brought against any person for an offence not triable 
summarily, a preliminary inquiry must be held. The preliminary inquiry should not be 
regarded as the start of the hearing of the case. Loizou and Pikis (1975:159) explain 
that ‘it is a preparatory investigation, not a trial in any respect, meant to elicit the 
evidence forthcoming against the accused with a view to deciding whether there are 
grounds for committing him to trial.’ In deciding this issue, the judge must be guided 
by section 94 of the Criminal Procedure Law, which provides that where there is a 
conflict of evidence, he shall consider the evidence to be sufficient to commit the 
accused for trial if the evidence against him is such that, if un-contradicted, it would 
raise a probable presumption of his guilt. The extent to which the available evidence 
raises a probable presumption of guilt is a matter of fact and degree. As Loizou and 
Pikis (1975:167) stated: ‘an interplay of logic and common sense should guide the 
Court in its task. Bearing in mind that the probability envisaged by the law must be a 
real and not a fanciful one, the guilt of the accused must be probable as a matter of 
logical inference.’ Therefore, if the judge is satisfied that there is enough evidence, 
the accused must be committed for trial at the Assize Court’s next sitting in the 
district in which the offence is alleged to have been committed. Otherwise, the 
accused must be discharged. However, this discharge does not bar any further 
prosecutions of the accused based on the same facts.
Thoma (2000) reports that in dealing with the aftermath of the Turkish invasion of 
1974 and the anomalous situation resulting from it, a law was passed45 which 
dispensed with the holding of a preliminary inquiry as above, provided that the
43 Criminal Procedure Law s. 155 (b).
44 Criminal Procedure Law, s. 90.
45 Criminal Procedure (Temporary Provisions) Law 1974 (Law 42/1974 as amended by Law 44/1983).
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Attorney General certified in writing that the holding of such inquiry was not 
necessary and that copies of each prosecution witness’s statement were served in 
advance on the accused or his counsel.46 This Law, 32 years later, is still in force. In 
fact, almost unexceptionally (the Deputy Attorney General, in the interview he gave 
me, stated that since 1974 only one preliminary inquiry has been held) all the 
defendants are committed for trial before the Assize Court without a preliminary 
inquiry.
Trial
Based on its common law background, Cyprus law adopted an adversarial system of 
trial. The judge acts as the referee between the two contending parties in their quest to 
win ‘an evidence contest’ (Loizou and Pikis 1975). As Thoma (2000:480) describes 
‘each party puts forward its own case and seeks to substantiate its case with the 
available evidence subject to the restrictions imposed by rules of law, evidence and 
procedure’. The judge, who has the overall responsibility to see that all rules in place 
are duly observed and that justice is properly delivered, resolves any conflict arising 
out of the application of these rules. The procedure at the trial, regulated for the most 
part by section 74 of the Criminal Procedure Law, is in broad lines the same as that 
followed in England. There are, however, two particular points that must be kept in 
mind:
The first relates to the criterion that the judge should apply to half-time submissions 
of no case to answer after the close of the prosecution case.47 The Criminal Procedure 
Law provides that ‘if the court is satisfied that the prosecution has failed to establish 
sufficiently a prima facie case to require him to make his defence, it must order the 
acquittal and discharge of the accused.’ The meaning of the term prima facie has 
troubled the courts on numerous occasions. In Azinas and Another v. The Police 
(1981) 2 C.L.R. 133, the Supreme Court declared that, in deciding whether a prima 
facie case exists, the court must use as a guide the Practice Directions that the
46 See a similar provision in the Canadian Criminal Code, s. 577 ( ‘Direct Indictments’), based on which 
the Attorney General has the power to directly indict the accused without the accused having the 
benefit o f  a preliminary inquiry.
47 As will be shown in Chapter Seven, it is this criterion that most o f  the Law Officers are referred to, 
when asked about the level o f evidence that a case should satisfy in order to be sent to court.
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Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division of the High Court of England issued 
in 1962, which provides that:
‘a submission that there is no case to answer may properly be made and upheld:
(a) when there has been no evidence to prove an essential element in the alleged  
offence; (b) when the evidence adduced by the prosecution has been so  
discredited as a result o f  cross-examination or it is m anifestly so unreliable that 
no reasonable tribunal could safely convict on it.’ 48
In the same case, however, there was a confusing reference to R. v. Galbraith,49 which 
arguably50 offers a lower criterion than the 1962 Practice Note according to which the 
evidence of the prosecution should be assessed. Although in later cases51 the Supreme 
Court reconfirms the guidelines based on the 1962 Practice Note, in some cases there 
is still an additional reference to Galbraith.
It can be observed that the Supreme Court at least theoretically adopts the position 
that in order to require the accused to make his defence the prosecution evidence must 
be credited as at least provisionally reliable. In the same way, as will be discussed in 
Chapter Seven, when Law Officers argue that there should be at least a prima facie 
case in order for a case to be sent to court, most of them mean by this ‘enough 
provisionally reliable evidence.’
The second point that must be kept in mind when referring to the criminal trial in 
Cyprus is that, as there is no jury system, the judge acts as arbitrator of both the law 
and the facts of the case. Considering that the jury is viewed by most as the ideal 
mode of conducting trials according to adversarial terms, the total absence of the jury 
in Cyprus may suggest some shifts in the character of the original adversarial trial.52 It 
could be assumed that it may also affect the selection of the cases that are sent to court
48 (1962) 1 All E R  448.
49 (1981) 2 All E R 1001.
50 See Mansfield and Peay (1987).
51 E.g. Attorney General v. Christodoulou (1990) 2 C.L.R. 133.
52 See Jackson and Doran (1995) for a discussion o f the Diplock Trials in Northern Ireland.
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as well as the way prosecutors present them in court.53 It should also be mentioned 
that the fact that the judges have the duty to provide a reasoned judgment in support 
of their decisions (as opposed to jury decisions and somehow as a compensation for 
the absence of them) offers a valuable source of information on what type of cases 
‘succeed or fail’ in courts and the reasons why.
Evidence Law
The Law of Evidence applied in Cyprus is a reflection of the rules prevailing in 
England in 1914, subject to some statutory amendments and modifications. In 1946 
Cyprus enacted the Evidence Law (Cap. 9), which essentially reproduced the 
legislation on evidence in force in England on 5 November of 1914. The development 
of this Law, though, has not gone along with the English law of evidence. For 
example, the provisions of the Police and Criminal Justice Act 1984, as well as those 
of the Police and Criminal Justice Act 1994, which permit the introduction of hearsay 
evidence in a number of instances in England, have not been followed in Cyprus. Yet 
some flexibility has been permitted with section 5 A of Evidence Law for computer­
generated materials which can be used as admissible evidence, provided that certain 
preconditions are satisfied. Apart from this statutory exception, the rules against 
hearsay are still subject to a rigid interpretation and application by Cyprus courts.
A further characteristic of the Law of Evidence in Cyprus, which has been abolished 
in many of the common law jurisdictions, is the need for the prosecution to provide 
corroborative evidence in an extensive list of cases54 (for instance, in the cases of a 
child giving un-swom evidence, procuration, peijury, claims on the estate of a 
deceased person, contradictory statements made during trial on information, etc). In 
some other cases (for example, in sexual offences, accomplices give evidence for the 
prosecution, identification evidence, etc), the judge may convict an accused in the 
absence of corroborative evidence, provided that he has ‘warned him self55 of the
53 It has to be mentioned, though, that this thesis does not deal with the role o f  the Law Officers in 
presenting cases in court.
54 Similar provisions can be found in Scottish law.
55 This is the exact -  oddly sounding -  phrase that the judiciary are using. Being both the arbiters o f the 
law as well as the facts, they are obliged to warn themselves -  instead o f the jury -  o f  the dangers that 
the acceptance o f evidence without corroboration may involve.
116
Chapter Four: Introduction to Cyprus Law and Prosecution System
dangers involved in reaching such a decision. Some argued that the need for 
corroborative evidence raises a number of obstacles for the prosecution in discharging 
their duty during trial and the application of this rule should be more limited in 
scope.56
As far as the rules for confessions, similar fact evidence, character evidence, 
compellability of witnesses, examination of witnesses, privileged documents, etc, are 
concerned, the law on evidence in Cyprus follows the common law position.
The reform of the Law of Evidence has been a topic that has fuelled many arguments 
for years now in Cyprus. There is a bill under consideration by the House of 
Representatives that caused much controversy over whether a more flexible approach, 
like that adopted in continental systems, should be followed or whether the common 
law principles should persist but be updated and revised to suit current standards. It is 
worth mentioning that absolutely all Law Officers I interviewed argued that the 
biggest problem they face presenting cases in court is the outdated Evidence Law.
Concluding remarks
From the foregoing it can be seen that the criminal justice process in Cyprus, although 
it evolved under the heavy influence of common law, developed its own particular 
characteristics under the influence of other legal systems and local needs but most 
importantly under the influence of a written Constitution which places great emphasis 
on the protection of human rights. It can be argued that the complex law of evidence, 
as well as the restrictions imposed by the Constitution on the gathering of evidence in 
criminal cases, imposes certain (arguably justifiable) difficulties upon the 
investigative duties of the police. These particular difficulties may partly explain the 
necessity of the prosecutors’ involvement in the investigative stage, as will be shown 
in Chapter Six.
56 Eliades (1994).
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III. PROSECUTIONS AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE
A) Before Independence -1960  
Police prosecutions
The history of criminal prosecutions in Cyprus charts a progression from a limited 
private activity to a unique system of prosecution in which broad and extensive 
powers are concentrated in the Office of the Attorney General. Unfortunately, there is 
very limited information available for the very early years of the British colonisation 
as far as prosecutions are concerned. The general conclusion that can be extracted 
from the study of historic sources is that the practice regarding prosecutions in Cyprus 
was similar to that in England at that time in that the initiation of criminal proceedings 
was the right of the private individual as well as one of the main duties of the newly 
re-organised police.
Since the importation of the common law to Cyprus, its fundamental philosophy that 
there is a responsibility as well as a right of each member of the community in the 
administration of the community’s affairs began to be introduced in the criminal 
justice system. However, it could be argued that, initially, it was introduced more as a 
responsibility to assist in keeping the peace and apprehending the offenders rather 
than as a right to participate in the administration of justice.57 Nevertheless, the right 
of every member of the public to initiate prosecutions was indisputable and very 
much encouraged. In fact, it is interesting to note that the 1882 Cyprus Courts of 
Justice Order introduced the ‘citizen’s arrest’, a power that authorised every person 
who had reason to believe that someone had committed an offence to arrest him 
(Kapardis 2001). Furthermore, it established a system of rewards and awards of costs 
to private prosecutions so they could cover witnesses’ expenses and the other usually 
daunting costs of prosecutions.
57 It should be noted that, as Kapardis (2001) remarks, this principle was introduced in Cyprus with the 
‘necessary’ adaptations suited for a colony: for example, although the High Commissioner had the 
power to appoint Justices o f the Peace for the lower courts, Ordinance XXVI o f 1879 provided for the 
appointment o f police magistrates, rather than lay magistrates, while, as we saw earlier, jury trials were 
never introduced into Cyprus. ‘One could, therefore, surmise that the British simply did not think they 
could call upon “good and lawful men” among the local population to administer justice...’ (Kapardis 
2001:60).
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Despite the encouragement of private prosecutions, it was very soon obvious that they 
were not effective. A system of criminal prosecutions which relied solely on the 
support, diligence and commitment of the general public would never have many 
hopes of success under a colonial regime, especially during the first years when there 
was a widespread suspicion and distrust of the administration of justice.58 In fact, the 
colonial administration never relied exclusively on private prosecutions. One of their 
first tasks, as soon as they arrived on the island, was to reform and strengthen the 
police force in order for it to ‘serve as a constabulary force for the prevention and 
detection of crime, the apprehension of offenders, the maintenance of peace and good 
order...’ (Cyprus Police Augmentation Ordinance [No. XXX] of 1879, as cited by 
Kapardis 2001:152).59 Very early on, therefore, the police assumed the role of 
bringing offenders to justice. Although the Cyprus Police Ordinance (No. VIII) of 
1880 established only one police force by placing under one command all the 
previous forces (e.g. municipal police, Ottoman zaptiehs, etc), the prosecutions were 
initiated in the name of the Chief Constable of each district, obviously under the 
influence of the same practice followed in Britain.
The Attorney General’s Office
The Office of the Attorney General existed throughout British rule.60 The post was 
first created in 1878 under the title of the ‘Legal Adviser of the Government’.61 As 
Loucaides (1974) remarks, peculiarly, the first holder of the post occupied at the same 
time the office of the Chief Judicial Officer. The same author points out that 
‘naturally, the execution of the duties resulting from these two posts by the same 
person was creating many problems and constituted a source of frustration for the 
(Colonial) Administration;62 therefore, as a result, in 1881 a different person was 
appointed for each post and the post of the Legal Adviser of the Government was 
renamed to King’s Advocate...’ (Loucaides 1974:22). Gradually the duties and 
responsibilities of that office-holder were significantly expanded to almost equal the
58 See in Chapter Two the similarities with the situation in Ireland and Northern Ireland.
59 See also Christodoulou (1994).
60 See in Appendix I a list o f all the post-holders during British rule.
61 Cyprus Gazette, 5/11/1878.
62 See the Governor’s Annual Report for the year 1881 (Sir R. Biddulft, K.C.K.M.G., C.B. London).
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powers of the Attorney General in Britain and eventually in 1925 the same title 
(‘Attorney General’) was adopted in Cyprus.
The public records of those times show the holder of the office of the Attorney 
General as one of the three permanent officials (the others were the Colonial Secretary 
and the Colonial Treasurer) who, under the Governor, comprised the Executive 
Council. They also record that he participated in the Legislative Council as an ex 
officio member until 1935 when the Council was abolished and the power to legislate 
was granted to the Governor. As is apparent, the Attorney General’s post concentrated 
a wide range of powers and authorities and exercised a substantial influence on the 
general government policy. It has to be remembered, however, that he was always 
exercising his functions under the supervision of the English Ministry of Colonies 
and, therefore, his independence -  which in England was regarded as a prerequisite 
for the proper execution of the duties of the Attorney General’s Office -  was seriously 
compromised. For example, Loucaides (1974) reports that regarding serious legal 
matters affecting the general policy of the Government, the Attorney General was 
obliged to ask for the directions of the Ministry of Colonies.
As Edwards (1964) shows, it has always been one of the functions of the Law 
Officers of the Crown and particularly of the Attorney General to enforce by 
prosecutions the criminal law. Casey (1996:27) points out, though, that in England 
and Wales Law Officers had only a residual concern in this area, as ‘...their interest 
historically lay in prosecuting serious offences against the state, such as treason and 
sedition. At the local level, enforcement of the law was left to other persons -  in 
particular, to the police when in the nineteenth century local constabularies began to 
be organised in modem lines.’ He contrasts the situation with that of Ireland where the 
Attorney General adopted a more active role in prosecutions and gradually became 
the apex in a system of public prosecutions. Even in the latter case, though, the 
Attorney General directed only relatively few prosecutions in the Assizes and even 
later, when the principle was extended and more cases were taken over by the
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Crown,63 these were again a small minority compared to the cases that were 
prosecuted by the police.64
In Cyprus the situation initially followed the same lines of development as in 
England. Very limited information is available on the exact categories of cases that 
were prosecuted by the Attorney General during the first years of British rule but the 
general conclusion was that, apart from very serious crimes, the discretion to choose 
which cases were fit for the Crown to prosecute was vested entirely in the Attorney 
General.65 Similar to the situation in England, different Attorney Generals had taken 
different approaches to the frequency with which the Crown would prosecute.66 The 
Attorney General in Cyprus was additionally armed with the powers recognised for 
his English counterpart as far as the rest of the prosecutions were concerned, the most 
important being the power to intervene and enter a nolle prosequi, if he thought 
necessary to do so. It seems, however, that, as time passed, the Attorney General and 
his Counsel dominated the Assize Courts. Later on, it was also stipulated in law that 
prosecutions on information could be only instituted by the Attorney General.67 
Meanwhile, the police had assumed a virtual monopoly over prosecutions at the 
District Courts. One can speculate that the similar circumstances that prompted a 
more active role for the Attorney General in Ireland at the end of the nineteenth and in 
the early twentieth centuries encouraged the same development in Cyprus as well.68 
Furthermore, the size of the country and the relatively low level of very serious crimes 
made the handling of these cases by the Attorney General a not unmanageable task.69
63 See Bell (1989) and Casey (1996).
64 See Chapter Two for the history o f public prosecutions in (including others) England and Wales and 
Ireland.
65 Loizou and Pikis (1975).
66 See Edwards (1964) and Casey (1996).
67 See Krone (1999) analysing the reasons why the Australian Attorney General was also given the 
monopoly over prosecutions on indictment. See also the situation in Ireland and Northern Ireland in 
Chapter Two.
68 See Bell (1989:9): ‘In Ireland...a deliberate policy was adopted to introduce a professional system o f  
law enforcement, the main reason being that its impartial administration could not be otherwise 
guaranteed.’
69 See Machlouzarides (1970) and Kapardis (2001).
121
Chapter Four: Introduction to Cyprus Law and Prosecution System
B) After 1960
The prosecution system of Cyprus after Independence is not described or set out fully 
in any single document. It is grounded in the Constitution and on some sections of 
statute law, notably the Criminal Procedure Law and Police Law, but many aspects of 
it are just implied or speculated rather than clearly stated.
The history of prosecutions in Cyprus after 1960 is characterised from the affirmation 
on any given opportunity of the supremacy of the Attorney General over all the rest of 
the actors involved in prosecutions which, however, was never combined with a 
detailed and thorough appraisal of his exact role in the process. As time passed, and 
for a variety of reasons, new powers and responsibilities were added to the already 
broad duties of the Law Office, regrettably though without a concerted effort to 
examine the prosecution system as a whole and without a long-term perspective. As 
will be discussed later in detail, some of the powers that are recognised to the 
Attorney General resemble powers that prosecutors of more inquisitorial system 
possess and yet these are not acknowledged as such (for example the power of the 
Attorney General to intervene during police investigations).
General status and powers of the Attorney General
Before discussing the specific role of the Attorney General as the head of the 
prosecution system, it would be worth referring briefly to his status and general role 
in the legal system of the Republic. It is to be observed that although the direct 
historical lineage between the Attorney General of Cyprus and his counterpart in 
England is expressly acknowledged in the rare official descriptions of the Office, in 
some aspects he departed quite significantly from the original model.
The post of the Attorney General was retained by the Constitution after Cyprus 
Independence (1960) and is recognised as one of the great offices of the State.70 He 
(as well as the Deputy Attorney General, who serves on the same terms as the 
Attorney-General) is appointed by the President of the Republic from among persons
70 Articles 112-114 o f the Constitution.
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who are qualified for appointment as Judges of the Supreme Court,71 holds office until 
the attainment of the age of sixty-eight and can be removed only in the manner and on 
grounds similar again to those for the removal of a Judge of the Supreme Court. He is 
an independent officer and not a political one, in as much as his office is not subject to 
any Ministry. Moreover, unlike the other statutory office-holders (e.g. the Auditor 
General of the Republic and the Governor of the Central Bank), the Attorney General 
is not obliged to submit an annual report to the President on the activities of his 
Office.
Apart from responsibilities concerning criminal prosecutions, the Constitution 
(supplemented by ordinary legislation) entrusts^ the Attorney General with a 
considerable and diverse body of other duties. The Attorney General is the Legal 
Adviser of the Republic and the head of its Legal Service. Therefore, he has to render 
legal advice to any organ or authority of the Republic, he has to draft all legislation 
proposed to be submitted to the House of Representatives72 and he is called very often 
at the meetings of the Council of Ministers to advise them on the legality of proposed 
measures to be taken. All legal actions by or against the Republic are brought in the 
name of the Attorney General. Furthermore, he is the Chairman of the Legal Board, 
which supervises the organisation and operation of the legal profession, of the 
Advocates Disciplinary Board and of the Advocates Pension Fund and is Honorary 
President of the Cyprus Bar Council. He is a member of the Supreme Council of 
Judicature and he is also represented in various statutory bodies such as the Medical 
Disciplinary Board and the Dentists Disciplinary Board. In addition, it is on the 
recommendation of the Attorney General that the President acts in the exercise of his 
prerogative right of mercy as to the remission, suspension or commutation of any 
sentence passed by a court in the Republic.
There are a number of points resulting from the above account of the status of the 
Attorney General, worth highlighting. First, as is apparent, he is responsible for a
71 There is a similar provision in the Constitutions o f other Commonwealth countries: see, for example, 
Article 76 o f the Constitution o f India, Section 88(1) o f the Nigerian Constitution and Article 42 o f  the 
Constitution of Guyana (Casey 1996).
72 The English and Irish Law Officers were relieved from their drafting responsibilities as early as 1869 
and 1875 respectively, when the Parliamentary Counsel’s Office was established. See Casey (1996).
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wide and diverse variety of duties. Underlining his position in criminal procedure and 
prosecutions in particular, should not obscure the fact that his role in the Cyprus legal 
system is far broader. The various roles that he is called on to fulfil, apart from 
making him an exceptionally powerful and influential person in the Republic, are one 
of the main reasons for the particularly heavy workload with which the Law Office 
has to deal. As will be shown later in this thesis, successive Attorney Generals have 
admitted that this exercises some influence on the way his role regarding prosecutions 
is carried out.
Secondly, the drafters of the Constitution chose to make the Office of the Attorney 
General an independent instead of a political one, contrary to the original model of the 
English Law Officer.73 It might reasonably be argued that the special circumstances of 
Cyprus, particularly the existence of two separate communities,74 were the reason 
behind the choice of an independent Attorney General, free from political pressures.75 
While also in countries where the Attorney General is a political appointee it is 
regarded that he should execute his duties independently from the Government,76 the 
official safeguard of the Office’s independence in Cyprus, undoubtedly, fosters his 
position and gives legal ground for the right of the Attorney General to act 
independently.77
73 There are other Commonwealth countries that chose this path, for example, Kenya, Singapore, 
Pakistan, Seychelles, etc (Edwards 1989).
74 The two communities are the Greek-Cypriot community and the Turkish-Cypriot one. However, 
since the Turkish invasion in 1974 the two communities have been violently separated. The majority o f  
Turkish-Cypriots are now living in the north part o f Cyprus, which is under Turkish occupation.
75 However, it should be noted that according to some officials at that time, the fact that the serving 
Attorney General (Mr Tomaritis) was part o f the committee that drafted the Constitution, contributed 
towards the allocation o f extremely broad powers and political independence to the Office o f  the 
Attorney General.
76 For example, in England he is a Minister appointed by the Prime Minister but not a member o f  the 
Cabinet. It has been advocated that when executing his prosecutorial functions, he may seek the advice 
o f the Cabinet but he is not required to do so. The most well known explanation o f  this relationship is 
the one found in a parliamentary speech o f Lord Shawcross when Attorney General in 1951 (see H.C. 
Debates, Vol. 483, col. 683).
77 On the contrary, in England and Wales the independence o f the Attorney General is only a matter o f  
convention. See, for example, Marshall (1984), cited in the Law Reform Commission o f Canada
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Thirdly, this independence, combined with the security of tenure that the Attorney 
General enjoys and the qualifications which he must possess in order to be appointed 
to the office, furnishes him with a quasi-judicial status which not only arguably 
generates the special respect of the public, but is also the basis on which courts have 
on many occasions stressed that his discretion is absolute and not reviewable. 
Therefore, the Attorney General enjoys a great independence regarding his 
relationship with both the Executive and the Judiciary.
The Attorney General and prosecutions
Among the other roles that the Attorney General is entrusted with, the Constitution 
recognised him as the head of the prosecution system, entitled to intervene in and 
supervise any prosecution:
‘The Attorney General o f  the Republic shall have power, exercisable at his 
discretion in the public interest, to institute, conduct, take over, and continue or 
discontinue any criminal proceedings for an offence against any person in the 
Republic.’ (Article 113.2 o f  the Constitution)
While it is correct to say that with this provision the formal introduction of a system 
of public prosecutions was declared, it must be realised that this was grafted on to the 
previously existing system and therefore it coexists with the (infrequently invoked 
and circumscribed) power of private prosecution. The Constitution avoided a radical 
change of the existing prosecution system and chose instead to insert in it a highly 
powerful new Office of the Attorney General to supervise and control the whole 
system of prosecutions. Thus, although the Constitution gives primacy to the Attorney 
General empowering him to oversee all prosecutions in the jurisdiction, it does not 
give him the monopoly of instituting criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court took 
the opportunity to declare that:
‘Article 113.2 (o f  the Constitution) is an empowering enactment conferring 
w ide powers upon the Attorney-General with regard to prosecution, in addition
(1990), commenting that it is difficult to find ‘any clear legal ground for asserting a right in the 
Attorney General to act independently.’
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and not in derogation o f  those vesting in other persons or authorities.’ (Ttofinis 
v. Theocharides 1983 2 C.L.R. 369)
With section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Law, however, the Attorney General is 
given the monopoly as far as prosecutions at Assize Courts are concerned. This 
section provides that:
‘N o  person shall be put upon his trial for any offence not triable summarily, 
although he may have been committed for trial, except upon an information 
f i le d  by the Attorney General in the A ssize Court in which such person is to be 
tried, (emphasis added)
Furthermore, there are a number of other legislative provisions that require the 
consent of the Attorney General in order for prosecutions of some offences to be 
invoked.78 ‘Consent provisions’ have been used with increasing frequency since the 
British period as an additional means of exercising control over private prosecutions 
and their preservation itself confirms the preservation of the right to a private 
prosecution.
Thus, apart from prosecutions on information and ‘consent prosecutions’, it depends 
on the Attorney General what other types of cases he wishes to prosecute. As will be 
shown later, different Attorney Generals have taken different approaches. 
Nonetheless, there are certain categories which have always been included in the Law 
Office’s workload: complex cases, sensitive cases, cases that involve public officers, 
etc.
A further point that arises out of the consideration of Article 113.2 of the Constitution 
is that it is confirmed that Cyprus prosecution system is an expediency-based system 
( in the public interest'). Apart from this broad statement in the Constitution, there is 
no published code stating the criteria which should be applied in prosecutorial
78 E.g. Corruption and extortion by a public office s. 105-6 o f Cap. 154, participation in an illegal union 
s. 56, 67 o f  Cap. 154, etc.
126
Chapter Four: Introduction to Cyprus Law and Prosecution System
decisions. On the contrary, it has repeatedly stated79 that ‘it is the exclusive right of 
the Attorney General to represent the public interest’ (Police v. Athienitis 1983 2 
C.L.R. 223)80 and that the Attorney General in exercising his discretionary power is 
not to be subject to the direction or control of any other person or authority.81
Private prosecutions
The courts have on many occasions been at pains to stress that ‘there is nothing in the 
Constitution neutralising the position at common law as regards private prosecutions’ 
(Ttofinis v. Theocharides 1983 2 C.L.R. 363) and ‘neither the constitution nor the 
Criminal Procedure Law had abolished the valuable right of private prosecutions’ 
(Police v. Athienitis 2 C.L.R. 194).82 It was held that the right of a common informer 
to bring and conduct a prosecution for the trial of a summary offence derives from the 
common law and remains untouched, and indeed untrammelled, by any statutory 
provision. However, as a Judge of the Supreme Court recognised extra-judicially, ‘a 
private prosecution is always subject to the control of the Attorney General through 
his power to control, take over, continue or discontinue criminal proceedings’ 
(Artemis 1989:4032). Furthermore, it only concerns summary prosecutions as 
prosecutions on information can only been carried out by the Attorney General. 
Therefore, if  a common informer wants to prosecute an offence tried on information, 
he can only do so up to the point of the preliminary inquiry. There are no official 
statistics about the exact number of private prosecutions that are being invoked every 
year, but it is common knowledge that they are very few and mainly limited to those 
relating to the offence of dishonoured cheques or offences regarding breaches of local 
administrative law.83
79 In Re Ttooulias (1984) 1 C.L.R. 885, Attorney General v. Ioannidi (1993) 2 C.L.R. 377, Attorney 
General v. Andrianou (1995) 1 C.L.R. 486.
80 See Artemis (1989:4033): ‘The power assigned to the Attorney General might be abused as there is a 
possibility o f  any power to be abused. As a general proposition that is true but it has nothing to do with 
this question. A law, either pre-existing the Constitution or enacted thereafter, cannot validly alter or 
abridge the powers o f the Attorney General conferred on him by the Constitution.’
81 See Chapter Seven.
82 See also: In Re Koumougiouros (1995) 1 C.L.R. 805.
83 Loucaides (1974), Loizou and Pikis (1975), Artemis (1989) and Pashalides (1991).
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Agencies’ prosecutions
Various Government Departments, such as the District Administrations, the Social 
Insurance Department, the Inland Revenue and the Custom and Excise Office, as well 
as other non-governmental agencies (e.g. Local Authorities) have a power based on 
specific statutory provisions84 to prosecute summary offences within their particular 
sphere of activity. Some of these statutory provisions clearly state that these 
prosecutions are instituted ‘subject to the directions of the Attorney General’.85 
Nonetheless, even when this is not specifically stated, it is assumed, resulting from the 
power of the Attorney General to control all prosecutions (Louca & Another v. The 
Republic 1984 2 C.L.R. 141 ).86
Police prosecutions
The police also have the right to institute criminal proceedings in the interests of law 
enforcement. Article 19 of the Police Law (Cap.285) clearly states their right to 
institute prosecutions:
''Subject to any direction by the Attorney General, it shall be lawful for any 
police officer to make a complaint or charge against any person before the 
Courts and to apply for a summons, warrant, search warrant or such other legal 
process as may by law be issued against any person, and to summon before the 
Courts any person charged with an offence and conduct public prosecutions and 
preliminary inquiries against such person.’ (emphasis added)
There are a number of interesting points arising out of this provision of the Police 
Law. First, with this section the power of the police to institute prosecutions is 
grounded on a statutory provision, despite the fact that in some judicial decisions it is 
regarded as deriving from the common law right of private prosecutions. This latter 
attitude is reinforced by some writings of members of the judiciary87 in the Cyprus
84 For example, Social Insurance Law 2/1964, Municipal Corporations Law 64/1964, Streets and 
Buildings Regulation Law Cap. 96, etc.
85 For example, Law 82/1967 s. 176.1: ‘Prosecutions against this Law ...are referred to as custom 
prosecutions and are made subject to any direction o f the Attorney General o f the Republic.’
86 See also Ttofinis v. Theocharides (1983) 2 C.L.R. 363.
87 See, inter alia, Pashalides (1991) and Artemis (1989).
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Law Review in which they referred to police prosecutions as private prosecutions. 
This view could be further enhanced by the fact that the Chief Constable of each 
district institutes prosecutions in his own name, following the previous situation in 
England.88 The difference in Cyprus, though, is that there is a single Police Force, 
which is hierarchically organised and although the Chief Constable of each district 
enjoys considerable discretion, at least theoretically, he comes under the orders of the 
Chief of the Police and the common policy of the Force. Therefore, it can be argued 
that the practice according to which the Chief Constable of each district brings 
prosecutions in his own name is just a residue of the situation during British rule and 
does not reflect the current nature of police prosecutions.89
Secondly, it is clearly acknowledged that the police in the execution of their 
prosecutorial functions are subject to the instructions of the Attorney General. Based 
on this provision it is officially accepted that although the Police as an organisation 
come under the Ministry of the Justice, as far as their activities relate to criminal 
prosecutions, the Attorney General is their supervising authority. At least in theory, 
all police prosecutions remain throughout under the supervision of the Attorney 
General, who is the competent authority to give directions and review at any time all 
police decisions on prosecution. Article 19 of the Police Law is arguably a more 
empowering provision than the constitutional provision of Article 113.2, since it 
formally recognises the Attorney General as the immediate supervisor of the police 
and, therefore, as entitled to exert direct control over police decisions regarding both 
individual cases and also matters of general policy.90
Thirdly, the above general provision was interpreted as additionally giving power to 
the Attorney General to intervene during investigations and/or require further 
information, as well as to cause any matter he considers appropriate to be investigated 
by the police. As was shown in Chapter Two, this is a power which used to be
88 As shown in Chapter Two, before the enactment o f  the Prosecution o f Offences Act 1985, the vast 
majority o f  prosecutions were carried out by the police and normally by a constable in his own right as 
a private prosecutor. See, though, the principle o f constabulary independence there.
89 See Chapter Five for a further analysis o f this point.
90 It has to be remarked, though, that the exact meaning o f this provision has not been properly 
analysed. See Chapter Five.
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associated with prosecutors in inquisitorial prosecution systems.91 This power of the 
Attorney General in Cyprus indicates the broader role that has been assigned to him in 
prosecutions compared to the role that his counterparts in common law jurisdictions 
until recently used to have.
Public Prosecutors Law 8/1989
Until 1989 criminal prosecutions on behalf of the police (summary prosecutions) were 
conducted by police officers serving in the Prosecution Department of each Police 
Division. As early as 1969 concerns had been voiced about the increasing difficulties 
in requiring non-legally qualified policemen to make legal judgments and exercise a 
quasi-judicial discretion as to who should be prosecuted and also present cases in 
court. With these concerns, formally expressed for the first time in Parliament by the 
Member of Parliament Mr Anastasiadis,92 it was indirectly submitted that the Attorney 
General did not or could not exercise control in every police prosecution. However, 
the brief reply of the Government to these fears was that the Attorney General, 
carrying the ultimate responsibility for prosecutions, is in a position to oversee police 
prosecutions as well and exert an effective control over them:
‘Each case that there is a doubt or difficulty with is forwarded to the Attorney 
G eneral’s O ffice and directions are given to the police for its handling. 
M oreover, frequently, Law Officers are presenting summary cases at District 
Courts...Only very simple cases are being handled by the police...U nder these 
circumstances, the change o f  the existing arrangements according to which 
police officers appearing in court for simple summary cases would cause 
additional costs without any valid reason.’ (Reply o f  the Ministry o f  Justice in 
Parliament, dated 04/04/1969)
It took more than two decades for the House of Representatives to deal with the same 
issue in some detail. In 1988, a Member of Parliament (Mr Efstathios Efstathiou93)
91 See Chapter Two, however, for exceptions to this rule, either as matter o f practice or new legislative 
trends.
92 See Question in Parliament o f MP Mr Anastasiadis, dated 01/02/1969. See also Loucaides (1979).
93 Mr Efstathios Efstathiou was Member o f Parliament (1985-1996) and President o f the Law 
Committee o f  the Parliament (1991-1996).
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pointed out that the merging of the investigative and the prosecutorial functions in the 
case of summary offences posed great dangers to the public perception of the 
impartial administration of criminal justice, and made a proposal for new legislation 
on the issue. The first draft of his proposal clearly demonstrated that he was 
influenced by the same concerns voiced in England prior to the 1986 reform of the 
prosecution system. It appeared that a golden opportunity was given to discuss in 
depth the entire prosecution system and adopt a strategy that would update the system 
in a structured and organised fashion.
Sadly, that opportunity was missed. It is remarkable that what could result in a major 
change of the prosecution process in Cyprus was dealt with briefly and with an 
apparent lack of consideration. In the Law that was finally passed (Law 8/1989) a 
half-hearted and confusing approach was taken which tried to avoid a disruption of 
the prosecution system. It only provided that (a) everyone who presents cases to court 
as a public prosecutor must be legally qualified, and (b) when a public prosecutor 
executes his duties he comes under the instruction of the Attorney General. A perusal 
of the Law reveals that considerably more attention and thought was given to the 
question of presenting cases in court, and the qualifications that one must possess in 
order to be so entitled, than was addressed to the question of the decision to prosecute. 
The power of the police to charge and institute criminal prosecutions per se was not 
discussed in the new Law and, therefore, it retained the same status as before.94
Indicative of this approach was the reaction of the police to this Law. The reason that 
it was not very welcoming was not so much the fact that they felt that with the new 
Law they were more ‘threatened’ by the Attorney General’s powers but the fact that 
police officers without legal qualifications were no longer permitted to appear in 
courts.95 From this reaction one could see how a proposal that could change the whole 
structure of prosecutions resulted in focusing on the -  still important but considerably
94 As will be shown later, however, this power is not identical to the power o f the police in England and 
Wales before the Criminal Justice Act 2003, as it is subject to the limitations and restrictions that the 
special relationship between the Attorney General and the police demands.
95 In fact, in order to appease police reactions a special section o f that Law provided that there would be 
an intermediate period during which police officers without legal qualifications would be able to appear 
in court provided that they would be qualified upon a certain date.
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minor -  point of the legal qualifications of Public Prosecutors. On a more positive 
note, however, although the Law per se did not substantially modify the existing 
structure of prosecutions (or indeed the powers of the Attorney General), as an 
indirect result, the supervisory authority of the Attorney General’s Office on police 
prosecutions became closer.96
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This chapter has given a brief historical background to the legal system in Cyprus, 
followed by an outline of the criminal justice process and a study of the evolution and 
legal framework of the prosecution system. It can be seen that ideas, practices and 
trends which have their roots in other jurisdictions have been borrowed, adapted and 
applied with distinctive results in the Cyprus legal system. The variety of influences 
from other legal systems which have been blended in a unique (but often also 
confusing) way, the total absence of the jury system and the primacy of a written 
Constitution over any statutory legislation are some of the noteworthy characteristics 
of Cyprus law.
In seeking an understanding of how successive office-holders have viewed their 
responsibilities as Attorney Generals (see next chapters), one element that arises 
frequently is their commitment to following British constitutional traditions. What, 
however, is becoming apparent, as the policies and practices followed within the 
Office of the Attorney General are examined in depth, is that declarations of 
adherence to British constitutional precedents have not always been followed through. 
As a matter of fact, they could not have been, since the Office in Cyprus has 
substantial differences from its counterpart in Britain.97 This observation is true for the 
whole of Cyprus law and it is one of the main issues that I wanted to illustrate in this 
chapter. Although sometimes there is a quasi-religious theoretical attachment to 
common law principles, the reality is that in many aspects there has been a 
considerable deviation from them.
96 See Chapter Five.
97 And also from the DPP’s Office which in 1879 acquired the role o f the Public Prosecutor in England 
and Wales.
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As far as prosecutions are concerned, the Attorney General’s role in the process 
appears far broader and more multifarious than his counterpart’s in England and 
Wales has ever been. The system of prosecutions in Cyprus is based upon the primacy 
of the Attorney General who has a constitutional power to control all prosecutions in 
the jurisdiction and is entrusted with very broad powers in the execution of his role. 
However, the exact parameters of his powers and the principles according to which 
they are executed have never been clearly determined or appraised.
In the face of a paucity of detailed statutory provisions and in the absence of extensive 
guidelines, there is a sense that the prosecution system relies for its functioning on 
convention and informal regulation besides statute law and pronounced official 
policy. Most importantly, as will be demonstrated in the next chapters, much is 
dependent on the broad discretion of the Office of the Attorney General, as well as on 
the particular holders of the Office.
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CHAPTER FIVE
The Workload of the Attorney General’s Office
‘Every decision relating to prosecution is ours. We decide whether a 
prosecution should be instituted or not or whether it should be 
interrupted... Directly or indirectly, this is the case for all prosecutions.’
(Law Officer 09)
A s was demonstrated in the previous chapter, the Attorney General in Cyprus is
entrusted with the overall control of, and responsibility for, all prosecutions. 
However, the exact parameters of his role have not been specified in detail in terms of 
the categories of cases that he is closely dealing with, the specific powers that he is 
enabled to exercise regarding them, or the criteria that he applies. This chapter 
investigates the first of these issues,1 namely the workload of the Attorney General’s 
Office. Is the role of the Office confined to the prosecution of serious or exceptional 
cases? Or does the Law Office have a more systematic involvement in the bulk of 
prosecutions within the system? And what is its role in relation to the police who also 
occupy a significant place in prosecutions? This chapter attempts to make sense of 
which cases the Law Office is supposed to deal with; and which cases actually end up 
at the Law Office. It also throws light on the reasons behind this reality and examines 
how Law Officers themselves see and reflect on these issues.
The first and second sections will attempt to uncover the rhetoric and the history of 
the system regarding the Law Office’s workload through the limited official accounts
1 The second issue (powers o f the Attorney General especially during investigations) and the third one 
(formulation o f prosecution policies and criteria) are discussed in Chapters Six and Seven respectively.
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of the system, the standpoints of the various ‘actors’ in the criminal justice system 
(judges, legislators, police), as well as the approaches that successive Attorney 
Generals have adopted over time. The latter will be achieved based on the results of 
an examination of the internal circulars, press releases and documents of the four 
Attorney Generals who have served since the establishment of the Cyprus Republic, 
corroborated by the interviews I carried out with three of those four office-holders.
The third and fourth sections will mostly deal with the situation existing during the 
time of my main fieldwork. I will firstly discuss the ideology that characterises the 
Law Officers’ way of thinking regarding the cases that make up their workload. Given 
the vagueness in the rhetoric, is there a certainty among them in determining the limits 
of their responsibilities? Do they have a clear understanding of the type of cases they 
are dealing with and the reasons for dealing with them? And do they relate in the 
same way to all aspects of their workload? Valuable insight into the Law Officers’ 
ideology is provided by the semi-structured interviews I carried out with them, as well 
as by the data I collected through my observation period at the Law Office and the 
less formal discussions I had with Law Officers during that period.
In the fourth and final section, I will describe the practices developed in the Law 
Office concerning the workload of the Attorney General’s Office as I explored them 
through observation and the examination of a series of cases during my fieldwork 
period. In this part, I will classify the actual categories of cases that I observed 
reaching the Law Office and identify the common or distinctive characteristics of 
each category.
I. RHETORIC
It is widely accepted2 that the ‘law in the books’, or the official rhetoric about a 
certain area, does not correspond completely to the ‘law in action’; but since the 
former ‘constrains, enables, and channels’ (Johnson 2002:13) the actual reality -  even 
if this is done through the context of many other factors -  it still merits careful
2 See McBamet (1981) and McConville et al. (1991).
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scrutiny. In Cyprus, the very broad legal provisions regarding prosecutions inevitably 
make the rhetoric that has been developed about them -  and, thus, what has been 
interpreted as the law -  more important. In the process of examining the rhetoric 
around the Law Office’s responsibilities, it is important to seek to understand how 
different actors in the system appreciate the Law Office’s role and, perhaps most 
importantly, how successive office-holders themselves have interpreted their role 
through time.
One of the crucial issues in this discussion will be the exact relationship between the 
Attorney General’s Office and the police, since this heavily influences the workload 
of the Law Office. Depending on the way the relationship between these two services 
is perceived, either more or less cases are regarded as belonging to the Law Office’s 
workload, or the justification for this varies considerably.
Broad legal provisions
As shown in Chapter Four, although the Constitution gives primacy to the Attorney 
General, empowering him to control and oversee all prosecutions in the jurisdiction, it 
does not give him the monopoly of instituting criminal proceedings. Therefore, apart 
from the specific categories of cases for which the Law Office has acquired exclusive 
responsibility by statutory provisions -  prosecutions before the Assize Courts and 
consent prosecutions -  it is left to the Attorney General to choose what other type of 
cases he wishes to prosecute.3 Consequently, while it is the unmistakable duty of the 
Law Office to prosecute serious crime, the same cannot be argued for ‘ordinary’ or 
minor crime.
Additionally, Article 19 of the Police Law provides that the police carry out their 
prosecutorial functions under the directions of the Attorney General. The nature of
3 This is a similar position to the powers o f the DPP in Northern Ireland before the reform of the Justice 
(Northern Ireland) Act 2002. Article 5(1 )(c) o f the 1972 Prosecution o f Offenders Order provided that 
it shall be the function o f the DPP ‘where he thinks proper to initiate, undertake, and carry on behalf o f  
the Crown, proceedings for indictable offences and for such summary offences or classes o f summary 
offences as he considers should be dealt with by him.’ For further analysis o f the system o f  
prosecutions in Ireland, see Chapter Two.
136
Chapter Five: The Workload o f  the Attorney G eneral’s Office
these directions, however, is left open. Moreover, various other laws,4 which give the 
right to several governmental departments to prosecute summary offences within their 
particular sphere of activity, also provide that these prosecutions are subject to any 
instructions by the Attorney General. Again, nothing specifies either the nature of 
these instructions or the categories of cases that might end up at the Law Office.
All these broad provisions do not spell out which cases the Attorney General chooses 
to deal with apart from the serious ones in front of the Assize Courts. Neither do they 
indicate in detail how he chooses to utilise his control over the police, which is, 
admittedly, the main service dealing with the bulk of summary prosecutions. 
Regarding the cases that the police are dealing with, does the Attorney General 
exercise oversight and control in exceptional circumstances or a day-to-day 
supervision? The approach that the Attorney General adopts regarding these issues is 
highly influential on the range and size of his Office’s workload.
Vague rhetoric/interpretations
As is evident from the foregoing, the legal provisions about the Law Office’s 
workload leave many questions unanswered, and clearly not the least important ones. 
Likewise, the rhetoric that has been developed around these issues is characterized by 
the same vagueness and the absence of a detailed examination. Over the years, the 
discussions around the Law Office’s role in prosecutions left out a number of 
important elements crucial to the understanding of both its constitutional position and 
its workload.
The limited texts on the role of the Attorney General focus on the word ‘control’, 
which signifies more oversight and accountability rather than minute direction.5 It is 
repeatedly asserted that ‘the Attorney General is entrusted with the ultimate
4 See Chapter Four for examples.
5 Furthermore, the power to suspend prosecutions -  to enter a nolle prosequi -  is so central in the 
rhetoric o f the Cyprus prosecution system that almost all the actors in the criminal justice system regard 
it as ‘the most important power o f the Attorney General’s Office’. From this, someone could conclude 
that, again, the emphasis in the rhetoric o f  the system regarding the Attorney General’s role in 
prosecutions is placed on the ‘control’ function.
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responsibility for, and control of, prosecutions’ (Loucaides 1974:44), but it is also 
repeatedly deduced that his direct involvement is not expected in every prosecution:
‘M ost criminal cases are prosecuted by the police, w ho act under the legal 
direction o f  the Attorney General. Prosecutions in the name o f  the Attorney 
General are instituted only in serious cases before the A ssize Courts and in 
som e other cases where it is expected that serious or com plex issues are going  
to arise.’ (Papaioannou 1999:4)
and
‘The prosecution o f  crime is not the exclusive province o f  the Attorney General.
It is also the right o f  other public authorities, as w ell as the police, upon whom a 
specific power has been conferred by the Police L aw ...T his right, however, is 
under the limitations which are determined by the powers o f  the Attorney 
General derived from the Constitution and the L aw s.’ (Loucaides 1974:43-44)
Great emphasis is placed upon the symbolism and potential of the power of the 
Attorney General rather than the everyday execution of his prosecutorial function:
‘(T)he constitutional powers o f  the Attorney General...are due to the need for 
control, oversight and organisation o f  the prosecution system by an 
independent...public prosecutor who w ill ensure the objective and fair 
functioning o f  the criminal justice system and w ill protect the public interest.’ 
(Loucaides 1974:44)
Similar wording is used in all of the rare official accounts of the system, as well as in 
articles authored by judges,6 lawyers or other commentators.7
There is little detailed reference to the categories of cases that the Law Office is 
dealing with, besides its obvious workload (Assize Court cases). The Attorney 
General is regarded as having absolute discretion to decide which other cases he 
wishes to prosecute. However, there are certain categories which are always cited in
6 See Loizou (1972) and Artemis (1989).
7 See Neocleous (2000) and Thoma (2000).
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portrayals of the Law Office’s workload: complex cases, ‘sensitive’ cases, cases that 
concern constitutional or novel legal issues, cases that involve public officers or 
‘important public persons’, etc.; and there is a general consensus among the different 
actors in the system regarding responsibility for these particular cases.
The extent to which the Attorney General uses this power in practice is obviously 
dependent on the choices of each office-holder. However, the fact that his power to 
choose whichever categories of cases he wishes to be forwarded to his Office is 
widely acknowledged is of great importance. As will be shown later in this thesis, this 
theoretical common standpoint regarding the supremacy of the Attorney General, and 
the power he can exercise over the rest of the services involved in prosecutions, is an 
important narrative which informs the everyday actions of the officials in the 
prosecution system.
Law Office -  Police Relationship
However, apart from the categorical and indisputable principle of the primacy of the 
Attorney General, if anyone attempts to scratch the surface of the arguments on which 
this principle is based, they will find a rhetoric riddled with some contradictions. This 
particularly relates to the relationship between the Law Office and the police.
It is clearly acknowledged that the police discharge their functions regarding 
prosecutions under the superintendence of the Attorney General. Based on Article 19 
of the Police Law, it is officially accepted that although the police, as an organisation, 
come under the Ministry of Justice, as far as their activities relating to criminal 
prosecutions are concerned, the Attorney General is considered to be their supervising 
authority. Most commentators argue that the form of words in Article 19 -  ‘subject to 
the directions o f  -  leaves no doubt as to the subordination of the police to the 
Attorney General: ‘Both in relation to setting general directives as to how 
discretionary powers are to be exercised and in the giving of specific directions with 
respect to the handling of an individual case, the ultimate authority lies with the 
Attorney General’ (Pashalides 1991:5588). This does not imply an obligation of the 
Attorney General constantly to assert this authority by intervening and giving 
directions for every individual case. It recognises that the police, in a great deal of 
their workload, enjoy broad discretion and are executing their functions without the
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constant control of the Attorney General. However, this in no way diminishes the 
recognition as to which office carries with it the ultimate authority in terms of making 
the final decision when it chooses to do so.
The confusion begins when some terms contradictory to the whole philosophy of the 
Attorney General’s positions and powers are used, or when the judiciary insists on 
relying upon the readily available precedents of the British period in interpreting the 
powers of the police. More specifically:
Adherence to the traditions of the British Attorney General’s role 
The first cause of confusion is the reference and reliance upon the constitutional 
conventions and customs that prevailed before Independence. In some cases, when 
reading the terms in which the role of the Attorney General in relation to the police is 
described, it becomes apparent that we have a mere recapitulation of the traditional 
roles associated with the Attorney General’s Office or the DPP Office in England of 
last century. This causes confusion and misinterpretation since the position of the 
Cyprus Attorney General differs in many aspects from his counterpart in England and 
Wales.
In England, neither the Attorney General, nor the DPP (even after the 1986 reform) 
have ever been regarded as the immediate supervisors of the police.8 On the contrary, 
long ago, the principle of ‘constabulary independence’9 was declared. The classic 
statement of the relationship between the Attorney General and the Police was made 
by Lord Denning in R. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, ex parte 
Blackburn:10
i  hold it to be the duty o f  the Com m issioner o f  Police o f  the M etropolis, as it is 
o f  every ch ie f constable, to enforce the law o f  the land...H e must decide 
whether or not suspected persons are to be prosecuted; and, if  need be, bring the 
prosecution or see that it is brought. But in all these things he is not the servant 
o f  anyone, save o f  the law itself. N o  M inister o f  the Crown can tell him that he
8 See Chapter Two for further discussion on the English Prosecution System.
9 See Jones (2003).
10 [1968] 2 Q. B. 118.
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must, or must not, keep observation on this place or that; or that he must, or 
must not, prosecute this man or that one. Nor can any police authority tell him  
so. The responsibility for law enforcement lies on him. H e is answerable to the 
law  and to the law alone.’
Furthermore, according to the doctrine of ‘constabulary independence’, each police 
officer has a legal right and duty to enforce the law as he sees fit, regardless even of 
the orders of his superior officers. Bennion (1986:5) suggests that ‘the constitutionally 
correct position is that it is not the police force as a whole that is the prosecutor in 
“police cases” but the police officer himself ’, and even that a police prosecution until 
the point at which it is taken over by the CPS (compulsory after 1986) is still regarded 
as a private prosecution. This fits the traditions and the origins of the English 
prosecution system."
In Cyprus, however, the situation is not the same. The courts themselves clearly 
acknowledge that:
‘Charges for offences triable summarily are filed by the police (District 
Divisional Commander o f  the P olice)...but always under the supervision, 
instructions, and with the approval o f  the Attorney General.’(In Re Ttooulias 1 
C.L.R. 1984:890)
However, at the same time, the President and the former President of the Supreme 
Court extra-judicially refer to police prosecutions as private prosecutions:12
‘The District D ivisional Commander o f  the Police has the right to institute 
criminal proceedings in the interests o f  law enforcement. This is implicit from a
" ‘The present prosecution system in England and Wales, having grown up in an undirected fashion 
over the centuries, is notoriously ramshackle. At its heart lies the tenet that it is for the citizen to set in 
motion the criminal law. The state apparatus that o f necessity grew up round this increasingly 
unrealistic idea lacked an accepted rational. Instead we have accustomed ourselves to the fiction that 
the police, who prosecute in the vast majority o f cases,...do so as private persons’ (Bennion 1986:3-4). 
See however, in Chapter Two, the changes introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
12 In their book on Criminal Procedure in Cyprus (until recently, the only book on this area in Cyprus) 
which has been widely used by courts as reference.
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study o f  the w ide powers vested in the police to ensure law enforcement. These 
prosecutions, private in theory, are o f  a public nature as the principal 
consideration for the institution is the safeguard o f  the public interest in law  
enforcement and not the satisfaction o f  the injured party. The process o f  police  
prosecution remains throughout under the supervision o f  the Attorney General.’ 
(Loizou and Pikis 1975:64) (emphasis added)
Furthermore, in the In Re Koumougioros case (1995 1 C.L.R. 805) the Supreme 
Court, using wording close to the philosophy of the ‘constabulary independence 
principle’, justified the filing of an accusation by the District Divisional Commander 
of the Police instead of the Chief of the Police. In this case, and for the first time, the 
tradition according to which the District Divisional Commander of the Police appears 
on the charge sheet in summary trials -  followed since the British years -  was 
challenged. Instead of clarifying the situation, the Court stated that:
‘Article 19 o f  the Police Law gives the right to each and every member o f  the 
Police Force to stay criminal proceedings...Executing his powers, each police  
officer does not act as a representative o f  the force or his superiors but as an 
organ o f  the law itself...’(In Re Koumougioros 1995 1 C.L.R. 808-809)
In the language of the foregoing judicial decisions one can observe the contradictory 
co-existence of two things: (a) the claim that police prosecutions are private 
prosecutions in form and that the police officers, when prosecuting, do not represent 
the whole force but only themselves, and (b) the declaration that they are under the 
immediate direction of the Attorney General. The question is therefore inescapable: 
How can they be under the direct control of the Attorney General, when it is argued 
indirectly that police officers are not even obliged to obey the orders of their 
immediate superiors?
If the first point is accepted (and thus, additionally, the fact that the police right to 
institute proceedings is similar to the traditions in England), it is also accepted that the 
principle of constabulary independence is applicable in Cyprus. Therefore, the
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Attorney General would not be able to order the police to prosecute or not13 but could 
only intervene when a case reaches the court. However, everything else indicates the 
contrary: The police force in Cyprus is governed by a statute and comes under the 
Ministry of Justice. Legislation establishes the powers and duties of police officers 
who are placed within a bureaucratic structure, hierarchically organized. Furthermore, 
and most importantly, Article 19 of the Police Law clearly provides that police 
prosecutions are ‘subject to the directions of the Attorney General.’14 Also, as has 
already been said, the courts themselves have on many occasions declared that police 
prosecutions are under the direct supervision of the Attorney General. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that the police in Cyprus do not enjoy the independence that they 
traditionally have enjoyed in England and Wales regarding prosecutions, but rather 
that they are completely bound by the directions of the Attorney General throughout 
the whole process.
Constitutional powers -  Police Law powers
Another cause of some confusion as to the nature of the Law Office’s powers vis-a- 
vis the police is the reference to the Constitutional provision of Article 113.2 as the 
provision on which the governance of the relationship between the two services is 
based, without reference to the specific provision of the Police Law:
‘The Attorney General o f  the Republic shall have power, exercisable at his
discretion in the public interest, to institute, conduct, take over, and continue or
13 See also Sanders (1985:6) referring to ex parte Blackburn: ‘... the common law theory makes a 
police prosecution, in form, a private prosecution, at least at its inception. Thus, if  the police do not 
wish to prosecute a case they cannot be forced to do so’.
14 See the Canadian case Bisaillon v. Keable and AG o f Quebec (1980) 17 C.R. (3d) 193 (Q.C.A.). As 
the Law Reform Commission o f Canada (1990, n.31) argued, ‘in that case the Quebec Court o f Appeal 
distinguished Blackburn on the facts from the situation in Quebec. Mr Justice Turgeon held that the 
police in England enjoy great autonomy; in Quebec, they were under the Ministry o f Justice... who has 
responsibility for all aspects o f the administration o f justice in the province. Turgeon also suggested 
that stricter prosecutorial control in Quebec meant that the decision whether to lay charges in that 
province lay with the prosecutor’s office rather than with the police. As a result, he held that Blackburn 
was not applicable in Quebec.’ See also Stenning (1986) for a discussion on the legal relationship 
between the police and the public prosecutors in Canada. See also the Report o f  Patten Commission on 
policing reform in Northern Ireland where the constabulary independence doctrine was critically 
analysed (Northern Ireland Office 2000).
143
Chapter Fixe: The Workload o f  the Attorney General's Office
discontinue any criminal proceedings for an offence against any person in the 
Republic.’
However, what the Constitution declares is the right of the Attorney General to 
exercise a retrospective control over all prosecutions by his intervention (‘take over, 
continue, discontinue’), besides his right to institute his own proceedings (‘institute’). 
It is the special provision (Art. 19) of the Police Law that argues for a more direct 
relationship between the police and the Law Office and designates the Attorney 
General as the immediate supervisor of the police concerning prosecutions.
The difference is that without the special provision of the Police Law,15 if the police 
failed or refused to prosecute in any case, the only thing that the Attorney General 
could do would be to bring his own prosecution; he would not be able to countermand 
the police decision and force the police to initiate proceedings. Conversely, if the 
police decided to prosecute and the Attorney General thought that this was wrong, he 
would have the right to enter a nolle prosequi in court but could not prevent the 
decision of the police to send the case to the court in the first place. The first set of 
powers arises from the Attorney General’s constitutional position as the official 
responsible for the oversight and control of all prosecutions, but it does not directly 
give him the right to define police prosecution policies or to give compulsory 
directions for everyday police functions regarding prosecutions. It can be logically 
argued that these latter powers are given to him by the special section of the Police 
Law.
It is interesting to note here that, as shown in Chapter Two, the hallmark that used to 
distinguish the Scottish prosecution system from the English, even after the 1986 
change, was that it was the fiscal’s ultimate responsibility to decide if and when the 
criminal process was set in motion by the laying of the charge. In England and Wales, 
even after 1986, the CPS could not prevent the police from charging someone; they 
could only discontinue (or take over) the proceedings.16 In Cyprus, if it is claimed that
15 And similar provisions in the particular Laws that give to other Governmental Departments the right 
to prosecute.
16 See, however, the recent changes with the enactment o f the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the 
introduction o f the ‘statutory charging’.
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the Attorney General is the immediate supervisor of the police, then it is also accepted 
that he can, if he wishes, order the police not to charge anyone without his prior 
notice. Even if it is acknowledged that because of practical and resource reasons he 
does not wish to do that in every case, nevertheless, he still has the right to order the 
police not to charge, as well as the right to order them to do so contrary to their will. 
Based solely on this interpretation, it can be argued that the Attorney General is 
justified in declaring that the Police are obliged to send to the Law Office cases which 
they do not wish to prosecute (see below).17
Legal Advisor
The Attorney General is the legal advisor of the Government according to Article 
113.1 of the Constitution. It is his duty to advise all Government Departments on the 
legality of their actions and the correct interpretation of the Laws and the 
Constitution. Tomaritis (1981:10) states that:
‘The Attorney General o f  the Republic, as its legal adviser, has to render legal 
advice to any organ or authority o f  the Republic on any matter involving legal 
consideration. Our Constitution does not restrict such function either to specific  
matters or in a case where legal advice is being sought. In the absence o f  any 
such restriction, it follow s that the Attorney General may on his own notion 
submit to the appropriate authority or organ...his v iew s as to the legality o f  any 
proposed course to be taken.’
17 There is another issue that must be addressed. The Greek text o f the Cyprus Constitution provides 
that the Attorney General has the right to ‘institute, take over, continue or discontinue and order any 
prosecutions in the Republic.’ As Loucaides (1974) states, it could be argued that strictly interpreted, 
this provision enables the Attorney General to order any Service in the Republic to lay charges against 
someone, even if  they wish not to do so. Therefore, it could be claimed that the relationship o f  
immediate supervision between the Attorney General and the Police (or any other prosecuting service) 
is indeed based on the Constitution. However, the phrase ‘order the prosecution’ is omitted in the 
Turkish and English texts o f the Constitution as well as in the Draft o f the Cyprus Constitution. The 
Cyprus Constitution was written in three languages: Greek, Turkish, and English. Article 149 o f  the 
Constitution provides that any contradiction between the different texts o f the Constitution is resolved 
by the Supreme Court with reference to the Draft o f the Constitution which was signed on the 6/4/1960. 
Therefore, as the same commentator argues, it can be concluded that this provision was introduced in 
the Greek text per incuriam and has no effect.
145
Chapter Five: The Workload o f  the Attorney G eneral’s Office
As Loucaides (1974) argues, the seeking of his advice regarding the legality of their 
actions is compulsory for Government Departments and they are obliged to follow it.
As a result of this additional status of the Attorney General, at times, in the 
descriptions of some commentators, the impression is given that his relationship with 
the police (and other prosecuting authorities) is that of legal advisor-advisee:
‘M ost criminal cases are prosecuted by the police, who act under the legal 
direction  o f  the Attorney G eneral/ (Papaioannou 1999:4) (em phasis added)
‘The Law O ffice must direct and lead the police in the execution o f  their duties 
and should provide them with the necessary legal assistance. Because o f  the 
status o f  the Attorney General as the legal advisor o f  the state and his status as 
the Public Prosecutor, the police are obliged to consult with him, get his 
directions and his legal advice...in  order for their actions to be according to 
la w ...’ (Loucaides 1974:47) (emphasis added)
Nevertheless, as it should be obvious by now, the Attorney General’s powers 
regarding police prosecutions are much wider than the concept of ‘legal advice’ 
would ever permit. The contrary would mean that although guidance as to the legality 
of a police prosecution would be properly within the domain of the Attorney General, 
any attempt to direct on the exercise of police discretion could be resisted as 
exceeding the authority comprehended in the concept of legal advice.
The Police approach
There are very few written accounts from the police describing their role or their 
relationship with the Attorney General’s Office. Their official view, repeatedly 
declared in the media18 and consistent with the general rhetoric about prosecutions, is 
that they discharge their functions regarding prosecutions under the superintendence 
of the Attorney General. This is also stated in the Police Force Standing Order 3/24, 
s.l:
18 See inter alia the newspapers ‘Phileleftheros’ 22/02/2000, 03/05/2001, ‘Politis’ 21/04/2000, 
‘Simerini’ 13/07/2002.
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‘Every police officer according to the Police Law has the power to charge any 
person before the Courts and to apply for a sum m ons, warrant, search warrant 
or such other legal process as may by law be issued against any person ...alw ays 
under the directions o f  the Attorney General ’ (em phasis added)
The official police approach to the workload of the Attorney General’s Office seems 
also to be consistent with the theory and the rhetoric of prosecutions described earlier. 
When asked about which cases they forward to the Law Office, they replied:
The following categories of cases are always forwarded to the Law Office:
a. Cases that concern offences punishable with five years or more.
b. Consent cases.
c. Sensitive cases, for example when the accused is a senior public 
servant or ‘an important and well-known person’.
d. Complex cases where constitutional or other novel legal issues may 
arise.
e. Cases where the accused is a police officer.
f. Files during the investigation stage when the advice of the Law Office is 
required.
g. Cases for which there is a suggestion to be classified as ‘otherwise 
disposed of.
h. Cases for which the police are not sure whether there is enough 
evidence to send them to Court.
i. All other cases that the Attorney General requires the police to forward 
to his office.’ (Interview with the Head of the Police Prosecutions 
Department)
Studying the Police Force Standing Orders (which are issued by the Chief of the 
Police and directed to the police officers) it can be observed that they are generally 
consistent with the above statement.19
It can be seen that very broad terms are used and, undoubtedly, without specific 
guidelines from the Attorney General, a wide discretion to interpret these terms is 
given to the police. It is important, though, that there is the recognition that the 
Attorney General is empowered to direct the police to send to his Office whichever
19 See particularly Standing Order 3/5, s.7.2 and Standing Order 3/4, s. 5 and s. 6.3c.
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categories of cases he wishes. However, it is also obvious that what the police regard 
as ‘the Attorney General’s workload’ is predominately whatever is serious, complex, 
sensitive or extraordinary.
There is one provision in Standing Orders not consistent with the above statement. 
Standing Order 3/5 s. 10.3 provides: ‘Regarding minor cases the District Commander 
of the Police could dispose of a case as ‘otherwise disposed o f  or ‘non-existent’ and 
return it to the Police Department.’ However, when that was drawn to the attention of 
the head of the Police Prosecution Department, he replied that this Order applied only 
to very minor cases and the rule was that ‘when there is a suggestion not to prosecute 
a case, we have to ask the Attorney General.’20 The following conversation I had with 
one of the senior members of the Central Police Prosecution Department is 
illuminating:
Q: If there is a suggestion for a case to be ‘otherwise disposed of, even if this is 
a minor case, must the file be sent to the Attorney General?
A: Yes, because even for minor cases, there is always the possibility that the 
victim may complain to the Attorney General...Only very minor and very clear 
cases can be closed by the Chief Constable or by us without the consent of the 
Law Office.
This was in line with the attitude of the heads of the District Police Prosecution 
Departments as well, who argued that they were asking for Law Office directions 
even when the Attorney General himself allowed them discretion:
There is a circular by the Attorney General stating that we can discontinue 
minor traffic cases or minor assaults, etc. without the prior notice of the Law 
Office. To be on the safe side, though, I always inform the Law Office, even if 
this is only by calling them (I usually call the Deputy Attorney General). You 
have to be careful, because there is always the chance that the victim may 
change his mind and complain to the Attorney General about the 
discontinuance of a case. This occurred in the past, so I always inform the Law
20 However, in discussions 1 had with other members o f the Police Force, the previous view was not 
supported equally strongly and it was admitted that there was a certain degree o f discretion that could 
be exercised.
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Office.’ (Interview with the head of one of the District Police Prosecution 
Departments)21
This is indicative of how police practice might have been influenced by the power of 
the Attorney General to intervene in any police case. Without clear guidance from the 
Attorney General, it is obvious that it is only when the police wish to involve the Law 
Office that the latter become involved in cases that are not part of their monopoly. 
However, the theoretical potential that someone else -  most probably the defendant or 
the victim -  might draw the Attorney General’s attention to a particular case and 
provoke his intervention (which would be justified) in a way forces the police to send 
problematic cases to the Law Office for their directions.
Concluding remarks
Although there is some vagueness in the rhetoric as far as the workload of the Law 
Office is concerned and some inconsistency regarding the exact relationship between 
the Attorney General and the police, the conclusion that all appear to reach in the end 
is that the Attorney General, if he wished, could make his control of the police tighter 
and extend the workload of his Office as he sees fit. The primacy of the Attorney 
General is never doubted; it is just the logic behind it that varies in some issues and 
causes confusion. Therefore, what remains to be seen is how successive Attorney 
Generals themselves have chosen to utilise their apparently broad discretion and 
which cases have been regarded as fitting in with their Office’s workload.
21 The head o f the second District Police Prosecution Department 1 interviewed argued that they used to 
adopt the same tactic.
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II. THE ATTORNEY GENERALS’ APPROACH -  HISTORY OF THE LAW 
OFFICE’S WORKLOAD22
‘However much care is taken in the formulation o f  the powers associated  
with the respective offices, there is little doubt that the experience, 
standing and personalities o f  the people occupying these positions... have 
to be carefully assessed if  a realistic picture is to be gained o f  the day to 
day administration o f  justice.’ (Edwards 1989:101)
In Cyprus, due to the absence of specific regulation and the broad discretion that is 
afforded to the Attorney General, what constitutes the law is closely linked to what is 
interpreted as the law by the Attorney General himself. Through the study of the 
history of the Law Office, one can notice that successive Attorney Generals have been 
comfortable with the broad nature of their role and the fact that they have acquired 
complete freedom of action to define and pursue their tasks.23 It is as though the 
mystique that surrounds the Law Office and the excessive latitude that characterises 
its powers have been regarded as essential in order to retain the respect and the 
symbolic role that it plays in the prosecution process.24
A general conclusion that can be also drawn is that, over time, the involvement of the 
Law Office in different categories of cases became greater, and its control over the 
police became more effective. As shown in the previous section, the theory had 
always been that the Attorney General would be entitled to intervene in any case.
22 In this section, I will provide data relevant to the Attorney Generals’ approach regarding only the 
workload o f their Office. Information about their approach regarding their powers (e.g. investigatory 
powers) and their prosecution policies and criteria will be provided in Chapters Six and Seven 
respectively.
23 As in any democratic country, in Cyprus, the Parliament has the formal authority to create and 
reform Laws. Officially the Attorney General has no right to propose legislation. However, the Law 
Office, as the legal service o f the Government, is responsible for drafting all the important legislation 
and it contributes significantly to the passage o f bills within the Parliament. As a matter o f fact, on 
many occasions it is the Law Office that initiates the introduction of new Laws or the reform o f the 
existing ones (see Tomaritis 1971). Therefore, it would be well within their powers if  they wished, to at 
least try and clarify the uncertainties in the legislation or pass more detailed provisions which would 
specify their powers regarding prosecutions.
24 However, see below Mr Markidis’ willingness to be more specific.
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However, in the past there was less expectation of him to do so and there also grew a 
tendency by some Attorney Generals to reserve their involvement for only the most 
exceptional cases. It will be evident by what follows in this section that a number of 
reasons advocated for a gradual shift of this attitude and that not all of them were 
based on the conscious efforts of the officials involved to do so.
Even so, the personality and the choices of each Attorney General formed some of the 
most significant factors that shaped the Law Office’s workload. There are two main 
issues that this section should focus on: Firstly, the way in which successive Attorney 
Generals chose to utilise their discretion to define other categories of cases -  apart 
from those required by law -  which they wanted to deal with systematically; 
secondly, the way in which they interpreted their relationship with the police, further 
to the obvious and common principle that the police carry out their prosecutorial 
functions under their supervision. The Attorney Generals’ approach to the latter issue 
defines the way they discharge their supervisory and regulatory role over the so-called 
police prosecutions.
The workload of the Law Office during Mr Tornaritis’ tenure
As Loucaides (1974) points out, before Cyprus gained independence (1960), the 
Attorney General’s responsibilities were defined by statutoiy laws and supplemented 
by the respective provisions of the Law Office in England. Mr Tornaritis was 
appointed to the office of the Attorney General in 1952 during British rule, and 
continued his service after 1960 as the first Attorney General of the independent 
Republic of Cyprus.25 Unsurprisingly, even after independence, he was heavily 
influenced in the discharge of his duties by his counterparts in England.
Mr Tornaritis wrote a number of short reports on various legal issues, as well as on 
the general responsibilities of his Office.26 Although he frequently referred to the
25 With an interruption o f his service during the years 1955-59 during which an armed liberation 
struggle was deployed in Cyprus which aimed for the expulsion o f British troops from the island, for 
self-determination and for union with Greece. The colonian administration judged that an Englishman 
should serve at the post o f the Attorney General during that time and, therefore, James H. Henry was 
appointed, replacing Mr Tornaritis. See Appendix I.
26 See Tornaritis (1969), (1971), (1975), (1981), (1983a), (1983b), (1983c), (1984), (1985).
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singularities of the Cyprus System and to the additional powers that the Attorney 
General’s Office in Cyprus acquired,27 his adherence to the British constitutional 
conventions and the common law was evident in his writings:
‘The Attorney General in Cyprus, in the execution o f  his duties deriving from 
Article 113.2 o f  the Constitution, follow s the same principles and conventions 
as are follow ed in England.’ (Tornaritis 1983a:6)
‘The Attorney General in Cyprus, presently as well as during the colonial 
period, has a similar status to the Attorney General in E ngland...H e carries the 
responsibility for criminal prosecutions...’ (Memorandum o f  the Attorney 
General regarding his relationship to the Ministry o f  the Interior28 and the 
police, dated 22/01/1969, p .l)
It is obvious in his accounts about the Law Office that he placed emphasis on the 
control function of the Attorney General over the prosecution system rather than on 
the everyday involvement of his Office in every case. He underlined the symbolic role 
of the Attorney General in the system deriving from his status as an independent 
official with quasi-judicial responsibilities:
‘The Constitution entrusts the Attorney General, an independent official, with 
broad powers so he can exercise effective control over the system o f  criminal 
prosecutions. He can intervene when public interest requires it and interrupt any 
criminal proceedings which constitute an abuse o f  the right in private 
prosecution.’ (Tornaritis 1983a:44)
and
‘The Attorney General is entrusted with the ultimate responsibility for, and 
control of, prosecutions.’ (Tornaritis 1969:2)
27 See Tornaritis (1983c). As will be shown in a latter chapter, Mr Tornaritis defended repeatedly, in a 
series o f articles in the Cyprus Law Review, the independent status o f  the Office and the quasi-judicial 
nature o f  many o f its powers.
28 Police was under the Ministry o f  Interior up until 1993 when the Ministry o f Justice was renamed to 
Ministry o f Justice and Public Order and acquired responsibility for the Police.
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The power to suspend prosecutions -  to enter a nolle prosequi -  preoccupied all of the 
written accounts by Mr Tornaritis regarding prosecutions.29 This may be due to the 
fact that, on several occasions, the exercise of his prerogative became the focus of 
controversy in discussions in Parliament.30 However, this indicates again that his 
emphasis was placed on the ‘control’ function and the potential to intervene in court 
at the trial stage rather than on an a priori policy and directions.
Although, during his time at the office, he issued a few circulars directed to the police 
about other issues (see, for example, in Chapter Six his circulars about his power to 
direct police during investigations), I was not able to find any circulars defining 
certain categories of cases that the police should forward to the Law Office. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the institution of criminal prosecutions on behalf of 
the Law Office during that period -  apart from those in front of the Assize Courts -  
was not very usual. Where there might, on occasion, be informal contact between the 
police and Law Officers regarding minor cases, such contacts were merely on an ad 
hoc basis. His supervisory role over the ‘police cases’ was reduced to discussing 
individual cases and incidents. This was also confirmed by the discussions I had with 
some senior members of the Law Office who also served during the last years of Mr 
Tornaritis’ tenure.
Loucaides (1974), who served as a senior Law Officer during Mr Tornaritis’ tenure, 
authored a short book about the Attorney General’s Office in Cyprus which was 
prefaced by Mr Tornaritis. In this publication, some information about the Law 
Office’s workload as far as prosecutions are concerned can be found. The author 
(1974:45) reports: ‘Criminal prosecutions on behalf of the Attorney General are 
limited to cases in front of the Assize Courts and some other cases where serious 
issues of public interest are raised.’ The only example of such a case that he refers to 
is a prosecution against a newspaper in 1963.31
29 Tornaritis (1983a), (1983c), (1985).
30 See Parliaments’ Records (1983:123) and the speech by Mr Kikis Talaridhs published in the Cyprus 
Law Review (1983 2CyLR:225).
31 Attorney General v. KIRIX Publications LTD (CC 17393/63).
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A speech32 by the same officer at the annual meeting of the Cyprus Bar in 1978 is 
illuminating on the same issue:
‘During the years 1975, 1976 and 1977 the total number o f  criminal cases that 
were tried by Cyprus courts reached 360,068. O f these, only 200 cases were 
presented in courts by members o f  the Law O ffice ....T h ese numbers relate to 
the cases that reach the courts, but it is also well recognised that in the great 
majority o f  cases the decision to prosecute or not is being taken by non­
members o f  the Law O ff ic e .’(L o u ca id es  1979:92-93)
It has to be mentioned, though, that apart from the ideological factors and the way the 
Attorney General interpreted his role, the reasons for the small systematic intervention 
of the Office in prosecutions may additionally lie in resource issues. It has to be 
recalled that the Law Office functions also as the Legal Service of the Republic. The 
newly established state of Cyprus appeared to generate a great deal of work for the 
Attorney General in its early days. He was called upon to give advice on a multitude 
of questions and he was responsible for drafting government bills and advising the 
parliament on the drafting of a large volume of new legislation.33 In an era when 
controversy centered on constitutional issues and on the distribution of power 
between the two communities of the island,34 one might presume that the Attorney 
General was too preoccupied with other affairs of government to prosecute frequently.
At this point, as a parenthesis, it has to be mentioned that the other post-holders also 
argued that the multiple roles that the Law Office is called upon to fulfil exert 
influence on the volume of criminal cases that the Law Office can deal with:
‘We have to draft legislation proposed to be submitted to the House of 
Representatives, give legal advice to all public authorities, handle all civil and 
administrative cases in which the Republic is a party, apart from our duties 
regarding prosecutions. Inevitably, this affects the amount of criminal cases that 
we can deal with.’ (Interview with Mr Triantafyllides, 01/02/2002)
32 The Loucaides’ speech ‘Presentation of criminal cases in court by non-legally qualified advocates’ 
was given on 01/10/1978 and it was published in the Cyprus Law Review (1979:92).
33 See Loucaides (1974) and Tornaritis (1981).
34 See Papaioannou (1984) and Neocleous (2000).
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‘This year, especially during the coming months, as a result of the preparation 
of Laws, etc regarding Cyprus accession to the European Union, the Law Office 
has to handle a particularly heavy workload.35 Because of their urgency we have 
to prioritise them above the rest of our duties.’ (Interview with Mr Markidis, 
15/05/2002)
In most of the common law countries36 the responsibilities of the Attorney General’s 
Office have been long ago transferred to a separate institution, the Office of Public 
Prosecutions. In Cyprus, successive Attorney Generals, while complaining about the 
resource problems caused by the diversity of their duties, have advocated against this 
choice.37
Concluding this section on Mr Tornaritis’ tenure, it has to be remarked that Mr 
Tornaritis did not establish a proactive policy about which cases the police were 
obliged to forward to the Law Office (apart from the Assize Court cases). Nor did he 
set up procedures for systematic contacts with the police regarding the cases that they 
used to deal with. However, he did manage to impose his status as the ultimate 
prosecuting authority. It is interesting to note that since that period, the police had 
regarded themselves as being part of a chain of command headed by the Attorney 
General in relation to prosecutions (irrespective of the fact the Attorney General 
rarely intervened in ‘their cases’). A revealing example is a letter by the Chief of the 
Police (dated 21/01/1969) sent to the Attorney General in which he complained of the 
intervention by the Ministry of the Interior in a murder case and asked the Attorney 
General to clarify ‘that in a criminal case the only responsible person to give 
directions to the police is the Attorney General’!38
j5 It is interesting that for the same reason in 1974 the Office o f the Director o f Public Prosecutors was 
created in Ireland as the Government o f the day thought it absolutely necessary to alleviate much o f  the 
workload o f the Attorney General’s Office in consequence o f the State’s accession to the European 
Economic Community.
36 For instance, in England and Wales, Ireland and Northern Ireland; see Chapter Two.
37 Interviews with the Attorney Generals.
38 As will be shown in the next chapter, this letter was also referring to the powers o f  the Attorney 
General to direct the police even during the investigations.
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Mr Triantafyllides* tenure (1988-95)
Public Prosecutors Law 8/1989
The passing of the Public Prosecutors Law 8/1989 marked the beginning of the tenure 
of Mr Triantafyllides as Attorney General. As was discussed in the previous chapter, 
with Law 8/1989 arose the opportunity to examine in depth the entire prosecution 
system and the relationship between the police and the Law Office. However, that 
particular Law did not clarify many of the problems enumerated in the discussion on 
the rhetoric of the system.39 Once again, many issues were left unclear or unanswered:
Firstly, the Law provided only for those cases that reached the court and not for those 
that the police might decide to filter out of the system -  and it was concerning those, 
as has been demonstrated, that the greatest confusion prevailed. Consequently, the 
situation as regards those cases remained untouched, and was interpreted as before. 
They were, however, always subject to the limitations and restrictions that the special 
relationship between the Attorney General and the police demanded.
Secondly, the Law appeared to confuse two issues, namely the question of the 
presentation of cases in court and the question of who was prosecuting. The Law did 
not clarify whether there should be a takeover of police prosecutions by the public 
prosecutors, or whether they were still considered as police prosecutions being carried 
out by ‘public prosecutors’. The Law could have set the preconditions to establish a 
system, as far as summary prosecutions were concerned, similar to that in England 
and Wales after 1986.40 However, the Public Prosecutors Law 8/1989 left untouched 
three crucial issues which could have advocated for such a change: (a) prosecutions 
were still being instituted in the name of the District Divisional Commander of the 
Police, (b) ‘public prosecutors’ continued to serve in the police prosecution services, 
and (c) their immediate supervisor was a senior police officer.
39A s shown in the previous chapter, the Law only provided that (a) everyone that presents cases to 
court as a public prosecutor must be legally qualified, and (b) the ‘public prosecutors’ -  who appear for 
the police or any other governmental service -  shall execute their duties under the instructions o f the 
Attorney General and they are considered as members o f the Law Office.
40 According to the Prosecution o f Offences Act 1985, in England and Wales public prosecutors were 
responsible and obligated to take over all criminal prosecutions instituted by the police; see Chapter 
Two.
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A new era?
However, notwithstanding these uncertainties (and the fact that if  the Law was 
correctly analysed, it would become clear that it did not give any extra powers to the 
Attorney General in addition to those he already possessed), that Law appeared to 
signal a new era in the tenor of the relationship between the police and the Attorney 
General’s Office. It was not so much the wording of the Law which brought about 
that change, but the ideas and the issues of principle, that for the first time were 
discussed in a slightly more extensive way than before.41 It was the beginning of a 
closer relationship between the police and the Attorney General and it provided the 
reaffirmation that the latter was the undoubted supervisory authority.
Mr Triantafyllides himself described the attitude he adopted once he took up his 
duties, comparing it to the previous situation:
‘Under the previous state of affairs, control over the police had been very lax.
They were left to do whatever they wanted with their cases... When I was 
appointed to office I made it clear to everyone that I was the supervisor. After a 
while, police officers understood that the Attorney General was their boss 
regarding prosecutions and that he was the only one responsible for giving 
them directions.’ (Interview 01/02/2002)
Even his critics admit that things changed for the better during his tenure as far as the 
control of police cases were concerned.42
However, instead of defining specific directions and a systematic approach towards 
the categories of cases he wished to deal with, he consciously refrained from such 
actions. He believed that classifying categories of cases or defining guidelines would 
somehow compromise his broad powers to deal with whatever he chose. In a frank 
response he admitted:
‘Why limit your powers voluntarily? Guidelines are not necessary.’ (Ibid)
41 See Discussions in Parliament (Parliament Records dated 22/04/88, p. 123).
42 See the article by a well-known journalist, Mr Drousiotis, in the newspaper ‘Alithia’ 29/04/1993 
where, although he criticised intensively Mr Triantafyllides on a series o f issues, he admitted that the 
control that he exercised over the police was more effective than before.
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Instead, he believed that interpersonal dynamics was a crucial factor that would 
enable him to exercise control over the police. He emphasised the great importance of 
trust and cooperation with the senior members of the Force:
The Attorney General should have a good relationship with the Chief of the 
Police. If you achieve that, then it is easier to isolate the police officers who 
disobey the Attorney General’s instructions.’ (Ibid)
Inevitably, without, again, comprehensive requirements on the police to report 
specific cases, the role of the Attorney General was limited to the ‘control function’ in 
relation to less serious cases. The only time that he dealt with these was when the 
police or someone else asked him to do so. Mr Triantafyllides believed that the 
jurisdiction was so small that he would always be informed of something that 
deserved his attention. Therefore, he argued that:
The important thing is to consolidate the position not only among the police but 
among the rest of the actors in the criminal justice system that you have the 
authority to intervene and to act that way...’ (Ibid)
It is true that during his tenure, police sought his directions more frequently than 
before and he intervened on many occasions in cases that did not belong to his regular 
‘Assize Court’ workload; always, however, on an ad hoc basis.43 The documentary 
survey carried out at the Law Office came across several records which prove his 
intervention in libel cases, cases against journalists, cases against public officials, 
cases concerning economic scandals and fraud as well as cases concerning 
accusations against police officers of violence against suspects.
Nevertheless, towards the end of his tenure, the previously sporadic complaints about 
police actions and the way police were dealing with criminal cases multiplied. This 
did not necessarily mean that police actions had worsened but rather that people felt 
more secure to reveal things and journalists more free to expose police abuses.44 Most
43 Source o f data: Interviews with Law Officers who served during his tenure and with defence 
advocates.
44 This must also be related to the fact that during that period, privately owned media were introduced 
to Cyprus for the first time.
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of the criticism was levelled towards the police practice of filtering cases out of the 
system45 (‘let off well-known suspects or powerful persons’).46 The Law Office was 
also criticised for either tolerating police practices, or even contributing towards 
them.47 Indeed, the criticism was so pronounced that the Attorney General felt 
compelled to issue one of his rare statements to the media stating that police did not 
have the power to filter out cases without his approval.48
Mr Markidis’ tenure (1995-2003)
During Mr Markidis’ tenure at the office, the way he interpreted his role together with 
a combination of other factors advocated the extension of the Law Office’s workload 
in terms of both the variety and the number of cases that they were dealing with.
As soon as he assumed office, he made it clear that he was willing to follow a more 
structured approach to the workload of his Office, to systematise his communication 
with the police, and to consider improvements to the presentation of summary cases in 
the District Courts. Indicative of this approach were the following measures he 
introduced:
a) He created specialised divisions in the Law Office which corresponded to their 
various responsibilities (e.g. Legislation Drafts division, and Civil Law, 
Administrative Law and Criminal Law divisions) and appointed one senior Law 
Officer as the head of each. Although Law Officers did not strictly come under one of 
these divisions, for the first time, some Law Officers were dealing exclusively with 
criminal cases. A very important development was that one Law Officer for each
45 It is very interesting to note that in Cyprus, the main focus o f controversy has always been on the 
cases that are filtered out o f the system. In the past, there was criticism that too many o f them are 
filtered out o f the system in contrary to the situation in England, for example, where there was criticism 
that the police were sending too many cases to courts. Undoubtedly, this is one o f the main reasons 
why successive Attorney Generals have placed particular emphasis on this category of cases.
46 See inter alia a series of articles in the newspapers ‘Alithia’, ‘Simerini’, ‘Phileleftheros’ between 
December 1993 and June 1994.
47 Anxieties were also voiced about the increasing number o f nolle prosequis that the Attorney General 
was entering.
48 Statement A.N. 61/85, dated 02/12/1993.
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Police District was appointed with responsibility for communicating with the police 
on every-day matters and directions.49
b) For the first time, he defined in writing some specific categories of cases that the 
police should forward to the Law Office, apart from the Assize Court cases: 1) 
domestic violence,50 2) corruption by public officers, 3) fraud/Stock Exchange, 4) 
fatal traffic accidents,51 and 5) all sensitive or complex cases or cases where 
constitutional issues arise. It was also the first time that separate records for certain 
categories of cases were kept in the Law Office, under his directions.52
c) During the first months of his tenure, he held a number of meetings with all the 
public prosecutors53 serving in Police Prosecution Departments, as well as with senior 
police officers and the Chief of the Police,54 during which they discussed prosecution 
policies and communication procedures between the two services. It is interesting to 
note that as a result of the meetings with the public prosecutors, he issued a circular 
defining certain steps that had to be followed when prosecutors faced problems 
presenting a case or when they judged that the case should be discontinued.55 At the 
end of that circular the Attorney General made the point that: ‘It is emphasised that 
the public prosecutors discharge their duties under the directions of the Attorney 
General and the head of the Prosecution Department ONLY’ (original emphasis).56
49 For each o f the busiest districts (Districts o f Nicosia and Limassol), there were two Law Officers 
appointed as heads. See Circular G.E. 74/72/6, dated 15/04/96. See also Appendix II.
50 See Circular G.E. 50(C)/! 992/N.42, dated 11/06/1998.
51 Another category, for a brief period, was cases o f unlawful hunting.
52 Previously, there was only one record for all the cases that were forwarded to the Law Office.
53 See also a later announcement by the Attorney General (G.E. 9/52/309), dated 30/10/2001: ‘In a 
meeting at the office o f the President o f the District Court o f Nicosia, the problems that courts are 
facing have been discussed and analysed and it was concluded (inter alia) that there is a need for the 
court to be relieved o f cases concerning offences that had been committed a long time ago. As a result 
o f this meeting, myself and the head o f the Prosecution Department of Nicosia have examined a series 
o f cases -  which are referred to in the attached catalogue -  and 1 have given the required directions for 
their further handling in court.’
54 See Memorandum G.E. 124/73/2, dated 03/05/1996.
55 See Circulars G.E. 50(B)/87/N.35.3, dated 07/05/1996 and G.E. 50(B)/87/N.35, dated 23/12/1996.
56 He also issued a number o f other circulars directed to public prosecutors, dealing with issues related 
to the cases they were handling: e.g. Circular G.E. 19(M)/1964, dated 16/02/1999 concerning the
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He soon realised, however, that it would not be easy to exercise effective control over 
the public prosecutors simply because Law 8/1989 and his circular declared that they 
had to obey his directions. Since they were still police officers, and they were serving 
in a police prosecution department under the immediate supervision of a senior police 
officer, there was always the danger that they would be influenced by police 
directions. The Attorney General himself admitted:
‘We didn’t think that the situation with the public prosecutors was the right one. 
Although the Law says that when dealing with prosecutions they should obey 
my directions as though they were members of my service, the reality is that 
they are still members of the police force and, at any time, the Chief of the 
Police could remove them or transfer them to another department.’ (Interview 
15/05/2002)
Therefore, he decided that the best solution was to appoint lawyers directly under his 
service, charging them with the duty of prosecuting the ‘police cases’ in front of the 
District Courts, and placing them within the District Police Prosecution Departments:
‘We have already appointed eight public prosecutors and eight more are to be 
appointed next year. It will take a few years before all the current public 
prosecutors/police officers are replaced with prosecutors who are coming, also 
formally, under our service. We will do this gradually because of the cost that is 
generated.’ (Ibid)
Mr Markidis seemed to realise the absurd situation that was created with Law 8/1989, 
and the inconsistencies that it produced and attempted to take some steps towards a 
more rational approach. However, once more, that attempt was done in a piecemeal 
fashion and without adequate reflection. Again, more thought was given to the 
presentation of cases in court rather than the actual decision to prosecute, and the 
status of the public prosecutors -  although stronger than before -  was still
priority of cases that were based on testimonies by foreigners, Circular G.E. 9/52/309, dated 30/10/01 
concerning the discontinuance o f a series o f cases pending in courts for extended period of time and 
Circular G.E. 74/72/7, dated 15/10/01, concerning general procedural issues regarding the handling o f  
cases in court.
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compromised by the fact that they were serving in Police Prosecution Departments.57 
On the first issue, the Attorney General admitted:
‘I know this is not the ideal situation. However, in order to change that (the fact 
that the police takes the decision for prosecution in most of the summary 
cases), huge resources are required. For the moment, we don’t plan to change 
that... Instead, I define certain categories of cases that I judge to need my 
attention and I give directions to the police to forward cases when they need my 
advice. In addition to the Assize Court cases, the police do send many cases 
here asking for our directions... And in any event they should send the cases 
that they want to filter out of the system for public interest reasons.’ (Ibid)
And:
There is no way that we can supervise and give directions on the thousands of 
cases that police are dealing with... However, we already have a much more 
extensive workload than the Law Office has ever had before’. (Ibid)
When asked how they could ensure that the police do send to the Law Office the cases 
that they should, Mr Markidis was very honest:
‘We can’t be absolutely sure. There is no perfect way to check, unless someone 
draws our attention to that. There are instances when the victim or the 
defendant complains about the police decision and we ask the police to send 
the file so we can review their decision... We may not have pre-emptive control 
of all cases but we can certainly exercise control afterwards, when someone 
informs the Law Office.’ (Ibid)
Contextual factors
It is evident from the above that Mr Markidis’ approach certainly pointed towards a 
more extensive workload for the Law Office. In addition to that, it is interesting to
57 An absurd situation was created with public prosecutors having to answer both to the head o f the 
PPD and to the Law Office. Even during Mr Markidis’ tenure, and despite the improvement observed 
compared to the previous situation, some circulars (e.g. G.E. 65/1993/3) directed to the public 
prosecutors were sent to the Chief o f the Police to circulate to the PPD, instead o f directly to them. 
Later, however, such circulars were sent directly to the PPD, albeit with a notification to the Chief o f  
the Police.
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refer here briefly to three other factors that appeared to contribute to the growth in the 
Law Office’s workload:
1. Complexity has always been a criterion that advocated for the Law Office’s 
involvement but, as time passed, complex crimes seemed to increase as new forms of 
criminality appeared (e.g. organised crime, especially money laundering and drug 
trafficking). Especially during the period of the opening of the Cyprus Stock 
Exchange (1999) and immediately afterwards, a huge rise in economic crime was 
observed.58 The low level of police experience59 regarding those cases made the Law 
Office’s intervention more frequent.60
2. The second catalyst appeared to be the increasing challenge to and criticism of 
police decisions by the media which on a number of occasions forced the Attorney 
General to intervene in police cases and, in a way, constituted an additional source of 
information for him.61
3. Defendants or victims themselves played a significant role in the tendency of the 
Law Office to intervene more frequently in summary cases. As will be seen in section 
four of this chapter, a great deal of the Law Office’s involvement in cases that usually 
did not belong to their ordinary workload was provoked by the defendants’ or 
victims’ requests to review police decisions on prosecution. As was shown above, that 
appeared to have influenced police practice as well. The police themselves admitted 
that they were more inclined to send problematic cases to the Law Office.62
Mr Nikitas’ tenure (2003-2005)
After Mr Nikitas’ appointment, a different philosophy for the running of the Office 
was adopted which influenced more dramatically the way in which cases were 
handled and decided (as will be discussed in Chapter Seven). But it also appeared to
58 See Kapardis et al. (2001).
59 Rossidou-Papakyriakou (2001).
60 See the next chapter for the cooperation o f  the police and the Law Office as far as the investigation 
for these crimes are concerned.
61 This was a phenomenon which began to emerge from the last years o f Mr Triantafyllides’ tenure.
62 Interviews with the heads o f the PPD o f Limassol and Nicosia and the Central PPD.
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have some effects on both the variety and the volume of cases that reached the Law 
Office.
His approach was characterised by an emphasis on the independence of the Attorney 
General and on the quasi-judicial status of his role and responsibilities.63 However, Mr 
Nikitas appeared more preoccupied with the establishment of solid principles on 
which cases should be decided rather than with which cases reached his Office. It is 
interesting to observe that the great majority of circulars that he issued concerned the 
way cases should be judged and the criteria by which the forum of trial should be 
chosen.64 Although he appeared very strict and detailed regarding these guidelines, he 
did not seem to pay the same attention to which cases his Office was, and should be, 
dealing with:
‘A: In studying the total number of cases, we can say that a relatively small 
number are reaching the Law Office. The police have their own department so 
they can institute proceedings. Only the serious or extraordinary cases are 
forwarded here...
Q: Have you given directions as to which other cases should be forwarded 
here?
A: ...Some... There is a huge number of criminal cases...You cannot control all 
of them... How could you?’ (Interview 11/01/2004)
Of the public prosecutors serving in the Police Prosecution Departments, he 
remarked:
‘Theoretically, they are under the Law Office. For practical reasons, their 
immediate supervisor is the head of the Police Prosecution Department...It is
63 The language he used in describing the role of the Attorney General is reminiscent o f the wording o f  
the Supreme Court decisions on the issue:
T h e  powers of the Attorney General are defined by Article 113 of the Constitution. He h as the  right 
to initiate prosecutions and to discontinue them  with what is defined a s  ‘nolle prosequi’. The police 
have the right to carry out prosecutions but they are  under the guidance of the Attorney G eneraL .1 
have to underline this: every citizen h as the right to institute criminal prosecutions -  courts have 
been very clear on this. Of course, the Attorney General’s  right to intervene -  by entering a nolle 
prosequi -  is undoubted.’ (Interview 11/01/2004)
Mr Nikitas was a Supreme Court Judge before appointed to the Office o f the Attorney General. His 
critics accused him o f being unable to escape from the judicial mentality.
64 See Circulars G.E. 41(K)/1947, dated 10/06/2003 and G.E. 42(K)/1947, dated 15/07/2003.
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not an ideal system. They should have been integrated into the Law Office...’
(Ibid)
During the first months of his tenure, he changed the structure of the Office, 
abolishing the positions of the Law Officers responsible for each of the District Police 
Prosecution Department -  who until then served as the link between the District PPD 
and the Law Office -  and ensured a more direct supervision of the PPD.65 However, 
he later66 went back to the previous situation, taking also the further step of placing 
two Law Officers in two of the remotest PPDs so that they could exert more effective 
control over the presentation of ‘police cases’ in court.
Mr Nikitas argued that the Law Office’s workload did not change significantly from 
the situation under his predecessor, but he did not find it necessary to give explicit 
directions to the police or the public prosecutors on this issue.
There are indications that his more general views on the criteria that should be applied 
to prosecution decisions influenced the workload of the Law Office. More 
specifically, as will be further discussed in Chapter Seven, Mr Nikitas strongly 
believed that neither the Attorney General nor the police had the right to filter cases 
out of the system due to mitigating factors concerning the defendant. He argued that 
these cases should be decided in an open forum and all the relevant factors could be 
taken into consideration by the judge.67 Thus, during the first months of his tenure, 
every request by defendants asking him either to enter a nolle prosequi or review a 
police decision to prosecute was either refused or returned unanswered.68 Inevitably, 
such requests reduced dramatically (see e.g. Table 1. on p.176).69 Therefore, as a 
result of that policy, a significant part of the Office’s workload -  involving mostly 
‘police cases’-  almost disappeared.
65 Circular G.E. 74/72/8, dated 19/06/03.
66 Circular G.E. 50(B)! 987/N.35/7, dated 17/05/04.
67 See his circulars in footnote 64 and the quotations from his Interview (11/01/2004) in Chapter Seven.
68 Information from the Criminal Records Department o f the Law Office.
69 See also in Table 1 (p. 176) that domestic violence cases also significantly reduced, most probably as 
a result o f the absence o f a clear direction by the Attorney General that they be sent to the Law Office, 
as was the case during Mr Markidis’ tenure.
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Concluding remarks
Whilst the statutory duties and powers of the Attorney General have changed little 
over the last forty-five years, the way in which subsequent office-holders have 
interpreted them has varied to some extent and inevitably affected the workload of the 
Law Office. Undoubtedly, though, as the time passed, other factors -  not directly 
relevant to the approach of each Attorney General -  have influenced the kinds of 
cases that the Office is dealing with. The tendency up until Mr Nikitas’ appointment 
was towards the expansion of the Law Office’s workload. However, some specific 
approaches by the last Attorney General raise some concerns that they might hold 
back a further extension, and confirm once again that the personality and specific 
choices of the office-holder still hold considerable influence over the Law Office’s 
workload.70
III. IDEOLOGY IN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE: THE LAW 
OFFICERS’ APPROACH TO THEIR WORKLOAD
In the previous sections, it has been shown that the workload of the Attorney 
General’s Office has never been unproblematic, given either the rhetoric developed 
regarding the prosecution system or the history of the Office. In this section, how Law 
Officers themselves approach the Law Office’s workload will be examined. Given the
70 However, towards the end o f 2005, Mr Nikitas resigned and Mr Klerides (the Deputy Attorney 
Genera] since Mr Markidis’ tenure) was appointed as the new Attorney General. Although this research 
does not include the tenure of Mr Klerides, it can be reasonably presumed that during his tenure there 
will be a return to the philosophy o f Mr Markidis’ running of the Law Office, especially regarding 
prosecutions. This is based on three points: (a) During Mr Markidis’ tenure, Mr Klerides was in charge 
of Prosecutions in the Law Office and, as admitted by Mr Markidis himself (interview data), was 
responsible for a great number o f prosecution decisions, often replacing the Attorney General 
(especially during the period that the latter was preoccupied with his duties as the advisor to the 
President o f the Republic during negotiation discussions on the solution o f the Cyprus political 
problem); (b) During Mr Nikitas’ tenure, Mr Klerides on several occasions disagreed with Mr Nikitas’ 
choices and policies regarding prosecutions (see statements by Mr Klerides in the newspaper 
‘Fileleftheros’ on 12/02/05 and 13/03/05); (c) Some limited research I carried out concerning circulars 
and memoranda that Mr Klerides has issued since his appointment, as well as several discussions I had 
with Law Officers and Mr Klerides himself during a number o f visits at the Law Office, confirmed -  at 
least prima facie -  the above assumption.
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vagueness of the rhetoric, is there a certainty among them in determining the 
boundary limits of their responsibilities? Do they have a clear understanding of which 
cases they are dealing with and the reasons for that? And do they connect equally with 
all aspects of their workload? For any legal theory or any policy of an Attorney 
General to be properly implemented, significance dependence (among other factors) 
has to be placed on the extent to which they are understood and internalised by the 
agents involved, and on the commitment of these agents to support them. 
Furthermore, arguably, Law Officers’ adherence to the role they associate with each 
aspect of the Law Office’s workload both defines and limits their sense of what they 
can and should properly do in each category of cases. This, however, is a matter that 
will be discussed extensively in Chapter Seven and it will be touched on here only 
indirectly.
Ultimate responsibility for prosecutions
The observation period in the Law Office, and particularly the interviews with the 
Law Officers, indicated their broad and strong awareness that the Attorney General 
held ultimate responsibility for all prosecutions. It was something that they stressed 
emphatically in all of their accounts of the Office’s role in prosecutions:
The Attorney General’s responsibilities regarding prosecutions are defined by 
Article 113 of the Constitution. He has the ultimate authority for all 
prosecutions...the general direction of the prosecution processes.’ (Law Officer 
02).
‘Every decision relating to prosecution is ours. We decide if a prosecution 
should be instituted or not or if it should be interrupted... Directly or indirectly this 
is the case for all prosecutions.’ (Law Officer 09)
‘We may not have the monopoly on prosecutions...but what we certainly do 
have is the right to control all prosecutions. Therefore, anytime we wish, we can 
stop a prosecution instituted by another organ, as well as take over a 
prosecution... ’ (Law Officer 01)
‘The Attorney General is dominant... And that’s how it should be...He is an 
independent, unbiased authority...’ (Law Officer 10)
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Assize Court cases: their main workload
The more serious cases are considered as the core of the Attorney General’s 
workload. Law Officers appeared to have a strong understanding that these cases were 
the exclusive responsibility of their Office and therefore deserved priority. As will be 
argued in Chapter Seven,71 Assize Court cases were given fuller consideration and 
more time and resources than the rest:
‘Assize Court cases are our main job and take up most of our time...’ (Law 
Officer 12)
'We have so many responsibilities as far as prosecutions are concerned and all 
have to be arranged to fit into our schedule regarding the Assize Court cases'.
(Law Officer 01)
Exceptional cases v. Run-of-the-mill cases
As far as the rest of the cases were concerned, it was obvious from Law Officers’ 
accounts that ‘exceptional, complex or sensitive’ cases were regarded as ‘Law 
Office’s material, in contrast to ‘ordinary or run-of-the-mill’ cases:
‘The cases that we are dealing with in District Court are not simple routine 
cases...These are not what we are here for.’ (Law Officer 13)
They were unanimous in what they described as cases that deserved the Law Office’s 
attention:
a. cases with complex /difficult legal issues,
b. cases in which constitutional issues may arise,
c. cases in which issues of greater public interest can arise,
d. when the accused is a public servant or an ‘important and well-known person’,
e. when the accused is a police officer,
f. exceptional/sensitive cases that can potentially create problems,
g. cases with ‘strong political overtones’.
71 In Chapter Seven, how the role that Law Officers associate with each categoiy o f these cases 
influences their decision-making will be discussed in detail.
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Their attitudes towards a more systematic involvement of the Law Office in more 
categories of cases varied. Most of them argued that it would have been good 
theoretically but due to resource issues, it could not be applied:
'It’s a situation forced by circumstances. Theoretically, there should be the 
involvement of the Office in all criminal cases because the opinion of our 
service as to what should happen to each case is by nature -  arising from our 
independence -  a more objective opinion. Additionally, we have the legal 
knowledge and that’s very important. However, the number of criminal cases is 
such that a decision stating that all of them should be sent here would create 
bigger problems than the ones it would solve. Cases would be stuck here 
forever and things wouldn’t move with the speed that they should...’ (Law 
Officer 10)
‘If all cases are forwarded here, then with the organisation and the resources 
we have now, chaos would be created.’ (Law Officer 17)
For some Law Officers, however, that disengagement from minor or routine cases 
was not purely a resource issue. It seemed to be a part of the culture of the Law Office 
that for years dictated their engagement with cases that were exceptional or serious or 
had some particular sensitivity:
‘You cannot deal with trivial cases here. If that were the case, you would not 
have time to deal with the real ones.' (Law Officer 03)
'Run-of-the-mill cases are not really our job...There has to be something 
extraordinary about them, or something that calls for attention. Sometimes they 
send very trivial things here and the increased workload prevents us from 
dealing with the more serious cases as thoroughly as we should.’ (Law Officer 
11)
‘Police prosecutions’
The rhetorical position that the Attorney General was responsible for the cases which 
the police were dealing with was theoretically adopted by the Law Officers. But the 
way they reflected on it was characterised by the same contradictions as the rhetoric 
itself, and probably as a result of this.
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As a rule, all Law Officers declared categorically their ultimate responsibility for 
those cases:
‘Police execute their prosecutorial functions under the directions of the Attorney 
General. He has every right to give them directions...’ (Law Officer 02)
‘We are responsible for all criminal cases, even the ones that the police are 
dealing with...Most of them come here at some stage...Very few don’t...For 
example, ordinary traffic cases do not come here, but fatal traffic accident cases 
do.' (Law Officer 09)
However, it was striking that the justifications for that were not equally clear to all of 
them. More senior Law Officers appeared to have a more sophisticated approach as to 
why they were dealing with summary cases and what their exact powers regarding 
them were, while the rest were less clear and, at times, self-contradictory.
For example, in reflecting on their exact relationship with the police, the terms they 
used mirrored some of the same misinterpretations or confusion that were observed in 
the rhetoric surrounding the Attorney General’s role in prosecutions:
‘If the Attorney General decides that all criminal cases should come to the Law 
Office, he is empowered to ask for that...It is his right according to the 
Constitution... ’ (Law Officer 15)
Theoretically we have parallel roles...in practice it is the relationship of a 
supervisor and a supervisee.’ (Law Officer 17)
‘We are the legal advisors to the police.’ (Law Officer 12)72 (emphases added)
Perhaps as a result of this confusion over the justifications on which they based the 
exercise of their control over ‘police cases’, a couple of Law Officers admitted that
72 It is interesting to note here that Law Officers who did not deal with criminal prosecutions 
exclusively but had additional duties in the Law Office (e.g. legal advice to Government Departments, 
etc) were more inclined to use the term ‘legal advice’ when referring to their relationship with the 
police, obviously because they equated it to the relationship they had with the other services they were 
working with.
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they were not in a position to define exactly which categories of cases the police were 
obliged to send to the Law Office apart from the ‘obvious ones’:
‘I’ll be frank with you. I am not sure which specific cases the police have to 
forward to the Law Office apart from the serious ones and exactly why our 
intervention is obligatory for them...When I have these minor cases in front of 
me, I am just answering what the police are asking ... ’ (Law Officer 01)
Some Law Officers appeared to regard this issue as the exclusive responsibility of the 
Attorney General himself, who was in power to define the terms and limits of the 
dealings of the Office with the police:
‘I’ve never considered this matter from such a theoretical point of view but deal 
with whatever comes along, knowing that we have the last word even in police 
cases. Anyway, this is an Attorney General’s matter or policy... He has the 
authority to order the police to send here specific categories of cases.’ (Law 
Officer 17)
It was striking that while all of them were quick to declare their certainty that if a case 
was forwarded to the Law Office, they had the final word on it, not all of them 
seemed equally enthusiastic to consider thoroughly the question of which cases police 
did send them.
Even the Law Officers who had a clearer view of their relationship with the police 
seemed to prefer to let the police decide which other cases deserved the Law Office’s 
attention:
‘Minor cases are practically their cases. Therefore, when they think that they 
need our advice, they contact us and ask for our directions. You cannot 
predefine everything anyway...’ (Law Officer 12)
The same applies to the stage where ‘police cases’ reach the public prosecutors at the 
Police Prosecution Departments:
'Public prosecutors who are dealing with cases in the District Courts contact us 
when they need advice or directions. Or we could ask them to send here the file
171
Chapter Five: The Workload o f  the Attorney General's Office
of a case they are dealing with when we need to investigate something. There 
should be a special reason, or something that calls for our attention...There is 
not a structured method of control...there couldn’t be any...’ (Law Officer 09)
‘Very often, public prosecutors ask me to authorise them to discontinue some 
cases or withdraw some charges when they are facing difficulties in presenting 
the case in court.’ (Law Officer 12)
All of the Law Officers argued that since the appointment of public prosecutors by the 
Attorney General, their cooperation with the Police Prosecution Departments had 
been closer and more effective. Again, though, they admitted that usually it was when 
public prosecutors needed their advice that they contacted them:
LO: In everyday dealings with criminal cases, public prosecutors are in touch 
with us and they are taking instructions from us.
R: Do you think that you can exercise everyday control over them?
LO: No. After we give instructions about a case, we are not informed of the 
outcome of it. It’s when they need advice and guidance that they contact us; we 
don’t contact them. (Law Officer 12)
Police discretion and ‘control potential’
Law Officers accepted that there was a considerable degree of flexibility regarding 
police reporting procedures, although they pointed out that the serving Attorney 
General (Mr Markidis) was far more specific in his directions than his predecessors.
Even regarding categories of cases where most of the Law Officers were clear on the 
obligation of the police to forward them to their Office, they seemed to acknowledge 
that the police had considerable discretion:
R: If the police decide not to prosecute a case, do they have to send the case 
here?
LO: Yes.
R: Even minor cases?
LO: For minor cases, not always...
R: But theoretically they should, shouldn’t they?
LO: They should...but sometimes, for very trivial cases, the police may 
deviate... (Law Officer 02)
172
Chapter Five: The Workload o f  the Attorney General's Office
R: If the police decide not to prosecute, do they send the case here so you can 
approve this decision?
LO: This is the tactic...but I am not in the position to check if they follow it. How 
could I? Having said that, I can say that we receive many cases where the 
police ask for directions from the Law Office, arguing, that for some reason, 
they should not prosecute...(Law Officer 01)
Nevertheless, most of them appeared to believe that human dynamics and trust were 
more important than predefined rules:
‘You should trust them to send you whatever needs attention. In a small society 
like Cyprus, it is more important to know the person you are dealing with and 
whether you can trust him. It is more important than saying to the police, ‘you 
must send these cases here, or you must ask for our advice on that’. That’s 
why, for example, the heads of the (Police) Prosecution Departments should be 
trustworthy...and the Attorney General ensures that they are.’ (Law Officer 09)
They acknowledged, though, that not all of the police officers involved in 
prosecutions deserved their trust, and some of the Law Officers were particularly 
cynical about that. For example, discussing a certain head of a Police Prosecution 
Department, a Law Officer was emphatic:
’...He does whatever he wants...he is corrupt...Once, he asked me about a 
case involving a relative of his...to give a direction for discontinuance...in so 
many other cases, he doesn’t ask...I don’t know why he asked that time.’ (Law 
Officer 14)
‘There were various problems with the police regarding cases of domestic 
violence. There were a couple of times when public prosecutors discontinued a 
case without our direction...We decided that some of them would not be 
prosecuting such cases...we excluded 2-3 public prosecutors...’ (Law Officer 
16)
‘It is strongly emphasised that the police cannot close a case...On some 
occasions we ordered investigations against police officers who were closing 
cases of domestic violence. ... In the future, they will be more sensitive with 
these issues, when they see that we are serious about this and we order 
investigations against officers who don’t obey our directions.’ (Law Officer 08)
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Generally, although they acknowledged that the police sometimes stretched the 
standards, and did not exclude the fact that, sometimes, the police exploit their 
powers, most of the Law Officers appeared confident that worrisome abuses were 
rare, for three reasons:
a) They believed that, because of the size of the jurisdiction, it was easy for the Law 
Office to become aware of special cases that required their attention, even if the police 
chose not to inform them:
'Cyprus is a small place. We find out about the extraordinary cases very easily.
Even Judges sometimes inform us that a case which the police are dealing with 
is not being properly handled and we should intervene.’ (Law Officer 09)
b) They argued that since it was widely appreciated that the Attorney General was the 
primary authority in prosecutions, victims or defendants made sure that he was 
informed whenever they felt that their cases were not dealt with properly by the 
police:
‘You can see that it is standard procedure to receive requests from the 
defendants to review their cases.’ (Law Officer 04)
c) With public prosecutors -  appointed by the Attorney General -  serving in the Police 
Prosecution Departments, they claimed that there was more security and that they 
were notified about what required their intervention.
Concluding remarks
In summary, it can be stated that the Law Officers’ attitude and ideology regarding 
their workload focus on the ultimate responsibility of the Office to control and 
oversee all prosecutions, even if the justifications they offer for their powers are fairly 
unclear. Although they theoretically accept that the Law Office can also deal with the 
most minor of cases, they connect more with the most serious ones since they regard 
these as the core of their workload. They realise that they cannot exercise everyday 
control in all cases mainly because of resource issues and therefore, they focus on 
their control function and their ability to intervene. Law Officers acknowledge that
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this allows the police a wide discretion, but they believe that if something really 
important needs their attention, there are sufficient mechanisms to find out.
IV. PRACTICE
In this section, I will provide an account of the categories of cases that actually reach 
the Law Office on an everyday basis and make up its workload. These data are based 
on my observation and the examination of cases I carried out during my fieldwork 
period in the Attorney General’s Office and they are supplemented by available 
records of cases which the Law Office dealt with over an extended period of time.
Preliminary remark
It is essential to make a note here about the records system in the Law Office. In the 
Records Department, separate records are kept only for the following categories of 
files:73
a) Files concerning the cases that are committed for trial before the Assize 
Courts,
b) Cases presented at the District Courts,
c) Applications by defendants (or victims) asking the Attorney General to review 
a police decision (usually applications on the entering of a nolle prosequi),
d) Domestic violence cases,
e) Fraud/Stock Exchange cases,
73 Therefore, although the total number o f cases that the Law Office is dealing with can be calculated 
for the cases for which there are separate records, the same cannot be achieved for the cases coming 
under category (f). For example, we cannot say how many o f the 2,681 cases that were forwarded to 
the Law Office in 2002 by the police, and recorded under this category, were indictable cases for which 
consent for a summary trial was requested, or how many were summary cases with a suggestion to 
refrain from prosecution for public interest reasons. For these cases, the numbers included in my 
sample provide an indication o f the real distribution o f each category of cases in the Law Office’s 
workload. However, I cannot argue that this is a very strong indication since, as I will show later, a 
significant part o f Law Officers’ workloads is not file-based. Nevertheless, from the beginning (see 
Chapter Three) I have stressed that my study does not aim to provide a strict statistical analysis -  but 
rather a qualitative description -  o f  the Law Office’s workload.
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f) Corruption by public officers cases,
g) There is a large record in which the rest of the files are included without being 
separated:
ga) Cases where the police are seeking the consent of the Attorney General for 
the summary trial of indictable offences,
gb) Cases where the police are not sure whether there is enough evidence for a 
prosecution, or believe that there is not enough evidence, and cases where they 
believe there are other (‘public interest’) reasons for not prosecuting,
gc) Cases at the investigation stage for which the advice of the Law Office is 
sought,
gd) Fatal motoring offences,
ge) Offences committed by juveniles,
gf) Cases which have been investigated after a complaint-report to the 
Attorney General.
The following table shows the number of files forwarded to the Law Office for each 
category of its workload during the years 2000-2005:
Categories of cases 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Files o f cases committed 
for trial before an Assize 
Court
135 104 71 97 137 96
Cases presented at the 
District Court by Law 
Officers
36 72 48 45 49 51
Requests for a nolle 
prosequi -  review of 
police decision
1276 1412 1316 686 349 744
Files concerning cases 
for review, consent, 
advice, etc
2774 2877 2681 2616 2769 2776
Domestic violence cases 192 136 192 147 72 86
Fraud/Stock Exchange 
cases
13 205 400 394 247 442
Corruption by public 
officers cases
3 14 42 14 14 3
Table 1.
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a) Prosecution of all cases before the Assize Courts
This category formed what was characterised by all the agents in the prosecution 
system as the principal workload of the Law Office. As was observed in practice, a 
significant part of the time and resources of the Office were invested in cases coming 
under this category. By virtue of Article 117 of the Criminal Procedure Law, the 
Attorney General has a monopoly over prosecutions on information.74 Therefore, 
cases concerning indictable offences (offences punishable with imprisonment of five 
years and above) with a suggestion to prosecute were always sent to his Office. After 
a positive decision for prosecution was taken, the Law Officers themselves (who were 
all qualified as advocates75) were responsible not only for the preparation of the case 
and the pre-trial stages, but also for the conduct of the trial in court.76 During my 
fieldwork period, I observed 18 such cases at various stages and I examined 60 
attachments to the Attorney General after the completion of the cases in court (these 
concerned cases finalised during 2001). The most common offences prosecuted in 
Assize Court were: Robberies, rape or other serious sexual offences,
manslaughter/murder/causing grievous bodily harm, conspiracies, serious forgeries, 
serious drug offences, arson, unlawful possession of firearms and explosives, 
burglary, destroying property by explosives, serious frauds, and stealing by a servant.
b) Prosecution before the District Courts
i) ‘Sensitive’ and complex cases
Despite the rule that most of the cases before a District Court were handled by Public 
Prosecutors serving in the Police Prosecution Departments, there were a number of 
cases which were presented by Law Officers. These were usually cases that were sent 
to the Law Office for consideration and the Attorney General, after a positive decision 
for prosecution, decided to keep them in the Office so they could be handled by 
members of his staff. These were the cases that had been characterised as complex or 
‘sensitive’ in my interviews with the Law Officers and the Attorney General. During 
my fieldwork (2002), these were:
74 ‘Prosecutions on information’ is the term used for prosecutions on indictment in Cyprus.
75 In Cyprus the division between barristers and solicitors does not exist within the legal profession.
76 In Cyprus the Attorney General’s Office does not instruct counsel to handle cases in court on its 
behalf. Law Officers themselves have rights o f audience not only in District Courts but also in Assize 
Courts.
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a. a case of stealing by a public servant and abuse of his power,
b. a case concerning the offence of forgery by a public servant,
c. a case concerning stealing electricity regarding which publicity was generated 
by the media,
d. a case concerning the offence of causing death by want of precaution or by 
carelessness (s.210 of Criminal Law) (the accused was the driver of a private 
minibus who caused an accident resulting in the death of all eight passengers),
e. a case concerning serious offences of domestic violence,
f. a case of indecent assault against a journalist,
g. 19 complex economic or Stock Exchange cases.
In order to extend the picture of what usually constitutes complex or sensitive cases, 
the records for the years 2000, 2001 and 2003 were additionally collected and studied. 
In 2000 the following cases were presented to District Courts by Law Officers: a case 
concerning the offence of corruption and extortion by two senior public officers; a 
case of a lawyer obtaining money by false pretences; a case of illegal trespassing in a 
Shelter for the protection of juveniles by the parents of one of the children kept in the 
Shelter; and 14 complex economic or Stock Exchange cases. In 2001: a case of
extortion by a public servant; a case of assault by a police officer; two cases
concerning fatal motoring accidents (one of them causing the death of six persons), 
three cases of conspiracy; two cases concerning the offence of corruption and 
extortion by public officers (a senior doctor at a Public Hospital), a case against a 
Metropolitan Bishop of conspiracy to ruin one’s reputation; a case concerning the 
offence of Contempt of Court against a well-known journalist; a case concerning 
offences under the Adoption Law against a gynaecologist; and 19 complex economic 
or Stock Exchange cases. In 2003: two cases of assault by police officers; a case of 
conspiracy to defraud; a case concerning the offence of forgery by a public servant; a 
case of forgery; a conspiracy to defraud case; a case concerning serious offences of 
domestic violence; five interrelated cases concerning offences of conspiracy to 
defraud and illegal importations (this was a widely publicised scandal); a case of
extortion by a public servant; a case of medical negligence; and four complex
economic or Stock Exchange cases.
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As can be observed, this category is not made up of ordinary, run-of-the-mill cases, 
but rather by cases that are either difficult to prove, involve a well-known person/a 
public official/a police officer, or attract extensive media attention.
ii) Government Department prosecutions
As was stated earlier, various Government Departments have the power to prosecute 
summary offences within their particular sphere of activity. During the time of my 
fieldwork (but also before and after that for an extended period of time), at the 
Ministry of Labour and the Department of Environment there was a shortage of 
qualified (according to Law 8/1989) prosecutors who could present cases in court and, 
as a result, many cases were sent to the Law Office in order to be presented by Law 
Officers. In 2002, Law Officers handled 23 cases on behalf of Government 
Departments (which equates to 50 per cent of the total number of cases before a 
District Court which were handled by a Law Officer).77 These were relatively simple 
cases (mainly concerning regulatory offences) compared to the cases that Law 
Officers used to handle before Assize Courts, or the rest of the District Court cases. It 
is curious that the limited resources of the Law Office were spent in that way because 
of the shortage of staff in other Government Departments.
c) Requests to enter a nolle prosequi or to review police decisions
It was observed that a special aspect of the Law Office’s workload concerned the 
consideration of requests submitted to the Attorney General by defendants asking him 
to exercise his power to terminate criminal proceedings or to review a decision for
prosecution before a charge is preferred in court. These requests concerned mainly
summary offences which were handled by the Police Prosecution Departments and a 
small number of them, prosecutions by other Government Departments. With these 
requests, defendants would ask the Attorney General to overrule a decision to 
prosecute made by the police (or by other authorities), stating various reasons. Most 
of them were based on public interest factors (health reasons, remorse, 
disproportionate consequences of a possible conviction, abuse of process/ 
oppressiveness in prosecution, reconciliation between offender and victim), but a 
number of them were based on evidential reasons (total absence of evidence,
77 In 2000,24 such cases (61 per cent) were presented and in 2001,40 cases (58 per cent).
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unreliable evidence, abuse of process by the police). In my sample, 53 applications 
were included which related to cases concerning the following offences:
Type of offences No of 
cases
Type of offences No of 
cases
Assaults causing actual bodily harm 6 Reckless and negligent acts 1
R eckless or careless driving 5 Offences against exchange 
control Law
1
Affray 3 Offences against Cyprus 
Athletic Organisation Law
1
Issue o f  a cheque without 3 Offence against Streets and 
Buildings Regulation Law
1
Theft 3 Disturbance 1
M otoring offences 3 O ffence under D ogs Law 1
Drug offences 2 Burglary 1
D om estic violence 2 Offences against Antiquities 
Law
1
O ffences against Law and regulations 
relating to driving licence
2 Poaching 1
Em ploying unlawful immigrants 2 Various regulatory offences
Common assault 2 Forgery and extortion 1
Public insult and threatening violence 2 S. 105 o f  Criminal Law 1
Indecent assault and criminal trespass 1 Causing grievous bodily harm 1
Carrying arms to terrorise 1
Table 2.
These were cases that would not normally be part of the Law Office’s workload and 
they were only forwarded there because defendants took the initiative to ask for the 
Attorney General’s intervention. They represented the best example of the Law 
Office’s ‘controlling potential’ (constantly referred to by the Attorney General and the 
Law Officers) which was activated by the actions of other agents in the prosecution 
system. The large number of those cases also indicated that there was a widespread 
appreciation among the public of the Law Office’s role and powers in the process; 
especially its power to intervene and overrule a police decision. Furthermore, defence 
lawyers I interviewed confirmed that the Law Office, in comparison to the police, was
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regarded as a far more objective and independent service, which they referred to so 
that a biased or unfair police decision could be corrected.
d) Domestic violence cases, e) Fraud/Stock Exchange cases, f) Corruption by 
public officers cases/‘consent’ cases and
gd) Fatal motoring offences, ge) Offences committed by Juveniles
All these cases formed categories that the Attorney General had clearly and 
specifically directed should be forwarded to the Law Office. They included offences 
where he was of the opinion that particular attention was required or were ‘cases that 
might reveal important considerations of public policy’. For the three first categories, 
a separated record was being kept at the Law Office and thus, the total number of 
cases for each category could be easily calculated {see Table 1). On the contrary, the 
cases coming under the last two categories were recorded under the general record 
(g).
Domestic Violence cases (Seven cases in my sample)
Since 1998, according to a circular from the Attorney General,78 all Government 
Department officers (police officers, social workers, doctors, etc.), to whose attention 
came a case of domestic violence, had an obligation to submit a report to the Attorney 
General within seven days. A team of Law Officers would examine the reports and 
give directions. Until 2000, all criminal files were forwarded to the Law Office after 
the police investigations and Law Officers decided whether to prosecute or not. Due 
to the large amount of files arriving at the Office, the police were directed to send 
only those cases in which they had decided not to prosecute or they were not sure 
whether they should prosecute.
Fraud/Stock Exchange cases
As a result of the opening of the Cyprus Stock Exchange (1999) and immediately 
afterwards, a huge rise in economic crime was observed. A special unit operated 
within the Law Office responsible for economic crime and money laundering offences 
which closely cooperated with the police department for economic crime. After a
78 Circular G.E. 50(C)/1992/N.42, dated 11/06/1998.
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positive decision for prosecution was taken, these cases were usually presented in 
court by Law Officers (see category b).
Corruption by public officers cases/ ‘consent ’ cases (five cases in my sample)
There are certain provisions in the Criminal Code, as well as in a few other statutes, 
which require that the Attorney General’s consent be obtained for the prosecution of 
particular offences. The almost exclusive category of ‘consent cases’ which was 
observed reaching the Law Office were offences relating to corruption and extortion 
by a public officer. There was a clear direction by the Attorney General that the police 
should forward such cases to the Law Office, even if it was thought that there was not 
enough evidence for prosecution. These cases were always presented in court by Law 
Officers.
Fatal motoring offences (two cases in my sample)
For motoring accidents which involve loss of life, two charges could be preferred; 
either ‘causing death in a traffic accident’, which is a minor offence, or ‘causing death 
by want of precaution or by carelessness’, which is a serious one. As the border 
between these two offences had not been clear, the Attorney General directed the 
Police to forward all such cases to the Office.
Offences committed by juveniles (twelve cases in my sample)
There was a special procedure followed for this category of cases. There were 
Committees comprised of the Police Constable and representatives of Social Services 
for each District, responsible for reviewing all juvenile cases. Their suggestion as to 
the proper disposal of the case and a review of the Social Services’ report were 
forwarded to the Attorney General’s Office with the relevant criminal file. Law 
Officers could endorse or overrule the decision of those Committees.
ga) Summary trial of indictable offences (65 files in my sample)
A large number of files referred to the Law Office by the Police concerned the 
suggestion for the summary disposal of indictable offences, a procedure for which the 
Attorney General’s consent is obligatory. In the Cyprus Legal System, there are no 
‘triable either way’ offences. The District Court has jurisdiction to try summarily all 
offences punishable with a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years and/or a
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fine not exceeding £5,000. For the most serious offences, the accused must be 
committed to the Assize Court for a trial ‘on information’. By Law, the Attorney 
General may consent to the summary trial of every offence.79
These files related mainly to offences of forgery of cheques, drug offences and 
Firearms Law offences. For these offences, the maximum sentence in Law is very 
high and there are no predefined subcategories, i.e. the maximum sentence in Law for 
the forgery of a cheque of £15 is the same as for the forgery of a cheque of £150,000! 
65 files of this category were examined and they involved the following offences:
T ype o f  offences N o o f  
cases
T ype o f  offences N o o f  
cases
Forgery o f  a cheque or uttering false  
documents
11 Stealing by trustees and persons 
in a position o f  trust
4
Unlawful possession, supplying or 
cultivation o f  drugs (Narcotic drugs 
Law 29/77)
18 Stealing by clerks and servants, 
s.268 o f  Criminal Law
1
Unlawful possession o f  firearms (Law  
38/74) or unlawful possession o f  
explosive substances (Law Cap. 54)
16 Stealing by persons in public 
service, s. 267 o f  Criminal Law
1
Breaking into a building and 
committing a felony (burglary)
10 Causing grievous bodily harm, 
s. 231 o f  Criminal Law
1
V iolence within family Law 47(1 )/94 2 Trespass in restricted areas, s. 
50B o f  Criminal Law
1
Table 3.
gb) Cases which the police want to filter out of the system (76 cases in my sample) 
Many files were forwarded to the Law Office regarding cases where (i) the Police 
suggested that a prosecution was not required due to public interest factors or (ii) they 
were not sure that there was enough evidence for a prosecution. This category formed 
an absolutely critical aspect of the Law Office workload. It validated the argument by 
the Attorney General, the Law Officers and the police80 that the police do not 
generally filter cases -  apart from very minor ones -  out of the system without the 
directions of the Law Office. Included in this category were not only cases concerning
79 Section 24 of the Courts o f Justice Law (Law 14/1960)
80 See the interviews earlier in this chapter.
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indictable offences (which is less debatable due to their being the exclusive 
responsibility of the Law Office), but also cases concerning less serious crimes:
Indictable offences cases -  mainly evidential issues:81 (ten cases in my sample)
a. a rape case,
b. a rape case of a mentally defective girl,
c. a case of forgery and fraud,
d. a case of arson (not sure whether it was intentional or accidental),
e. two cases of stealing by a servant,
f. three cases of forgery,
g. a case of stealing by a trustee.
Indictable offences cases -  mainly public interest factors: 82 (21 cases)
a. two cases of unlawful possession of a weapon,
b. a case of forgery of a public document,
c. two cases of forgery of a cheque,
d. a case of unlawful possession of explosive substances,
e. a case of unlawful importation of explosive substances,
f. a case of burglary,
g. 13 cases of drugs offences.
Summary offences cases — mainly evidential issues: (eleven cases)
a. two cases against two companies for unlawful possession of explosive 
substances relating to the type of games they were selling,
b. a case of breach of banking regulations,
c. a case of unlawful possession of drugs,
d. a case of fraud,
e. a case concerning offences against Foreign Currency Law,
f. a case concerning offences against Bankruptcy Law,
g. a case of stealing,
81 As will be shown in Chapter Seven, public interest factors and evidential issues were quite often 
mixed.
82 Most o f  those cases were cases which only technically concerned indictable offences. The 
circumstances o f the offences would normally argue for a suggestion o f  a summary trial.
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h. a case of receiving stolen goods,
i. a case of criminal impersonation,
j- a case of extortion by a police officer.
Summary offences cases -  mainly public interest factors: (34 cases)
a. nine cases of drug offences,
b. seven cases of regulatory offences,
c. five cases of assault causing bodily harm -  the victim withdrew the complaint,
d. two case of common assault,
e. a case of affray,
f. a case of obtaining a formal document by false pretences,
g- a case of obtaining goods by false pretences.
h. a case of a motor accident,
i. a case of selling counterfeit CDs,
j- a case of illegal cutting of trees (Forest Law),
k. two cases of assault causing bodily harm,
1. a case of employing an unlawful immigrant (Immigration Law),
m. a case between a father and a son of threatening violence/carrying arms to
terrorise,
n. a case of a psychological disturbed individual carrying arms to terrorise.
Law Officers’ decisions in these cases could be either a direction for prosecution or 
non-prosecution based on public interest or evidential reasons, or a direction for 
further investigations.83
gc) Files referred to the Law Office for advice during the investigation stage (ten 
cases in my sample^)
This part of the Law Office’s workload concerned files referred by the police during 
the investigation stage and it will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. The police 
quite often sought Law Officers’ advice on the kind of information needed to sustain 
certain charges, on legal provisions or even on investigation techniques and strategies.
83 See Chapter Seven.
84 This is not representative because I observed many other cases where police officers came in person 
asking for advice or called the Law Officers for the same purpose (see next chapter).
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This part of the Law Office’s workload was not solely file-based. During my 
fieldwork, I noticed that, for serious cases, police investigators used to come to the 
Office in person and consult with the Law Officers. Typical cases that were included 
in this category were: cases of forgery, cases of obtaining goods by false pretences, 
fraud/Stock Exchange cases, murder/manslaughter cases or cases where a well-known 
person was involved.
gf) Cases which have been investigated after a complaint-report to the Attorney 
General (six cases in my sample)
The Law Office from time to time received correspondence from various sources, e.g. 
Members of the Parliament, other elected representatives or simply members of the 
public, who felt that a certain incident required a prosecution. The type of reports 
received this way amounted to very serious allegations of criminal conduct (e.g. 
exercise of violence by police officers against arrested persons in custody), but it also 
concerned information regarding trivial offences. When the Attorney General 
considered it appropriate, he would request the police to carry out investigations and, 
depending on their outcomes, he would decide whether to prosecute or not:
a. a case of unlawful possession of antiquities -  after a report by the Ministry of 
Transportation,
b. a case of unlawful disclosure of bank accounts -  after a complaint by a member 
of the public,
c. two cases of Contempt of Court -  after a letter from the Ministry of Finance,
d. a case of malicious prosecution by the Police -  after a complaint by a member of 
the public,
e. accusations of police violence against suspects in custody -  by a Member of 
Parliament.
Concluding remarks
It is evident that the Law Office’s workload is incredibly diverse and multifarious. 
The following are some general conclusions that can be derived by studying the actual 
cases that reach the Law Office:
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Firstly, the workload of the Attorney General’s Office includes an interesting mixture 
of high-profile cases, complex crimes, ‘sensitive cases’, as well as the more 
ordinary/run-of-the-mill cases.85
Secondly, there is a variety o f reasons which explain which categories of cases are 
forwarded to the Office. Some of them are sent because it is mandatory by law (a, ga,
f); some because of clear and specific directions by the Attorney General, (b, d, e, f, 
gd, ge); some because of police initiative -  influenced by the policy of each Attorney 
General (gb, gc) -  and others because agents involved in the process (usually the 
defendants) ask for the Law Office’s intervention (c, gf).
Thirdly, there are cases in which the Law Office are systematically involved (e.g. 
Assize Court cases) and others in which they are only involved {control potential) if 
someone else draws their attention (e.g. when the police ask, the defendants request, 
or the public inform).
Fourthly, there are cases that are under the immediate control of the Attorney 
General’s Office from the beginning to the end (e.g. Assize Court cases) and others 
that are forwarded to the Law Office only for a limited period of time (e.g. advice 
during investigation, requests for nolle prosequi, etc).
V. SUMMARY
Based on this chapter, it can be concluded that the workload of the Attorney General’s 
Office has never been straightforward, not even in the rhetoric developed around the 
system, let alone in its everyday practice. However, it can also be understood that it 
has been as varied and multifarious as the broader role of the Law Office in 
prosecutions appears to be.
In the rhetoric, great emphasis has been placed upon the symbolism and potential of 
the power of the Attorney General rather than the everyday execution of his
85 Which, in a way, become extra-ordinary because either it is suggested that they should be filtered out 
o f the system, or because the defendant takes the initiative to involve the Attorney General in them.
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prosecutorial function. The very broad powers that the Office is given by the 
Constitution, as well as the absence of any detailed statutory legislation, allowed 
sometimes varied interpretations not only by the rest of the actors in the criminal 
justice system, but also by the different office-holders themselves. A reluctance to be 
detached from terms and customs associated with the common law tradition of 
prosecutions in the last century was observed, when even in the country of their origin 
things have changed. This contrasts with the indisputable recognition -  by the same 
actors -  of characteristics and powers of the Attorney General’s Office, which are not 
compatible with the ‘strict’ common law tradition.
However, although there is some vagueness in the rhetoric as far as the Law Office’s 
workload is concerned, and some inconsistency regarding the exact relationship 
between the Attorney General and the police, the conclusion that is unanimously 
reached is that the Attorney General, if he wished, could make his control over the 
police tighter and extend the workload of his Office as he sees fit. The primacy of the 
Attorney General is never doubted; it is just the logic or the justifications behind it 
that vary on some occasions and create confusion.
It is obvious that successive Attorney Generals have been comfortable with their 
broad discretion, as it permitted them to be flexible with the categories of cases they 
were dealing with. At the beginning, there was less expectation from the Attorney 
General to be involved in cases other than the most serious ones, even if the law, right 
from the start, enabled him to do so. Gradually, as time passed, and due to a number 
of reasons -  practical ones as well as the specific choices of some office-holders 
(mainly Mr Markidis’) -  this approach started to change and, as a result, the Law 
Office’s workload has been significantly extended.
Given the vagueness in the rhetoric and the varied interpretations of successive office­
holders, it is not remarkable that the Law Officers’ approach towards their workload 
{ideology) is relatively unclear as well -  especially regarding the justifications of their 
powers. Although theoretically they accept that the Attorney General oversees the 
whole prosecution system and can also deal with the most minor of the cases, they 
connect more with the most serious ones since they regard them as the core of their 
workload. They realise that they cannot exercise everyday control in all cases, mainly
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because of resource issues, and, therefore, they emphatically focus on their ‘control 
function’ and their ability to intervene. Law Officers acknowledge that this gives the 
police a wide discretion (which might result in abuses), but they appear confident that 
if something really important needs their attention, there is always a way to find out.86
In practice, it has been observed that the workload of the Attorney General’s Office is 
very mixed, consisting not only of the most high-profile cases, but also of minor ones 
that reach the Law Office sometimes as a matter of purely accidental practical 
arrangements (see prosecution on behalf of Government Departments). Apart from the 
cases that it is obliged by law to deal with, the Law Office also deals with those 
categories of cases that the Attorney General has clearly specified a priori or chosen 
ad hoc, cases for which the police request advice or directions, as well as cases for 
which other agents in the process (usually the defendants) ask the Law Office’s 
intervention -  usually to overrule a police decision.
Although the serving Attorney General (at the time of my fieldwork) has been more 
specific than his predecessors in defining categories of cases that should be forwarded 
to the Law Office, he has not fully utilised his powers. Admittedly, as a result, the 
police have enjoyed a broad discretion; apart from specific categories of cases, they 
are left to judge semi-autonomously what is important and problematic enough to be 
sent to the Law Office. However, the fact that there is a strong consensus on the 
matter of principle -  namely that the Attorney General is the ultimate authority in 
prosecutions and has the authority to give directions regarding all prosecutions -  
appears to inform the practices of all the actors in the system. Victims and defendants 
quite often request the Law Office’s intervention in cases that do not regularly belong 
to its workload and the police practices appear to be influenced by this theoretical 
potential.
86 The way and the criteria upon which cases are decided in the Law Office are issues that will be 
discussed in the next two chapters (especially in Chapter Seven). At this point, it is sufficient to say that 
the Law Officers’ adherence to the role they associated with each aspect o f their workload and how 
strong they feel that a category o f cases is ‘Law Office material’ are some o f the most influential 
factors that affect their decision-making.
189
Chapter Five: The Workload o f  the Attorney G eneral’s Office
Therefore, as a first general conclusion, it can be stated that the Law Office’s role in 
the system is not confined to the prosecution of serious crime. The theory, as well as 
the practice, proves that the Attorney General is expected to, and does, play a much 
broader role in all criminal prosecutions, even if  he is not closely dealing with all of 
them. One of the most crucial aspects of this role is the ‘controlling mechanism’ he 
offers to supervise and intervene dynamically in the bulk of criminal prosecutions.
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CHAPTER SIX
The Role of the Attorney General’s Office regarding 
Investigations
‘The true independence o f  the prosecutor from the police is not to be 
found in the total separation o f  the investigative and prosecutorial 
functions, but rather in the prosecutor’s authority over the police in 
relation to the evidential side o f  the criminal investigation ...’ (L. Robb 
1988:28)
In  the previous chapter the categories of cases that the Cyprus Law Office is dealing
with have been examined, placing particular emphasis on the sharing of its workload 
with the police regarding prosecutions. In this chapter, another aspect of the Law 
Office’s relationship with the police will be studied. This relates to the role and the 
powers of the Law Office as far as the investigation and the collection of information 
for a case are concerned. Therefore, it explores the Law Office’s participation in the 
stage that cases are still being formed as potential ‘prosecutable edifices’.1 It is widely 
accepted that whatever takes place during this phase exerts considerable influence on 
the later decision of prosecution, but also on the progress of the case overall.
In common law jurisdictions investigations have been traditionally regarded as the 
preserve of the police, contrary to the pure continental tradition which has placed 
prosecutors in charge of the investigatory as well as the post-investigatory stage. 
However, as was shown in Chapter Two, both models have been compromised over 
time by a variety of factors. In the first section of this chapter the standpoint of the
1 Sanders (1988a:35).
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Cyprus prosecution system regarding the involvement of the Attorney General’s 
Office in investigations will be reviewed. Once again, since there are no detailed 
statutory provisions relating to this issue, a study of their interpretation and the 
rhetoric that has been developed over time, as well as of the Attorney Generals’ 
approach regarding prosecutors’ involvement in investigations, is essential.
In the second section the Law Officers’ viewpoint will be examined. Given the broad 
nature of the legal provisions and the great discretion they enjoy regarding their 
involvement in criminal investigations, it is crucial to explore how Law Officers 
themselves approach, interpret and reflect on their role. **
Finally, in the third section the role that is carried out by the Law Office in 
investigations in practice will be described, drawing on observation of the everyday 
life of the Office, as well as on the examination of cases during the fieldwork period 
in the Law Office.
I. RHETORIC -  HISTORY
The involvement of prosecutors in investigations is directly related to the 
constitutional position of the police in relation to the prosecution service. As was 
discussed in detail in Chapter Two, pure inquisitorial systems traditionally place the 
police, when investigating a crime, under the authority of the prosecutors. Usually, in 
those systems, there is a line of command between the two services. According to the 
traditional common law, by contrast, the responsibility for the investigation lies 
exclusively in the hands of the police. In most common law countries there is no 
direct line of authority between the police and the prosecution service and the former 
enjoy a considerable independence in the execution of their duties.
However, this clear-cut division of work between the constitutionally separate 
institutions of the police and prosecutors has recently begun to change, because of a 
number of factors. For example, the appearance of new forms of criminality and the 
ever increasing complexities of substantive and procedural law made the police 
dependent on the prosecutors for legal advice, a fact which in many jurisdictions has
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evolved into forms of cooperation that have provided the prosecutor with some 
influence in the investigation process itself. Nevertheless, in most jurisdictions the 
appropriate boundary between the police and the prosecutor’s involvement in 
investigations has not yet been set in theory, let alone achieved in practice, and 
certainly remains a controversial issue in the discussions about the relationships of 
these two institutions.
Legal theory in the Cyprus Prosecution System
In Cyprus the Attorney General, right from the beginning, in contrast to his common 
law background, was entrusted with a role in investigations as well as in 
prosecutions.2 This is in accordance with the wide powers that were delegated to him 
generally as far as prosecutions are concerned and which rendered him so important in 
the Cyprus prosecution system. However, also in line with the broad nature of the rest 
of his powers, his role in investigations was not prescribed in detail in the statutory 
provisions.
The Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155 s.4.1) gives police the primary responsibility 
for investigations but it also confers on the Council of Ministers a complementary 
authority to appoint independent investigators in any case (s.4.2). Sections 4-34 
regulate the conduct of investigations, placing particular emphasis on the powers of 
the police to arrest and search a suspect.3 As was shown in Chapter Four, there are 
strict exclusionary rules regarding the collection of evidence and its admissibility in 
court (imposed by the constitutional provisions) but the framework of procedural 
rules determining how interrogation is to be conducted is rather limited. There is a 
section in the Criminal Procedure Law providing that the Judges’ Rules, which are in 
force in England, apply in Cyprus as well. A new Law (163(I)/2005) has been enacted 
recently, however, to safeguard the rights of people detained for interrogation, in part 
reiterating (and also specifying) the relevant provisions of the Constitution, which are 
already strictly applied by the courts.4
2 This is an additional role that has been acquired by the Attorney General in Cyprus that did not appear 
to exist during the pre-independence period.
3 See Chapter Four for a further analysis o f these powers.
4 E.g. the right for legal advice in the police station (Article 11.4 of the Constitution).
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The law does not give the Attorney General, and thus the Law Officers, direct 
investigatory powers. Therefore, Law Officers themselves are not empowered to 
undertake any specific investigative actions, such as interrogating witnesses and 
suspects or collecting any other evidence. However, a special provision of the Police 
Law (Cap.285, Art. 19), as well as the general constitutional relationship between the 
Police and the Law Office, places the investigation of crimes by the former, formally, 
subject to the instructions of the latter.
In particular, Article 19 of the Police Law specifically provides that police officers 
applying for summons, arrest warrants, search warrants or any other legal process, 
which can be issued against any person during an investigation, are ‘subject to the 
directions of the Attorney General’. Therefore, regarding these specific investigatory 
actions, there is a clear provision in law, which empowers the Law Office to give 
directions or authorisation to the police. The rest of the same section widens even 
further the powers of the Law Office regarding investigations. As examined in the 
previous chapter, Article 19 (combined with the constitutional provision of Article 
113.2) is the cornerstone on which the relationship between the two services is based. 
By this provision, it is clearly acknowledged that the police in the execution of their 
prosecutorial functions are subject to the instructions of the Attorney General. Based 
on this section, it is officially accepted that, although the Police as an organisation 
come under the Ministry of Justice, regarding all their activities that relate to criminal 
prosecutions (and not only the ones that concern the presentation of the cases in 
court), the Attorney General is their supervising authority.5 This general provision, 
therefore, has been interpreted as additionally giving power to the Attorney General to 
intervene during investigations and/or require further information, as well as to cause 
any matter he considers appropriate to be investigated by the police.6
The logic of this interpretation is consistent with the situation in other jurisdictions: 
wherever there is a line of authority between the public prosecution service and the 
police, the former are empowered to issue directions to the latter regarding
5 See Papaioannou (1999).
6 See similar wording in s. 17 o f the Scottish Police Act 1967: ‘...in relation to the investigation o f  
offences the chief constable should comply with such lawful instructions as he may receive from the 
appropriate prosecutor.’
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investigations.7 Loucaides (1974:48) argues that ‘since the investigation of an incident 
constitutes the first step of a procedure leading to the institution of a prosecution, the 
control and the responsibility for which bears with the Attorney General, Police even 
during the investigative stage are obliged to follow the instructions of the Law 
Office.’
The question arises as to whether there are any direct mechanisms for enforcing these 
directives in the event that the Law Office are not satisfied with the response of the 
police, given the fact that they themselves have no immediate investigation powers 
enabling them to carry out the actions that the police do not. Apart from having 
available the very simple expedient of refusing to prosecute if the quality of the police 
investigations fails to satisfy their directions,8 Loucaides (1974) claims that the Law 
Office could initiate a criminal or a disciplinary procedure against investigators who 
refuse to obey their orders.
Loucaides (1974) based most of his arguments on a memorandum9 published by the 
first Attorney General of the Republic, Mr Tomaritis, in the early years of his tenure. 
In this memorandum for the first time10 the relationship between the police and the 
Law Office was formally analysed. It was made clear that the Attorney General was 
the supervising authority of the police regarding investigations (as well as 
prosecutions) and the only one authorised to give directions. It is remarkable that a 
police initiative caused the issue of this document. In a letter that the Chief of the 
Police sent to Mr Tomaritis11 he complained about the intervention of the Ministry of 
the Interior during the investigation of a murder case and he asked the Attorney 
General to direct that no one else except him can give instructions regarding
7 See, for example, Germany, France and the Netherlands.
8 Law Officers have the power to prevent the police from prosecuting and not only the power to 
discontinue prosecutions with which they do not agree (see previous chapter). Therefore, once the Law 
Office have this power, it is reasonable that they can require the police to investigate further before 
agreeing to the commencement o f  criminal proceedings.
9 A.F. 7/1969, dated 22/01/1969 (incorporated in Circular G.E. 7/1969).
10 This was the first and the only time that an Attorney General issued a formal document stating in a 
relatively explicit manner the relationship o f his Office with the police.
11 A.F. E/274/34, dated 21/01/1969.
195
Chapter Six: The Role o f  the Attorney General’s Office regarding Investigations
investigations and prosecutions. It is interesting to observe that, from the beginning, 
the police themselves regarded the Attorney General as their supervisor for the 
investigations they carried out.
Although different views about the exact legal relationship between the police and the 
Attorney General regarding investigations can be found,12 these days it is generally 
and formally accepted that the Law Office can exert control over the police even 
during investigations. See, for instance, a relatively recent declaration of the powers 
of the Attorney General in a formal document by the Government:
‘In exercise o f  his constitutional powers, the Attorney-General o f  the Republic 
o f  Cyprus, can ex-proprio molu ask the Police to initiate, and carry out an 
investigation into the com m ission o f  any criminal o ffen ce ...for  the purpose o f  
determining whether to institute criminal proceedings against any person, and 
can give instructions to the Police regarding the conduct o f  the investigation  
(collection o f  evidence and interrogations), both in the case o f  an investigation  
initiated in pursuance to his own instructions, and also in the case o f  an 
investigation carried out in performance o f  the P olice’s duty to detect and bring 
offenders to justice.’13
Apart from the general position that places the police under the control of the Law 
Office during investigations, there are a number of cases where a direct investigative 
power has been clearly conferred with legislative provisions on the Attorney General:
1. According to the Military Criminal Procedure (Law 40/1964). which 
resembles the continental Greek Military Code, the Attorney General 
supervises and directs the investigations of crimes under the Military Criminal
12 See, for example, Malachtou (2004:482): ‘The Police are under no legal obligation to consult the 
Office of the Attorney General in relation to investigations that they are carrying out.’ However, the 
same writer later comments that ‘in practice...such a consultation takes place on a daily basis...In any 
event, the Attorney General may ask the police to inform him o f progress made and issue specific 
instructions at any stage during the investigation process’ (Malachtou 2004:482-83).
13 National Report o f the Republic o f Cyprus on the Implementation o f the Conclusions o f the European 
and World Conferences against Racism (Ministry o f Justice and Public Order 2003:27).
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Code.14 In this case, the legality of the investigation is directly connected to the 
oversight and final control of the Law Office and a specific procedure is 
provided for the execution of this control. Therefore, the involvement of the 
Law Office is obligatory and not just discretionary.15
2. As was stated above, the Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155 s.4.2) allocates to 
the Council of Ministers a complementary -  to the general police power -  
authority to appoint independent investigators in any case they consider 
appropriate. In 1996, for the first time, the Council of Ministers delegated to 
the Attorney General the power to appoint criminal investigators to investigate 
instances of alleged commission of criminal offences by members of the 
police and also economic offences punishable with more than one year 
imprisonment.16 The prerequisite that a written complaint must be submitted to 
him has been eradicated through a decision of the Council of Ministers taken 
on 22 March 2001.17 The new decision adopted a recommendation by the 
Attorney General ‘to extend the ambit of the delegation so as to afford the 
power of appointment of criminal investigators in all instances concerning the 
relevant offences coming to his knowledge in any manner whatsoever (e.g. 
through newspapers reports, television broadcast and reports by any 
organisation, committee, body or tribunal domestic or otherwise)’.18 The 
proposal of the Attorney General was submitted as a result of the report of the 
European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhumane and 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) of 2000. In that report19 the CPT 
recommended that ‘steps (should) be taken to ensure that investigations into 
cases involving complaints of ill-treatment by police officers are, and are seen
14 See Daskalakis (1966) for an analysis o f the Cyprus Military Criminal Law.
15 In practice, the Attorney General has appointed a Law Officer who serves at the Military Prosecution 
Department and executes all the responsibilities and duties o f the Law Office deriving from the 
Military Criminal Procedure Law. It has not been possible, due to limited resources and time, to 
examine how this part o f  the responsibility o f the Law Office is carried out in practice.
16 See Decisions o f the Council o f Ministers 44.874, dated 03/10/1996 and 44.448, dated 07/10/1998.
17 Decision o f the Council o f Ministers 53.406, dated 22/03/2001.
18 Letter o f the Attorney General, Mr Markidis, to the Council o f Ministers, dated 14/03/2001.
19 Report to the Government o f Cyprus on the visit carried out by the European Committee for the 
prevention o f Torture and Inhumane and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) (2000:41).
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to be, totally independent and impartial’ and ‘the Attorney General (should) be 
accorded the power proprio motu to appoint independent investigators, in 
cases where he deems this necessary.’20
3. Under Law 31(1VI995 for the Prevention of Crime (Controlled Delivery and 
Other Special Provisions), as far as certain serious offences are concerned (e.g. 
drug and weapon trafficking), the police are empowered to make use of a 
special investigation method known as ‘controlled delivery’. This Law ensures 
that the use of this technique is under the supervision of the Attorney General. 
More specifically, although s.6 of the Law provides that the decision for the 
use of this special investigation procedure is taken by the Chief of the Police 
or the Director of Customs and Excise, s.6.3 clearly provides that: ‘the 
Attorney General is notified in advance for any decision for controlled 
delivery and upon notification he may give any directions he considers proper 
or necessary.’ As Malachtou (2004:483) points out ‘this is a concrete example 
of the legislator’s anxiety to ensure that, when using drastic investigation 
methods, the police operate under the vigilant eye of the Attorney General.’
4. Law 95(D/2001 for the Protection of Witnesses and Informants, s. 16, provides 
that the Attorney General will control, oversee and be responsible for the 
execution and utilisation of the Plan for the protection of witnesses and 
informants of justice.
5. Law 6KIV96 provides for the establishment of a special interagency 
investigation team to deal with cases of money laundering and economic 
crime. This Unit consists of police officers, Custom officers, accountants and 
Law Officers, operates within the Law Office and is granted all the powers 
recognised to the police investigators by a specific legislative provision 
(sections 53 and 54).
20 The Attorney General exercised this right in more than 30 cases within the period April 2001 to July 
2002. However, legislation has recently been enacted (Law 9(1) 2006) which provides for the 
establishment and operation o f an Independent Police Complaints Commission. Even in this Law, 
though, it is provided that independent investigators are obliged to follow the Attorney General’s 
directions.
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What is concluded from these examples is that legislative provisions have gradually 
been introduced to ensure the obligatory (and not just discretionary) involvement of 
the Law Office in certain investigations, especially in areas where either coercive 
measures could be used or sensitive/complex issues may arise.
In contrast to the effect of these specific legislative provisions, however, in all other 
cases, the position that generally places the police under the directions of the Attorney 
General during investigations is less imposing than it sounds. The legal text is framed 
very broadly and does not make the Attorney General’s intervention in investigations 
obligatory. It does not set out specific duties and responsibilities for the Law Office 
during the investigatory period, neither does it associate the legality of the 
investigation with the authorisation or the final control of the Attorney General.21 
What it does ensure, however, is that there is a theoretical potential and power of the 
Attorney General to act in such a way if he wishes to do so. Once again, the extent to 
which, and the way that, this power is used is left open to the Attorney General to 
define.
The Attorney Generals’ policy
The law does not stipulate which specific powers the Attorney General could use 
within the context of his general role in investigations. It is very difficult to find out 
how exactly this power has been utilised or indeed interpreted by the different 
Attorney Generals in the past since, apart from Mr Tomaritis’ memorandum 
mentioned above, no other Attorney General has issued any similar document 
explaining his policy vis-a-vis the police regarding investigations.
The examination of relevant circulars in the Law Office and letters of correspondence 
between them and the police, as well as the interviews with the former and the current 
Attorney Generals I carried out,22 revealed that the Law Office for many years hardly 
developed any active or at least publicly pronounced policy on investigations in 
practice. Once again, the succeeding Attorney Generals preferred to deal with cases
21 As is the case, for example, in France and in Germany.
22 Complemented by interviews with police officials and defence attorneys.
199
Chapter Six: The Rdle o f  the Attorney General’s Office regarding Investigations
on an ad hoc basis instead of formulating a deliberate and comprehensive policy 
regarding all investigations.
Having said that, it is noticeable that it appeared not to be unusual for the Law Office 
to direct the police to initiate investigations regarding particular incidents. Several 
letters of all the successive Attorney Generals directed to the Chief of the Police 
requesting the investigation of allegations of crimes were found in the Law Office’s 
records.23 In a number of other cases, the Attorney General took the initiative in 
requesting information regarding the investigation of particular cases and sometimes 
required to be constantly informed about the investigation of a particular case. These 
mainly concerned cases that created media attention and publicity, something that had 
not been unusual in a small society like Cyprus, or cases of particular sensitivity or 
complexity that came to the attention of the Law Office. The following are selective 
examples of such actions:
A letter of the Attorney General (Mr Triantafyllides) to the police requesting the 
investigation of the offence of libel against a well-known journalist after the 
publication of extensive articles in the newspapers.
A document confirming the investigation of allegations of violence committed by 
police officers against civilians which was ordered and supervised by the 
Attorney General (Mr Markidis).
A direction for investigation of allegations against a senior doctor of the 
Government Hospital for negligence (Mr Markidis).
Directions for investigations of the offence of contempt of court against a 
Minister of the Government (Mr Nikitas).
There were also a number of circulars expressing criticism of the police conduct of 
investigations. For example, in a circular by Mr Nikitas24 addressed to the Chief of the 
Police, a concern was expressed about the delay of the investigation of offences 
committed by juveniles. The Attorney General underlined the negative effects on the
23 Documentary survey in the Attorney General’s Office.
24 Circular G.E. 4 ] (AO/1947/17), dated 17/10/03.
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prosecution of a case that the unduly delayed investigations might have and he gave 
relevant directions to the police on that issue.
There were not, however, any circulars by any of the Attorney Generals detailing 
specific policies about the investigation of crimes. The only exception was a circular 
by Mr Markidis indicating the procedure of requesting the revelation of bank 
documents.25 He directed the police that whenever they wanted to proceed in such an 
action they should get the authorisation of one of the Law Officers. This was a 
procedure that was agreed after consultation with all the major banks and regarded as 
an effort to avoid the abuse of that power by the police investigators.26
The impression that was given from the wording used, and generally from the content 
of the correspondence between the police and the Attorney General, was that the 
police had always regarded themselves -  at least theoretically -  as absolutely bound 
by an instruction from the Law Office, at least concerning these serious or high profile 
cases. The wording used in that correspondence included phrases like: ‘Please give us 
directions as to what we should do in this case’ or ‘Shall we investigate further in this 
case?’. However, it was equally noticeable that until recently, apart from rare 
exceptions, serious issues that created friction between the two services regarding the 
investigation of crimes appeared not to exist.27 This may be interpreted as indicating a 
good cooperative relationship between them. It may be also attributed to the fact that 
generally, apart from those special cases, the Law Office did not interfere regularly
25 Circular G.E. 41(A)/1947/15, dated 14/02/2002. See also the recent confirmation o f this procedure 
by the current Attorney General with Circular G.E. 41 (A )/1947/18, dated 05/06/2005.
26 This power derives from s.6 of the Criminal Procedure Law but in the past banks threatened to 
dispute such actions in court. Eventually, they agreed to accept requests to reveal bank documents 
provided that the police investigator had the authorisation o f the Law Office. This is another indication 
o f  the integrity that the Attorney General’s involvement in the process ensures.
27 Recently, however (during Mr Nikitas’ tenure), there had been some friction in the relationship o f the 
Law Office and the police concerning investigations against a Minister o f the Government. It was 
apparent that the Attorney General disagreed with the way the police were investigating the matter and 
gave repeated and strict directions as to how the investigations should proceed. Although, as a result o f  
this, there had been some police frustration, it was obvious that the police acknowledged that the 
Attorney General had every right to give directions: ‘We are obliged to obey the directions o f the 
Attorney General, even if  we disagree’ (Statement o f the Deputy Chief o f the Police on 29/09/04).
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and systematically in the day-to-day work of the police unless their advice was 
sought.
On the contrary, there were some incidents in the past when they preferred to keep a 
distance from police investigations and expressed contradictory positions as to their 
appropriate role regarding them. For instance, Mr Triantafyllides on one occasion, 
when asked if he was willing to order the police to initiate investigations against a 
Chief Constable, stated that investigations were mainly the responsibility of the police 
and the responsibility of the Law Office started when the police forwarded the 
completed file to the Office.28
It has to be observed, that this curious statement contradicted previous actions and 
positions of the same Attorney General. Nevertheless, it is indicative of an ideology -  
more or less adopted by all the Attorney Generals -  that afforded a flexibility 
regarding their role in investigations and preferred at times not to promote -  or to 
declare -  a very interventionist policy in the investigative role of the police.29
The following (deliberately extensive) quotations from the interviews I carried out 
with the Attorney Generals illustrate the approach they adopted regarding their role in 
investigations:
Q: Is there a Law Office’s role and intervention during the investigative stage?
A: Absolutely; investigations are subject to our directions. The fact that we do 
not intervene that often is a matter of discretion...The investigator is obliged to 
follow the directions of the Law Office. The Attorney General is empowered to 
give directions for the issue of a search warrant or an arrest warrant or to 
prevent the police from doing so. In practice, we have never prevented the 
police from issuing warrants but we have often directed them to carry out further 
investigatory acts, issue search warrants, or investigate other lines of inquiry.
There are some complex or sensitive cases that should be forwarded here from
28 See Statement K.E. 61/85/IV, dated 13/07/1994.
29 See also an interview o f the Deputy Attorney General in the newspaper ‘Fileleftheros’, dated 
26/08/2001:
‘Police should acknowledge and respect the fact that the Law Office h as the crucial role (in 
prosecutions). And from our side, we respect the  responsibilities and powers that the  law entrusts 
the police with, for exam ple their role in the investigations where we don’t usually intervene.’
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the very beginning so we can study them and give directions for further inquiries. 
(Interview with Mr Markidis) (emphasis added)
Q: Are you involved in investigations?
A: Not regularly, unless our opinion or advice is sought. Of course, police during 
investigations could ask for our legal advice at any time. The Attorney General 
also has the right to direct the police to undertake further investigations. We 
could send a file back with directions for additional or other evidence. For 
example, if we see that an argument of the accused has not been investigated, 
we can send the case back and ask the police to make further inquiries in 
relation to that. (Interview with Mr Nikitas) (emphasis added)
A: In a number of cases I have directed the police to investigate allegations of 
an incident...! was empowered to do that...During the investigations of all 
crimes they could also come here to ask our ad vice... After they send the file 
here we must check the evidence and possibly ask for further inquiries. 
(Interview with Mr Triantafyllides) (emphasis added)
There are some interesting points arising out of these comments, which reflect the 
Attorney Generals’ philosophy regarding investigations. First, they all declare their 
theoretical potential to intervene in every stage of an investigation but they are careful 
not to claim that this is a regular job for their Office to execute inescapably and on a 
systematic basis. Secondly, they talk more about legal advice, rather than supervision 
of investigations, apart from specific categories of cases (‘sensitive cases’, cases 
involving public figures, allegations against police officers) when they choose to use a 
more authoritative terminology. Finally, during the stage that a case is forwarded to 
the Law Office for a decision for a prosecution to be taken, it is then clearly 
considered as their duty to thoroughly examine the evidence and order further 
inquiries if this is required.
II. IDEOLOGY -  THE LAW OFFICERS’ APPROACH
In this section, the ideology that has been developed within the Law Office
concerning their powers over investigations will be explored. It is crucial to study
here how Law Officers themselves approach, interpret and reflect on their role in
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investigations. In the next section, it will be shown how these attitudes, combined 
with a number of other contextual and structural factors, are translated into practice 
and form the actual role that the Law Office plays in investigations.
A right, not a duty, to intervene
Law Officers appeared uncertain about determining exactly the boundary lines of the 
Law Office’s role during investigations. Although most of them acknowledged that, at 
least in theory, the Attorney General could direct the police even during the 
investigative stage:30
‘The rule is that the police are under the direction of the Attorney General during 
the investigative stages as well.’ (Law Officer 04),
they stressed that this was more of a right to intervene whenever he deemed proper 
rather than a duty to do so in each and every case:
‘In principle, the Attorney General could direct the police during the investigative 
stages as well. However, the Law Office does not have to intervene in all the 
thousands of cases which the police investigate at the same time.’ (Law Officer 
12)
‘Of course, we have the right to intervene in investigations. We are not, though, 
obliged to do so.’ (Law Officer 01)
Further questioning revealed that this attitude was based on a reluctance to accept a 
role which would dramatically increase their workload without an analogous increase 
of their resources. They argued that under the given circumstances it was inevitable 
that they limited their role to those cases that were complex, difficult or regarding 
which the police chose to ask for their advice:
‘Inevitably, given the current arrangements, our role can only be reactive...’
(Law Officer 02)
30 However, a couple of Law Officers appeared to deny even that:
T h e  Attorney G eneral is responsible for the decision of prosecution, not for the investigations. He is 
in charge of all the services that are  related to the presentation of a case  in court. There is no 
involvement in the investigative s tage  unless the police ask  for our advice.’ (Law Officer 07)
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'Our resources could not possibly allow us to get involved in each and every 
case. This happens when there is a special reason for it to happen, e.g. when a 
case is particularly complex or sensitive... or when the police ask for our advice.’
(Law Officer 10)
Positive attitude
Nevertheless, in general, Law Officers were very much in favour of their participation 
in the investigative phase and emphasised the advantages of their early involvement in 
a case:
‘It would be ideal to have control of the case from the beginning. In other 
countries prosecutors are systematically involved in the investigations. These 
are different systems, though; there are different arrangements there...But, still, 
it would be very effective to be able to do this in every case.’ (Law Officer 12)
The Law Office should be involved in the process of investigation of a case from 
the early stages more substantially...! believe that these stages are the most 
important and the most crucial stages of a criminal case.’ (Law Officer 05)
‘Police have the primary investigative role’
Law Officers appeared to acknowledge that, regardless of whether it was a matter of 
practice or theory, the police bear the burden of the investigative stage in a case. 
Therefore, investigations were regarded as primarily a police job and responsibility, at 
least up until the point that they would send a file to the Law Office.
Therefore, some Law Officers argued, it was the responsibility of the police to seek 
directions from the Law Office when they needed advice or assistance for their job, 
and, most of the time, it was after police initiative that this occurred:
The police role is to investigate. Our role usually begins after the completion of 
the investigation. However, in complicated cases it is not unusual to be involved 
during the investigative stage. They usually ask for our advice and direction. It is 
their responsibility to do that when needed...We have a cooperative 
relationship.’ (Law Officer 12)
‘In serious cases we assist the police from the early stages. It’s better to control 
things from the beginning. However, it is usually at the investigator’s initiative
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that a case comes here during the investigative stage. They usually come to the 
Deputy Attorney General and ask his advice. Unfortunately, this is not a practice 
followed in all cases.’ (Law Officer 06)
Some Law Officers admitted that police investigators did not always come to the Law 
Office for advice and, as a result, crucial mistakes were sometimes made during 
investigations. However, they did not seem to think that there was anything at the 
moment that the Law Office could do in order to correct this situation, other than (a) 
refusing to prosecute improperly investigated cases:
‘When a case fails to be prosecuted due to mistakes they committed during the 
investigation, it makes investigators realise how important it is to contact the 
Law Office for advice early enough.’ (Law Officer 04)
and (b) encouraging more cooperation with the police.
Cooperation rather than supervision
This is obviously an additional reason why the Law Officers tended to talk more 
about assistance and cooperation with the police during the investigative stage rather 
than supervision or authority to give orders:
‘It is in the best interests of both services to have a cooperative relationship. We 
encourage the police when they are investigating a serious allegation to contact 
us at an early stage so that we can discuss the case and provide our assistance 
with any evidential or other problem that they may deal with in an investigation.’
(Law Officer 01)
Moreover, they referred constantly to the importance of police officers’ practical 
experience:
The role of the police during investigations is crucial. Without their assistance 
we cannot do many things. They have the experience. We realise their value in 
cases where we are appointed as independent investigators, e.g. cases against 
police officers. Without their help our job is very difficult, so, it is not useful to 
declare and boast that we are the leaders in an investigation.’ (Law Officer 13)
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‘You have to show respect for the work that the police investigator is doing and 
take into serious consideration his experience. He is the one who 'lives’ the 
case, right from the beginning, and in addition knows how to handle certain 
circumstances.’ (Law Officer 07)
Legal assistance: their main role
However, almost everyone pointed out that police investigators’ input, although 
crucial and vital was not, these days, enough for the proper execution of 
investigations. They believed that while legal knowledge and advice had always been 
helpful in collecting the right evidence, the complexity of new forms of criminality 
besides the strict exclusionary rules of the Cyprus Constitution had currently rendered 
them essential:31
‘It is necessary that experienced lawyers are involved in the process of 
investigation from the beginning in order to ensure that the provisions of the 
Laws and the Constitution regarding the collection of evidence are not violated... 
Police...are not qualified to do that... They do not have lawyers or people with 
legal knowledge to lead them during investigations...for example, how to collect 
exhibits... In Cyprus we have strict exclusionary rules... The Constitution does 
not allow the courts to take into account illegally-obtained evidence.’ (Law 
Officer 05)
‘Nowadays, some criminals adopt sophisticated methods for their crimes. You 
have to be very careful from the beginning in order to collect the right evidence’
(Law Officer 04)
Law Officers pointed out that police officers were not legally trained:
‘Sometimes there are gaps in the evidence. We have to keep in mind that 
investigators are not legally qualified. There have been occasions when it was 
obvious that certain evidence should have been obtained and the investigators 
did not act that way. Sometimes they don’t have the ability to predict things or to 
evaluate some evidence in the right way.’ (Law Officer 12)
31 Another reason why they believed that their help was becoming more vital to the police, and 
therefore their role in investigations more crucial, was that:
‘Now that we don’t have admissions a s  often a s  before, everyone is skeptical about investigations 
and the collection of the  evidence.’ (Law Officer 03)
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‘ Sometimes police officers make mistakes when they investigate. Under the 
circumstances though, it could be worse... They don’t get special training for 
that, it is all what they learn in practice...’ (Law Officer 09)
They, therefore, viewed their main role in investigations as providing legal advice to 
the police investigators and offering the legal knowledge that police were lacking:
'Our role is to provide them with legal advice during the investigations. Some 
issues regarding the collection of evidence require legal knowledge.’ (Law 
Officer 09)
'Evidence should be collected at the right time...In order to achieve that, you 
need legal knowledge and experience...Police may have experience but they 
don’t have legal knowledge and a combination of the two is essential. We have 
the legal knowledge.’ (Law Officer 05)
Furthermore, although there were several favourable comments about the expertise of 
police officers working in the field, Law Officers talked about variable competence. 
Some Law Officers described a few police investigators as incompetent and therefore 
saw their own assistance as more essential.32 Due to the relatively small number of 
police investigators (especially those serving at the CID dealing with serious crime), 
Law Officers had personal knowledge of almost all of them.
As far as intentional breaches of the law by police investigators and police 
malpractice were concerned, most Law Officers appeared to correlate them again with 
individual investigators, adopting the theory of ‘bad apples’ in the police force. They 
considered it as their indisputable duty to exclude evidence which had been obtained 
improperly, but they admitted that their role could not extend to preventing such 
incidents from occurring.
32 See for example the comments o f one Law Officer:
‘Som e investigators are totally incompetent. There have been occasions when it w as obvious that 
certain evidence should have been obtained and the investigators did not act that way.’
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A more proactive role?
The last observation is directly related to the above-mentioned issue. Apart from the 
legal direction that they were more than happy to provide the police with, Law 
Officers appeared divided in their views about a more proactive role in investigations 
that would extend to choosing the methods or techniques for investigations, defining 
policies or even watching over the legality of investigators’ actions.
Some Law Officers argued that this was not feasible anyway because there were 
simply insufficient resources for them to engage in a more proactive way with the 
police investigation:
‘In order to be able to control every movement of the investigator you need a 
Law Officer for each investigator.’ (Law Officer 04)
Some of them claimed that such a systematic involvement was not even desirable 
because it would compromise their objectivity. They believed that a valuable 
consequence of the fact that they did not appear too involved in the investigations was 
the maintenance of a more independent and objective status. Their independence was 
seen as arising from their separation from the day-to-day concerns of the police and 
the investigation process combined with their ultimate control over investigations:
‘When you don’t have to deal with the everyday concerns of an investigation you 
can keep a certain distance, be more objective and have a clearer picture of the 
situation sometimes... And at the end of the day you can always give directions 
for certain things to be done while still keeping a distance...’ (Law Officer 09)
Duty to order further investigations
Law Officers appeared to separate the stages during which they could intervene in (a) 
the main investigative stage before a complete file was formed and (b) the stage when 
a case was forwarded to the Law Office.
For Law Officers, in accordance with the views of their superiors (see earlier), once a 
file was forwarded to the Law Office for a prosecution decision to be taken, the right 
to intervening and ask for further information or order other lines of inquiries also 
became a duty:
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‘In almost all cases I ask for further evidence...There are always some gaps in 
the evidence. Our duty is to check for gaps and see if the case has been 
investigated properly or whether more needs to be done.’ (Law Officer 03)
‘At this stage, we have the duty to make a decision about prosecution and, if 
there are gaps in the evidence or if the evidence is obviously illegally obtained, 
we cannot proceed...Therefore we should either ask them to proceed to further 
inquiries or decline to prosecute. ‘ (Law Officer 09)
Most of the Law Officers argued that at that stage alternative lines usually suggested 
by defence lawyers could also be explored, if they appeared reasonable. They further 
claimed that generally, defence comments or information about the evidence 
collected by the police, when offered, were taken into consideration when evaluating 
the evidence:
‘Information from the defence attorneys could prove very useful in making us 
review the police file with a more vigilant eye. Sometimes, when you have in 
mind certain factors you can read between the lines and discover other things.’
(Law Officer 04)
Concluding remarks
In conclusion, it could be argued that the Law Officers’ approach to their role in 
investigations reflects the policies that succeeding Attorney Generals have promoted 
over time. They regard their involvement in investigations more as a power rather 
than a duty and although they consider it as extremely beneficial, they acknowledge 
that due to their heavy workload this cannot be particularly extensive. They emphasise 
the good cooperation and trust that should characterise their relations with the police 
so that police investigators seek their assistance when needed. However, when a file is 
forwarded to the Law Office for a prosecution decision to be taken, Law Officers 
consider it as their duty to ask for further information or order other lines of inquiries 
(often suggested by the defence) when necessary so that a justified decision can be 
taken.
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III. PRACTICE
In this section, an insight into the role that is actually carried out by the Law Office in 
investigations will be attempted, drawing on observations of the everyday life of the 
Office, as well as the examination of cases during the fieldwork period. It will be 
explored how the approach of the Law Officers and the Attorney General himself to 
their powers is combined with a number of other factors, including the attitudes of 
other actors in the system, to construct the role that the Law Office plays in 
investigations in practice.
There are three stages33 during which the Attorney General’s Office could potentially 
exert its power to intervene in the building up of a case, or in what can be described as 
the investigation and collection of information based on which a decision would be 
made as to whether a case would be sent to court or not:
a. Stage one: The Attorney General is empowered to order the initiation of 
investigations.
b. Stage two: He is able to intervene during the conduct of investigations.
c. Stage three: He can order further investigations after the file of a case is 
forwarded to the Office for a decision to prosecute or not.
Direction for the initiation of investigations
‘We don’t have the ability to watch everything in order to be able to know 
when and where a certain crime is being committed. When we have a 
complaint and we find out that there is something that prima facie is worth 
being investigated it is then a matter of a routine action: we give directions 
to the police to investigate it.’ (Mr Markidis’ Interview in the newspaper 
“Neos Typos” on 18/03/01)
33 Regarding the cases that Law Officers present to the court, there is another opportunity to elicit 
further information, at a later stage though. After the committal, there is a practice followed by the Law 
Officers o f seeing the main witnesses before testifying in Court and, thus, checking on the quality o f  
the evidence personally.
211
Chapter Six: The Role o f  the Attorney G eneral’s Office regarding Investigations
As mentioned before, there is evidence (resulting from the previous circulars and 
letters of correspondence between the Law Office and the police) that Attorney 
Generals have been using the power to instruct the instigation of investigations in 
cases of particularly serious crimes or crimes that created publicity.
In the field, it was observed that the power of the Attorney General to order the 
initiation of investigations was a power exercised either by him personally or by the 
Deputy Attorney General. It did not form a part of the ordinary, everyday workload 
of the Law Officers.
What usually caused the exercise of the Attorney General’s power was the receipt of 
information that a certain incident had occurred and investigation was required, or the 
media coverage of an event that contained allegations of a crime. This kind of 
correspondence would usually come from a Government Department, a Member of 
Parliament or simply a member of the public who claimed that he had been the victim 
of a crime. It was observed that the type of reports received in this way amounted to 
very serious allegations of criminal conduct but, surprisingly, they also concerned 
information regarding relatively trivial offences. That indicated awareness on the part 
of the public that the Attorney General had the authority to order the initiation of 
investigations, even contrary to the police will, as well as trust and belief that they 
would secure a fairer decision; people usually turned to the Attorney General when 
they felt that there had not been a proper police reaction to the allegations of a crime.
In all the cases that I observed, the Attorney General considered it appropriate to 
request that the police (or independent investigators) carry out investigations, after 
which he was informed of the results and decided whether to prosecute or not:
Case IN1: a case of unlawful possession of antiquities -  after a report of the 
Ministry of Transportation.
Case IN2: a case of unlawful disclosure of bank accounts -  after a complaint by 
a member of the public.
Cases IN3 and IN4: two cases of contempt of court -  after a letter from the 
Ministry of Finance.
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Case IN5: a case of malicious prosecution by the police -  after a complaint by a 
member of the public.
Case IN6: accusations for police violence against a suspect in custody -  letter 
by a Member of Parliament and extensive media coverage.
For the last case, the Attorney General activated the power conferred on him by the 
Council of Ministers (see earlier) to appoint independent investigators. Two senior 
Law Officers and a former judge were selected and granted the authority to conduct 
investigations.
It was also observed that the Attorney General could sometimes set priorities as to the 
initiation or the process of investigation of particular cases. That concerned serious 
cases -  when there was an exceptional public outcry -  regarding which speedy 
investigation was a necessity. For example:
Case IN7: A direction of the Deputy Attorney General to a Chief Constable 
asking him to speed up the investigations of a particular case, widely covered by 
the media, concerning forgery by a public servant. He specifically ordered the 
police to give priority to the investigation of that case over the other cases that 
the same investigators were dealing with during the same time.
Intervention during the conduct of investigations
There was no formal or static structure to facilitate the Law Office’s involvement in 
police operations from the beginning. Most of the time, but not always, the decision to 
request advice from the Law Office during investigations depended upon the 
judgment of the investigator or his seniors. However, it was observed that there was a 
well-developed culture of cooperation that was encouraging police officers to seek the 
Attorney General’s advice regularly. During my fieldwork, I noticed that the police 
investigators would come to the Law Office in person quite often to consult with the 
Law Officers, would call Law Officers on a daily basis asking questions about 
different aspects of their investigation, or would send files in the middle of an 
investigation asking for directions.
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As far as complicated cases were concerned, they would seek Law Officers’ 
directions from the very beginning of the investigation. For example:
Case LP: A case involving a series of complex offences of stealing electricity 
power and frauds. A particular newspaper had caused the initiation of 
investigations with the publication of some information they discovered and, 
accordingly, great publicity was created. Because of the complexity and the 
novelty of the case, police investigators sought the Law Office’s help from the 
very first day of the investigation.
There were a number of particularly complex cases where the police required almost 
continuous advice throughout the investigation:
Case MM: A case of a series of frauds relating to the importation of a large 
number of luxury cars from abroad violating inter alia the tax laws. An innovative 
way of committing those offences was involved as new cars were imported in 
parts and after being assembled in Cyprus were sold as used cars.
Furthermore, in a number of cases, the Attorney General himself took the initiative in 
requesting information regarding the investigation of particular cases and sometimes 
required to be constantly informed about the investigation of a particular case. This 
mainly concerned cases that created media attention and publicity or involved public 
figures.
Case PK: A case of forgery by a public servant widely covered by the media.
The Deputy Attorney General, after giving advice on that case, asked the police 
to keep him informed about further investigations. The file was forwarded to the 
Law Office three times during the investigation period and at the end a Law 
Officer handled the case in the District Court.
In those cases, supervision and directions were far more comprehensive than in the 
rest of the cases. Law Officers would give orders, check on progress, coordinate 
tactics and hold regular briefings. There was a sense that, regarding those cases Law 
Officers and the Attorney General himself34 were actually leading the investigation.
34 In fact, most o f the time, it was the Deputy Attorney General.
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In many other -  not necessarily very serious -  cases, police officers would send the 
file to the Law Office in the middle of the investigation, asking advice about how to 
proceed and Law Officers had the chance to give directions and order the collection of 
more information. Police investigators usually asked for directions about the kind of 
information that was needed to sustain certain charges or regarding the applicability 
of certain legal provisions. Furthermore, they sometimes took Law Officers’ advice 
concerning disputed points of law, especially regarding the collection of evidence 
with special investigative techniques. Typical cases that were included in this 
category were cases of forgery, cases of obtaining goods by false pretences, fraud, 
Stock Exchange cases, etc. They also used to send files concerning ‘sensitive’ (as they 
called them) cases:
Case GP: This concerned the rape of a mentally handicapped girl. The 
investigator described the evidence collected up to that time and asked for 
directions on how to proceed, expressing some doubts about the strength of the 
evidence, the ability of the girl to testify in court and the harm that may be 
caused to her by a possible appearance in court. The Law Officer asked the 
police to take the opinion of a second expert, to take further statements from the 
mother and the doctor of the girl and to examine the possibility of finding other 
independent evidence so that the girl would not have to testify in court.
As was explained in Chapter Four, according to the constitutional provisions, flagrant 
crimes excluded, the police are not empowered to arrest or search someone without a 
judicial warrant. Therefore, the police were often seen to seek Law Officers’ 
assistance when wishing to obtain judicial authorisation for their activities. As a 
police investigator remarked:
These days, judges make it more difficult to grant warrants than in the past.
Thus, legal assistance from the Law Office is often essential.’
Responding to this ‘police need’, and also in an attempt to encourage even more the 
police-Law Office liaison at the level of the investigation of a case, a catalogue with 
names and telephone numbers of Law Officers (an on-call list) who were available 
any time that advice was needed (especially regarding the issue of warrants of arrest 
or search) had been sent to the Police Departments by the Attorney General.
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Finally, it is important to note that for serious economic crime cases the Law Office’s 
involvement in the investigation process was much more systematic and regular. A 
Fraud Investigation Team had been established, in which Law Officers, accountants 
and police investigators participated and, under the immediate control of the Attorney 
General, they were dealing with the investigation and prosecution of all serious and 
complex economic crimes.35
Directions for further investigations
During the stage that a file was forwarded to the Law Office so that a decision for a 
prosecution could be taken, Law Officers appeared, as was seen in the last section, 
more willing to play their ‘investigative role’. This is a good point at which to explore 
how this role was translated in practice and whether there were appropriate 
circumstances which facilitated such an action.
i) The Investigation file
‘If all materials collected by the police in the course of the investigation 
were handed to crown prosecutors, then they would be in a much stronger 
position than at present to provide some real direction to enquiries.’
(Baldwin and Moloney 1992:78)36
It was logical that in order for the Law Officers to be able to exercise any meaningful 
role during that stage, they should have had a real sense of what had happened up 
until that point. In cases where they had not been personally involved in the 
investigations from the beginning (see previous section), the investigation files were 
their main source of information. Therefore, it is worth examining here the type of 
information included in those files.
35 Such investigation teams consisting o f experts, investigators and prosecutors have been established 
in most countries because of the need for special knowledge and expertise on financial matters when 
investigating complex economic crimes.
36 Research studies suggest that review bodies cannot effectively review earlier decisions or processes 
o f other agencies without access to the raw material that those agencies have considered, or at least 
submissions from other agencies other than those which they are reviewing (Leng et al. 1996).
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It was observed that when the police forwarded cases to the Attorney General’s Office 
they would almost always send the original investigation files. Those were firmly 
settled. Each file was divided into three parts. The first consisted of the ‘activity 
calendar’, a detailed chronological record of the progress of a case under investigation 
from the time the police were notified of a crime and investigations began until the 
day the file was forwarded to the Law Office. That was accompanied by a summary 
report by the investigating officer which recorded the relevant personal details of the 
suspect, described the evidence collected and summarised the main witnesses’ 
statements. It also recorded whether the suspect had been charged or not and/or 
whether any other evidence was still to be obtained and any additional observations 
that might have been relevant. It concluded with the recommendations of the 
investigating officer regarding the decision to prosecute and/or his suggestions as to 
what charges, if any, should be laid. In the ‘activity calendar’ the recommendations of 
at least three more senior officers were included (which were not necessarily the same 
as those expressed by the investigating officer), as the file had to reach the Law Office 
through the hierarchical structure of the police force (investigating officer to officer in 
charge of the police station to Chief Constable to officer in charge of the Prosecution 
Department of the Police Headquarters).37 The second part of the file consisted of 
statements by the various witnesses. It might run from a few pages to hundreds of 
pages, depending on the complexity of the particular case. This part also contained 
copies of documentary evidence, for example, copies of invoices or bank statements 
in fraud cases or copies of maps and sketch plans in road traffic cases. The third part 
of the file might contain any other miscellaneous papers, such as the detention 
schedule showing the number and length of interviews of an accused person by the 
police, and the criminal record of the accused.38
37 This structure within which a file proceeds is similar to the situation existing in England before the 
Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which gave custody officers a critical role in the decision to charge. 
Before 1984, a police officer was supervised by his Sergeant during the investigation o f a crime. The 
file o f  a case was then sent to the Inspector and after that to the Detective Inspector who would make 
the decision whether to prosecute. See in Baldwin’s (1998:530-31) interviews with police officers their 
comments that the earlier situation was enabling quicker and more efficient identification o f  evidential 
weaknesses in a case, since there was the input o f three senior people in the hierarchy o f the police 
before the case reached the court system.
38 See, in comparison, Sanders (1986c:27) commenting about the great use o f  abbreviated files as the 
only available base for prosecutors’ decisions in England: ‘They are little more than police precis and
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As is obvious, the investigation files were usually very long and appeared to 
constitute a detailed account of ‘what happened’ until that stage. However, as 
McConville et al. (1991:12) state: ‘...at each point of the criminal justice process 
“what happened” is the subject of interpretation, addition, subtraction, selection and 
reformulation.’ Prosecution files were the product of the police investigation and they 
reflected the quality of their work and the resources and effort they invested in the 
investigation of the case, as well as their interpretation of certain facts and their 
inferences from others. As will be shown later, however, Law Officers appeared to 
acknowledge the implications of this reality. Furthermore, the fact that in the 
investigation file Law Officers were able to find the views on the evidence not only of 
the investigator of the case but also of all his superiors proved on occasions very 
useful in locating inconsistencies in the police accounts of events.
ii) Police prompting
There were occasions when, even at that stage, the police themselves appeared to alert 
Law Officers to possible problems or weaknesses in the cases and ask them to 
consider whether, in view of those difficulties, a prosecution was desirable. Law 
Officers’ decisions in these cases could be either a direction for prosecution or non­
prosecution, or a direction for further investigations (for example, they would direct 
that a witness should make an additional statement giving fuller details of an event, 
they would ask the police to arrange an identification parade to be held or they would 
request further documentary evidence).39
Case SE: A case of arson -  The police investigator wrote in the file that, based
on the evidence collected, it was unclear whether the action was intentional or
the defendant’s statements, rendering much prosecution screening perfunctory...Some cases in my 
research underwent six or more hearings before a full file was produced.’
39 There were 21 cases of this category in my sample which included: two rape cases, a case o f forgery 
and fraud, a case o f arson, two cases o f stealing by a servant, three cases o f forgery, a case o f stealing 
by a trustee, two cases against companies for unlawful possession o f explosive substances, a case o f  
breach o f banking regulations, a case of unlawful possession o f drugs, a case o f fraud, a case 
concerning offences against Foreign Currency Law, a case concerning offences against Bankruptcy 
Law, a case o f stealing, a case o f  receiving stolen goods, a case o f criminal impersonation and a case o f  
extortion by a police officer. See the complete catalogue in Chapter Five, under section IV (gb)
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accidental. The Law Officer found further gaps in the evidence and decided not 
to prosecute.
Case FF: A case of forgery and fraud -  The police suggested that the evidence 
was weak. The Law Officer asked for further documentary evidence and 
additional witnesses’ statements.
Cases HG and HE: two cases against two companies for unlawful possession of 
explosive substances relating to a type of games they were selling -  The police 
were not sure whether a regulation allowing the possession of certain explosive 
substances in certain circumstances was applicable in those cases. The Law 
Officer argued that it was applicable: Decision to refrain from prosecution.
Case FT: a case of criminal impersonation -  The Law Officer did not agree with 
the police suggestion of weak evidence: Direction to prosecute.
iii) Law Officers’ practices
Law Officers appeared to use their power to order further investigations and 
information on a case quite often, especially regarding the serious cases that they were 
going to present to court themselves.
Regarding those cases the investigation file was not approached as an unproblematic 
given but was sufficiently scrutinised so that any weaknesses or gaps in the evidence 
could be uncovered.40 It must be observed, however, that this approach was not 
adopted for all cases with the same vigilance. For the so-called ‘ordinary cases’ the 
degree of scrutiny that the investigation file was subjected to was directly correlated 
to the amount of time they had available (or to the information that another source -  
usually the defence -  provided). Organisational pressures and practical constraints 
required the Law Officers to prioritise the cases which they considered to be more 
important.
40 See in comparison Baldwin and Moloney (1992:64) describing the totally different approach o f  the 
English prosecutors: ‘Despite the relative gravity o f the offences in question, the investigations were 
for the most part viewed as straightforward, unproblematic and satisfactorily conducted by the officers 
concerned. There was not a single case in which the Crown Prosecutors had requested that further 
information be collected or had criticism o f the way an enquiry had been conducted.’
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It was also true that even for the serious cases, often their directions for further 
investigations concerned only clarification of details, correction of internal 
inconsistencies or the taking of statements which had for some reasons been 
overlooked by the police. However, it was not unusual for Law Officers in various 
cases to order new lines of inquiry or to challenge the ‘police construction of a case’.41 
When the latter occurred it was largely the result of one of two factors:
1. Law Officers alert to police ‘biased information’
Some Law Officers seemed to be more alert than others to the possibility that the 
police may present ‘biased information’, omit crucial evidence or conceal facts either 
intentionally or unintentionally.
Case AK: possession of drugs with intent to supply -  The case was committed 
for a trial before the Assize Court. The Law Officer confirmed 'the instinct he had 
that something was wrong with this case’ when he had the chance to meet the . 
police undercover agent before the opening of the trial. ‘After a couple of 
questions I realised that he was lying about certain things. I confronted him and 
he told me the truth. I realised that the evidence was very weak and probably 
illegally obtained. We entered a nolle prosequi.’ (Law Officer 04)
Case AB: a case of unlawful possession of firearms and explosives -  On this 
occasion the case appeared strong on paper, as witnesses’ statements were 
given great value. However, the real ‘confidence’ the police had about this case 
-  arising from ‘informal information’ that they had about the certain suspect -  
was not explained at the beginning, and gaps and weaknesses in the evidence 
were left aside. The case was withdrawn.
Law Officers correlated the standard of information received from the police with the 
personal competence or integrity of the investigator. They seemed to be more alert
41 This was contrary to research findings in England and Wales regarding the prosecutors’ requests for 
further information. See, for example, Baldwin (1997:547-548) commenting on the results o f his own 
research: ‘In few o f  the files were there examples o f  imaginative questioning o f the evidence. Instead, 
requests to the police, in so far as they were made at all, were overwhelmingly for clarification o f  the 
detail...There were only isolated instances in the files where suggestions had been made by reviewing 
lawyers about the need to pursue fresh lines o f inquiry.’
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and suspicious whenever particular police officers were in charge of the 
investigations:
‘There are certain investigating officers that I can absolutely trust. When I 
receive their cases I know that at least I will have a carefully prepared file.’ (Law 
Officer 01)
‘Some investigators do not perform their duties adequately. They make serious 
mistakes, which occasionally prove damaging for the case. As time passes, you 
know who they are and you are more careful when reviewing their cases.’ (Law 
Officer 06)
2. The Defence’s input
‘Whatever system may be adopted it is the defence solicitor who w ill have 
to stimulate the critical intellect o f  any judicial or prosecutorial 
intermediary, in the investigative process and at the pre-trial stage in 
general. We cannot rely on the examining magistrate or prosecutor to do 
so without the assistance o f  one w hose adversariness in interest stimulates 
critical reflection.’ (Leigh and Zedner 1992:73)
The drawing of ambiguity or impropriety to the attention of the Law Officers by 
defence attorneys was a key factor that used to prompt them to challenge the police’s 
construction of a case. During my research period, I observed that the Attorney 
General and the Law Officers were frequently informed about gaps and
inconsistencies in the evidence by the defence lawyers. Defence lawyers could also 
provide further information, not included in the police file, or prompt the Law Officer 
to ask the police to investigate new directions in their inquiries.42
42 Research studies in Britain (McConville and Mirsky, 1988; Baldwin, 1985; Baldwin and
McConville, 1977) have been particularly critical o f  the defence attorneys’ attitude and role in the 
prosecution process. They commented on their failure to act in an adversarial way and their often 
uncritical acceptance o f the prosecution case. McConville et al. (1991) suggest that defence lawyers 
quite often judge their clients’ cases in the light o f the police case, while Sanders (1992) argues that 
although quite often police constructions are weak, the police are saved from exposure because o f the 
legal defence community’s inability or unwillingness to challenge those constructions. For a more 
focused empirical study, which confirms the lack o f active pre-trial investigation by defence lawyers in 
England and Wales, see McConville et al. (1994).
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Case AG: A drug case -  The suspect’s explanation was left out of the summary.
After a meeting with the defence lawyer and the information he gave him, the 
Law Officer realised that there were various gaps in the evidence and, therefore, 
he decided not to proceed with the case.
Case AV: A case of an alleged rape of a 14-year-old girl -  The case was 
forwarded to the Law Office with the suggestion not to prosecute based mainly 
on the victim’s lack of credibility and some inconsistencies in her testimony (this 
case is further analysed elsewhere). A direction of no prosecution was issued 
initially. The victim’s attorney sent a number of letters to the Law Office asking 
for explanations for their decision and offering evidence and reasons why the 
case deserved to go to court. He repeatedly asked for a meeting with the 
Attorney General and the Law Officer who reviewed the case. As a result of this 
meeting and a second review of the case by another Law Officer, the Attorney 
General directed for the case to be prosecuted. The accused was convicted but 
after an appeal he was acquitted.
There are two interesting points related to Case AV: Firstly, this case shows that not 
only do the defence attorneys provide the Law Office with information that advocates 
against prosecution, but the converse situation occurs as well: the victims’ attorneys 
provide the Law Office with information which advocates towards prosecution. 
Secondly, it highlights a phenomenon observed on a number of occasions during my 
fieldwork period: the fact that the Attorney General and (more often) the Deputy 
Attorney General are personally and actively involved in very serious cases.
In most cases, even when a defence attorney did not offer specific information or 
tangible evidence on a case, his comments on a possible misuse of police powers or 
on suspicious police practices urged the Law Officers to question the police 
construction of a case. The following was an example of a situation where the 
persistence of the defence attorney led the Law Officer to go behind the police 
account and discover information that the police, in order to strengthen their case, had 
not disclosed:
Case CF: An armed robbery -  There were two perpetrators, of whom one was 
arrested in the act and the other escaped. The defence attorney contacted the 
Law Officer and strongly argued that the case was a police ‘set up’ and giving a
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number of indications as to why this might be. The Law Officer confronted the 
police and they admitted that the Central Intelligence Service knew about the 
planning of the robbery beforehand. They were informed by the perpetrator who 
was left to escape! The charge was reduced to attempted robbery. The accused 
pleaded guilty and the whole story was revealed to the court.
It was obvious that Law Officers were regarded by the defence attorneys as much 
more trustworthy and objective than the police and, therefore, the defence felt 
comfortable contacting them and suggesting alternative accounts for a case. Those 
accounts were sometimes effective in challenging the police story and opened up new 
lines of investigation. The Law Officers’ response to such claims, namely the fact that 
they used to appear willing to take them into consideration and act upon them, 
strengthened even more the independent and the ‘ministry of justice’ status that the 
Law Officers were promoting.
Concluding remarks
The role that the Law Office plays in practice regarding investigations corresponds to 
the way Law Officers themselves approach their powers, but it is also responsive to 
the needs and actions of other actors in the system (as well as constrained by practical 
limitations). Therefore, the Law Officers: (a) order investigations where allegations of 
crimes are not properly investigated by the police; (b) provide extensive legal advice 
to the police during investigations, usually when the police sought such advice but 
sometimes because they judged that because of the sensitivity of the case they should 
intervene; and (c) order further inquiries and additional evidence after the case is 
forwarded to the Law Office, and ensure that defence information is taken into 
account.
The Law Office’s early involvement in a case, apart from providing a valuable 
assistance to police investigative actions, ensures a better understanding of the case43 
and provides an obstacle to the absolute control of the investigative stage by the 
police.
43 As Sanders (1988a:35) points out, ‘involvement in the early stages could assist... in understanding 
cases prior to their construction by the police as prosecutable edifices.’
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‘Much research evidence from England and Wales concludes that 
prosecutors cannot effectively monitor police investigations via police- 
constructed files. But this need not necessarily be the case in jurisdictions 
where there is a greater diversity of influences on the file; the difficult 
trick is to ensure that diversity.’ (Field 1994:126)
IV. SUMMARY
The Attorney General in Cyprus, in contrast to his common law background, is 
entrusted with an important role in investigations. This is in accordance with the wide 
powers that are delegated to him generally as far as prosecutions are concerned and 
which have rendered him so important in the Cyprus prosecution system.
Apart from some specific legislative provisions, the legal text that governs the Law 
Office’s general role in investigations is framed very broadly and does not make the 
Attorney General’s intervention in investigations obligatory. Nevertheless, it ensures 
that there is the theoretical potential and power of the Attorney General to act in such 
a way, if he wishes to do so. Once again, the extent and the way that this power is 
used are left open to the Attorney General to define. However, a gradual introduction 
of legislative provisions which confer on the Attorney General a direct investigative 
power or which make his intervention in investigations obligatory can be observed.
The Law Office for many years hardly developed any active, or at least publicly 
pronounced, policy on investigations in practice. Successive Attorney Generals 
preferred to deal with cases on an ad hoc basis instead of formulating a deliberate and 
comprehensive policy regarding all investigations. However, an examination of past 
circulars and letters in the Law Office revealed that the Attorney Generals used to 
exercise their power quite often and that the police had always regarded themselves as 
absolutely bound by an instruction from the Law Office, at least concerning serious or 
high profile cases.
Law Officers, generally, were very much in favour of their participation in the 
investigating phase and emphasised the advantages of their early involvement in a
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case. However, their limited resources made them reluctant to adopt a more proactive 
role in all investigations. They, therefore, appeared to consider investigations as 
predominantly a police job and their role usually as complementary, providing legal 
knowledge in the investigative process. They talked more about legal advice rather 
than supervision of investigations, apart from specific categories of case (‘sensitive 
cases’, cases involving public figures, allegations against police officers, etc) when 
they chose to use a more authoritative terminology. Furthermore, at the stage that a 
case was forwarded to the Law Office for a decision for a prosecution to be taken, it 
was then clearly considered as their duty to thoroughly examine the evidence and 
order further inquiries if this was required.
In practice, Law Officers:
a) would order investigations where allegations of crimes were not properly 
investigated by the police after the receipt of information that a certain incident 
had occurred or after media coverage of an event.
b) would provide extensive legal advice to the police during investigations. There 
was no formal or static structure to facilitate the Law Office’s involvement in 
police operations from the beginning. There was, however, a well-developed 
culture that encouraged the police officers to seek the Attorney General’s advice.
c) would quite regularly order further inquiries and additional evidence after a case 
was forwarded to the Law Office. It was true that, very often, this only concerned 
clarification of details and correction of internal inconsistencies, but sometimes 
Law Officers, especially when they were prompted -  usually by the defence 
attorneys -  ordered new lines of inquiry or challenged the police construction of a 
case. Moreover, their actions generally served to enhance confidence in the 
integrity of investigations.
‘While prosecutors may not play an investigative role in all or even most 
criminal cases, the majority of which are probably reactive as well as 
routine, the importance of the investigative role lies not in the number of 
cases it affects, but in the significance of the role in the matters where it 
arises.’ (Little 1999:728)
225
Chapter Seven: Prosecution Policies and Decision-making within the Attorney General’s Office
CHAPTER SEVEN
Prosecution Policies and Decision-making within the 
Attorney General’s Office
‘The highest authority within the prosecution service is the Attorney 
General. He alone prescribes prosecution policy and supervises its 
im plem entation...The Constitution expressly provides that the Attorney 
General exercises his powers ‘in the public interest’ and he h im self is the 
sole judge o f  that.’ (Malachtou 2004:486)
T he extent to which a prosecuting agency is regarded as responsible for the
investigatory stage is a matter of great variation across different prosecution systems. 
The special status of the Attorney General’s Office in Cyprus in that area has been 
discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter deals with what is regarded as the 
central function -  the sine qua non -  of every prosecuting authority: the power to 
decide whether a particular case should be forwarded to court or filtered out of the 
system, and inevitably the power to define the answer to a number of other issues that 
result from this initial decision (e.g. choice of charges, selection of the mode of trial, 
discontinuance of prosecution, acceptance of a plea).
In the first section of this chapter, the legal standpoint of the Cyprus prosecution 
system on the issue of prosecutorial discretion will be examined. The great latitude 
that is afforded to the Attorney General to formulate prosecution policies and exercise 
his prosecutorial discretion will be highlighted.
In the second section, an analysis of the way the Law Office has approached this 
broad discretion through time will be attempted. Based on the results of the
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examination of the Attorney Generals’ internal circulars, their press releases and the 
documents they authored, as well as the interviews I carried out with them, I will 
attempt to provide answers to a number of questions: Have the succeeding Attorney 
Generals developed any specific criteria/policies by which prosecution decisions 
should be made? Have they publicly announced these policies? Have these criteria 
been consistent over time and through the succession of different Attorney Generals?
In the third section, the approach of the Law Officers themselves towards 
prosecutorial discretion will be examined. An analysis will be attempted into the way 
Law Officers approach prosecution decisions and into the values and principles they 
aspire to promote with their decision-making. Furthermore, and more specifically, an 
examination of the factors that they consider to be important in their decision making 
will be performed.
Finally, in the fourth section, a more empirical approach into both the way 
prosecutorial decisions are taken within the Law Office and the factors that are 
considered will be provided. This section will mainly draw on the results of the 
examination of cases that was carried out in the Law Office, as well as on the 
conclusions extracted from the observation period that was spent there.
I. RHETORIC
As shown in Chapter Two, prosecution systems have traditionally been characterised 
as adhering to either the legality or the opportunity principle, depending on the extent 
of the discretion that prosecutors are allowed in the decision to prosecute, and the 
permission to take into account factors other than evidence in making this decision. 
Once it is admitted that a certain amount of discretion should be allowed to 
prosecuting agencies, a number of issues arise regarding the formulation of 
prosecutorial policies, which different jurisdictions have dealt with in different ways. 
In some countries, prosecutors are obliged to issue a code stating their policy and 
criteria by which prosecution decisions should be made. Other jurisdictions, however, 
have adopted a different approach, which allows a broader discretion, while at the 
same time significantly limiting the number of decision makers. Furthermore, the
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formulation of prosecutorial policies in some countries is the responsibility of the 
prosecution service itself, while in others it comes under the control of the Executive 
who also defines the Government’s criminal policy.
Legal theory in the Cyprus Prosecution System
The Cyprus prosecution system, given its common law origins, adheres to the 
opportunity principle. There has never been an unavoidable obligation placed by law 
on the prosecuting authorities to institute proceedings for all crimes that come to their 
notice.1 Therefore, it is accepted that the prosecuting authorities enjoy a certain 
amount of discretion in deciding whether or not to institute criminal proceedings and, 
thus, to develop their policies and/or criteria by which this discretion is exercised.
As shown in previous chapters, apart from the Attorney General’s Office, there are 
various other authorities empowered to institute prosecutions within the sphere of 
their activity, the most important being the police. Nevertheless, as it has also been 
established by now in this thesis, the system of prosecutions in Cyprus is based upon 
the primacy of the Attorney General who has a constitutional power to control all 
prosecutions in the jurisdiction.
There are, therefore, two issues that merit discussion regarding the formulation of the 
prosecution policy in Cyprus. The first issue concerns the extent of the discretion that 
is allowed to the Law Office to formulate a certain policy regarding prosecutions, and 
the second concerns the question whether the Law Office is empowered to define the 
prosecution policy of the rest of the prosecuting authorities (especially the police) and 
thus, the question of the role that the Law Office has to play in the formulation of the 
overall prosecution policy of the jurisdiction.2
The Constitution specifically declares that the Attorney General exercises his 
prosecutorial powers "at his discretion, in the public interest’ (Article 113.2) and, 
therefore, entrusts him with a broad discretion in the area without imposing any terms
1 See Loucaides (1974) and Tomaritis (1985).
2 The questions of whether there is such a policy, which is this, and how it is actualised, are issues that 
will be raised in later sections o f this chapter.
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or conditions for the execution of this power. Neither the Constitution nor statutory 
legislation oblige the Attorney General to declare publicly the principles upon which 
he acts in exercising his discretion in prosecuting;3 neither <lo they oblige him to give 
reasons for his decisions in particular instances. On the contrary, both judicially4 and 
extra-judicially, it has been recognised that because the powers of the Law Office are 
constitutionally upheld, they are absolute and cannot be compromised by common 
legislation: ‘A law, either pre-existing the Constitution or enacted thereafter, cannot 
validly alter or abridge the powers of the Attorney General conferred on him by the 
Constitution’ (Artemis 1989:4033).
Furthermore, as was stated in Chapter Four, the Constitution grants to the Office of 
the Attorney General an independent rather than a political status. The Attorney 
General is appointed, serves and can only be removed under the same conditions as 
the Judges of the Supreme Court, and his Office is not subject to any Ministry. 
Moreover, unlike the other independent office-holders (e.g. the Auditor General of the 
Republic and the Governor of the Central Bank), the Attorney General is not even 
obliged to submit an annual report to the President on the activities of his Office. 
Therefore, at least theoretically, he can formulate his prosecution policy totally 
independently of the Executive:
‘(The Attorney General) alone prescribes prosecution policy and supervises its 
implementation. It is important to appreciate that the executive has no authority 
in the matter. If, for exam ple, the Ministry o f  Justice would wish to promote a 
policy decision for first-time drug users not to be prosecuted, the m ost the 
Minister can do is to make a suggestion to this effect to the Attorney General. 
However, it is for the Attorney General to make the decision.’ (Malachtou 
2004:486)
Additionally, the courts have on many occasions been at pains to stress that the 
Attorney General’s discretion is absolute and not reviewable. It has been repeatedly
3 As, for example, it is the case in England and Wales where the CPS is obligated by statutory 
legislation to publish a code with the criteria by which they exercise their prosecutorial discretion.
4 E.g. Police v. Athienitis (1983) 2 C.L.R. 223.
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stated5 that ‘it is the exclusive right of the Attorney General to represent the public 
interest’ (Police v. Athienitis 1983 2 C.L.R. 223) and that ‘the Attorney General in 
exercising his discretionary power is not to be subject to the direction or control of 
any other person or authority’.6
Regarding the first issue of this section, what is concluded from the above is that the 
formulation of the prosecution policy is considered as falling within the absolute 
jurisdiction of the Attorney General without any limitations posed by statutory 
legislation and without sharing power with any other governmental department such 
as the Ministry of Justice.
Turning now to the second issue, namely the question of whether the Law Office is 
empowered to define or influence the prosecution policy of the rest of the prosecuting 
authorities: It was extensively discussed in Chapter Five that the Attorney General’s 
relationship with the police (as well as with other prosecuting authorities) is not only 
limited to his constitutional obligations and powers to oversee and control all 
prosecutions. The Police Law7 clearly acknowledges that the police discharge their 
functions regarding prosecutions under the superintendence of the Attorney General 
and, based on that, it is accepted that the Attorney General could, if he wishes, define 
police prosecution policies.8
Consequently, the Attorney General’s Office might not be obliged (or appear ready) 
to take the decision for prosecution in each and every case; nevertheless, it seems to 
be the institution responsible (or the institution that possesses the power) for the 
formulation of the overall prosecutorial policy in the system.
5 Xenophontos v. The Republic 3 SCCC 89, In re Ttooulias (1984) 1 C.L.R. 885, Attorney General v. 
Ioannidi (1993) 2 C.L.R. 377, Attorney General v. Andrianou (1995) 1 C.L.R. 486.
6 This was also particularly stressed by all the Attorney Generals; for instance: ‘When exercising this 
power (the power to carry out prosecutions or entering a nolle prosequi), the Attorney General is 
enjoying an absolute discretion and he is not subject to the directions o f any authority; however, he is 
acting always in the public interest’ (Tomaritis 1974:18).
7 And similar provisions in Laws that give to other Government Departments the right to prosecute. 
For example, Law 82/67 s. 176(1) ‘Prosecutions against this Law...are referred to as custom 
prosecutions and are made subject to any direction o f the Attorney General o f  the Republic.’
8 See Chapter Five for further reflection on this matter.
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II. THE ATTORNEY GENERALS’ POLICIES
In this section, an analysis of the way the Law Office have approached the broad 
discretion they enjoy in the formulation of their prosecutorial policy through time will 
be attempted. Have they developed any specific criteria by which decisions to 
prosecute should be made? Have they publicly announced them? Have these 
criteria/policies been consistent through the succession of different Attorney 
Generals? These are some of the issues that will be raised here in an effort to examine 
how the great latitude afforded to the Attorney General has materialised.
Policies and approach to discretion
The examination of relevant circulars in the Law Office and some limited press 
releases, and the interviews with the serving and the former Attorney Generals 
revealed that the Law Office for many years have not developed a comprehensive and 
publicly announced policy which defines a priori how their prosecutorial discretion 
has been exercised. There has never been a code for prosecutors in Cyprus or any kind 
of public document which would explain the Attorney Generals’ policy or state in a 
detailed way the criteria which should be applied in prosecutorial decisions. However, 
in the past, there have been some releases to the press explaining some prosecution 
practices or particular decisions and some statements by some of the Attorney 
Generals stating their broad philosophy regarding prosecutions.
The official rhetoric used by all the Attorney Generals to articulate their prosecutorial 
discretion has placed emphasis on the quasi-judicial nature of their power and their 
independent status. In this way, they have implied that a detailed specification of the 
criteria by which they exercise their discretion is not well suited to the judicial nature 
of their duties, nor is it essential, given their independent status:
The Attorney General executes his prosecutorial discretion according to the 
public interest...In doing so, he acts in a quasi-judicial way... Like judges, he 
cannot publicly declare a priori his policies in detail...The only criterion should 
be that his decisions should do justice.’ (Interview with Mr TriantafyHides) 
(emphasis added)
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‘The Attorney General in Cyprus may not be a member of the Court as 
prosecutors are in most continental jurisdictions. However, his prosecutorial 
decisions are of a quasi-judicial nature.’ (Tomaritis 1974:18)
There has also been an emphasis on the virtues of individualised justice and the 
incapability to predefine very specific policies:
‘Every case is unique. The danger in the publication of guidelines is that they 
can never include every eventuality. And the inescapable result would be that 
cases would arise which appear to come under a certain guideline, but this 
guideline will not be followed because of their specific circumstances ... and 
then everyone would protest and criticise us...’ (Interview with Mr 
Triantafyllides)
The impression that is also given by the views of some of the Attorney Generals is 
that this ‘mystery’ that surrounds the Law Office and the broad nature that 
characterises their powers are regarded as essential in order to retain respect and the 
symbolic role that they play in the prosecution process:
The Attorney General enjoys enormous discretion and he should promote this 
picture so that everyone realises his powers and his role in the system. You 
cannot be on TV all the time explaining your policies and apologising for them.
In the end you will lose respect...’ (Interview with Mr Triantafyllides)
The Attorney General must engender by his attitude wonder, authority, and 
awe in order to be respected ...’ (Interview with Mr Nikitas)9
The above comments are also directly related to the approach of each Attorney 
General to openness and accountability. Although none of the Attorney Generals has 
ever advocated a detailed a priori publication of their policies, not all of them have 
approached openness and the ‘public relations’ game with the same attitude. Mr 
Triantafyllides and Mr Nikitas apparently took the view that political and procedural 
independence were best safeguarded by maintaining a low profile, whereas during Mr
9 Mr Nikitas published a couple o f circulars, as will be shown later. However, this was only to state that 
there was no need for the specification o f certain criteria by which discretion to refrain from 
prosecution should be exercised, because he would only do so in very exceptional cases.
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Markidis’ tenure of the office, a more open approach, as far as the work of the Law 
Office was concerned, was adopted. He used to appear regularly in Parliament giving 
some explanation about the Office’s policies and performance and he was more open 
to the press and publicity in an effort to explain the functions of his Office and the 
way some decisions were made.10
So far in this section, the approach of successive Attorney Generals towards mainly 
the publication of any detailed policy has been discussed. However, were there any 
indications of a certain policy inside the Law Office, even if this had not been 
published or pronounced publicly? What were the trends that each Attorney General 
appeared to follow regarding (even broad) criteria for prosecutions?
All Attorney Generals argued directly or indirectly that although they used to promote 
individualised justice, they adopted a certain broad approach to prosecutions which 
was known to all Law Officers. Even if that was not explicitly expressed or stated in a 
written form, the small size of the Law Office was regarded as a guarantee of ‘shared 
knowledge’:
The Office was small. There was everyday contact with the Law Officers and 
therefore, my approach was well known.’ (Interview with Mr Triantafyllides)
‘We have policies and criteria on various issues (as far as prosecutions are 
concerned). They may not be publicised but Law Officers are aware of these 
policies and they do apply them...In the past, I have also issued internal 
circulars...they are just not codified.’ (Interview with Mr Markidis)
‘Internal circulars are useful...However, the Law Office is a small place and no 
one could convincingly argue that he does not know my policies and my views.’ 
(Interview with Mr Nikitas)
10 All the Attorney Generals appeared in Parliament from time to time but not equally as frequently or 
with the same attitude. For example, Mr Tomaritis (see Tomaritis 1975, Tomaritis 1983c, and 
Memorandum G.E. 7/1969, dated 20/04/1975) furiously denied that he was obliged to explain to the 
Parliament the use o f nolle prosequi in certain cases (indeed, theoretically, the Attorney General is not 
obliged to do so), whereas Mr Markidis used to present to the Parliament at the end o f the year a 
catalogue detailing the numbers o f nolle prosequis he entered. See the concluding chapter for a brief 
discussion on the issues of public accountability and openness.
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During Mr Tomaritis* tenure, the approach adopted towards the criteria by which 
prosecution decisions should be made evoked the corresponding approach adopted in 
Britain by Attorney Generals in the 1950s. Mr Tomaritis, in various talks, internal 
circulars11 or articles,12 repeatedly referred to Sir Hartley Shawcross’stalk of 1951:13
‘In deciding whether or not to prosecute in a particular case, a consideration of 
the repercussion on his personal political fortunes...was altogether excluded.
Apart from that, the Attorney General may have regard to a variety of 
considerations, all of whom leading to the final question whether a prosecution 
would be in the public interest.' (emphasis added)
The public interest appeared to be the dominant consideration; and the Attorney 
General as the ‘repository of public conscience’ (Tomaritis 1974:18) and the ‘arbiter 
of the public interest’ (Tomaritis 1975:4) was entrusted with the duty to take into 
account a variety of factors.14 Mr Tomaritis, partly citing Sir Hartley Shawcross,15 Sir 
John Simon16 and Sir Theobald Mathew,17 was referring to the effect that a 
prosecution, successful or not, would have upon public morale or order, issues of 
public policy, issues of national or international concern, the effect of the prosecution 
on the administration of law, the penalty that was likely to be imposed (if it was only 
a nominal penalty, a prosecution may be better avoided), the reaction of public 
opinion, humanitarian considerations, etc.
Studying the first documents written by Mr Tomaritis it appeared that (following the 
tradition of that period in Britain18) evidential considerations were regarded as one of
11 Circular G.E. 7/1969, dated 22/01/1969.
12 Tomaritis (1975), (1983a), (1983c) and (1985).
13 H.C. Debates, Vol. 483, cols. 679-90, January 1951.
14 ‘It is the Attorney General, applying his judicial mind, who has to be the sole judge o f those (public 
interest) considerations’ (Tomaritis 1985:1745, partly citing Edwards 1964).
15 H.C. Debates, Vol. 483, cols. 679-690, January 1951.
16 H.C. Debates Vol. 2105-6, December 1925.
17 Sir Theobald Mathew was the Director o f Public Prosecutions in England and Wales from 1944 to 
1964.
18 As Mansfield and Peay (1987:30-31) report, referring to the parliamentary speech o f Lord Shawcross 
in 1951, the common law tradition historically did not separate the evidential assessment o f a case from
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many considerations that ought to be taken into account and were not clearly 
separated from the rest:
‘The Attorney General may have regard to a variety of considerations...Usually 
it is merely a question of evidence; in other cases, wider considerations than that 
are involved.’ (Tomaritis’ Circular 22/01/1969, p.2)'9 (emphasis added)
Later,20 frequent reference was also made to the criteria for prosecutions that Glanville 
Williams advocated in his writings.21 Although sufficiency of evidence was stated as 
the first question to be decided, a rather flexible approach to this issue was adopted 
which afforded again the latitude to take into account other considerations when 
deciding to prosecute an apparently ‘weak case’:
‘Since the enforcement authorities do not prosecute in the case of every crime 
which comes to their notice but they exercise discretion, the first question to be 
decided is whether there is sufficient evidence to warrant a prosecution. But it is 
also important to consider whether the prosecution is likely to succeed. It would 
not be a good thing for the administration of justice if prosecutions were 
undertaken without any possibility of success. Though there may be special 
reasons for launching a prosecution in what appears to be a weak case when the 
accused is definitely morally blameable and there is a serious legal point to be 
argued...’ (Tomaritis 1985:1745)
the public interest one as neatly as is the case currently. Instead, public interest was regarded as the 
dominant consideration, while evidential sufficiency was considered as one aspect o f the public interest 
assessment. Of course, as Lord Shawcross stated, the public interest would never demand ‘to put a man 
on trial ...when the evidence is insufficient to justify his conviction, or even to call upon him for an 
explanation.’ Nevertheless, these days, common law systems tend to separate in theory evidential 
considerations from ‘public interest’ considerations but most o f the time they embody in what they call 
the evidential assessment o f a case, additional considerations which might be better included in the 
public interest limb o f their evaluation.
19 Again citing Sir Shawcross’s talk.
20 Tomaritis (1984) and Tomaritis (1985).
21 Especially in his article ‘Discretion in Prosecuting’ (Williams 1956).
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The same spirit and approach towards prosecution decisions was sustained during Mr 
Triantafyllides’ tenure. His philosophy and arguments regarding prosecutions run 
along the same broad lines:
The Attorney General should be guided by the public interest when deciding 
whether to prosecute. He has the final word...he should balance the various 
considerations...’ (Interview with Mr Triantafyllides)
During his tenure, there was strong criticism, especially from parts of the press, that 
he was making very frequent use of his prerogative to enter a nolle prosequi, as well 
as his power to refrain from prosecutions. As a result, he was forced to release a series 
of statements22 to the press explaining the reasons why he refrained from prosecutions 
especially in some widely publicised and relatively serious cases. In those statements, 
some of the factors that Mr Triantafyllides took into account when deciding whether 
to prosecute can be identified: the seriousness of the offence, the fact that the 
defendant has put right the loss or harm caused, the victim’s wishes, the defendant’s 
remorse, etc. It is remarkable that again evidential sufficiency or the likelihood of 
conviction was referred to as one in a series of many factors that were considered.
Apart from the above releases, which were merely issued in order to explain specific 
decisions, Mr Triantafyllides issued another more general statement23 explaining his 
approach to prosecutions. There are a number of interesting conclusions that can be 
drawn from this statement that illuminate Mr Triantafyllides’ policies:
a) He considered the power to discontinue or refrain from prosecutions to be a 
power that can be used regularly and not only on very rare occasions.24 
However, he stressed that this was a power exclusively exercised by the 
Attorney General himself:
22 Press releases K.E. 61/85/IV, dated 05/10/1993, K.E. 61/85/V, dated 18/11/1993, K.E. 61/85/VI, 
dated 23/11/1993 and K.E. 61/85/VII, dated 15/12/1993.
23 Mr Triantafyllides’ Statement A.N. 61/85, dated 02/12/1993.
24 See below the exactly opposite approach adopted by Mr Nikitas in his circular.
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‘The power to discontinue prosecutions is regularly and not rarely exercised 
whenever this is necessary, and it is an essential supplement to the power to 
institute prosecutions.’ (Statement A.N. 61/85, dated 02/12/1993, p.l) .
b) He stressed once again that the criterion on which the decision to prosecute 
must be taken is the public interest. He specified that public interest reasons 
for not prosecuting could be factors related to the national interest or the 
interests o f the society, to the special circumstances o f the defendant or the 
victim, as well as factors which concern the progress o f  specific criminal 
proceedings. He particularly stressed the consideration of humanitarian 
reasons associated with the defendant and the exclusion of any political or 
discriminatory influences.
c) He made clear that the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General, as 
well as the policies he followed, were not subject to the control of any 
authority and, therefore, he was not obliged to explain publicly his decisions in 
every case. However, he declared that whenever it was judged wise, he would 
publicise the reasons for a specific decision so that the public received 
information about cases that might create doubts.
Although M r Markidis argued in favour of individualised justice as his predecessors 
did, he also stressed the importance of the principle of equal treatment.25 That is why 
he considered it necessary to issue certain internal circulars regarding some categories 
of cases. These concerned mainly either cases for which a great number of requests 
for the discontinuance of prosecutions were received (and thus, it was felt that certain 
criteria must be established so that a common approach was ensured), or cases for 
which there was a particular sensitivity and the Attorney General wished to promote a 
very specific policy. More specifically, circulars were issued for:
a) Traffic offences by juveniles
There is a relatively high rate of these offences (especially the offence of driving a
motorcycle without licence) committed by juveniles in Cyprus. The Attorney
General, after a meeting at the Law Office with the Assistant Chief of the Police, a
25 Interview with Mr Markidis on 15/05/2002.
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representative of the Traffic Department of the Police, and a Social Services 
representative, issued a circular26 stating that: ‘The first time that a juvenile 
committed such an offence, he would not be prosecuted. Instead, he would be 
cautioned in the presence of his parents and he would be warned that if the same 
offence was committed again, he would be prosecuted for both offences.’ 
Furthermore, the circular stated that requests from the defendants for the 
discontinuance of such criminal proceedings would be regularly denied unless 
extremely special circumstances argued to the contrary.
b) Traffic accidents which cause damages and/or minor injuries
There was a circular27 stating that prosecutions would not be instituted (or they 
would be discontinued if instituted) for such traffic offences provided that (i) there 
was a statement by the victim declaring that he did not want to proceed, (ii) there 
was evidence that the damages had been restored and the victim had been 
compensated and (iii) there were no previous convictions against the defendant for 
similar offences.
c) Domestic Violence offences
There was a particular sensitivity for these cases at the Law Office28 during Mr 
Markidis’ tenure. Meetings were arranged between the police, Law Officers and 
Social Services at the Law Office dealing with serious cases of domestic violence. 
Since 1998, according to a circular from the Attorney General, the general policy 
was to prosecute such cases even if the victim did not wish to do so.
Furthermore, even if there were not written circulars regarding these issues, Mr 
Markidis argued that he had a specific policy for some other types of offences as well:
26 Circular G.E. 124/73/2B, dated 26/06/1997. This was issued to replace o f a previous Circular G.E. 
124/73/2A dated 03/05/1996.
27 Circular G.E. 50(B)/87/N.35/3, dated 23/12/1996.
28 As was shown in Chapter Five, these cases are necessarily sent to the Law Office as a result o f  
specific directions by the Attorney General. There is a team o f Law Officers assigned with the duty to 
examine such cases. Furthermore, all officers o f  the Government Departments (police officers, social 
workers, doctors, etc) to whose attention comes a case o f  domestic violence have an obligation to 
submit a report within seven days to the Attorney General.
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d) Abortion
The Attorney General argued that they had never instituted proceedings for 
abortion and they were not planning to do so in the future.29 He confirmed that 
the reason that that offence had not yet been decriminalised was mainly the 
strong negative reaction of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus.
e) Libel/slander
Mr Markidis also stated that prosecutions for libel were not instituted either:30
'I believe that the specific legal provision is not suited to the current 
circumstances and the principles of freedom of expression.31 We never 
prosecute journalists because they express their opinions, even if they do so 
in a strong way. Anyway, we believe that enough protection against this 
offence is provided by civil law.’ (Interview with Mr Markidis)
f) Contrary to the last two categories, there were some offences for which the 
Attorney General categorically argued that they were always prosecuted once 
there was sufficient evidence. These were: offences concerning the use of 
violence by the police against suspects, the employment of illegal immigrants, 
illegal hunting, and violence against animals.
All of the above concerned specific policies that Mr Markidis adopted towards certain 
categories of offences. However, which were the criteria that he argued he applied 
more generally? Mr Markidis was the first Attorney General to make a clearer 
separate reference to the evidential sufficiency criterion:
The rule is that there is sufficient evidence for a case to be sent to court when 
there is a prima facie case...when a court will be justified in finding a case to 
answer.’ (Ibid)
29 Interview with Mr Markidis (15/05/2002). See also Discussions in Parliament on 25/09/2001, 
reported in the newspaper ‘Phileleftheros’ on 26/09/2001.
30 Contrary to this approach, Mr Triantafyllides, during his tenure, instituted prosecutions against 
journalists on a couple o f occasions for which he was heavily criticised (see, for instance, articles in 
the newspaper ‘Alithia’ on 29/04/94 and 10/07/94)
31 There are numerous unworkable and antiquated provisions still exist in the Cyprus criminal code. 
Both the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General stated in their interviews that they 
refrained from carrying out prosecutions based on them.
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Although it appeared that he adopted a very strict evidential criterion, later in his 
reflection of public interest reasons that might argue against prosecutions, there were 
also considerations regarding the reliability or the availability of evidence. 
Consequently, he appeared to take the view that although, as a rule, when there was a 
prima facie case, prosecution ought to be instituted, he accepted that other 
considerations -  including the credibility, reliability or availability of evidence -  
might justify a non-prosecution decision or a decision to discontinue a prosecution:32
The public interest requires, as a rule, that when there is sufficient evidence 
(prima facie case), a case must be prosecuted... (For the opposite to occur) 
there must be some special reasons which argue for non-prosecution or 
discontinuance of prosecution. These reasons could be related to the security of 
the state; they could be related to the evidence available...sometimes you can 
see that it is definite that the defendant will be acquitted either because the 
quality of the evidence is not good enough, or because witnesses may become 
unavailable...in that case, the public interest says that a person should not be 
dragged through the courts; another reason could be the unnecessary harm 
that would be caused by a prosecution; for example, in the case of a drug user 
who, by the time of the trial, had managed 'to stay clean’; also, when the 
defendant has already been punished enough for his offence.’ 33 (Ibid)
More generally, during Mr Markidis’ tenure, there were the first indications that more 
complete documents setting out prosecution criteria and policies might not be 
regarded as totally undesirable or inconsistent with the broad discretion that the Law 
Office enjoyed. For example, the Deputy Attorney General34 issued a circular35 to all 
prosecutors in which he declared that the Rules formulated by the International 
Association of Prosecutors, as well as the Recommendation of the Council Of Europe 
(2000) 19 regarding principles for prosecutors, should be adopted and followed. 
Furthermore, he indicated his interest in the formulation of a code stating the 
principles on which a prosecution should be carried out or discontinued. He issued a
32 Note the similarity with the approach advocated by Mansfield and Peay (1987).
33 He specifically referred to tax offences.
34 The Deputy Attorney General was the immediate supervisor o f all Law Officers regarding 
prosecutions.
35 Circular G.E. 65/1993/3, dated 12/07/2002.
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circular36 to all Law Officers asking for proposals and suggestions and attached to it 
samples of similar codes adopted in other countries.37
When M r Nikitas was appointed to the office, he adopted a very different philosophy 
from his predecessors regarding his prosecutorial policy. Contrary to the emphasis 
that all the former Attorney Generals had placed on their very broad discretion 
regarding the decision to prosecute or not, Mr Nikitas, right from the beginning, 
underlined that:
‘...the Attorney General cannot replace the courts in a case...The judges of a 
case are, and will always be, the courts and the members of the courts...’38
His approach was characterised by a great respect for the judicial power (which could 
be partly explained by the fact that before his appointment, he was a Supreme Court 
Judge) and the values associated with a public trial. He strongly believed that the 
public interest was served by sending cases to courts and that the Attorney General 
should not try to usurp courts’ powers by diverting cases on a regular basis:
The public interest requires that all cases where there is enough evidence 
should be sent to the court. A public trial guarantees the rights of the 
defendants, and the court is the only judge of a crime. Here (at the Law Office), 
decisions are inevitably taken behind closed doors.’ (Interview with Mr Nikitas)
Mr Nikitas strongly believed that neither the Attorney General nor the police had the 
right to filter cases out of the system due to mitigating factors concerning the 
defendant, apart from very extreme occasions. He argued that all the relevant factors 
could be taken into consideration by the judge and any mitigating factors could be 
reflected in the verdict or the penalty:
36 Circular G.E. 41(K)/1947, dated 23/01/2003.
37 This effort did not produce any results as, a few months after this circular, a new Attorney General 
(Mr Nikitas) was appointed, following the resignation o f Mr Markidis, with a totally different 
philosophy on prosecutions.
38 Circular G.E. 41(K)/1947, dated 10/06/2003, p. 2.
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‘Even for minor cases you cannot argue that because they are minor, they 
should not be sent to court. If the law provides for a minor offence, it means that 
there is a distraction of the public order... Maybe it should be decriminalised... In 
addition, if there are mitigating factors, these can be taken into account in court 
...Of course, if there is a terminal illness, for example, I will not prosecute ...but 
this is an exception. You cannot refrain from prosecutions on a regular basis.
This is important for deterrence, as well as for retaining the trust of the public in 
justice.’ (Ibid)
It is striking that his approach and the justification he offered for it were identical to 
the legality systems’ philosophy.39
Furthermore, Mr Nikitas strongly criticised his predecessors for the frequent use they 
made of their power to enter nolle prosequis or discontinue criminal cases. In a 
circular40 he issued soon after he was appointed,41 he clarified that this specific 
prerogative would be used rarely and exceptionally.42 Although acknowledging that 
the Constitution entrusted the Attorney General with the power to discontinue cases or 
refrain from prosecutions whenever he judges that the public interest so requires, he 
argued that ‘the public interest requires the prosecution and the punishment of every 
criminal’. Therefore, he continued, ‘the entering of a nolle prosequi will be used in 
exceptional cases and the reasons for doing so would be explained in court so that it 
can be demonstrated that the public interest so required in those specific cases.’43 In 
general, Mr Nikitas appeared to introduce an approach which advocated the restriction 
of the Attorney General’s discretion.44
39 See Chapter Two.
40 Circular G.E. 41(K)/1947, dated 10/06/2003.
41 This circular was also publicly announced.
42 During the first months o f his tenure, every request by defendants asking him either to enter a nolle 
prosequi or review a police decision for prosecution was either refused or returned unanswered. 
Inevitably, these requests dramatically reduced (see Chapter Five).
43 Circular G.E. 41(K)/1947, dated 10/06/2003, p. 2.
44 However, it seems that nowadays the previous philosophy regarding prosecutions is once again 
applied since, following the recent resignation o f Mr Nikitas, Mr Klerides, the Deputy Attorney 
General responsible for prosecutions under Mr Markidis’ tenure, was appointed to the office. See also 
footnote 70 in Chapter Five.
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Police prosecutorial discretion
‘Since diversion is a dispositive function, it is appropriate that it be 
fulfilled by a quasi-judicial official such as the crown prosecutor and not 
by someone whose principal task is the investigation and prevention of 
crime.’ (Ashworth and Redmayne 2005:206)
As shown earlier, theoretically the Attorney General is empowered to define the 
prosecution policy of the rest of the prosecuting authorities, especially the police, who 
according to the Police Law, discharge their functions regarding prosecutions under 
his superintendence. The question is whether and how successive Attorney Generals 
have realised this theoretical potential.
Since there was not a detailed and comprehensive policy providing even for their own 
prosecutorial decisions, it could not be expected that such a policy would have been 
issued for the police. However, all the Attorney Generals agreed that the 
harmonisation of police policies with the approach adopted by each Attorney General 
was achieved by:
a) The close contact they had on an everyday basis with police prosecution 
authorities,
b) The notification of any internal circulars issued in the Law Office to the police 
as well,
c) The specification of certain categories of cases that should be forwarded to the 
Law Office so that the Law Office exclusively take prosecutorial decisions 
regarding them,45
d) The ex posterior review and overruling of police decisions especially after 
requests by the defendants or the victims.46
45 See Chapter Five.
46 See Chapter Five. Prosecutors serving in the Police Prosecution Departments stated: ‘a specific 
decision by the Attorney General to overrule a police decision serves as a guidance for future similar 
cases’ (Interview with the head o f  the Central PPD). Similar statements were made by the heads o f the 
PPD in Limassol and Nicosia.
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Nevertheless, the most important means by which police prosecutorial policy was 
controlled had been the direction of all the Attorney Generals -  which was, however, 
more forcefully applied by Mr Markidis -  according to which all cases that the police 
wished to filter out of the system ought to be forwarded to the Law Office. In Cyprus, 
most debates have always been centred on the frequency with which cases are filtered 
out of the system rather than on the possibility that weak or divertable cases are 
forwarded to the courts.
All Attorney Generals regarded diversionary decisions as their responsibility. 
Regardless of the approach that each one adopted to the frequency that cases could be 
diverted from courts, all appeared to agree that these decisions were the exclusive 
responsibility of the Law Office:
The rule that the police should apply is to prosecute unless the Attorney 
General directs otherwise.’ (Interview with Mr Triantafyllides)
The power to refrain from prosecutions belongs to the Attorney General. The 
police must forward to the Law Office all cases for which there is a suggestion 
not to prosecute.’ (Interview with Mr Markidis)
‘Only the Attorney General should decide that a case should not go to 
court...and this ought to occur very rarely.’ (Interview with Mr Nikitas)
The Attorney Generals accepted that the Law Office was not able to take every 
prosecution decision. However, by adopting the approach that the police were obliged 
to prosecute as a rule and forward to the Law Office all cases that they wished to filter 
out of the system, they demanded that any diversionary action should be carried out 
by the Attorney General. This contributed to the central control of any depositary 
actions (which admittedly are the most important prosecutorial decisions47) by a 
limited number of officials, a philosophy advocated by a legality system approach.48
47 See Ashworth and Redmayne (2005, Chapters 1.2, 6 and 7) and Sanders and Young (1994, Chapter
6).
48 See Chapter Two.
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Concluding remarks
Closing this section on the prosecutorial policies and approach to discretion that 
successive Attorney Generals in Cyprus have adopted, some general conclusions can 
be drawn:
Firstly, all the Attorney Generals, with the exception of Mr Nikitas, were comfortable 
with the idea of their broad discretion in formulating prosecution policies. They 
emphasised the need for flexible and responsible decision-making by an independent 
official with a quasi-judicial status, entrusted with the duty to take into account 
various considerations, all of which made up the general public interest.
Secondly, they largely refrained from spelling out detailed criteria for their decision­
making, although their general approach and specific policies for certain categories of 
cases were publicly announced. However, as time passed, especially during Mr 
Markidis’ tenure, a more positive approach to the formulation of more specific 
policies had been adopted without, however, extending to the level of formulating a 
comprehensive and detailed policy for all prosecutions.
Thirdly, all the Attorney Generals argued that even if it was not always published, a 
certain approach to prosecutions always existed and its consistent application in the 
Law Office was guaranteed by the small size of the service.
Finally, the theory had always been that prosecution was the rule and diversion from 
prosecution was an exception (regardless of how extensive or limited the use of this 
exception was, according to each Attorney General’s philosophy) and, furthermore, 
that diversionary decisions were the exclusive responsibility of the Law Office. As a 
result, the central control of the prosecutorial policy regarding all prosecutions was (at 
least theoretically) achieved.
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III. IDEOLOGY
‘When there is widespread agreement among decision-makers, and when 
decision-makers have the same values and the same background and the 
same skills, discretion is likely to seem most desirable.’ (Schauer 2005:9)
In this section, the approach of the Law Officers themselves towards their 
prosecutorial discretion will be examined. An analysis will be attempted of the way 
Law Officers understand and materialise the broad discretion afforded to the Law 
Office to formulate criteria and practices for prosecution decisions. How do they 
approach prosecution decisions? What do they aspire to promote? Which are the 
values and principles that they consider to be guarantees for the wise use of their 
discretion (section A)? And, more specifically, what do they consider important in 
their decision-making (section B)?
A. General approach to discretion/decision-making -  Values that Law Officers 
aspire to
Flexible decision-making -  No strict guidelines
Through discussions and interviews with the Law Officers, I realised that the absence 
of any declared policy or criteria on which their prosecutorial discretion was exercised 
was not regarded as a drawback. Law Officers, in their great majority, emphasised the 
need for flexible and responsible decision making in the pursuit of their various 
purposes and responsibilities regarding prosecutions. This approach reflected a certain 
way of thinking which was cultivated over the years in the Law Office, as shown in 
the previous section.
‘You have to be flexible when you are dealing with real-life cases...Your 
judgment should be guided by the law, but very often the solution to a problem 
cannot be found within the law...Therefore, you are obliged to reach outside the 
letter of the law and take into account a variety of considerations.’ (Law Officer 
09)
This philosophy also explained their reserved approach towards strict guidelines that 
would provide for the way they should exercise their prosecutorial discretion. There
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was a fear that rigid rules would hamper their ability to be flexible, and also 
scepticism that guidelines could ever be useful in practice:
‘Written guidelines would be inflexible. This has always been the philosophy of 
common law. That’s why, for so many years, there were no written laws.’ (Law 
Officer 05)
There is no recipe ...I don’t think that we should have guidelines...Every case 
is unique; it has its own peculiarities; there are no formulae in criminal 
cases...This does not mean that you can say x today and y tomorrow on the 
same issue... We never do this...’ (Law Officer 07)
'Guidelines would not be useful...Each case is different...Guidelines could not 
include every singularity of each case and therefore, eventually, they would not 
be just or useful...’ (Law Officer 18)
’You cannot set rules and guidelines...Can you say, for example, that age is a 
factor which advocates against prosecutions? But what will happen in the case 
of a rape? Guidelines cannot provide for everything and thus, are not useful.
This is mere philology...’ (Law Officer 09)
Some Law Officers were less absolute in their responses and specified some 
occasions and circumstances under which guidelines could be useful:
'It depends on how guidelines are defined...They can be useless if they are 
very broad or if they don’t take into consideration the complexity of real-life 
cases. They can be helpful only if they are carefully defined, explicit and provide 
for specific cases...’ (Law Officer 04)
‘Specific criteria would be useful for minor cases for which, every day, we 
receive numerous requests for discontinuance (and entering of nolle prosequis).
If there were specific criteria for those cases, we would save a lot of time; and 
defendants would probably not send so many requests, if they knew a priori that 
their cases were not included in those criteria.’ (Law Officer 12)
‘Guidelines could help to a limited extent...Things are not black or white...There 
are some clear cases, but there are other cases with complicated 
circumstances...which cannot be predicted a priori and included in the 
guidelines...’ (Law Officer 15)
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Individualised decision-making
Directly connected to their ideas on flexibility in decision-making was the fact that 
individualised justice was regarded by all Law Officers as the ideal that ought to be 
respected and aspired to, and guide their prosecutorial decisions:
‘We should be sensitive to the singularities of each particular case... We ought 
to take into account the facts and circumstances of each individual case before 
deciding whether or not to initiate a prosecution, and if we do, what charges and 
mode of trial should be chosen... ’ (Law Officer 02)
‘We should be guided by the public interest when deciding whether to prosecute 
in each case. What do we mean by public interest? You cannot make an 
exhaustive list; not even an indicative one. There are so many considerations 
that you have to take into account ...You can define public interest in each case 
depending on the specific circumstances. You can say this is what the public 
interest demands in this particular case...’ (Law Officer 05)
‘Each case should be dealt with on its own merit. A strict formula could never be 
sufficient as a guide to good prosecuting. The ideal is to always have the time to 
look deeper into the particular circumstances of a case and reach the best 
solution.’ (Law Officer 09)
Some of the Law Officers readily admitted that such an approach to decision-making 
could not be possible in all categories of cases.49 What was still important, though, 
was the fact that the values of individualised justice constituted what they regarded as 
the measure of their success. Failure to measure up to these ideals was considered by 
most of the Law Officers as a compromise to what was regarded as good prosecuting.
The Law Officers’ status as guarantee for consistent and fair decisions
Although Law Officers emphasised the need for flexible and adaptable decision­
making, they themselves acknowledged the dangers that a very broad discretion could 
entail. Therefore, the emphasis on individualised justice did not ignore the ideal of 
consistency, but rather assumed that it would be maintained mainly through the 
personal competence and professional standards of the Attorney General and his staff 
attorneys:
49 See section IV o f this chapter.
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‘A person of the highest ethical and legal status is appointed to the office of the 
Attorney General...Based on that, it is considered that he can interpret the 
public interest rationally.’ (Law Officer 06)
The Attorney General represents and interprets the public interest according to 
our Constitution. The guarantee for the right and just interpretation of the public 
interest is the independence, integrity, high esteem and reputation of the 
Attorney General himself.’ (Law Officer 05)
‘Control of our decisions is exercised by the courts, which judge the cases we 
send to them...Security is also, and most importantly, provided by the ethos and 
the qualifications that a person should have in order to be appointed to the 
office.’ (Law Officer 09)50
The Attorney General as an independent official with a high status and guarantees of 
neutrality, entrusted by the Constitution to act in the public interest, was a powerful 
image in Law Officers’ ideology and was reflected in the views of their status as well. 
Therefore, Law Officers believed that by virtue of their independence and their 
qualifications, they could be trusted to perceive the best solution to each prosecutorial 
dilemma, even when they were not constrained by rigid written rules. The 
representation of public interest and the ‘ministry of justice approach’ to prosecutions 
were recurring themes in their description of their role and prosecutorial decision­
making:
'I never use the word ‘prosecution authority’...! prefer to say that we are the 
representatives of the public...’ (Law Officer 06)
‘We have no vested interest in the cases...We are part of the administration of 
justice.’ (Law Officer 12)
'We represent the public interest; therefore, we represent the people, the 
security of society, the rule of law, the interests of the victims and the interests 
of the defendants... We have to be fair to the defendant and secure his rights,
50 However, a couple o f Law Officers argued that the publication o f their policy would be an additional 
control o f their power:
'It would be useful to have written criteria...It would be good to have them  published a s  well. The 
better way to exercise control of a power is to have transparency...Furtherm ore, the public h as the 
right to know ...’ (Law Officer 02)
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but we also have to secure the interests of the victim...Every decision we take 
has to take all of these into account.’ (Law Officer 05)
‘Shared ethos9 -  The Attorney General balances possible differences
Furthermore, the fact that the Attorney General’s Office has traditionally been a 
relatively small office, and the number of Officers dealing with prosecutions limited, 
strengthened even more the idea of a ‘shared ethos’ within the Law Office:
‘We get to know the approach to prosecutions through experience and everyday 
contact with the Attorney General...We are a small office and the approach 
towards prosecutorial decision making is a common one.’ (Law Officer 10)
'Although we don’t have detailed written criteria by which we exercise our 
prosecutorial powers, in practice we have developed criteria which guide our 
decisions...A small number of Officers are dealing with prosecutions. Thus, we 
discuss cases with each other, exchange opinions and generally follow a similar 
approach.’ (Law Officer 02)
Moreover, they all agreed that all crucial decisions were taken by the Attorney 
General (or the Deputy Attorney General) himself, and therefore, the absence of a 
detailed set of guidelines was not a major shortcoming.
‘We all know the way of thinking and the policy of the Attorney General and 
anyway, every crucial decision is taken by him personally.’ (Law Officer 06)
There was a widespread perception among the Law Officers that when a controversial 
problem occurred, the solution was given by the Attorney General himself. They 
argued that the balance of different interests in each difficult case was a task that was 
achieved by the Attorney General guided by the public interest:
‘Whenever there is a doubt in a particular case, we ask the Attorney 
General...especially for serious cases, where different considerations advocate 
different solutions...’ (Law Officer 13)
‘When there is an important issue, we always ask the Attorney General for 
directions. Especially the decision on the discontinuance of a prosecution is 
strictly controlled by him personally.’ (Law Officer 14)
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Some Law Officers were particularly emphatic in stating that the discretion regarding 
prosecutions was vested in the Attorney Generals and their role was only to assist him 
in exercising that discretion, which at all times remained his:51
The constitution entrusts the Attorney General with the responsibility for 
prosecutions and with broad discretion in performing his duties. We are 
applying his policy and ought to follow his directions.’ (Law Officer 03)
However, most Law Officers admitted that they themselves enjoyed a considerable 
degree of discretion:
‘We exercise a discretion that is vested in the Attorney General...We are 
supervised while executing our powers. However, the Attorney General allows 
us discretion...the crucial thing is to know when you should ask for direction.’
(Law Officer 19)
B. Specific considerations in Law Officers* decision-making
‘In which direction does the public interest lie? Crown prosecutors are 
often engaged, either explicitly or implicitly, in a balancing exercise  
between considerations o f  evidential sufficiency, culpability, law  
enforcement and resource management.’ (Ashworth 1987:596)
Despite their support for individualised decision-making and their scepticism towards 
strict written guidelines, Law Officers, when prompted, were ready to offer a series of 
factors that they usually took into account when making decisions on prosecutions. In 
this subsection, a closer examination of those more specific considerations, which 
arguably preoccupied their decision-making on whether and how to prosecute, will be 
attempted.
51 At times, there was the impression that by denying that they were applying their own discretion, they 
were allowed to keep a distance from potentially bad decisions.
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Complexity of considerations -  Sophisticated way of thinking
Before referring to the specific considerations that Law Officers cited as factors they 
used to take into account, there are some preliminary remarks that ought to be 
mentioned:
Firstly, Law Officers appeared to be deeply conscious of the inherent complexity that 
a prosecutorial decision usually entailed and the vast variety of considerations that 
had to be calculated. In their responses they did not refer only to factors related to the 
offence, the defendant or the victim. They also referred to considerations related to the 
resources of the Office, the credibility and efficiency of the system, the reaction of the 
public, implications for other criminal justice agencies, etc.52 Their reflection on 
prosecutorial decision-making, especially when they were talking about specific 
cases, indicated a sophisticated train of thought which did not try to avoid apparent 
dilemmas and conflicting interests in the process. In the words of one Law Officer:
‘Conflicting demands are not always easy to reconcile in practice. Delicate 
judgments about complex considerations are often needed...’ (Law Officer 02)
They also acknowledged the different sub-decisions that a prosecution decision used 
to involve: choice of charges, mode of trial, possible prosecution of the co-accused, 
etc. Moreover, they recognised the need for a continuous review of their decisions as 
the cases proceed:
‘Circumstances change all the time...You have to be able to react and change 
or modify your decision as the case proceeds.’ (Law Officer 09)
‘Witnesses could change their mind, evidence could be discredited, the 
defendant might offer a guilty plea...Our decisions are modified all the time.’
(Law Officer 04)
52 Factors that Prosecutors in other jurisdictions often avoid admitting but which they surely consider in 
practice. See, for example, Fionda (1995:229): ‘In England and Wales...such considerations are still 
regarded with a certain distaste and cause jurisprudential anguish at what are seen as unjustifiable 
reasons for compromising the course of justice, and for informalising the legal process.’
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However, what Law Officers failed or appeared reluctant to recognise was that in 
order to be able to resolve contradictions between different interests and reach the 
right solution, you might need to set some principles and priorities beforehand. As 
was shown above, they argued that the balance of different interests in each case was 
a task that was achieved by the Attorney General himself guided by the public 
interest.
The rule is to prosecute -  Extensive exceptions
Secondly, Law Officers argued that the starting point in their decisions on 
prosecutions was that criminal cases should go to court when there was a prima facie 
case. They agreed that there should be a presupposition that where there was a breach 
of criminal law, the offender should be subject to prosecution, but, at the same time, 
they admitted that beyond this point there were many exceptions, based on a variety 
of considerations:
‘You start with the theory that, as a rule, the public interest requires that a case 
should go to court.’ (Law Officer 03)
‘As a rule, cases should go to court. This is, of course, a rule with many 
exceptions, but we have to start from this basis so that we do not appear to be 
appropriating the powers of the legislature and those of the court.’ (Law Officer 
09)
In addition, they asserted that this rule also contributed to the better control of their 
discretion by the Attorney General:
The Attorney General, at times, may exercise a looser control over our 
decisions to send cases to court... maybe it is because this is regarded as the 
rule and, anyway, the courts will eventually judge our decisions...However, he 
is very thorough with our decisions not to prosecute or to discontinue a 
prosecution.’ (Law Office 14)
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Evidential considerations
Law Officers, in their initial responses, appeared to follow a long-standing tradition in 
the Law Office53 that did not clearly separate evidential from other -  public interest -  
considerations. In their reflections of what criteria were used when deciding whether 
or not (and also how) to prosecute, matters that could be characterised as evidential 
issues were mixed with a variety of other factors.
However, this proved to be a hasty conclusion to a superficial analysis of their 
responses. Law Officers did mix evidential with other issues, but only on a secondary 
level of their arguments. They firstly clarified that a prima facie case was the 
minimum evidential limit that should be reached so that a case could be sent to court 
and when that was satisfied, the rule was to prosecute. On a secondary level, though, 
issues of reliability, credibility and availability of evidence were mixed with other 
public interest considerations in order to decide whether a case should be prosecuted.54
However, even the definition of a prima facie case they offered was not as strict as it 
might sound but it rather afforded weighing of the evidence. They used definitions 
similar to the 1962 Practice Note which is also the test applied by Cyprus Courts at 
half-time submissions:55 ‘When the evidence adduced by the prosecution ... is so 
manifestly unreliable that no reasonable tribunal could safely convict on it.’56 Cyprus 
Courts adopt the position that in order to require the accused to make his defence, the 
prosecution evidence must be credited, at least provisionally, as reliable. In the same 
way, when Law Officers argued that there should be at least a prima facie case in 
order for a case to be sent to court, by this most of them meant ‘enough provisionally 
reliable evidence’:
‘A: Sufficient evidence means admissible and relevant evidence which proves
all the essential elements of the offence.
Q: Do you examine the reliability of the evidence?
53 See earlier in this chapter the successive Attorney Generals’ policies and criteria for prosecutions.
54 This was the approach o f  Mr Markidis himself. See earlier Mr Markidis’ responses in his interview.
55 See Azinas and Another v. The Police (1981) 2 C.L.R. 133 and Attorney General v. Christodoulou 
(1990)2 C.L.R. 133.
56 (1962) 1 All E R  448.
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A: When evidence is obviously so unreliable that no court would accept it, we 
do not prosecute.’ (Law Officer 02)
Most Law Officers, though, readily accepted that although a prima facie case (even 
the broader definition of it) was a minimum, very often it was not enough. They 
offered some examples where a higher evidential test should apply:
‘It is very dangerous to send people to court based only on evidence the 
reliability of which is in serious question...particularly with some specific 
categories of crime, people can be stigmatised very badly...(we are a small 
society) we should be very careful...it is not always easy to send people to 
courts...’ (Law Officer02)
‘I admit that in some economic crime cases -  those on the borderline -  we 
apply a higher evidential criterion...The victim could be better protected by civil 
action in most of these cases... So it is better to go to court when there is a clear 
possibility of winning the case, otherwise a lot of time is wasted.’ (Law Officer 
03)
Some, but not all, Law Officers57 also admitted that the mode of trial was another 
reason which might argue for ‘evidence of a better quality’:
‘Cases in front of Assize Courts take a lot of time and resources...You should 
think twice before you send a case there when the quality of evidence is not of a 
certain standard.’ (Law Officer 01)
They also remarked that as the case proceeded, a constant review of the evidence 
ought to be carried out, which might lead to the discontinuance of a case. Law Officers 
usually referred to the chance they had to meet with witnesses before the trial. For 
Assize Court cases, after the committal, there was a practice followed by the Law 
Officers of seeing the main witnesses before they testified in court. They argued that 
this constituted a chance to check the quality of the evidence and possibly discontinue 
the case or modify the charges.
57 See in section IV o f this chapter that practice showed that the mode o f the trial is indeed a serious 
influential factor in the level o f evidence required.
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More generally, Law Officers appeared to take the view that in cases where they had 
the chance to have a personal and more complete view of the case -  e.g. in cases 
where they were involved in investigations or in serious cases where meetings with 
victims, witnesses and experts were arranged -  and therefore, it was possible and 
more justifiable to check the quality of evidence, a higher evidential criterion was 
somehow automatically involved in their judgments.
Public interest considerations
‘What do we mean by “public interest”? You cannot make an exhaustive list, not 
even an indicative one. There are so many considerations... No one ‘dares’ to 
specify this term...’ (Law Officer 05)
‘You have to consider everything... seriousness, resources, time, personal 
circumstances, the effect on the public...’ (Law Officer 19)
As shown earlier, Law Officers appeared to acknowledge the variety of considerations 
that a prosecution decision should entail. Before detailing various other issues that 
they took into account, all Law Officers referred to the specific policies for particular 
categories of cases that the serving Attorney General determined.58 They were, 
therefore, aware of, and alert to, cases for which specific choices had been clearly 
made by the Attorney General.
More generally, most of the other considerations which they cited were expressed in a 
negative form as considerations that could advocate towards non-prosecution.59 These 
were:
a) Factors related to the defendant:
All Law Officers appeared sensitive to the personal circumstances of the defendants 
and argued that, especially in minor cases, these could lead to a decision for no 
prosecution; while in more serious cases, they could lead to the choice of a lesser 
charge. Age, health reasons, family circumstances, absence of prior criminal record,
58 See Mr Markidis’ specific policies earlier in this chapter.
59 This is consistent with their view -  mentioned earlier -  that prosecution is the rule and non­
prosecutions are the exceptions.
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disproportionate consequences of a prosecution for the defendant’s future, and 
remorse were some of the factors detailed.
'Prosecution decisions should be humane and take into consideration personal 
factors as well...We do not apply mathematical formulas and we cannot close 
our eyes to such factors.’ (Law Officer 05)
Taking such factors into account was regarded as part of the ‘individualised justice 
approach’ that they argued they promoted.
b) Factors related to the victim:
Law Officers cited the wishes of the victim as an influential factor in their 
prosecutorial decision. They clarified that these were not always followed, as they 
sometimes needed to be balanced with other interests or concerns.60 However, they 
were particularly influential in specific types of offences like sexual offences and such 
minor offences as common assaults, affrays, etc. Law Officers argued that they ought 
to be sensitive towards victims’ views in some types of offences and meetings with 
them were often essential in order to discuss their wishes. They also referred to the 
need to save vulnerable victims from testifying in court as a reason to accept a plea to 
a lesser charge.
c) Issues o f  ‘wider public interest
Law Officers also referred to issues of ‘national or international concern’, which 
might advocate against prosecutions:
‘In the past, we had a case -  not a very serious one -  concerning two 
(reference to the nationality of the offenders). Their government demanded they 
be left free to return to their country. We were in danger of a diplomatic incident, 
as during this particular period, our relations with that country were in crisis. We 
could not risk such a serious crisis by insisting on prosecution. That was one of 
those exceptional cases where national interests prevailed.’ (Law Officer 09)
60 For example, in domestic violence cases the policy is to prosecute cases, even if the victim wishes 
otherwise.
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d) Factors related to the offence:
The triviality of an offence was also mentioned as a potential reason to refrain from 
prosecutions but most of the time in connection with other factors like the wishes of 
the victim, the payment of possible damages caused by the offence, etc. Law Officers 
clarified that even minor offences ought to be sent to courts when there were certain 
reasons:
‘Even some minor offences should always be sent to court... For example, when 
there is an increase in this particular form of criminality...or when we want to 
promote a certain policy, e.g. we always prosecute the owners of night clubs in 
tourist areas for regulatory offence regarding the running of their business, even 
if this would only result in a nominal penalty... it is because we want to send the 
message that services relating to our tourism industry should maintain good and 
quality standards.’ (Law Officer 03)
'Some offences, although appearing relatively minor, if commonly committed, 
should be sent to courts.1 (Law Officer 19)
e) ‘Specific choices’
Law Officers also admitted to some considerations that, at first sight, might appear 
unjustifiable. As they explained, though, these were choices that prosecutors had to 
make as the result of a balancing exercise between conflicting interests. Most of them 
referred to the choice of not prosecuting some co-defendants in exchange for their 
testimony against others, but there was a particular Law Officer who also cited the 
necessity of sometimes ietting o ff police informants for minor crimes. They 
emphasised, though, that these were sensitive decisions that only the Attorney 
General himself could take after careful consideration:
‘For example, in a case of a series of frauds and abuse of power by a senior 
public servant, we decided not to prosecute his accomplices because this was 
the only way to convince them to testify against him. We considered it to be 
more important to convict the public official, even if this meant that others would 
go unpunished... We did not have any other choice.’ (Law Officer 01)
‘Let’s say, for example, that a police informant commits a very minor 
offence...and this person is at the heart of the crime (she refers to a certain area 
known for its high criminality)...he provides police with invaluable information
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that cannot be obtained otherwise...You cannot risk loosing him (as an 
informant) because he committed a very minor offence... I do not claim that you 
should allow a serious crime not to be prosecuted ...but there is a balance of
interests that should be struck.’ (Law Officer 09)
It could be argued that Law Officers’ willingness to admit to the existence of such 
considerations showed an approach that did not attempt to deny obvious dilemmas in
the prosecution process. Rather, they tried to face them by acknowledging their
sensitivity and accepting that the only one responsible for finding the right solution 
each time was the Attorney General.
f) Resources/Workload/Time
Law Officers appeared to consider their limited resources, as well as the resources of 
other criminal justice agencies (mainly courts), as a factor that they inevitably ought 
to take into account:
We don’t have unlimited resources and unlimited time. Therefore, we cannot 
take decisions regardless of these considerations.’ (Law Officer 01)
They seemed to acknowledge that a possible backlog of the system would lead to 
major injustices and therefore, sometimes, less than ideal decisions ought to be taken 
in order to avoid just that.
Plea negotiation was regarded by some Law Officers as one of the legitimate ways to 
deal with time pressures and save resources:
‘If, by accepting a plea, justice is done, then saving court’s time, witnesses’ time 
and our time is very important.’ (Law Officer 09)
‘Sometimes it is a good way to handle the case. Why waste five months in court 
when you could get a guilty plea to the next lower charge available? You save 
time and money, you have a conviction, and justice is done.’ (Law Officer 01)
The acceptance of a plea is a pragmatic choice in terms of efficiency and 
serves the public interest. However, pleas would be refused if ...they do not 
reflect the seriousness of the incident at all.’ (Law Officer 05)
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The general attitude tended to be that the plea should reflect the criminality of the 
offence and not affect the sentence too greatly. Most of the Law Officers, though, 
admitted that they would not insist on the defendant being tried on the most serious 
charge, even when they thought it would be justified, if accepting a plea to a lesser 
offence or fewer offences would avoid the time and effort involved in running a trial 
in court.
Concluding remarks
Summarising, it could be stated that Law Officers, reflecting on their prosecution 
decisions, placed emphasis on the need for flexible and responsible decision-making 
and individualised justice. The emphasis did not necessarily ignore the ideal of 
consistency, but rather assumed that it would be maintained through the personal 
competence, professional standards and guarantees of neutrality and independence of 
the Attorney General and his staff attorneys. Failure to measure up to the ideals of 
individualised justice was considered by most of the Law Officers as a failure of 
‘good prosecuting’, which sometimes was inevitable for some categories of offences.
More specifically, Law Officers appeared to be genuinely aware of the inherent 
complexity of prosecutorial decisions and the vast variety of considerations that ought 
to be calculated each time. In their responses, they did not refer only to factors related 
to the defendant, the victim or the offence. They also referred to considerations related 
to the resources of the Office, the credibility and efficiency of the system, the reaction 
of the public, implications for other criminal justice agencies, etc. Their reflection on 
prosecutorial decision-making indicated a sophisticated way of thinking, which 
attempted to solve even the most ‘sensitive’ dilemmas and conflicting interests in the 
process. Generally, they regarded it as the role of the Law Office to try and balance 
conflicting interests in the prosecution process and interpret the public interest in each 
case.
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IV. PRACTICE
In this section, a more empirical approach to both the way prosecutorial decisions are 
carried out in the Law Office and the factors that are considered regarding them will 
be attempted. This undertaking will mainly draw on the results of the examination of 
cases that was carried out in the Law Office, as well as on the conclusions drawn from 
the observation period spent there.
Several empirical studies have emphasised the illusion policy-makers may promote 
that a catalogue of criteria for prosecution decision-making could be automatically 
translated into practice, ignoring the multiplicity of conflicting values and aims in the 
process. In the previous sections, it was shown that the situation in Cyprus has been 
the reverse. Successive Attorney Generals, and the Law Officers themselves, were 
deeply conscious of the variety of concerns involved in prosecutions, and for many 
years have declared the inherent fallibility of an a priori specification of criteria for 
prosecutions. They rather adhered to the values of individualised justice through a 
small number of officials, with guarantees of neutrality and independence, 
empowered to do justice in each case. One of the purposes of this section will be to 
examine the extent to which the practice lives up to this ideal. Theory suggests that 
Law Officers have many advantages/powers in the pursuit of this ideal (e.g. 
involvement in investigations, as shown in the previous chapter, additional 
information from other sources, meetings with witnesses, etc). Do they make use of 
these powers in all cases? Additionally, which are the factors which practice shows 
that they affect their prosecutorial decisions? And how closely do they correspond to 
their theoretical reflection on this issue? Which other circumstances exert influence on 
their decision-making? These are the main issues that this section will touch upon 
which broadly correspond to two questions: (a) In which way are prosecutorial 
decisions carried out in practice, and (b) which specific factors are considered 
regarding them?
As shown in Chapter Five, the Law Office’s workload is extremely varied not only in 
the type of cases involved, but also regarding the stages that different cases reach the 
Office and the reasons that they are sent there. For systematic reasons, prosecution 
decisions will be examined separately for each of the categories of cases that the Law
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Office is dealing with. In this way, differences between categories of cases will be 
illustrated more easily.
Review and prosecution of indictable cases (and complex/sensitive summary 
cases)
As was shown elsewhere, these cases were considered as the core of the Law Office 
workload. The fact that they were the sole responsibility of the Attorney General and 
were continually under the immediate control of the Law Office meant that questions 
regarding all aspects o f the cases were being raised (considerations of evidence and 
public interest, level of charges, etc), and also that Law Officers’ decisions regarding 
them could be re-examined or modified as they proceeded.
The wav that prosecutorial decisions were carried out
It was very obvious from the beginning of the fieldwork that this part of the Attorney 
General’s Office workload was distinct from the rest, in the sense that it was given 
considerably fuller consideration, time and resources.
Information on which decisions were made concerning these cases was not 
exclusively obtained from the police investigation file. On many occasions, as 
discussed more extensively in Chapter Six, Law Officers were also involved in the 
investigative stage and therefore had a more complete view of the cases from their 
early stages. The defence was also very active in providing the Law Office with 
alternative stories about the facts of the cases. Furthermore, for cases where an initial 
positive decision for prosecution was made, there was the chance for prosecutors to 
collect even more information and assess the quality of the evidence at a later stage. 
After the committal proceedings, there was a practice followed by the Law Officers to 
see the main witnesses before testifying in court.61 This was justified theoretically in 
terms of clarifying inconsistencies or refreshing their memories but in practice, it 
extended to far more than that. Such a practice was giving them the chance to judge
61 See Block, Corbett and Peay (1993:106) describing the absence o f such a practice in England and 
Wales: ‘There is little or no contact between the CPS and prosecution witnesses in the run-up to trial, 
this being currently a police function. Closer liaison between the CPS and witnesses and victims would 
enable some assessment to be made as to the latter’s willingness, likelihood and ability to testify, and to 
some kind o f track of them to be kept between committal and trial.’
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the ‘quality’ and the ‘sufficiency’ of the evidence.62 As a result, their decisions in 
various cases were altered or modified (e.g. they dropped some charges or modified 
some others, or they decided to accept a plea to a lesser offence because of the 
vulnerability of the witness).
Case CP: Rape/indecent assaults -  Although police were confirming victims’ 
willingness and desire to testify in court, after a meeting with the victims, the 
Law Officer began to consider the possibility of accepting the defence’s offer of 
a plea of guilty to a lesser charge. ‘Victims were so terrified by the thought of 
testifying in court that I am not sure whether they could cope with the 
procedure, or whether further harm would be caused.’ (Law Officer 01)
Case AR: Possession of drugs with intent to supply -  The case was committed 
for trial before the Assize Court. The Law Officer confirmed ‘the instinct he had 
that something was wrong with this case’ when he had the chance to meet the 
under-cover agent of the police before the opening of the trial. ‘After a couple of 
questions, I realised that he was lying about certain things. I confronted him and 
he told me the truth.’ A nolle prosequi was entered.
More generally, it was observed that decisions regarding these cases were under a 
continuous review. Law Officers were expected to review the decision to prosecute in 
the light of emerging developments affecting both the quality and/or availability of 
the evidence and other public interest considerations. Such common developments 
were:
a) Evidential problems appearing after the beginning of the trial: e.g. a main 
witness refused to testify, the main witness changed the testimony in court or 
left the country.
b) The accused had already been convicted of another offence and sentenced to 
many years of imprisonment.
c) A guilty plea was entered to some of the charges and the rest of the charges 
were discontinued (plea bargaining).
d) Victim’s wishes: Extreme circumstances. E.g.:
62 Furthermore, quite often, consultations were arranged with expert witnesses such as forensic 
scientists or doctors so they could explain to Law Officers their statements and clarify complex points 
o f  their evidence.
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Case JE: A case of rape -  The offender was the ex-boyfriend of the victim.
While at the beginning she was willing to testify, later on, she sent a letter to the 
Attorney General stating that she did not wish to testify and she was going to 
marry the offender. The Attorney General initially refused the entering of a nolle 
prosequi but after a personal meeting he had with the victim and her advocate 
and the insistence of the victim that further harm was going to be caused, he 
changed his opinion).
Specific factors that were considered
The analysis of these cases resulted in some general conclusions about the 
considerations that would influence decision-making:
Firstly, regarding the evidence required for such cases, it could be said that there were 
conflicting interests at stake suggesting different levels of evidence. On one hand, the 
seriousness of the offences advocated for the prosecution of cases even if there was 
only a prima facie case. On the other hand, though, the resources required for a trial in 
front of the Assize Court, and the fact that serious allegations were potentially 
damaging to the reputation of an innocent person, advocated for a higher level of 
evidence. Law Officers appeared to adopt a higher level of evidence in cases where 
they had personal knowledge of the quality of the evidence (e.g. due to their 
involvement in investigations) and as far as the rest of the cases were concerned, as 
the cases proceeded and more information was obtained, initial decisions could be 
overruled or modified. It should be noted here that a specific category of cases for 
which a higher level of evidence was usually required (even from the beginning) was 
economic offences for which civil action could be instituted.
Secondly, it was generally difficult for a very serious case not to be prosecuted at all, 
based only on ‘public interest’ considerations. Public interest considerations for these 
cases would rather justify a suggestion for a trial before a District Court or a 
prosecution for a lesser charge.
However, Law Officers did refrain from (or discontinue) prosecutions in a number of 
these cases based on a variety of considerations. These were:
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a) Extreme personal circumstances:
E.g.: Case JE (see p.264)
b) When the case was only technically regarded as an indictable offence due to 
the level of its seriousness (The circumstances of the offences would normally 
argue for a suggestion for a summary trial) and there were, additionally, extra 
mitigating factors relating to the accused.
E.g.: Case NC -  A case of forgery of a cheque of £50 (because of the amount 
of money involved, this case would be normally tried in front of a District Court 
instead of an Assize Court). The accused suffered from a psychological 
disorder. There was a relevant report from the Social Services confirming that.
Choice of mode of trial for indictable offences
This category of cases primarily provided important information on the criteria that 
Law Officers were employing in the choice of mode of trial for indictable offences. 
As explained elsewhere, in the Cyprus Legal System, there are no ‘triable either way’ 
offences. There are summary offences63 tried by the District Courts, and indictable 
offences tried either by the Assize Courts or by the District Courts, provided that the 
Attorney General consents to that mode of trial. Thus, by law,64 the Attorney General 
may choose the mode of trial of every indictable offence.
The wav that prosecutorial decisions were carried out
The first and most important question being addressed in those cases was ‘What mode 
of trial is appropriate for this case?’ Or even more specifically, ‘Would the special 
circumstances o f the case justify a summary trial, even though it concerns crimes 
punishable with a penalty that exceeds five years? ’
The information on which decisions were made was mainly the investigation file. 
Law Officers themselves admitted (and were observed to do so) that, most of the time, 
in those cases they would only read the summary report prepared by the investigator;
63 Offences punishable with a term o f imprisonment not exceeding five years and/or a fine not 
exceeding £5,000.
64 Court o f  Justice Law 1960, s. 24.2.
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they only read witnesses’ statements, or other documents, when they found something 
unusual or unclear in the summary, or when the police requested their advice on 
particular aspects of the case (apart from the determination of the mode of trial). A 
more careful study of those files, though, revealed that the police did often ask 
questions or request directions about various issues in the case. As a result, in some 
cases the Law Officers, besides granting consent for the summary trial of indictable 
offences, were also giving advice/directions on any other offences included in the 
same criminal file, or general advice about the handling of the case in court (see e.g. a 
drug case where the Law Officer called the expert in order to clarify a point in his 
statement and accordingly he gave a direction to the police on how to handle the case 
in Court).65 It was also found that for some of those cases, the advice of the Law 
Office was sought during the investigation of the offence mainly via telephone 
communication between the investigator and the Law Officer.
Additional information from other sources which might influence the choice of the 
mode of trial was provided only in cases for which an Assize Court trial was selected 
and, thus, they were kept in the Law Office and were handled by Law Officers. In 
those cases information from the defence for e.g. mitigating circumstances relating to 
the defendant, or a later check of the quality of the evidence by the Law Officer 
himself handling the case (for example, after meeting with witnesses or after a more 
thorough study of the criminal file), led, in a number of cases, to an alteration of the 
initial decision. As a result, and depending on the stage of the process, the case was 
either remitted to the District Court66 or a nolle prosequi was entered and another 
prosecution was instituted in the District Court.
Specific factors that were considered
Based on the analysis of these cases, the following factors appeared to influence the 
selection of the mode of trial:
65 In 28 cases (43 per cent) out o f 65 that were included in this category in my sample, the Law Officers 
dealt with other issues besides the determination of the mode o f trial, and in 21 o f them that occurred 
after the police prompting.
66 According to s. 155 (b) o f Criminal Procedure Law, during the period between the completion o f  
committal proceedings and the beginning o f the trial in the Assize Court, the Attorney General has the 
power to remit a case to the District Court.
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a) The seriousness o f the offence:
For many categories of offences in which the question of the choice of trial 
was raised, the maximum sentence in Law was very high and there were no 
predefined subcategories (e.g. the maximum sentence in Law for forgery of a 
cheque of £15 is the same as for forgery of a cheque of £150000!). Therefore, 
the seriousness of each particular case and the perceived appropriate sentence 
was the main factor that was observed to influence the choice of the forum of 
the trial. This was determined by, for example, the value of the goods stolen in 
a burglary, the amount and type of drugs in drug cases, the injury suffered by 
the victim in offences against the person.
b) The particular circumstances surrounding the criminal incident:
These were mainly the intention/motive behind an offence (a very common 
factor for the offence of carrying a firearm67), the gross provocation by the 
victim and the time that had passed since the commission of the offence.
c) Mitigating factors relating to the defendant:
The most common ones were the young age of the defendant or the old age of 
a defendant with no prior record, special personal or family circumstances, and 
health reasons.
d) Burden o f  work:
The choice of the mode of trial in some cases was substantially influenced by 
the pressures of the workload that Law Officers were dealing with. The choice 
of an Assize Court trial had the inevitable consequence that the case would 
stay at the Law Office to be handled by a Law Officer. Therefore, in some 
cases it was clearly stated that ‘due to the heavy workload that the Office is 
facing at the moment, it is judged that this case can be tried in a District 
Court.’ It has to be noted though, that most of these cases could be 
characterised as borderline cases for which either decision could be justified.68
67 This mainly concerned cases relating to the carrying o f a firearm for hunting without a licence or 
during the period that hunting is not permitted.
68 However, Law Officers themselves admitted that in particularly busy period even cases that could be 
characterised as rather clear Assize Court cases could be sent to District Courts (Interviews with Law 
Officers).
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e) Legal complexity o f the case:
This reason advocated towards the choice of an Assize Court trial in cases for 
which, if based only on the prediction of the sentence likely to be imposed, a 
District Court trial might be chosen. Law Officers preferred to keep a couple 
of cases in the Assize Court which were particularly complex or in which 
evidential difficulties were likely to arise. The Deputy Attorney General 
commented:
‘Assize Court is undoubtedly a better forum for the trial of difficult cases, as 
Judges are more experienced and a Law Officer would deal with them in 
Court. This way, we have the chance to keep a close eye on them’.
f) Publicity (media coverage):
For similar reasons, it was preferred that another borderline case was kept in 
the Assize Court. Widespread publicity and media coverage advocated 
towards an Assize Court trial.
g) Evidential reasons:
Questions about the credibility of the victim/witness and the circumstances 
under which the offence was committed were reasons for some cases to be 
tried in the District Courts. The words of a Law Officer explaining his choice 
in a particular case were illuminating:
‘It is not possible for all cases to be tried before the Assize Court;.therefore, if 
you have to choose, you will not send cases where there are serious doubts 
about the credibility of the witnesses or the victim ...Of course, you cannot 
drop a case mainly based on the credibility of the witness -  this is a matter for 
the Court -  so you send it to the District Court, where at least not so many 
resources are wasted.’ (Law Officer 01)
Categories of cases that the Attorney General specifically directs to be forwarded 
to the Law Office
These categories included offences where the Attorney General was of the opinion 
that particular attention was required, or were ‘cases that might reveal important 
considerations of public policy’ and, therefore, it was judged that it would be better 
that the decision for prosecution was taken by the Law Office. As shown in Chapter
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Five, these were domestic violence cases, offences committed by juveniles and 
corruption by public officers’ cases/4consent’ cases.
The main question regarding these cases was whether the public interest required a 
prosecution, taking into consideration the specific policy of the Law Office relating 
on these categories of offences.
The wav that prosecutorial decisions were carried out
Information for most of these cases (especially for juvenile and domestic violence 
cases) was secured from additional sources other than the police. More specifically:
a) For juvenile cases:
There was a special procedure followed for this category of cases. There were 
committees comprised of representatives of the Police Constables and of Social 
Services for each district, responsible for reviewing all juvenile cases. The Social 
Services would prepare a report on each juvenile, giving details about his/her 
background, family circumstances, character, etc. The committees’ suggestions for the 
proper disposal of the cases and a review of the Social Services’ report were 
forwarded to the Attorney General’s Office with the relevant criminal file. The Law 
Officers usually accepted the committees’ suggestions.
b) For domestic violence cases:
As shown in Chapter Five, since 1998, according to Circular G.E. 50(C)/1992/N.42 
by Mr Markidis, all officers of Government Departments (police officers, social 
workers, doctors, etc) to whose attention came a case of domestic violence had an 
obligation to submit a report within seven days to the Attorney General. A team o f  
Law Officers examined the reports and gave directions. Until 2000, all criminal files 
were forwarded to the Law Office after the police investigations and Law Officers 
decided whether to prosecute or not. Due to the large amount of files arriving at the 
Office, the police were directed to send only those cases in which they decided not to 
prosecute or they were not sure whether they should prosecute.
There was a declared policy that these cases should be prosecuted unless very special 
circumstances advocated for the opposite. Even when the victims withdrew their
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complaints, the procedure followed was to send the case to the Court and if the 
victims still did not wish to testify, a nolle prosequi was entered.
Furthermore, there was close cooperation between the Social Services and the Law 
Officers’ team dealing with these cases. In very serious cases, meetings were arranged 
between the police, Law Officers and Social Services even during the investigations.69
Specific factors that were considered
a) For juvenile cases: As a rule, the suggestion of the special commission 
mentioned above was adopted. This was usually a suggestion for no 
prosecution unless the case concerned a particularly serious crime or ‘the 
juvenile showed a persistent criminal behaviour’.
b) For domestic violence cases: As mentioned above, the rule for these cases was 
in favour of prosecution unless very special circumstances advocated for the 
opposite.
c) For corruption by public officers’ cases: If  there was sufficient evidence, it 
was regarded that the public interest required the prosecution of these cases. 
This category represented a good example where specific choices had to be 
made about the prosecution or not of all co-defendants. Where there was not 
enough independent evidence, Law Officers would prosecute the public 
official and offer immunity from prosecution to his co-defendants in order to 
ensure that they would testify in court against him.
Review of summary cases
As was shown earlier, although summary cases were usually dealt with by Police 
Prosecution Departments, the police were obliged to forward to the Law Office cases 
in which they suggested that a prosecution was not required due to public interest 
factors or regarding which they were not sure whether there was enough evidence for
69 There was a particular sensitivity for domestic violence offences at the Law Office. They admitted 
that the police attitude towards these cases until recently had not been the proper one. I even observed a 
number o f short, educational sessions about the handling o f these cases, organised by the Law Officer 
in charge, in which police officers, Social Service Officers and Law Officers participated.
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prosecution. Thus, in these cases, the Law Office had to decide 'whether diversion 
from prosecution was justified.
The wav that prosecutorial decisions were carried out
The information on which these decisions were made was mainly the investigation 
file. Law Officers were observed to adopt a more pragmatic attitude towards this 
aspect of their work, which advanced standardisation rather than individualised 
justice. It was observed that the extent to which a case would be thoroughly reviewed 
depended on the workload that the Law Officer had to deal with regarding the rest of 
the cases.70 In very minor cases, they were only looking for some standard information 
in every case which could be routinely and quickly checked: e.g. in minor assault 
cases, a letter from the victim that he did not want to proceed; in minor drug 
possession cases, confirmation from the police that the defendant was a first offender, 
etc.71 However, they appeared to be alert to unusual cases of this category that might 
demand a more careful consideration (e.g. a case against a well-known journalist, 
cases of carrying arms to terrorise, a case of extortion by a police officer, etc).
It was also observed that the opinion of the police, although not always adopted, was 
given considerable weight. There was the underlying presupposition, especially by 
some Law Officers, that these were police cases and, therefore, the views of the police 
ought to be seriously considered.
Specific factors that were considered
Questions of evidence were not usually disassociated from other considerations and, 
therefore, the overall question that was raised in these cases was whether a certain
70 Blumberg (1967), in his classic work on the criminal justice system, argues that the most common 
reason for criminal justice officials deviating from their ideological and professional commitments is 
the intolerably large caseloads they have to deal with.
71 Especially during very busy days, or days that Law Officers had also to appear in court, these cases 
were dealt with quickly and sometimes casually. A Law Officer admitted:
‘W hen I don’t have to be  at court all day, I have the time to exam ine th e se  c a se s  carefully, 
comm unicate with the  investigator, ask  for clarification, etc. Also, when I have time, I prefer to read 
w itnesses’ sta tem en ts instead of relying on the police summary. However, I admit that next week 
when I will be  in court m ost of the time, things will be  different.’ (Law Officer 01)
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case could be justifiably filtered out of the system. Factors that contributed towards a 
positive answer to this question were:72
a) The triviality of the offence in connection with other factors such as 
remorse/apology, etc.
b) Mitigating factors related to the defendant, such as no prior criminal record, 
good character/law-abiding citizen, health reasons, difficult family 
circumstances, commission of the offence under enormous stress, the offender 
has already been punished, remorse/apology, payment of the damages. 
Especially in minor drug cases (concerning use and possession of illegal 
drugs), the rule was that a prosecution was not instituted for the first offence, 
in order to give defendants ‘a second chance5.
c) Withdrawal of the victim's complaint mainly in cases concerning common 
assaults, affrays, negligent acts, etc.
d) Misleading information from, or acts by, the responsible authority or a later 
obtaining of a relevant licence (mainly for regulatory offences).
e) ‘The accused assisted the police in the past with the investigation of other 
offences5: There were a couple of minor cases concerning police informants in 
which the police made the suggestion to refrain from prosecution.
f) Evidential reasons: these might concern (i) problems in establishing even a 
prima facie case but also (ii) problems with the availability or the credibility 
of the evidence which, in combination with the (lack of) seriousness of the 
case, advocated towards a non-prosecution decision.
It has to be remarked that for cases where it was decided not to prosecute mainly for 
reasons under categories (b) and (c), Law Officers would direct that the files should 
remain ‘open5 for a defined period of time. If during that time the accused did not 
commit another offence, then the file was closed.
Factors that contributed towards a negative answer to the request or suggestion by the 
police to refrain from prosecution were:
72 These were almost identical with the factors on which nolle prosequis were granted.
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a) A specific policy of the Attorney General to prosecute all offences coming 
under a certain category.
b) The nature of the offence:
- Offences that involved carrying arms:
Case CJ: A case of threatening violence and carrying arms to terrorise -  
Despite the withdrawal of the complaint, the apology of the accused, the fact 
that the accused was a first offender, the commission of the offence under 
enormous stress and the police suggestion that prosecution would cause 
problems in family relations (the victim was the son and the accused was the 
father), the Law Officer directed to prosecute because ‘the settlement of a 
dispute carrying arms is unacceptable and extremely dangerous.’ (See in 
comparison Case KJ on p. 276).
Case CF: Another case of carrying arms to terrorise -  The Police suggested 
no prosecution as the accused had very serious family problems and suffered 
from a psychological disorder. The Law Officer refused as ‘the accused could 
be a danger to himself as well as to the public, and prosecution is necessary 
in order to be deprived of the license to carry a weapon.’
- Offences concerning ‘sensitive issues’ for which a possible non-prosecution 
could create the impression o f  being ‘let o ff’:
Case CH: A case of extortion by a police officer -  The police had serious 
doubts about the victim’s credibility and suggested that the case be dealt with 
using disciplinary measures/procedures. The Law Officer directed 
prosecution: The credibility of the witnesses is a matter for the Court. Cases 
involving public servants should be sent to the Court in order for the 
accusation of letting off public servants to be avoided.’
c) The prior criminal record of the accused.
Requests to enter a nolle prosequi or to review police decisions
This category of cases concerned the consideration of requests submitted to the 
Attorney General by defendants asking him to exercise his power to terminate 
criminal proceedings (or, to a lesser extent, to review a decision for prosecution 
before a charge is preferred in court). They concerned mainly summary offences 
handled by the Police Prosecution Departments and a small number of prosecutions
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by other Government Departments. What Law Officers were called upon to decide in 
these cases was whether a prosecution should be discontinued.
The wav that prosecutorial decisions were carried out
There was a special procedure followed regarding this aspect of the Law Office’s 
workload, in which eleven Law Officers were employed.73 It is noticeable that among 
them were Officers who were not dealing with criminal cases systematically. Every 
week a different Law Officer was responsible for dealing with all requests that 
reached the Law Office. This special procedure was adopted due to the numerous 
requests that were reaching the Law Office, as well as in an effort to increase 
objectivity in the handling of these cases.
The information on which decisions were taken was received from both the defence 
and the police. Defendants, in their requests, used to state the facts of the case and 
various reasons why they asked for the discontinuance of the prosecution. Most of 
them were based on public interest factors (e.g. health reasons, remorse, 
disproportionate consequences of a possible conviction, oppressiveness in 
prosecution, reconciliation between offender and victim, etc), but a number of them 
were based on evidential reasons (total absence of evidence, unreliable evidence, 
abuse of process by the police). For each request, the Law Officer responsible would 
send a fax to the Police Prosecution Department dealing with the case, in which 
he/she informed them of the request (forwarding a copy of the letter) and asking their 
opinion. The PPD would reply stating the facts of the case and the reasons why a 
discontinuance was justified or not. For some cases (six per cent of my sample), the 
Law Officer asked the PPD to forward to the Law Office the whole criminal file.
This is one of the categories of the Law Office’s workload for which Law Officers 
had to meet the Attorney General personally and make their suggestions on them, 
since it was regarded that only the Attorney General himself could take these 
decisions. It was observed that this procedure was generally followed, but Law 
Officers stated that in very busy periods the Attorney General was asking them to 
forward to him only the cases in which there was a positive suggestion for the
73 See Chapter Three, pp. 87-8.
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entering of a nolle prosequi. This was another indication that in theory prosecution 
was the rule and the power not to prosecute or discontinue a prosecution was an 
exception that had to be controlled more tightly -  even within the Law Office. Mr 
Markidis issued a circular on that directed to all Law Officers, firmly stating that 
especially decisions to discontinue a prosecution ought to be taken exclusively by 
him.74 Nevertheless, in the great majority of cases, the Attorney General would accept 
the Law Officers’ suggestions.75
In many of the cases, the Law Office agreed with the PPD’s suggestion, which was 
often positive.76 However, there were cases for which there was disagreement and the 
Law Office’s decision prevailed. In my sample, there was disagreement in 15 per cent 
of the cases. The most common reasons for disagreement were: (a) a certain policy of 
the Law Office regarding some categories of offences, or (b) a different evaluation of 
some public interest factors.
In some of these cases the Attorney General set conditions on his entering of a nolle 
prosequi: e.g. (a) the accused must pay the damages, (b) he must pay the costs of the 
trial up to that point, (c) a nolle prosequi will be entered to certain charges if the 
accused plead guilty to the remainder, and (d) if the accused commits another offence 
in a defined period of time, the prosecution for this offence will be re-instituted.
Specific factors that were considered
The main reasons for requests being granted were mainly:
a) The triviality of the offence: These requests concerned mainly minor offences 
such as motoring offences, minor drug offences, public insults, common 
assaults, affrays, regulatory offences, etc.77
74 Circular G.E. 74/72/7, dated 02/05/2001.
75 In 2000, 46.4 per cent o f  the requests were granted while 53.6 per cent were rejected; in 2001, 44.7 
per cent were granted and 55.3 per cent rejected. In my sample, 47 per cent were granted and 53 per 
cent were rejected.
76 In many o f these cases, it was clear that police wanted the discontinuance o f the case even 
independently o f the defendant’s request.
77 See Chapter Five for a detailed catalogue o f these cases.
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b) Mitigating factors related to the defendant such as: no prior criminal record, 
good character/law-abiding citizen, health reasons, the offender had already 
been punished (e.g. in a traffic accident, the responsible person had been 
seriously injured), remorse/apology, payment of the damages, difficult family 
circumstances and commission of the offence under enormous stress. E.g.:
Case KJ: A case of threatening violence and carrying arms to terrorise -  A 17 
year old was the accused and his father was the victim. There was a 
withdrawal of the complaint, the apology of the accused and the fact that the 
accused was a first offender. Moreover, the offence was committed under 
enormous stress after a series of family problems caused by the father.
c) Withdrawal of the victim’s complaint (which was usually accompanied by his 
unwillingness to testify in court after his reconciliation with the offender), 
mainly in cases concerning common assaults, affrays, negligent acts, etc.
d) Misleading information or acts by the responsible authority or the later 
securing of a relevant licence: mainly for regulatory offences.
e) Weakness of evidence.
The main reasons for requests being rejected were mainly:
a) The seriousness of the offence.
b) A repeated behaviour/prior record.
c) A need for deterrence in particular categories of cases due to the increase of 
criminality concerning these offences.
d) The inherent dangerousness of the offence, despite the actual consequences of 
the offence.
e) The victim’s wishes to proceed with prosecution.
f) The fact that the trial was already at a late stage and a possible discontinuance 
would constitute intervention in courts’ jurisdiction.
g) There was a declared policy of the Attorney General on particular categories 
of cases78 (e.g. motoring offences by juveniles, domestic violence offences, 
unlawful employment of immigrants, etc).
78 See the Attorney General’s specific policies in section II.
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Concluding remarks
There are a number of general conclusions that can be drawn from the analysis of Law 
Officers’ decisions in the above cases:
It was observed that Law Officers would make a genuine effort to adhere to the values 
of individualised justice which they advocated in the theoretical reflections of their 
decision-making. However, due to the pressures of their workload, this type of 
decision-making was not always possible for all categories of cases. When Law 
Officers had to make a choice, cases concerning indictable offences were their 
priority. For the rest, Law Officers appeared not to always have the same time and 
information needed for a detailed and reflective decision.
The rest of the cases that usually attracted more careful consideration than the others 
were cases for which there was a specific/explicit policy on them, cases for which the 
defence appeared particularly active in providing information, and cases that were 
subject to media exposition. More generally, all decisions concerning non-prosecution 
or a discontinuance of prosecution were regarded as exceptions (regardless of their 
number) and were more carefully approached (and more tightly controlled) than 
positive decisions for prosecutions.
The factors that were usually considered in prosecutorial decisions were broadly those 
that Law Officers referred to in their theoretical reflections (mitigating factors related 
to the defendants, the seriousness of the case, victim’s wishes, availability of 
resources, etc). What was noticeable was that specific and declared policies of the 
Attorney General regarding particular cases were almost without exception followed 
and were one of the most powerful reasons that the Law Office might disagree with 
police suggestions in specific cases. This would suggest that carefully drafted 
guidelines do make a difference on some occasions after all.
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V. SUMMARY
The Cyprus prosecution system appears to adhere to the opportunity principle and to 
the values of individualised justice through a small number of officials (in the Law 
Office), who are empowered to do justice in each case. It also seems to combine 
characteristics that are associated with both the legality and the opportunity-based 
systems.
The Constitution entrusts the Attorney General with a very broad discretion regarding 
prosecutions, while it ensures guarantees for his neutrality, independence and 
‘ministry of justice’ status. The formulation of the overall prosecution policy is 
considered as within his absolute jurisdiction without any limitations posed by 
statutory legislation (e.g. the publication of his policy) and without the sharing of this 
power with any other government department.
Successive Attorney Generals largely refrained from spelling out detailed criteria for 
their decision-making, although their general approach and their specific policies on 
certain categories of cases were publicly announced. They all emphasised the need for 
flexible and responsible decision-making by an independent official with quasi­
judicial status, entrusted with the duty to take into account various considerations, all 
of which made up the general public interest. All the Attorney Generals argued that 
even if it was not always published, a certain approach to prosecutions had always 
existed and its consistent application in the Law Office was guaranteed by the small 
size of the office. Furthermore, due to their approach of regarding prosecutions as the 
rule and diversion from prosecutions as both the exception (regardless of how 
extensive use of this exception could be made) and the exclusive responsibility of the 
Law Office, a central control of the prosecutorial policy regarding all prosecutions 
was achieved.
Law Officers too, reflecting on their prosecution decisions, placed emphasis on the 
need for flexible and responsible decision-making and individualised justice. They did 
not ignore the ideal of consistency but they believed that by virtue of their 
independence, qualifications and ‘shared ethos they could be trusted to perceive the 
best solution to each prosecutorial dilemma even when they were not constrained by
278
Chapter Seven: Prosecution Policies and Decision-making within the Attorney G eneral’s Office
rigid written rules. The representation of public interest and the ‘ministry o f  justice 
approach' to prosecutions were recurring themes in the description of their role and 
prosecutorial decision-making.
More specifically, Law Officers appeared to be genuinely aware of the inherent 
complexity that prosecutorial decisions usually entailed and the vast variety of 
considerations that ought to be calculated each time. In their responses, they did not 
only refer to factors related to the defendant, the victim or the offence. They also 
referred to considerations related to the resources of the Office, the credibility and 
efficiency of the system, the reaction of the public, implications for other criminal 
justice agencies, etc. Their reflection on prosecutorial decision-making indicated a 
sophisticated way o f thinking, which did not attempt to avoid ‘sensitive’ dilemmas 
and conflicting interests in the process.
In practice, it was observed that Law Officers were trying to incorporate into their 
decision making the values of individualised justice that they advocated in theory (e.g. 
varied sources of information, continuous review of the cases, etc). However, this 
type of decision-making was not always possible for all categories of cases, mainly 
due to their heavy workload. When they had to make a choice, cases concerning 
indictable offences were their priority. For the rest, Law Officers appeared to not 
always have the same time and information needed for a detailed and deliberate 
decision. Nevertheless, other cases that usually attracted more careful consideration, 
apart from the very serious cases, were those for which there was a specific/explicit 
policy, those for which the defence appeared particularly active in providing 
information, and those that were subject to media exposure. More generally, all the 
decisions that concerned a non-prosecution or a discontinuance of prosecution were 
regarded as exceptions and were more carefully approached and more tightly 
controlled than positive decisions for prosecutions.
Specific factors that were usually considered in prosecutorial decisions were: the 
seriousness of the case, mitigating factors related to the defendant, the victim’s 
wishes, the availability of resources, specific and declared policies of the Attorney 
General regarding particular categories of cases, etc. As far as questions of evidence 
were concerned, once Law Officers had clarified that a prima facie case was
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established, on a secondary level, issues of reliability, credibility and availability of 
evidence were mixed with other public interest considerations in order to decide 
whether a case should be prosecuted.
‘(R)ules can be evaluated in a decision-theoretic way. A  strongly rule- 
based environment is prone to those errors that w ill be made when a 
faithful and accurate application o f  the rules will poorly serve a rule’s 
background justification. And a strongly discretionary environment is 
prone to the errors that w ill be made when decision-makers o f  limited 
judgm ent, limited experience, limited wisdom , or simply limited time 
directly apply background justifications, but apply them incorrectly.
Thus, one type o f  error — the error that com es when rules are avoided — is 
the error o f  em powering poor decision-makers to exercise too much 
discretion. And the other type o f  error -  the error that com es when rules 
are the dominant form o f  decision-m aking — is the error that is the 
consequence o f  hampering and constraining w ise and experienced  
decision-m akers by rigid rules.’ (Shauer2005:7)
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Recapitulation and Conclusions
‘The Attorney General is entrusted with the ultimate responsibility for, 
and control of, prosecutions.’ (Tomaritis 1969:2)
T he objective of this thesis has been to explore the role of the Cyprus Attorney
General’s Office in prosecutions, an enterprise neglected so far on both the theoretical 
and the empirical level. It is mainly based on empirical data gathered during a five- 
month fieldwork period in the Attorney General’s Office which involved observation, 
semi-structured interviews with Law Officers and examination of criminal files. The 
findings are supplemented by the results of an examination of the internal circulars, 
press releases and documents of the four Attorney Generals who have served since the 
establishment of the Cyprus Republic; and by interviews carried out with three of 
those four office-holders.
In the preceding chapters the findings of my research have been set out, focusing on 
the workload of the Law Office and its relationship with the police, the role it acquires 
during investigations and its role in the formulation and application of prosecution 
policies and principles. In this chapter, all the findings will be drawn together and 
further discussed, so that the role of the Attorney General’s Office in prosecutions can 
be elucidated and more profoundly understood. Some preliminary observations on 
several potentially weak points in the system will be exposed and implications for 
further research and reform proposals will also be considered.
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I. LA W  A N D  R H ETO R IC
‘If we are to make sense of this chaotic picture, we will have to look 
beyond official criminal justice rhetoric to the reality of criminal justice 
practice -  whilst also recognising the sense in which the rhetoric is a part 
of the reality.’ (Lacey 1994:33)
The prime characteristics of the legal provisions regarding the Attorney General’s role 
in prosecutions are their broad nature and the great latitude they afford to the post­
holder in the specification and use of his powers. As was shown in Chapters Four and 
Five, the prosecution system in Cyprus is not prescribed or fully set out in any single 
document. It is grounded in the Constitution and in some sections of statute law, but 
many of its aspects are implied or left to the Attorney General to define. The rhetoric 
developed on prosecutions in Cyprus after 1960, is characterised by the affirmation on 
any given opportunity of the supremacy of the Attorney General over all the other 
actors involved in prosecutions which was never combined, however, with a profound 
appraisal of his exact role in the process.
The Law Office’s constitutional position, workload and relationship with the 
Police
The Constitution, although preserving the right to private prosecution, and 
consequently the right of other agencies to prosecute, recognises the Attorney General 
as the head of the prosecution system who is entitled to intervene in, control and 
supervise any prosecution. Therefore, the Constitution does not give the monopoly of 
instituting criminal proceedings to the Attorney General; neither does it define his 
intervention in each and every prosecution as obligatory. It does declare, however, his 
right to exercise a retrospective control over all prosecutions through his potential 
intervention (‘take over, continue, discontinue’), besides his right to institute his own 
proceedings (‘institute’).
It was observed in previous chapters that the rhetoric which has been developed over 
time has placed great emphasis on the symbolism and the potential of the power of the 
Attorney General rather than on the everyday execution of his prosecutorial function. 
The limited discussions on the role of the Attorney General focus upon the word
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‘control’ which signifies more oversight and accountability rather than minute 
direction. It is repeatedly asserted that ‘the Attorney General is entrusted with the 
ultimate responsibility for, and control of, prosecutions’ (Loucaides 1974:44), but it is 
also repeatedly deduced that his direct involvement is not expected in every 
prosecution.
Therefore, apart from specific categories of cases for which the Law Office has 
acquired exclusive responsibility by statutory provisions (the Assize Court cases and 
the ‘consent prosecutions’), it is regarded as the Attorney General’s absolute 
discretion to choose which other types of cases he wishes to deal with. Nevertheless, 
there is a general expectation by all actors in the system that certain categories of 
cases would always be included in the Law Office’s workload: complex and 
‘sensitive’ cases, cases that concern constitutional or novel legal issues, cases that 
involve public officers or ‘important public persons’, etc.
The police (as well as a number of other agencies) also have the right to institute 
criminal proceedings in the interests of law enforcement. However, Article 19 of the 
Police Law clearly states that the police discharge their functions regarding 
prosecutions under the superintendence of the Attorney General. Although there is 
some confusion in the discussions concerning the justification of the relationship 
between the police and the Law Office, as was discussed in detail in Chapter Five, it 
has been argued that it is on this special provision of Police Law that the more direct 
relationship between the police and the Law Office is based. Article 19 formally 
recognises the Attorney General as the immediate supervisor of the police and, 
therefore, entitled to exert direct control over police decisions regarding both 
individual cases and also matters of general policy. It consequently constitutes a 
further step that enables the Attorney General not only to confine himself to an ex 
posterior control or supervision of police decisions (permissible by the constitutional 
provisions) but also to give compulsory directions to the police and to control their 
everyday functions regarding prosecutions. It is based on this statutory provision that 
the Attorney General is entitled to order the police not to charge anyone, as well as the 
right to order them to do so contrary to their will.
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The Attorney General’s role during investigations
As was shown in Chapter Six, the specific provision of the Police Law (Cap. 285, 
Art. 19) and also the general constitutional relationship between the police and the 
Law Office, formally place the investigation of crimes by the former under the 
instructions of the latter. Therefore, the Attorney General is entrusted with a role in 
investigations on top of his other functions relating to prosecutions.
The law does not give the Attorney General (and, thus, the Law Officers) direct 
investigatory powers. As a result, the Law Officers themselves are not empowered to 
undertake any specific investigative actions such as interrogating witnesses and 
suspects or collecting any other evidence. However, they are empowered to intervene 
during investigations and/or require further information, and to cause the investigation 
by the police of any matter they consider important.
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the legal text does not make the Attorney 
General’s intervention in investigations obligatory. It does not set out specific duties 
and responsibilities for the Law Office during the investigation period; neither does it 
associate the legality of the investigation with the authorisation or the final control of 
the Attorney General. What it does ensure, though, is the theoretical potential and 
power of the Attorney General to act in such a way if he chooses to do so.
Nevertheless, apart from the general position that places the police under the control 
of the Law Office during investigations, a series of legislative provisions has been 
gradually introduced which either confer on the Attorney General a direct 
investigatory power, or directly connect the legality of some investigations to the 
oversight and final control of the Law Office. These legislative provisions seek to 
ensure the obligatory (and not just discretionary) involvement of the Law Office in 
investigations, especially in areas where either coercive measures could be used or 
sensitive/complex issues may arise.
The Attorney General’s role in the formulation of prosecutorial policies
It has been shown that the Cyprus prosecution system, given its common law origins, 
adheres to the opportunity principle. There has never been an unavoidable obligation 
placed by law on the prosecuting authorities to institute proceedings for all offences
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that come to their notice. Therefore, it is accepted that the prosecuting authorities 
enjoy a certain amount of discretion in deciding whether or not to institute criminal 
proceedings and, thus, to develop the policies by which this discretion is exercised.
The discussion about the Attorney General’s role in the formulation of prosecutorial 
policies has been centered on two themes: the first is the extent of the discretion that 
is allowed to the Law Office to formulate its own policies regarding prosecutions, and 
the second is the role that the Law Office has to play in the formulation of the overall 
prosecution policy of the jurisdiction and, thus, the question of whether the Law 
Office is empowered to define the prosecution policies of the rest of the prosecuting 
authorities.
The Constitution entrusts the Attorney General with a broad discretion regarding his 
prosecutorial decisions, without imposing any terms or conditions on the execution of 
this power. Neither the Constitution nor statutory legislation oblige the Attorney 
General to declare publicly the principles upon which he acts in exercising his 
discretion in prosecuting; neither do they oblige him to give reasons for his decisions 
in particular instances. On the contrary, both judicially and extra-judicially, it has 
been recognised that because the powers of the Law Office are constitutionally 
upheld, they are absolute and cannot be compromised by common legislation.
Additionally, the Constitution grants to the Law Office an independent rather than a 
political status. The Attorney General is appointed, serves, and can only be removed 
under the same conditions as the Judges of the Supreme Court, and his Office is not 
subject to any Ministry. Therefore, in theory, he can formulate his prosecution policy 
totally independently of the Executive. Furthermore, the courts have on many 
occasions declared that the Attorney General’s discretion is absolute and not 
reviewable.
Therefore, regarding the first aspect of the Attorney General’s role under this section, 
it has been established by now that the Attorney General is considered as the official 
who is exclusively responsible for the formulation of the prosecution policy of the 
Law Office, without sharing power with any other government department such as the 
Ministry of Justice, or being constrained by statutory legislation.
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Turning now to the second aspect of the Attorney General’s role in this area: It has 
been extensively discussed in this thesis that the Attorney General’s relationship with 
the police is not only limited to his constitutional obligations and powers to oversee 
and control all prosecutions. The Police Law (as well as similar provisions in Laws 
that give the right to prosecute to other Government Departments) clearly 
acknowledges that the police discharge their functions regarding prosecutions under 
the superintendence of the Attorney General. Based on this, it is accepted that the 
Attorney General could, if he wishes, define police prosecution policies. 
Consequently, the Attorney General’s Office might not be obliged or appear ready to 
take the decision for prosecution in each and every case; nevertheless, as has been 
argued in this thesis, it appears to be the institution responsible (and the institution 
that possesses the power) for the formulation of the overall prosecutorial policy in the 
jurisdiction.
II. THE ATTORNEY GENERALS’ POLICIES
‘H owever much care is taken in the formulation o f  the powers associated 
with the respective offices, there is little doubt that the experience, 
standing and personalities o f  the people occupying these positions... have 
to be carefully assessed, i f  a realistic picture is to be gained o f  the day to 
day administration o f  justice.’ (Edwards 1989:101)
Given the very broad legal provisions and the great discretion that is afforded to the 
Attorney General to specify his powers regarding prosecutions, this study regarded as 
essential the need to examine how successive office-holders themselves have 
interpreted their role and chosen to utilise their broad discretion over time.
A general conclusion that can be drawn is that successive Attorney Generals have 
been comfortable with the broad nature of their role and the fact that they have 
acquired complete freedom of action to define and pursue their tasks. The impression 
is given that the mystique that surrounds the Law Office and the excessive latitude 
that characterises its powers have been regarded as essential in order to retain its 
symbolic role in the prosecution process. However, as time passed, a slight tendency
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can be observed -  caused by the approach of particular office-holders -  towards a 
greater specification of the role of the Law Office in prosecutions.
The second general conclusion that can be drawn is that the involvement of the Law 
Office in prosecutions has progressively become both more active and more 
extensive. This is again attributable to the choices of certain office-holders, as well as 
to a series of other reasons that advocated towards such an expansion.
Policies regarding the Law Office’s workload and relationship with the Police
As has been shown, the theory had always been that the Attorney General would be 
entitled to intervene in any case but enjoyed the discretion to choose the categories of 
cases that he wished to deal with. In the past, there was less expectation of the 
Attorney General to be involved in cases other than the most serious ones and there 
grew also a tendency by some office-holders to reserve their involvement for only the 
most exceptional cases. Over time, the involvement of the Law Office in various 
categories of cases became greater, and its control over the police became more 
effective. It has been argued in this thesis that the personality and the choices of each 
Attorney General constituted some of the most significant factors that shaped the Law 
Office’s workload.
Mr Tomaritis placed emphasis on the control function of the Attorney General over 
the prosecution system rather than on the everyday involvement of his Office in every 
prosecution case. He underlined the symbolic role of the Attorney General in the 
system and his potential to intervene whenever necessary. The institution of criminal 
prosecutions on behalf of the Law Office -  apart from the Assize Court cases -  during 
that period was not very usual. Mr Tomaritis did not establish a proactive policy on 
the type of cases that the police were required to forward to the Law Office, nor did 
he set up procedures for systematic contacts with the police regarding the cases that 
they used to deal with. However, he did manage to impose his status as the ultimate 
prosecuting authority. It is interesting to note that, since that period, the police have 
regarded themselves as being part of a chain of command headed by the Attorney 
General in relation to prosecutions.
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The passing of the Public Prosecutors Law 8/1989 marked the beginning of the tenure 
of Mr Triantafyllides as Attorney General. That Law (although full of uncertainties 
and not giving extra powers to the Law Office) appeared to signal a new era in the 
philosophy of the relationship between the police and the Law Office. It was the 
beginning of a closer relationship between them (during his tenure, the police sought 
his directions more frequently than before, and he intervened on many occasions in 
cases that did not belong to his regular ‘Assize Court’ workload) and it provided the 
reaffirmation that the Attorney General was the undoubted supervisory authority. In 
spite of this, Mr Triantafyllides, like his predecessor, refrained from defining specific 
directions as to which cases he wished to deal with and from setting comprehensive 
requirements on the police to report specific cases. He strongly believed that 
interpersonal dynamics was the crucial factor that would enable him to exercise 
control over the police, and that classifying categories of cases or defining guidelines 
would somehow compromise his broad powers to deal with whatever he chose.
During Mr Markidis’ tenure at the office, his approach and the way he interpreted his 
role, together with a combination of other factors, advocated the extension of the Law 
Office’s workload in terms of both the variety and the volume of cases that they were 
dealing with. Mr Markidis followed a more structured approach to the workload of his 
Office, systematised his communication with the police, introducing a series of 
measures towards that direction and, for the first time, he defined in writing some 
specific categories of cases that the police should forward to the Law Office. These 
included offences for which he was of the opinion that particular attention was 
required or were ‘cases that might reveal important considerations of public policy’. 
Nevertheless, he admitted that the involvement of the Law Office in every case was 
not possible, but he appeared confident that the theoretical potential of the Law Office 
to intervene influenced both the police to send problematic cases to the Law Office 
and also the victims/defendants to ask for the Law Office’s intervention when 
necessary.
Mr Nikitas did not find it necessary to give explicit directions to the police or the 
public prosecutors concerning the cases that they should forward to the Law Office. 
He appeared more preoccupied with the establishment of solid principles on which 
cases should be decided rather than with which cases reached his Office. Although he
288
Chapter Eight: Recapitulation and Conclusions
appeared very strict and detailed regarding prosecution criteria, he did not seem to pay 
the same attention to which cases his Office was, and should be, dealing with. Mr 
Nikitas argued that the Law Office’s workload did not change significantly from that 
under his predecessor, but there are indications that his more general views on the 
criteria that should be applied in prosecution decisions influenced the workload of the 
Law Office.
Policies regarding the Law Office’s investigatory role
It has been demonstrated that the law in the majority of cases does not make the 
involvement of the Law Office in investigation obligatory. Once again, the extent and 
the way that these powers are used are left open to the Attorney General to define. 
This research revealed that the Law Office for many years hardly developed any 
active or at least publicly pronounced policy on investigations in practice. Successive 
Attorney Generals preferred to deal with cases on an ad hoc basis instead of 
formulating a deliberate and comprehensive policy regarding all investigations.
However, it appeared not to be unusual for all the Attorney Generals to direct the 
police to initiate investigations regarding particular incidents or request information 
regarding ongoing investigations. This mainly concerned cases that created media 
attention and publicity or cases of particular sensitivity or complexity that came to the 
attention of the Law Office. The impression that was given from the content of the 
correspondence between the police and the Attorney General was that the police had 
always regarded themselves -  at least theoretically -  as absolutely bound by an 
instruction from the Law Office, at least concerning those serious or high-profile 
cases. This generally cooperative relationship between the Law Office and the police 
may also be attributed to the fact that in general, apart from those special cases, the 
succeeding Attorney Generals did not appear to promote or declare a very 
interventionist policy towards the police investigative role.
Summarising the philosophy of all the Attorney Generals towards their role in 
investigation, it can be said that: (a) they all declared their theoretical potential to 
intervene in every stage of the investigations, but they were cautious not to claim that 
this was a regular job for their Office to be carried out on a systematic basis; (b) they 
talked more about legal advice rather than supervision of investigations apart from
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specific categories of cases (‘sensitive cases’, cases involving public figures, 
allegations against police officers) when they chose to use a more authoritative 
terminology; and (c) they clearly considered it as their duty to thoroughly examine the 
evidence and order further inquiries if required, during the stage that a case was 
forwarded to the Law Office for a prosecution decision to be taken.
Formulation of prosecutorial policies
All the Attorney Generals, with the exception of Mr Nikitas, strongly promoted their 
broad discretion in prosecution decisions. The official rhetoric used by all of them to 
articulate their prosecutorial discretion has placed emphasis on the quasi-judicial 
nature of their power and their independent status. In this way, they implied that a 
detailed specification of the criteria by which they exercise their discretion was not 
well suited to the judicial nature of their duties, nor was it essential, given their 
independent status. Furthermore, they praised the virtues of individualised justice and 
they emphasised the need for flexible and responsible decision-making by an 
independent official, entrusted with the duty to take into account various 
considerations that make up the general public interest.
This research revealed that successive Attorney Generals, for many years, had not 
developed a comprehensive and publicly pronounced policy which defined a priori 
how their prosecutorial discretion ought to be exercised. They largely refrained from 
spelling out detailed criteria for their decision-making (e.g. there has never been a 
prosecution code in Cyprus), although their general approach and their specific 
policies on certain categories of cases were publicly announced. However, over the 
years, and especially during Mr Markidis’ tenure, a more positive approach towards 
the formulation of more specific policies had been adopted without, however, 
extending to the level of formulating a comprehensive and detailed policy for all 
prosecutions. Nevertheless, all the Attorney Generals argued that, even if it was not 
always published, a certain approach to prosecutions always existed and its consistent 
application in the Law Office was guaranteed by the small size of the service.
It was evident that apart from the common characteristics observed relating to their 
prosecutorial discretion, each Attorney General adopted his own prosecution policy. 
The most striking difference in prosecution policies was observed between the
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approach of Mr Triantafyllides and that of Mr Nikitas. Mr Triantafyllides considered 
the power to discontinue or refrain from prosecutions on public interest reasons as a 
power that can be used regularly and not only on very rare occasions. He stressed, 
though, that this was a power exclusively exercised by the Attorney General himself. 
On the other hand, Mr Nikitas strongly believed that the Attorney General should not 
filter cases out of the system due to mitigating factors concerning the defendant, apart 
from on very extreme occasions. He argued that the public interest was served by 
sending cases to court and the Attorney General should not try to usurp courts’ 
powers by diverting cases on a regular basis. In general, Mr Nikitas, contrary to all his 
predecessors, appeared to introduce an approach which advocated the restriction of 
the Attorney General’s discretion.
As shown earlier, theoretically, the Attorney General is empowered to define the 
prosecution policy of the rest of the prosecuting authorities, especially the police who, 
according to the Police Law, discharge their functions regarding prosecutions under 
his superintendence. The question is whether and how successive Attorney Generals 
have realised this theoretical potential. All the Attorney Generals agreed that the 
harmonisation of police policies with the approach adopted by each Attorney General 
was achieved by (a) the close contact they had on an everyday basis with police 
prosecution authorities, (b) the notification to the police of any internal circulars 
issued in the Law Office, (c) the specification of certain categories of cases that 
should be forwarded to the Law Office so that the Law Office exclusively take 
prosecutorial decisions regarding them, and (d) the ex posterior review and overruling 
of police decisions, especially after requests by the defendants or the victims.
Nevertheless, the most important means by which the police prosecutorial policy was 
controlled had been the directive of all the Attorney Generals (which was, however, 
more forcefully applied by Mr Markidis) according to which all cases that the police 
wished to filter out of the system ought to be forwarded to the Law Office. All the 
AGs regarded diversion from prosecutions as the exclusive responsibility of the Law 
Office (regardless of the approach that each office-holder adopted to the frequency 
with which cases could be diverted from courts). Therefore, they ensured a central 
control of any depositary actions, which admittedly are the most important
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prosecutorial decisions and, thus, a central control of the overall prosecutorial policy 
in the jurisdiction.
III. IDEOLOGY
A further objective of this thesis has been to uncover the ideology that characterises 
the Law Officers’ approach to their prosecutorial role. In order to get a fuller picture 
of the role that the Law Office plays in prosecutions, it was considered important to 
gain an appreciation of Law Officers’ own understanding and attitudes towards their 
functions which, presumably, also infuse and influence their practices.
The Law Officers9 approach to their workload and relationship with the Police
As far as their attitude to the Law Office’s workload was concerned, Law Officers 
declared categorically the ultimate responsibility of their Office to control and oversee 
all prosecutions in the jurisdiction. Although they theoretically accepted that the Law 
Office could also deal with minor cases, they considered the most serious cases as the 
core of the Law Office’s workload. Regarding the rest of the cases, it was obvious 
from Law Officers’ accounts that exceptional, complex or sensitive cases were 
regarded as ‘Law Office material’, in contrast to ordinary or run-of-the-mill cases.
The rhetorical position that the Attorney General was also responsible for the cases 
which the police were dealing with was emphatically adopted by the Law Officers. 
However, the way they reflected on it (especially the justifications they offered for the 
Law Office-Police relationship) was characterised by the same contradictions as the 
rhetoric itself, and probably was a result of this.
Law Officers realised that they could not exercise everyday control in all ‘police’ 
cases mainly due to resource issues and, therefore, they focused on their ‘control 
function’ and their ability to intervene when necessary. Furthermore, they accepted 
that there was a considerable degree of flexibility regarding police reporting 
procedures, although the serving Attorney General (Mr Markidis) was far more 
specific in his directions than his predecessors. They acknowledged that this allowed 
the police a wide discretion, but they appeared confident that if something really
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important needed their attention, there were sufficient mechanisms in place to find 
out.
The Law Officers’ approach to their role in investigations
The Law Officers’ approach to their role in investigations reflected the consistent 
policies that successive Attorney Generals had promoted over time. They regarded 
their involvement in investigations more as a power rather than a duty and, although 
they considered it as extremely beneficial, they acknowledged that due to their heavy 
workload it could not be particularly extensive. Therefore, it was inevitably limited to 
those cases that were complex or difficult, or those where police chose to ask for their 
advice.
They appeared to consider investigations as predominantly a police job and their role 
usually as complementary, providing essential legal knowledge in the investigative 
process. They talked more about legal advice rather than supervision of investigations, 
apart from specific categories of cases (‘sensitive cases’, cases involving public 
figures, allegations against police officers) when, like their superiors, they chose to 
use a more imposing terminology. In general, they emphasised the good cooperation 
and trust that ought to characterise their relations with the police so that police 
investigators were encouraged to seek their assistance when needed.
Law Officers appeared to separate the stages during which they could intervene in the 
main investigative stage before a complete file was formed, and the stage when a case 
was forwarded to the Law Office for a prosecution decision to be taken. At that latter 
stage, Law Officers appeared to consider it as their duty to thoroughly examine the 
evidence and order other lines of inquiry or further information, if that was required.
The Law Officers’ approach to prosecutorial discretion and decision-making
Law Officers, reflecting on their prosecution decisions, placed emphasis on the need 
for flexible and responsible decision-making. Directly connected to their ideas on 
flexibility in decision-making was the fact that individualised justice was regarded by 
all Law Officers as the ideal that ought to be respected and aspired to, and ought to 
guide their prosecutorial decisions. Failure to measure up to this ideal was considered 
by most Law Officers as a compromise to what was regarded as good prosecuting.
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Their approach to prosecutorial decision making did not ignore the ideal of 
consistency but they believed that by virtue of their independence, qualifications and 
‘shared ethos’, they could be trusted to perceive the best solution to each 
prosecutorial dilemma, even when they were not constrained by rigid written rules. 
The representation of public interest and the ‘ministry o f  justice approach ’ to 
prosecutions were recurring themes in the description of their role and prosecutorial 
decision-making. The Attorney General as an independent official with a high status 
and guarantees of neutrality, entrusted by the Constitution to act in the public interest, 
was a powerful image within Law Officers’ ideology and was reflected in the views 
of their status as well. Nevertheless, they all agreed that all of the crucial decisions in 
the Law Office were taken by the Attorney General himself and, therefore, the 
absence of a detailed set of guidelines was not a major shortcoming.
More specifically, Law Officers appeared to be genuinely aware of the inherent 
complexity that prosecutorial decisions usually entailed and the vast variety of 
considerations that ought to be addressed each time. When prompted, they were ready 
to offer a series of factors that they usually took into account when making 
prosecution decisions. They did not only refer to factors related to the defendant, the 
victim or the offence, but they also referred to considerations related to the resources 
of the Office, the credibility and efficiency of the system, the reaction of the public, 
implications for other criminal justice agencies, etc. Moreover, they recognised the 
need for a continuous review of their decisions as the cases proceeded. Their 
reflection on prosecutorial decision-making indicated a sophisticated way o f  thinking, 
which did not attempt to avoid taking into consideration ‘sensitive’ dilemmas and 
conflicting interests in the process.
IV. PRACTICE
‘ . . . “practice” (is) a relatively structured field o f  action o f  agents or 
groups o f  agents, which can only be understood in terms o f  the 
assumptions, values, goals, and interpretive frames which inform the 
agents’ actions and infuse the surrounding context in which those actions 
take place.’ (Lacey 1994:31)
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The last objective of this research has been to explore the practices developed in the 
Law Office when discharging their prosecutorial functions and, thus, to provide a first 
insight into their actual day-to-day activity regarding prosecutions.
Workload of the Law Office
In practice, it was observed that the workload of the Attorney General’s Office was 
incredibly diverse and multifarious. It included an interesting mixture of not only 
high-profile cases and complex and ‘sensitive’ ones, but also minor and prima facie 
run-of-the-mill cases which used to reach the Law Office for a variety of reasons.
Apart from those that they were required by law to deal with (Assize Court and 
‘consent’ cases), the Law Office also dealt with categories of cases that the Attorney 
General had clearly specified a priori or chosen ad hoc, cases for which the police 
requested advice or directions, as well as cases for which other agents in the process -  
usually the defendants -  asked for the Law Office’s intervention, usually in order to 
overrule a police decision. Cases that the police wished to filter out of the system, 
mainly on public interest grounds, and those for which the entering of a nolle 
prosequi or discontinuance was requested were observed to constitute a very crucial 
part of the Law Office’s workload.
As shown earlier, although the serving Attorney General had been more specific than 
his predecessors in defining categories of cases that ought to be forwarded to the Law 
Office, he had not fully utilised his powers. As a result, apart from specific categories 
of cases, the police were left to judge semi-autonomously what was important and 
problematic enough to be sent to the Law Office. However, the fact that there was a 
strong consensus on the matter of principle -  namely that the Attorney General was 
the ultimate authority in prosecutions and had the authority to give directions 
regarding all prosecutions -  appeared to inform the practices of all the actors in the 
system. Victims and defendants quite often used to request the Law Office’s 
intervention in cases that did not regularly belong to their workload and the police 
practices appeared to be influenced by this theoretical potential.
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The Law Office’s role in investigation
In practice it was observed that there were three stages during which the Attorney 
General’s Office could exert its powers regarding the investigation of, and the 
collection of information for, a case. The Attorney General could order the initiation 
of investigations; he could intervene during the conduct of investigations; and he 
could also order further investigations after the file of a case was forwarded to the 
Office for a decision to prosecute or not.
The Law Office used to order the instigation of investigations in cases of particularly 
serious crimes or crimes that created publicity. What usually caused the exercise of 
this Attorney General’s power was the receipt of information that a certain incident 
had occurred and usually was not properly investigated by the police, or the media 
coverage of an event that contained allegations of a crime. Moreover, it was also 
observed that the Attorney General sometimes used to set priorities as to the initiation 
or the process of investigations of particular serious cases (usually when exceptional 
public outcry was present and speedy investigation was crucial).
During investigations, Law Officers used to provide extensive legal advice to the 
police, usually when the police sought such advice, but sometimes because Law 
Officers themselves judged that due to the sensitivity of a case, they ought to 
intervene. Regarding the latter cases, supervision and directions were far more 
comprehensive and there was a sense that Law Officers and the Attorney General 
himself were actually leading the investigation. Concerning the rest of the cases, there 
was no formal structure to facilitate the Law Office’s involvement in police 
operations from the beginning. However, it was observed that there was a well- 
developed culture that was encouraging the police officers to seek the Attorney 
General’s advice regularly. Police investigators usually asked for Law Officers’ 
directions concerning disputed points of law, regarding the collection of evidence 
with special investigative techniques, and they used to seek Law Officers’ assistance 
when wishing to obtain judicial authorisation for their activities.
During the stage that a file was forwarded to the Law Office for a prosecution 
decision to be made, Law Officers used to order further inquiries and additional 
evidence quite regularly. It is true that this approach was not adopted for all cases
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with the same vigilance. It is equally true that, very often, their directions for further 
investigations concerned only clarification of details or correction of internal 
inconsistencies which had for some reason been overlooked by the police. However, it 
was not rare for Law Officers to order new lines of inquiry in various cases or to 
challenge the ‘police construction of a case’. That usually occurred when the defence 
provided them with alternative information or drew their attention to possible misuse 
of police powers and suspicious police practices.
Prosecutorial decision-making within the Law Office
In practice, it was observed that Law Officers used to make a genuine effort to adhere 
to the values of individualised justice which they advocated in the theoretical 
reflections of their decision-making (e.g. varied sources of information, continuous 
review of the cases, etc). Due to the pressures of their workload, however, this type of 
decision-making was not adopted for all categories of cases with the same vigilance. 
Cases concerning indictable offences appeared to be the Law Office’s priority. For the 
rest, Law Officers were observed not to have always the same time and information 
needed for a detailed and deliberate decision.
Other cases that usually attracted more careful consideration, apart from the very 
serious cases, were those regarding which the Attorney General adopted a specific 
policy, those where the defence appeared particularly active in providing information, 
and those that were subject to media exposure. More generally, all decisions 
concerning non-prosecution or a discontinuance of prosecution were regarded as 
exceptions and were more carefully approached and more tightly controlled than 
positive decisions for prosecutions.
The factors that were usually considered in prosecutorial decisions were broadly those 
that Law Officers referred to in their theoretical reflections: mitigating factors related 
to the defendants, the seriousness of the case, the victim’s wishes, the availability of 
resources, etc. What was noticeable was that the Attorney General’s specific and 
declared policies regarding particular cases were almost without exception followed 
and were one of the most powerful reasons why the Law Office might disagree with 
the police suggestions in specific cases. Based on that, it could be assumed that 
carefully drafted guidelines did make a difference, on some occasions, after all. As far
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as questions of evidence were concerned, once Law Officers had clarified that a prima 
facie case was established, on a secondary level, issues of reliability, credibility and 
availability of evidence were mixed with other public interest considerations in order 
to decide whether a case ought to be prosecuted.
V. CHOICES OF THE CYPRUS PROSECUTION SYSTEM AND
FUNCTIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE
As shown in Chapter Two, the main questions that have troubled most prosecution 
systems over time centred on three crucial dichotomies:
a) Systematic v. unsystematic approach to prosecutions
b) Prosecutors’ power to direct investigations v. complete separation of the 
investigative and the prosecutorial stages
c) Legality v. expediency principle.
The choices that prosecution systems have adopted regarding these issues have 
traditionally and at large defined their characterisation as adversarial or inquisitorial 
systems. However, as was also demonstrated, these dichotomies have progressively 
eroded not only in practice but also in the legislations providing for prosecutorial 
arrangements. Nevertheless, even today, certain existing characteristics of prosecution 
systems can be traced back to their different origins and convey their different 
philosophies. In this section, in the light of the aforementioned findings of my 
research, the answers that the Cyprus prosecution system has provided for these 
questions will be briefly exposed, highlighting the special position that the Attorney 
General’s Office occupies in them.
Cyprus prosecutorial arrangements make up a system which reflects the influence of 
the English legal model during its early development, but one which has been refined 
according to local needs and has also incorporated numerous characteristics 
associated with the inquisitorial rather than the adversarial tradition. This system 
seems to represent a compromise between common law’s traditional unsystematic 
approach to prosecutions and the continental European tradition which requires
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prosecutions in general to be structured and controlled by an independent public 
official responsible for all of them. On the one hand, it retains the right to private 
prosecutions and, consequently, the right of various other agencies -  most crucially 
the police -  to carry out a significant number of prosecutions, according to the 
original common law tradition. On the other hand, however, it entrusts to an 
independent, quasi-judicial official (the Attorney General) the ultimate responsibility 
for, and control of, all prosecutions, in line with the continental tradition, besides 
giving him the monopoly of the most serious prosecutions; and it places the police 
under the superintendence and immediate directions of the Law Office, denying them 
the complete independence that they used to enjoy in common law jurisdictions.
In common law jurisdictions, investigations have been traditionally regarded as the 
preserve of the police, contrary to the pure continental tradition which has placed 
prosecutors in charge of the investigative as well as the post-investigative stages. In 
Cyprus, the Attorney General is empowered to intervene in investigations, like his 
counterparts in inquisitorial jurisdictions. In spite of this, his intervention is nor
9 '
obligatory, nor does his authorisation or final control constitute a prerequisite for the 
legality of the investigations. In theory, as well as in practice, the Law Office’s 
involvement in investigations is not regarded as an everyday activity, which would 
substitute the role of the police, but as a complementary function and, more 
importantly, as a theoretical potential that allows for the overall control of police 
actions during the investigative stage.
As far as prosecutorial discretion is concerned, the Cyprus prosecution system, again, 
seems to combine characteristics that are associated with both the legality and the 
opportunity-based systems. The Constitution entrusts the Attorney General with a 
very broad discretion regarding prosecutions (following the opportunity principle), 
while it guarantees his neutrality, independence and quasi-judicial status (following 
the continental tradition). Furthermore, this unlimited discretion only refers to a small 
number of officials in the Law Office. Due to the Attorney Generals’ policy to regard 
prosecutions as the rule and diversion from prosecutions as both the exception 
(regardless of how extensive use of this exception could be made) and the exclusive 
responsibility of the Law Office, a central and strict control of non-prosecution 
decisions is achieved (contrary to the situation in common law jurisdictions, where
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most non-prosecution decisions are still made by a relatively large number of police 
officers and, thus, are difficult to control).
In light of the above remarks, combined with the findings of my research, it can be 
said that the main functions that the Law Office has been observed to fulfil within the 
Cyprus prosecution system appear to be as follows:
a) Prosecution of serious crime and exceptional cases
The Law Office is the exclusively responsible service for dealing with the prosecution 
of the most serious cases, together with those that are regarded as exceptional, 
complex, sensitive or in need for particular attention by the serving Attorney General.
b) Control and oversight of all prosecutions in the jurisdiction
The Attorney General serves as the head of the prosecution system and exercises 
overall control and supervision of all prosecutions carried out in the jurisdiction, even 
when he is not closely and systematically dealing with all of them. These powers, and 
also the theoretical potential to intervene dynamically in the bulk of criminal 
prosecutions, form very crucial aspects of his role and appear to influence the 
practices of all prosecuting agencies (especially the police) in the system.
c) Formulation of prosecutorial policies -  Central control of diversionary 
decisions
The Attorney General determines and formulates the prosecution policy of his Office, 
as well as the overall prosecution policy in the jurisdiction. Furthermore, he provides 
a central and relatively tight control of all diversionary decisions.
d) Ultimate control of the investigative stage
The Attorney General orders the initiation of investigations in serious cases, when the 
police fail to act appropriately, and offers valuable legal advice to the police during 
investigations. By ordering further inquiries and taking into account alternative 
information, usually provided by the defence, he provides an obstacle to the absolute 
control of the investigative stage by the police and enhances confidence in the 
integrity of investigations.
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e) Review forum
One of the most crucial functions that the Law Office appears to perform is that it 
serves as a forum of appeal where all prosecutorial actions (or inaction) of other 
prosecuting agencies in the system can be reviewed. The public ask for the Law 
Office’s intervention when investigations are not carried out properly, or are not 
carried out at all; they require the Law Office’s intervention in cases that usually do 
not belong to its workload, when they judge that they are not being handled properly 
by the police; and they apply for a review or overturn of police prosecutorial 
decisions.
In addition to the aforementioned functions that the Law Office carries out, there are 
at least a couple of others that it could theoretically serve, but appears reluctant to do 
so. These are (a) the systematic involvement in, and handling of, all prosecutions, and 
(b) the regular intervention in all investigations. This thesis has demonstrated that the 
rhetoric regarding the Attorney General’s role in prosecutions, combined with the 
choices of successive office-holders, as well as structural and attitudinal factors within 
the Law Office, advocate against this approach.
VI. CRITIQUE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND 
REFORM PROPOSALS
‘Is it possible to make prescriptions about a practice unless w e understand 
how it works? Are our explanatory interpretations o f  criminal justice  
practices really untainted by our normative commitments?’ (Lacey  
1994:24)
The purpose of this thesis has been to develop our knowledge and understanding of 
the role of the Attorney General’s Office in prosecutions. This study did not set out to 
criticise this role or to compare it to an ideal model; neither did it aim to propose 
reforms to the current system. It is believed that there are two prerequisites that should 
be fulfilled prior to an attempt to criticise a given phenomenon and provide proposals 
for possible reforms: (a) the existing situation should be explored and profoundly
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understood, and (b) normative questions about ‘how the situation ought to be’ should 
be extensively discussed and answered.1
My research has aimed to offer insight into the first of these issues. Obviously, more 
empirical studies on decision-making within the Law Office would be useful. 
Furthermore, studies on the role that Law Officers play at the trial stage2 and specific 
research on the role of other agencies in prosecutions are also required. However, 
apart from these, it is equally important to reflect on questions concerning the 
appropriate role for the Attorney General in prosecutions, and the justified criteria 
and principles upon which he should carry out this role; an enterprise that this 
research only indirectly has touched upon. Nevertheless, Lacey (1994) maintains that 
these two broad research approaches inevitably interact with each other. Normative 
reflection about the proper role of prosecution agencies provides the lenses through 
which the current situation is viewed and, conversely, more descriptive or empirical 
research approaches inform the theoretical discussion of the appropriate role and 
functions of a prosecuting agency and throw light on possible difficulties in realising 
this role.
It is only in this context that some observations on several potentially weak points 
regarding the current role of the Attorney General’s Office in prosecutions will be 
exposed here. They can only serve as preliminary remarks in a future discussion about 
possible reforms of the system:
a) The Attorney General in Cyprus enjoys a very broad discretion in the specification 
and use of his powers regarding prosecutions. Although there are important 
guarantees for his independence and objectivity, and this research indicated a high 
level of trust with which the Law Office is surrounded, these are very wide powers to 
be left to a single person to define and an enormous discretion to be left without any 
form of control.
1 See Lacey (1992:380-88).
2 This research has focused on the pre-trial stage o f prosecutions and considered the role o f the Law 
Office during the trial stage only indirectly.
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b) The Law Office appears to adopt a very reserved attitude towards openness and 
accountability. Some office-holders in the past have taken the view that their 
independence and quasi-judicial status are best safeguarded by maintaining a certain 
mystique relating to the execution of their powers. However, the Law Office performs 
one of the key functions of the state and, especially in the absence of any other forms 
of control (judicial or legislative), openness and transparency in the execution of its 
role ensures a form of accountability and a greater understanding by the public of the 
Law Office’s functions. Although, lately, there have been positive steps towards the 
publication of the Law Office’s prosecutorial policies, there are still further steps to be 
taken in this direction.
c) Related to the above point is the following remark: It has been observed that the 
representation of the public interest is a core aspect of the Attorney General’s role and 
one that largely justifies his wide powers and responsibilities. It is emphasised that the 
Attorney General is the only responsible official to define the public interest in 
prosecutions, balancing in each case the different interests at stake. However, as 
Sanders (1988a:40) points out, ‘even the existence let alone the content of one 
universal ‘public interest’ is far from self evident. If any concept of public interest is 
to have legitimacy, it must be based on specific, clearly articulated and publicly 
debated values.’
d) The formulation of guidelines, even within the Law Office, has been regarded for 
years as unnecessary. The fact that the Attorney General’s Office has traditionally 
been a small Office and the number of Officers dealing with prosecutions a limited 
one has cultivated firstly the idea of a ‘shared ethos’ within the Law Office and 
secondly the assumption that all crucial decisions are taken by the Attorney General 
himself. It is true that, as Schauer (2005:9) remarks, ‘when there is widespread 
agreement among decision-makers, and when decision-makers have the same values 
and the same background and the same skills, discretion is likely to seem most 
desirable.’3 However, although generally Law Officers appeared to hold similar views
3 Schauer (2005:9) continues: ‘And that is perhaps why the common law, a far more discretionary 
approach to legal decision-making than the civil law, arose at a time when it was widely believed that 
English judges, by virtue o f their training and background, could be trusted to perceive the best solution 
to a legal problem even when they were not constrained by rigid written rules.’
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on the crucial issues of prosecutions, and a relatively tight control of important 
decisions by the Attorney General was indeed observed within the Law Office, there 
were indications that this was starting to change as the workload of criminal cases was 
increasing and the Law Office was expanding. The words of a Senior Law Officer are 
illuminating:
‘We used to be a very small and tight team... 15 years ago, the news that a new 
counsel was appointed to the office was big news. The Attorney General would 
introduce him to the rest of us one by one...Nowadays, the Office is expanding 
dangerously...We will reach a point where we will not know each other...’
(Senior Law Officer 02)
e) Successive Attorney Generals have always feared that the specification of their 
powers would result in their restriction. That is why, with the exception of Mr 
Markidis, they largely refrained from specifying the categories of cases that they 
would deal with, and from setting specific prosecution policies. This research has 
demonstrated that this fear is false. On the contrary, where predetermined categories 
of cases were set, the Law Office’s role in prosecutions appeared more active and its 
intervention became more systematic. Furthermore, it was observed that where 
specific policies were in place, instead of limiting Law Officers’ discretion, they 
formed one of the most powerful factors in not unquestioningly endorsing other 
agencies’ decisions. Therefore, this indicates that what successive Attorney Generals 
feared as limiting their powers could instead result in the potential for an even more 
proactive and wider role in the prosecution process. Related to this is the assumption 
that the need to formulate guidelines may be an incentive to successive Attorney 
Generals to think more thoroughly and critically about the objectives to be attained 
and the policies to be followed regarding prosecutions.
f) Finally, the Attorney General’s Office, as explained in Chapter Four, functions both 
as the Legal Service of the Government as well as the Office of Public Prosecutions. 
Consequently, its workload apart from responsibilities concerning the criminal 
prosecutions also includes a considerable and diverse body of other duties. All post­
holders have admitted that this inevitably exerts some influence on the volume of 
criminal cases that the Law Office can deal with. Therefore, the creation of a separate 
service responsible for prosecutions or the reorganisation of the Attorney General’s
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Office are some issues that should not be excluded from discussions about possible 
reforms of the system.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The central purpose of this thesis has been to provide a more profound understanding 
of the role of the Cyprus Attorney General’s Office in prosecutions, an undertaking 
lamentably neglected so far. On a more general level, though, it is hoped that this 
study has also shed light on the choices of the Cyprus prosecution system in some of 
the most debatable issues regarding prosecutions in many jurisdictions. Questions 
concerning the desirability of prosecutors and police having a more clearly 
hierarchical constitutional relationship; the giving of direct investigatory functions to 
prosecutors; the retention by the police of the power to filter cases out of the system 
without any control from the prosecuting authorities; and the institution responsible 
for formulating the prosecution policy in the jurisdiction have constituted the most 
controversial topics of discussion among academics and practitioners and are still 
included in the reform agenda of various commissions. The choices of the Cyprus 
prosecution system -  a system initially based on the original British model which, 
however, has developed and been modified through time -  have been exposed, always 
in the light of the pivotal position that the Law Office occupies in them.
This research has demonstrated that, in Cyprus, the Attorney General’s role in 
prosecutions is impressively wide and multifarious. There are enough indications that 
it will, most probably, be further extended in the future. The examples of other 
jurisdictions show a growing role for prosecutors who are called to deal with new 
challenges in the criminal justice system. Moreover, in Cyprus, recently enacted 
legislative provisions add new duties to the already broad powers and responsibilities 
of the Law Office.4 Therefore, a wide scale appraisal of the Attorney General’s role, 
combined with an empirically informed reflection on his appropriate functions in the 
system, is more urgent than ever. It is hoped that this research has provided the 
foundation for such a discussion, as it has offered an insight into the rhetoric, ideology
4 See, for example, in Chapter Six, the various Laws that provide for his obligatory intervention in 
investigations.
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and practices involved regarding the role of the Attorney General’s Office in 
prosecutions. Moreover, since it constitutes the first research study being carried out 
in the previously closed environment of the Law Office, it is anticipated that it may 
open some windows for further research on this topic.
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I. List of Post-holders before the establishment of the 
Cyprus Republic (1960) 1
LEGAL ADVISER
Sir Elliot Charles Bovill 1878-1881
KING’S ADVOCATES 
William Robert Collyer 1881-1892
Archibald Fitzgerald Law 1892-1893
Frederic Gordon Templer 1893-1898
Alfred George Lascelles 1898-1902
William Rees-Davis 1902-1907
John Alexander Strachey Bucknill 1907-1912
William Alison Russell 1912-1924
John Curtois Howard 1924-1925
ATTORNEY GENERALS 
John Curtois Howard 1925-1926
Charles Cyril Gerahty 1926-1929
Harry Herbert Trusted 1929-1932
Henry William Butler Blackall 1932-1936
Lloyd-Blood 1936-1940
Stafford William Powel Foster Sutton 1940-1944
Stelios Pavlides 1944-1952
Criton T omaritis 1952-1956
James H. Henry 1956-1960
1 Source: Loucaides (1974).
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II. Organisation of the Attorney General’s Office and the 
Police Prosecution Departments1
Chief o f the Police
Central Police 
Prosecution 
Department
Deputy Attorney General
Police Prosecution 
Department o f 
Lamaca
Police Prosecution 
Department o f 
Limassol
Police Prosecution 
Department o f 
Nicosia
Police Prosecution 
Department o f 
Paphos
Attorney General
Law Officers -  Public Prosecutors
1 During the time o f my main fieldwork period.
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III. Statistics'
' Source: Statistical Service (2004).
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TABLE 1. TRUE CASES OF SERIOUS OFFENCES REPORTED TO THE POLICE BY OFFENCE GROUP, 1976-2004
O ffence 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003(2) 2004(2)
I. Against public order 243 88 90 122 190 182 197 186 173
II. Against lawful authority 14 17 7 2 7 7 12 16 20
III. Injurious to the public in general 41 27 59 50 158 303 444 497 589
IV. Sexual offences 50 26 21 6 22 35 25 52 71
V. Against the person 126 140 75 95 154 111 142 176 212
VI. Against property 1.383 1 .606 2.851 2.739 2.328 2.388 2.495 4.992 4.804
VII. M alicious injuries to property 166 191 315 306 303 290 262 375 341
VIII. Forgery, coining, counterfeiting, 
similar offences and personation 45 134 142 354 814 1.012 1.114 918 1.322
IX. M iscellaneous offences 4 3 2 10 57 12 67 44 83
ALL SERIOUS OFFENCES 2.072 2.232 3.562 3.684 4.033 4.340 4.758 7.256 7.615
V olum e o f  crim e (1) 416 439 658 636 620 626 670 1.007 1.033
Notes 1. Volume o f crime = Serious offences per 100,000 population.
2. As from 2003 the Police has changed the recording practice of serious offences reported; as a result a much higher number of  
cases are recorded, mainly against property. The figures are not strictly comparable with previous years.
311
Appendices
TABLE 2. SERIOUS OFFENCES REPORTED TO THE POLICE, TAKEN TO COURT
AND TRIED, 1976-2004
Offence group 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004
( 0 (!)
I. Against public order 275
REPORTED TO THE POLICE
93 99 124 193 184 200 187 174
II. Against lawful authority 14 21 10 3 8 8 13 16 20
III. Injurious to the public 
in general 48 29 62 53 159 306 452 500 591
IV. Sexual offences 56 28 23 8 24 39 26 54 71
V . Against the person 143 152 80 97 157 116 143 178 212
VI. Against property 1.523 1.708 3.000 2.799 2350 2.411 2.521 5.033 4.822
VII. M alicious injuries to 
Property 244 320 447 360 320 303 271 393 346
VIII. Forgery, coining,
counterfeiting, similar 
offences, personation 72 143 169 377 826 1.021 1.125 930 1.328
IX. M iscellaneous offences 8 4 4 11 60 12 67 46 84
TOTAL 2.383 2.498 3.894 3.832 4.097 4.400 4.818 7.337 7.648
I. Against public order 57
TAKEN TO COURT AND TRIED 
17 22 16 11 7 16 11 11
II. Against lawful Authority 1 2 2 0 1 0 1 1 3
III. Injurious to the public 
in general 21 14 20 20 38 59 61 29 52
IV. Sexual offences 11 4 3 1 0 2 2 3 4
V. Against the person 28 22 9 14 7 7 12 20 22
VI. Against property 293 331 523 374 191 358 289 232 230
VII. M alicious injuries to 
Property 46 20 37 16 10 19 8 10 5
VIII. Forgery, coining,
counterfeiting, similar 12 86 22 90 103 69 275 166 276
offences, personation 
IX. M iscellaneous offences 0 0 1 0 43 1 24 5 14
TOTAL 469 496 639 531 404 522 688 477 617
Note 1. Due to the change in the recording practice o f the Police concerning serious offences reported, 
a much higher number o f cases are recorded; thus the figures are not strictly comparable with 
previous years.
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TABLE 3. SERIOUS OFFENCES REPORTED TO THE POLICE BY
METHOD OF DISPOSAL, 1976-2004
Method o f  disposal 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004
(3) (3)
N o case 311
ABSOLUTE NUMBERS 
266 324 144 64 58 60 80 33
Found false 8 4 0 2 0 1 0
Undetected 773 850 1.368 1.317 703 467 464 2.649 2.241
Otherwise disposed o f 303 227 343 157 323 316 305 108 78
Handed over to: 
National Guard 124 43 16 7 11 3 2 8 0
UNFICYP 8 4 1 0 0 1
British Forces 8 0 0 0 0 0 0
Taken to Court: 
Tried 469 496 639 531 404 522 688 477 617
Awaiting trial 154 396 302 399 552 719 825 966
Pending (1) 403 462 646 1.070 1.769 2.087 1.804 1760 1857
Under investigation^) 138 296 423 393 776 1.429 1.855
TOTAL 2383 2.498 3.894 3.832 4.097 4.400 4.818 7.337 7.648
No case 13,1 10,6
PERCENTAGES
8,3 3,8 1,6 1,3 1,2 1,1 0,4
Found false 0,2 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Undetected 32,4 34,0 35,1 34,4 17,1 10,6 9,6 36,1 29,3
Otherwise disposed o f 12,7 9,1 8,8 4,1 7,9 7,2 6,3 1,5 1,0
Handed over to: 
National Guard 5,2 1,7 0,4 0,2 0,3 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,0
UNFICYP 0,2 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
British Forces 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Taken to Court: 
Tried 19,7 19,9 16,4 13,8 9,9 11,9 14,3 6,5 8,1
Awaiting trial 6,2 10,2 7,9 9,7 12,5 14,9 11,2 12,6
Pending (1) 16,9 18,5 16,6 27,9 43,2 47,4 37,4 24,0 24,3
Under investigation^) 3,6 7,7 10,3 8,9 16,1 19,5 24,3
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Notes: .... Not separately reported
(1) The term "prima facie detected" has changed to "pending" as from 2000.
(2) The term "prima facie undetected" has changed to "under investigation" as 
from 2001.
(3) Due to the change in the recording practice o f the Police concerning serious 
offences reported, a much higher number o f cases are recorded; thus, the 
figures are not strictly comparable with previous years.
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TABLE 4. TRUE CASES OF SERIOUS OFFENCES REPORTED TO THE POLICE BY
OFFENCE GROUP, 1976-2004
Offence group 1976 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
(1) (1)
J. Against public order 243 88
REPORTED TO THE POLICE
90 122 190 182 222 197 186 173
II. Against lawful authority 14 17 7 2 7 7 19 12 16 20
III. Injurious to the public 
in general 41 27 59 50 158 303 412 444 497 589
IV. Sexual offences 50 26 21 6 22 35 25 25 52 71
V . Against the person 126 140 75 95 154 111 136 142 176 212
VI. Against property 1.383 1.606 2.851 2.739 2.328 2.388 2.024 2.495 4.992 4.804
VII. Malicious injuries to 
property 166 191 315 306 303 290 284 262 375 341
VIII. Forgery, coining, 
counterfeiting, similar 
offences and personation 45 134 142 354 814 1.012 1.360 1.114 918 1.322
IX. Miscellaneous offences 4 3 2 10 57 12 24 67 44 83
TOTAL 2.072 2.232 3.562 3.684 4.033 4.340 4.506 4.758 7.256 7.615
L Against public order 11,7 3,9 2,5
PERCENTAGES
3,3 4,7 4,2 4,9 4,1 2,6 2,3
II. Against lawful authority 0,7 0,8 0,2 0,0 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,2
HI. Injurious to the public 
in general 2,0 1,2 1,7 1,4 3,9 7,0 9,1 9,3 6,8 7,7
IV . Sexual offences 2,4 1,2 0,6 0,2 0,6 0,8 0,6 0,5 0,7 0,9
V . Against the person 6,1 6,3 2,1 2,6 3,8 2,6 3,0 3,0 2,4 2,8
VI. Against property 66,7 71,9 80,0 74,3 57,7 55,0 44,9 52,4 68,8 63,1
VII. Malicious injures to 
Property 8,0 8,6 8,8 8,3 7,5 6,7 6,3 5,5 5,2 4,5
VIII. Forgery, coining,
counterfeiting, similar 
offences and 2,2 6,0 4,0 9,6 20,2 23,3 30,2 23,4 12,7 17,4
personation 
IX. Miscellaneous offences 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,3 1,4 0,3 0,5 1,4 0,6 1,1
TOTAL 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
N ote 1. Due to the change in the recording practice o f  the Police concerning serious offences reported, a 
much higher number o f  cases are recorded; thus, the figures are not strictly comparable with 
previous years.
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TABLE 5. INTERNATIONAL STATISTICS, 2003
Indicators (l) Cyprus(2) G reece Israel Spain France Jordan Albania Bulgaria Slovenia
Murder
Cases known to the Police 
Number of offenders 
Volume of crime per 100.000 
Population
Offenders per 100.000 
population 
Sexual offences
26
4
3,6
0,6
248
268
2.3
2.4
193
298
3,0
4,6
1.274
1.557
3,0
3,6
2.173
1.840
3,6
3,1
348
559
6,4
10,2
445
465
14,4
15,1
403
377
5,1
4,8
58
66
2,8
3,2
Cases known to the Police 
Number of offenders 
Volume of crime per 100.000 
population
Offenders per 100.000 
population 
Serious assault
54
13
7,5
1,8
899
1.194
8,2
10,9
3.478
2.439
53.5
37.5
7.234
4.448
16,9
10,4
40.577
26.594
68,1
44,6
1. 788 
2.422
32,6
44,2
98
101
3.2
3.3
1.062
1.201
13,5
15,3
420
417
20,4
20,3
Cases known to the Police 
Number of offenders 
Volume of crime per 100.000 
population
Offenders per 100.000 
population
136
82
18,9
11,4
7.663
8.452
70,0
77,3
3.232
3.845
49,7
59,2
10.143
7.911
23,7
18,5
135.003
100.919
226,4
169,3
568
1.030
10,4
18,8
132
135
4.3
4.4
90
80
1.1
1,0
313
317
15,2
15,4
Theft
Cases known to the Police 
Number of offenders 
Volume of crime per 100.000 
population
Offenders per 100.000 
population
4.762
419
660,8
58,1
75.369
12.523
688,9
114,5
219.199
17.965
3.372,3
276,4
732.833
82.760
1.715,6
193,7
2.380.770
275.476
3.992,8
462,0
8.647
10.679
157.8
194.9
1.766
1.516
57,2
49,1
89.188
31.720
1.136,8
404,3
43.733
11.738
2.124,0
570,1
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(cont'd) INTERNATIONAL STATISTICS, 2003
Indicators Cyprus Greece Israel Spain France Jordan Albania Bulgaria Slovenia
Fraud
Cases known to the Police 1.154 824 11.219 24.168 346.700 1.601 74 5.696 4.378
Number of offenders 
Volume of crime per 100.000
343 551 5.468 5.515 75.578 2.435 87 3.165 4.652
Population 160,1 7,5 172,6 56,6 581,5 29,2 2,4 72,6 212,6
Offenders per 100.000 
population 47,6 5,0 84,1 12,9 126,8 44,4 2,8 40,3 225,9
Drug offences
Cases known to the Police 477 10.556 24.054 10.355 125.479 1.277 227 2.006 1.046
Number of offenders 
Volume of crime per 100.000
179 15.189 21.326 15.424 124.549 2.119 284 2.023 1. 167
Population 66,2 96,5 370,1 24,2 210,4 23,3 7,4 25,6 50,8
Offenders per 100.000 
population 
Number offences in national
24,8 138,8 328,1 36,1 208,9 38,7 9,2 25,8 56,7
crime statistics
Cases known to the Police 7.337 434.497 390.185 916.623 3.974.694 29.756 5.816 143.921 76.643
Number of offenders 
Volume of crime per 100.000
1.326 386.219 130.102 200.601 956.423 6.350 71.283 41.036
population 1.018,2 3.971,7 6.002,8 2.145,8 6.666,1 543,0 188,4 1.834,4 3.722,4
Offenders per 100.000 
population 184,0 3.530,4 2.001,6 469,6 1.604,0 ... 205,7 908,5
1.993,0
Notes: 1. In must be stressed that the data provided may not be strictly comparable as different countries may choose to process 
their national crime statistics in a different way, depending on the severity o f the offence, the relevant legislation and 
procedures
2. In 2003 the Police has changed the practice o f serious offences reported; as a result a much higher number of cases are 
reported, mainly against property. Thus figures are not strictly comparable with previous years.
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IV. Constitutional and statutory provisions
Article 112 of the Constitution
1. The president and the Vice-President o f  the Republic shall appoint 
jointly two persons who are qualified for appointment as a judge o f  
the High Court one to be the Attorney General o f  the Republic and the 
other to be the Deputy Attorney General o f  the Republic.
2. The Attorney General o f  the Republic shall be the head and the 
Deputy Attorney General o f  the Republic shall be the deputy head o f  
the Law O ffice o f  the Republic which shall be an independent office  
and shall not be under any Ministry.
3. The Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General o f  the
Republic shall have the right o f  audience in, and shall take precedence
over any other persons appearing before, any court:
Provided that the Attorney General o f  the Republic shall always take 
precedence over the Deputy Attorney General o f  the Republic
4 . The Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General o f  the
Republic shall be members o f  the permanent legal service o f  the
Republic and shall hold office under the same terms and conditions as 
a judge o f  the High Court other than its President and shall not be 
removed from office except on the like grounds and in the like manner 
as such judge o f  the High Court.
Article 113 of the Constitution
1. The Attorney General o f  the Republic assisted by the Deputy Attorney 
General o f  the Republic shall be the legal adviser o f  the Republic and o f  
the President and o f  the Vice-President o f  the Republic and o f  the 
Council o f  M inisters and o f  the ministers and shall exercise all such 
other powers and shall perform all such other functions and duties as 
are conferred or imposed on him by this Constitution or by law.
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2. The Attorney General of the Republic shall have power, exercisable at 
his discretion in the public interest, to institute, conduct, take over, and 
continue or discontinue any criminal proceedings for an offence against 
any person in the Republic.
Article 19 of the Police Law (Cap. 285)
Subject to any directions by the Attorney General, it shall be lawful 
for any police officer to make a complaint or charge against any 
person before the Courts and to apply for a summons, warrant, search 
warrant or such other legal process as may by law issue against any 
person, and to summon before the Courts any person charged with an 
offence and conduct public prosecutions and preliminary inquiries 
against such person.
Section 107 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Cap. 155)
No person shall be put upon his trial for any offence not triable 
summarily, although he may have been committed for trial, except upon 
an information filed by the Attorney General in the Assize Court in 
which such person is to be tried.
Section 24 of the Courts of Justice Law (Law 14/1960)
1. Every President, Senior District Judge and District Judge of a District Court 
has jurisdiction to try summarily all offences punishable with term of 
imprisonment not exceeding five years and/or a fine not exceeding CY£5000.
2. Every President, Senior District Judge and District Judge of a District Court 
has also jurisdiction to try any offence beyond the above limits summarily, 
provided the consent of the Attorney General is obtained. In such cases, the 
sentence passed could not exceed the sentence that could be passed by the court 
trying the case summarily, regardless of what the Criminal Code or any other 
Law may provide for this offence.
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